Name: 法瑞德的觀點：川普在中東的個人交易風格奏效了，但對中國不行！ (Fareed’s take: Trump’s personal dealmaking worked in the Middle East. It won’t with China.)
Uploaded: 2025-12-26T16:57:22.000Z
Duration: 6 min 24 s

Last week's ceasefire in Gaza was an undisputed success for President Trump and his style of foreign policy.

上週加薩的停火，無疑是川普總統及其外交政策風格的一大成功。

He and his team engaged in intense personal diplomacy, persuading Israel to hold its fire and coaxing the Qataris, Egyptians and Turks to lean on Hamas.

他跟他的團隊進行了密集的個人外交，說服以色列停火，並說服卡達、埃及和土耳其向哈瑪斯施壓。

For a president who relishes deals and drama, the grand signing ceremony in Egypt was a natural stage.

對於一位熱愛交易和戲劇的總統來說，埃及的大型簽署儀式是個自然的舞臺。

But as the Middle east quieted, another much more important theater grew more discordant that involving U S.

但隨著中東趨於平靜，另一個更重要的領域變得更加不和諧，那就是美國。

In this arena, Trump has lurched from threat to retreat to confusion.

在這個領域，川普在威脅、撤退和混亂之間搖擺。

First he threatened new 100% tariffs and warned that he would cancel a planned meeting with Xi Jinping.

他先是威脅要加徵百分之百的新關稅，並警告將取消與習近平的計畫中的會議。

Then, as Beijing refused to blink, Trump quickly softened, posting a conciliatory message on social media about wanting to help China, not hurt it.

接著，由於北京拒絕屈服，川普迅速軟化，在社群媒體上發布了一則安撫訊息，表示想幫助中國，而不是傷害它。

Aids reverse course, saying the Trump Xi summit would take place after all.

幕僚們改變了方向，表示川普與習近平的峰會終究會舉行。

The pattern loud threats, quick backdowns and ensuing uncertainty has become familiar.

大聲威脅、迅速退縮和隨之而來的困惑，這種模式已經很熟悉了。

The problem is that Trump's diplomatic playbook, effective in the Middle east for fits poorly in the longer, larger struggle with China.

問題是，川普的外交策略，在中東地區有效，卻不太適合與中國進行長期、大規模的鬥爭。

Trump's approach works where America has overwhelming leverage and the politics are personal.

川普的做法在美國擁有壓倒性優勢和個人政治的領域裡才有效。

In the Middle East, Washington holds the purse strings, the weapons systems, the security umbrella, cutting edge technology and the UN veto.

在中東，華盛頓掌握著金脈、武器系統、安全保護傘、尖端科技以及聯合國否決權。

The region's leaders Netanyahu, Sisi Erdogan, Mohammed bin Salman are strong men who respond to presidential pressure and transactional incentives.

該地區的領導人，像是納坦雅胡、賽西、艾爾段、穆罕默德·沙爾曼，都是強人，他們會回應總統的壓力與交易性的誘因。

He can call a leader, threaten, flatter and then make a deal.

他可以打電話給一位領導人，威脅、奉承，然後達成協議。

The Hamas Israel ceasefire was precisely that kind of performance personal, visible and theatrical.

哈瑪斯與以色列之間的停火，正是那種個人化、可見且具戲劇性的表現。

The contest with China, by contrast, is structural, a rivalry between two great powers bound by mutual dependence.

相較之下，與中國的競爭是結構性的，是兩個大國之間因相互依賴而形成的對抗。

在這裡，川普的直覺就失準了。

He prefers bluffing to planning, pressure to partnership.

他寧願虛張聲勢也不願計畫，寧願施壓也不願合作。

But Beijing has the strength to call his bluffs.

但北京有實力拆穿他的虛張聲勢。

When he first imposed sweeping tariffs, China retaliated immediately with sweeping counterterrorifs of its own and with restrictions on rare earth exports that are essential for American defense electronics and carmakers.

當他首次實施廣泛關稅時，中國立即以同樣廣泛的報復性關稅以及限制稀土出口作為反擊，而稀土對美國國防電子產品和汽車製造商至關重要。

華盛頓對中國握有真正的籌碼。

China depends on the US and its allies for advanced chip design, aerospace technology and access to Western markets.

中國在先進晶片設計、航空航太技術以及進入西方市場方面，都依賴美國及其盟友。

But America depends on China for about 70% of its rare earth imports, more than 70% of lithium ion battery imports, many low end semiconductors and pharmaceuticals.

但美國約有 70% 的稀土進口、超過 70% 的鋰離子電池進口、許多低階半導體和藥品，都依賴中國。

China's size and scale give it some commanding leads, particularly in manufacturing, which it dominates.

中國的規模和格局讓它在製造業等領域擁有部分主導優勢，而中國在這方面佔據主導地位。

But as Rush Doshi and Kurt Campbell explained in Foreign affairs, while the US alone cannot make every critical technology, the US plus its allies can.

但正如 Rush Doshi 和 Kurt Campbell 在《外交事務》雜誌中所解釋的，雖然美國無法獨自製造所有關鍵技術，但美國加上其盟友卻可以。

The combined economies of America, the European Union, Japan and India represent over 50% of global GDP and more than 50% of world R and D spending.

美國、歐盟、日本和印度的經濟總體佔全球 GDP 的 50% 以上，研發支出也佔世界 50% 以上。

The best China strategy, then, involves coalition management, coordinated investment, technology partnerships and shared deterrence that requires patience, consistency and trust.

是以，最佳的中國策略涉及聯盟管理、協調投資、技術夥伴關係以及共同威懾，這需要耐心、一致性和信任。

He alienated Europe and Canada with punitive tariffs.

他對歐洲和加拿大實施懲罰性關稅，讓他們感到疏遠。

He began a review of the Aukus submarine pact, which binds the us, UK And Australia in a critical Indo Pacific partnership.

他開始審查「澳庫斯」潛艦協議，這項協議將美國、英國和澳洲連結在印太地區的關鍵夥伴關係中。

He has repeatedly questioned NATO's value.

And he has upended nearly three decades of patient diplomacy with India, the only country with the scale to balance China economically, technologically and militarily.

他顛覆了近三十年來與印度耐心經營的外交關係，印度是唯一一個在經濟、技術和軍事上能與中國抗衡的國家。

Over time, by slapping sky high tariffs on India and publicly courting Pakistan, now a de facto Chinese defense ally, he has managed to enrage New Delhi for little discernible gain.

隨著時間推移，他對印度課徵高額關稅，並公開拉攏巴基斯坦（現在巴基斯坦已成為中國事實上的國防盟友），卻惹惱了新德里，卻沒什麼明顯的好處。

The critical aspect of any competition with China is, of course, internal rebuilding U.S.

任何與中國的競爭，最關鍵的方面當然是美國的內部重建。

capacity by investing in research, supporting critical industries and attracting global talent.

透過投資研發、支持關鍵產業和吸引全球人才來增強實力。

Yet federal R and D funding as a share of GDP had fallen to barely 0.6% by 2023, around half its Cold War average.

然而，聯邦的研發經費佔 GDP 的比例到 2023 年已降至僅僅 0.6%，大約是冷戰時期平均水平的一半。

And that was before Trump's massive research cuts this year.

而這還是在川普今年大幅削減研究經費之前。

Visa restrictions and other Trump administration actions have driven International student arrivals down 19% since last year.

簽證限制和其他川普政府的措施，讓國際學生人數比去年下降了 19%。

And support for homegrown technology has been pushed aside, replaced instead by tariffs and more tariffs.

對本土科技的支持被擱置一旁，取而代之的是關稅，還有更多的關稅。

Consider Washington's strategy towards Taiwan.

讓我們來看看華盛頓對臺灣的策略。

For half a century, US Policy has maintained a fragile but stable equilibrium, supporting Taipei militarily while avoiding provocation.

半個世紀以來，美國的政策一直維持著一種脆弱但穩定的平衡，在軍事上支持臺北，同時避免挑釁。

That balance has endured through administrations of both parties because it's grounded in strategic consistency, careful signaling and institutional memory.

這種平衡之所以能在兩黨政府之間持續，是因為它根植於戰略一致性、謹慎的信號傳達和制度記憶。

U S China relations is not the place for impulsive tweeting.

美國與中國的關係不是可以隨意發推特的地方。

Trump's deal in the Middle east shows that his style of diplomacy can deliver bursts of success where personalities and asymmetries rule.

川普在中東的協議顯示，他的外交風格可以在個人和不對稱性主導的領域取得短暫的成功。

But the China contest is slower, harder, more technical, less theatrical.

但與中國的競爭是一個更緩慢、更艱難、更技術性、不那麼像戲劇化的領域。

It requires statecraft, not showmanship, patience, not bravado.

這需要治國之道，而非譁眾取寵；需要耐心，而非虛張聲勢。

這次的利害關係再高也不為過了。

If Trump continues to treat Beijing the way he treats the Gulf, America might discover that the art of the deal is no substitute for the architecture of Strategy.

如果川普繼續以對待海灣國家的方式來對待北京，美國可能會發現，交易的藝術無法取代策略的架構。

Go to CNN.com fareed for a link to my Washington Post column this week,

請到 CNN.com fareed 網站，連結我這週的華盛頓郵報專欄。