Name: 巴基斯坦軍隊：守護者還是權力掮客？| 亞洲衝突內幕 (Pakistan's Army: Guardians or Power Brokers? | Inside Asian Conflicts)
Uploaded: 2025-06-17T17:36:07.000Z
Duration: 14 min 21 s

基礎被動語態

In May 2023, a line was crossed. Protestors stormed military installations across Pakistan, a rare direct challenge to the country's most powerful institution.

2023 年 5 月，一條界線被跨越。抗議者衝擊了巴基斯坦各地的軍事設施，這是對該國最強大機構的一次罕見的直接挑戰。

The unrest followed the arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, but it also revealed something deeper, a breakdown of the delicate balance between politics and the military.

騷亂髮生在前總理伊姆蘭-汗被捕之後，但它也揭示了更深層次的問題，即政治和軍事之間微妙平衡的崩潰。

程度副詞

In most democracies, armies take orders from elected leaders. In Pakistan, the army has long held influence, not just over matters of security, but also over politics, economy and the foreign policy. How has it retained that power? And why is it being challenged now?

在大多數民主國家，軍隊聽命於民選領導人。在巴基斯坦，軍隊長期以來不僅對安全事務，而且對政治、經濟和外交政策都擁有影響力。它是如何保持這種權力的？現在又為何受到挑戰？

Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf, or PTI, is now the country's most prominent opposition force.

巴基斯坦自由黨（PTI）現在是該國最著名的反對派力量。

But just a few years back, this party was widely seen as being close to the military establishment. That alliance fractured in 2022, when Khan's government was ousted through a no-confidence vote in parliament.

但就在幾年前，該黨還被普遍認為與軍方機構關係密切。2022 年，當汗的政府在議會的不信任投票中被推翻時，這一聯盟破裂了。

Khan claimed his ouster was engineered with foreign backing and domestic support, including from the army. From that point on, PTI's criticism of Pakistan's army became sharper.

汗聲稱，他的下臺是在包括軍隊在內的外國支持和國內支持下策劃的。從那時起，PTI 對巴基斯坦軍隊的責備變得更加尖銳。

Khan survived an assassination attempt he blamed on senior generals, and he was eventually jailed ahead of the 2024 elections.

可汗在一次未遂暗殺中倖免於難，他將責任歸咎於高級將領，最終在 2024 年大選前入獄。

PTI was a script of its iconic electoral symbol, a cricket bat, and its candidates were forced to contest as independents. Despite that, they won the greatest number of seats in the new parliament, but couldn't form a government. The party claimed its mandate had been stolen.

PTI 的標誌性選舉符號--板球棒--成為了一個劇本，其候選人被迫以獨立候選人的身份參加競選。儘管如此，他們還是贏得了新議會中最多的席位，但卻無法組建政府。該黨聲稱其授權被盜。

But critics ask, is PTI against military interference in politics, or just against interference?

但批評者問，PTI 是反對軍方干預政治，還是僅僅反對干預？

On one hand, they say, this is our military, and this is our country, but attacking the top leadership of Pakistani military and trying to cut deals with them at the same time, trying to convert it into an institution that would mainly serve the interests of megalomaniac, egoistic politician, clearly means that it has nothing to do with democracy.

一方面，他們說，這是我們的軍隊，這是我們的國家，但同時攻擊巴基斯坦軍隊的最高領導層，並試圖與他們達成交易，試圖將其轉變為一個主要為自大狂、利己主義政客的利益服務的機構，這顯然意味著它與民主毫無關係。

After Pakistan's independence from British colonial rule in 1947, the country's military quickly took on a prominent role. The first military coup took place in 1958, and since, generals have governed the country directly for nearly half of its entire history. Even during democratic interludes, real power has often been exercised from behind the scenes, with the military continuing to exert significant influence in key policy areas.

1947 年巴基斯坦擺脫英國殖民統治獲得獨立後，軍方迅速扮演了重要角色。1958 年發生了第一次軍事政變，自此以後，在整個歷史中，將領們直接統治了巴基斯坦近一半的時間。即使在民主的間歇期，真正的權力也往往是在幕後行使的，軍方繼續在關鍵政策領域施加重大影響。

Hussain Haqqani is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington DC and the

侯賽因-哈卡尼（Hussain Haqqani）是華盛頓哈德遜研究所（Hudson Institute）的高級研究員。

Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy in Abu Dhabi. He also served as Pakistan's ambassador to the United States from 2008 to 2011.

阿布扎比安瓦爾-加爾加什外交學院。2008 年至 2011 年，他還曾擔任巴基斯坦駐美國大使。

and palace manipulation. During that phase, the weight of the army, as soon as the army got an indigenous commander, General Ayub Khan, who became commander-in-chief in 1951, as soon as he got power, he decided to put his weight first behind one set of politicians, then behind another. And by 1958, he was ready to take power in a coup d'etat.

和宮廷操縱。在這一階段，軍隊的重任落在了阿尤布-汗將軍身上，1951 年，阿尤布-汗將軍成為軍隊總司令，他一掌權，就決定先支持一批政客，然後再支持另一批政客。到 1958 年，他準備發動政變奪取政權。

They decide who's going to come, and for decades, they have pushed governments out either directly or indirectly.

他們決定誰會來，幾十年來，他們直接或間接地將政府排擠出局。

Ayesha Siddique is an author and senior fellow at King's College London, and an expert on military affairs, South Asia, and politics.

阿耶莎-西迪克（Ayesha Siddique）是作家、倫敦國王學院高級研究員，也是軍事事務、南亞和政治方面的專家。

There have been more than 12 to 15 years of direct military rule. Then another method with the military is running government through military presidents, which they have done about 15 years of that in Pakistan's history. But a longer period is also when they run it in partnership with civilians. And that is one of the most tricky periods in Pakistan's politics because the face of such governments is civilian.

軍方直接統治的時間超過 12 至 15 年。軍方的另一種做法是通過軍方總統管理政府，在巴基斯坦歷史上，軍方總統管理政府的時間大約有 15 年。但更長的時期是他們與文職人員合作管理政府。這是巴基斯坦政治中最棘手的時期之一，因為這類政府的代言人是平民。

The military claims it doesn't seek political control, but just steps in when civilian governance, violence breaks down. In 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq seized power amid widespread political unrest and street protests against an elected government.

軍方聲稱自己並不尋求政治控制，只是在文官治理和暴力崩潰時才會介入。1977 年，齊亞-烏爾-哈克（Zia-ul-Haq）將軍在廣泛的政治動亂和反對民選政府的街頭抗議中奪取了政權。

Two decades later, after taking over in a bloodless coup, General Pervez Musharraf called for the institutionalization of the military's political role. Those who defend the army and its actions as an institution see the military as a stabilizing force in a fragile state that is constantly threatened by religious extremism, militancy, separatism, and external enemies.

二十年後，佩爾韋茲-穆沙拉夫將軍在不流血的政變中接管政權後，呼籲將軍隊的政治作用制度化。那些為軍隊及其作為一個機構的行動辯護的人認為，軍隊是一個脆弱國家的穩定力量，這個國家不斷受到宗教極端主義、好戰主義、分裂主義和外敵的威脅。

Border skirmishes with India are also not uncommon. The two, now nuclear-armed neighbours, have fought four major wars since independence. But during the past two years, the country has seen an uptick in militant violence, particularly in its western provinces bordering Afghanistan and Iran.

與印度的邊境衝突也並不少見。這兩個現在擁有核武器的鄰國自獨立以來已進行了四次大規模戰爭。但在過去的兩年裡，該國的武裝暴力活動有所上升，尤其是在與阿富汗和伊朗接壤的西部省份。

In March 2025, militants attacked a passenger train in the southwest of the country, triggering a 36-hour hostage crisis. The army led the rescue, but after the operation, the army chief raised alarm over governance gaps in the civilian system.

2025 年 3 月，武裝分子襲擊了該國西南部的一列客運列車，引發了長達 36 小時的人質危機。軍隊上司了營救行動，但在行動結束後，軍隊負責人對文職系統的管理漏洞提出了警告。

This statement signalled what many thought was the military's perspective. They claim failure in governance, whether social, economic, or political, ultimately leads to a host of security challenges in the country. So, politics and security, therefore, cannot be treated separately.

這一聲明表明了許多人認為軍方的觀點。他們聲稱，無論是社會、經濟還是政治治理的失敗，最終都會導致國家面臨一系列安全挑戰。是以，政治和安全不能分開處理。

And the military sees itself as the only institution that can decide what is in Pakistan's national interest. Therefore, even major foreign policy decisions are no longer made by Pakistan's diplomats, but they are made by the military officers and conveyed to the diplomat.

軍方認為自己是唯一能夠決定什麼符合巴基斯坦國家利益的機構。是以，即使是重大外交政策決定也不再由巴基斯坦外交官做出，而是由軍官做出並傳達給外交官。

I think this is not an accurate perception that the Pakistan army controls Pakistan's foreign policy.

我認為，認為巴基斯坦軍隊控制著巴基斯坦的外交政策並不準確。

Syed Muhammad Ali is a senior research fellow at the Centre for International Strategic

賽義德-穆罕默德-阿里是國際戰略中心的高級研究員。

Like all countries, the input on critical foreign policy issues is offered to the foreign office by different institutions, including military, including intelligence, including civilian intelligence organizations, and different think tanks as well. And the foreign office practically functions as the entity which consolidates this input into policy and active policy measures.

與所有國家一樣，不同的機構，包括軍事機構、情報機構、民間情報組織以及不同的智囊團，都會就重要的外交政策問題向外交部提供意見。外事辦公室實際上是將這些意見整合為政策和積極政策措施的實體。

For decades, political parties have struggled to govern independently. They have often invited military mediation during crises, reinforcing the army's central role.

幾十年來，各政黨一直在努力獨立執政。它們經常在危機期間邀請軍方進行調解，從而加強了軍隊的核心作用。

Mazhar Abbas is a senior journalist and political analyst.

馬扎爾-阿巴斯（Mazhar Abbas）是一名資深記者和政治分析家。

Political parties have always been victims of their own interests.

政黨一直是自身利益的犧牲品。

And the establishment has sometimes intervened unnecessarily.

而當權者有時會進行不必要的干預。

The problem in Pakistan is that everybody looks towards the army as the one that is going to resolve a stalemate or become the final arbiter in a confrontation.

巴基斯坦的問題在於，每個人都指望軍隊能化解僵局或成為對抗的最終仲裁者。

If the politicians work things out among themselves, there would be no need for a final arbiter.

如果政治家們自己解決問題，就不需要最終仲裁者了。

And like other countries where there is democracy and civilian supremacy, the civilians would control the political process and the army will take directions from the civilian leadership.

與其他實行民主和文官至上的國家一樣，文官將控制政治進程，軍隊將聽從文官上司的訓示。

The military's power isn't limited to politics. Over the years, it has built a vast financial empire, estimated to exceed $20 billion, spanning from real estate and banking to construction and agribusiness.

軍方的權力不僅限於政治。多年來，它建立了一個龐大的金融帝國，估計超過 200 億美元，業務範圍從房地產和銀行業到建築業和農業綜合企業。

This desire for autonomy has led them into the business sector. So all three major sectors – agriculture, manufacturing, service industry – you have military presence there and a very dominant military presence. So they became powerful, they built their economic strength on the basis of their political strength.

對自主權的渴望使他們進入了商業領域。是以，所有三個主要部門--農業、製造業、服務業--都有軍事存在，而且軍事存在占主導地位。是以，他們變得強大了，他們在政治力量的基礎上建立了自己的經濟實力。

This autonomy has made the institution harder to reform.

這種自主性增加了機構改革的難度。

There is a perception that the Pakistan army is involved in business ventures. But in reality, such initiatives are governed by the necessity to take care of the families of deceased armed forces personnel, particularly those who have laid down their lives in different combats and crises.

有一種看法認為，巴基斯坦軍隊參與了商業活動。但實際上，這些舉措是出於照顧已故武裝部隊人員家屬的需要，特別是那些在不同戰鬥和危機中獻出生命的人。

Not only Imran Khan, over time political leaders including former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali

不僅是伊姆蘭-汗，隨著時間的推移，包括前總理祖利菲卡爾-阿里在內的政治領導人也在不斷改變自己的政治立場。

Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto were exiled or jailed.

布托、納瓦茲-謝里夫和貝娜齊爾-布托被流放或監禁。

Protests turn into crises and the military continues to act as the ultimate guarantor of stability while denying any political ambition.

抗議演變成危機，軍方繼續充當穩定的最終保障者，同時否認任何政治野心。

These are politicians who have always been out of time. So never have the time and the confidence to build institutions to push back the military. So it doesn't happen.

這些政治家總是沒有時間。是以，他們從來沒有時間和信心來建立機構，以擊退軍隊。是以，這種情況不會發生。

If politicians stop playing games with one another, agree that they will respect each other's mandates, agree to the rules of the game, then it will be very difficult for the military to intervene in politics.

如果政客們不再相互博弈，同意尊重彼此的授權，同意遵守遊戲規則，那麼軍方就很難干預政治。

Allegations of electoral manipulation and institutional overreach continue to raise concerns about the country's long-term trajectory. But many argue this isn't just about one party, one leader or one general.

有關選舉操縱和機構越權的指控繼續引發人們對該國長期發展軌跡的擔憂。但許多人認為，這不僅僅是一個政黨、一位領導人或一位將軍的問題。

This is a military which will not be controlled through dealing with individual generals.

這是一支無法通過與個別將軍打交道來控制的軍隊。

It has to be an institutional approach and unfortunately we have two problems here.

這必須是一種制度性的方法，不幸的是，我們在這裡遇到了兩個問題。

One of the problems is that most of the politicians who are in power, they are created by the military itself and they feel that they have communication to convince the military to allow them, let them remain in power. It doesn't work that way.

其中一個問題是，大多數掌權的政客都是由軍方一手打造的，他們認為自己可以通過溝通說服軍方，讓他們繼續掌權。但事實並非如此。

Will Pakistan break out of this vicious cycle and transition towards a more stable democratic order, one in which state institutions operate within their clearly defined boundaries and power is exercised with undiluted accountability?

巴基斯坦能否擺脫這種惡性循環，過渡到一個更加穩定的民主秩序，一個國家機構在其明確界定的範圍內運作，權力的行使不負任何責任的秩序？

The answer will shape Pakistan's future and its democracy for years to come.

答案將決定巴基斯坦的未來和未來數年的民主。