Name: 費裡德的觀點：新核武競賽帶來危機！ (Fareed’s Take: New nuclear arms race brings peril)
Uploaded: 2026-02-09T17:14:00.000Z
Duration: 10 min 26 s

We all sense that the world is entering a more uncertain phase.

我們都感覺到世界正在進入一個比較不確定的階段。

Alliances feel shakier, trade is fragmenting, and great powers are jostling more openly.

同盟關係感覺更不穩固，貿易正在碎片化，大國之間的較勁也越來越公開。

But beneath these visible shifts lies something less discussed and more dangerous the slow collapse of nuclear stability.

但這些明顯的變化之下，藏著一個較少被討論、也更危險的東西——核穩定性的緩慢崩潰。

For much of the Cold War, people were terrified that a world with nuclear weapons would inevitably lead to proliferation and and that wars would end up nuclear.

在冷戰的大部分時間裡，人們都害怕一個擁有核武器的世界，最終會導致核武擴散，戰爭也會以核戰收場。

After all, rarely in human history has a weapon sat unused in arsenals.

畢竟，在人類歷史上，很少有武器會被閒置不用。

The arsenals remained, but they were bound by treaties, habits and doctrines about restraint.

核武庫依然存在，但它們受到條約、習慣和關於剋制的準則的約束。

Deterrence relationships were relatively clear.

Proliferation was constrained and, if imperfectly, by norms and pressure.

擴散受到規範和壓力的約束，雖然不完美。

It was not a safe world, but it was a stable one.

這不是一個安全的時代，但它是一個穩定的時代。

The clearest marker was the expiration this week of New Start, the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia.

最明顯的標誌是本週 New Start 的到期，這是美國和俄羅斯之間最後一份核武器管制條約。

There are now no legally binding limits on the world's two largest nuclear arsenals.

現在，世界上兩個最大的核武庫沒有任何具有法律約束力的限制。

For the first time in more than 50 years, some hope this will be a brief interregnum, and

這是五十多年來第一次，有人希望這只是一個短暫的過渡期，

efforts have begun to find a successor agreement.

尋找繼任協議的努力已經開始。

But the broader context is not encouraging.

When New Start was signed in 2010, it reflected a different world.

New Start 在 2010 年簽署時，反映的是一個不同的世界。

China's nuclear arsenal was small and oriented toward what was called minimum deterrence.

中國的核武庫規模不大，而且是以所謂的最低限度威懾為導向。

Now, as Eric Edelman and Franklin Miller write in Foreign affairs, that world no longer exists.

但現在，正如 Eric Edelman 和 Franklin Miller 在《外交事務》雜誌上所寫的那樣，那個世界已經不復存在。

Russia has modernized roughly 95% of its strategic nuclear forces, at least according to President Vladimir Putin.

俄羅斯已經更新了其戰略核力量的約 95%，至少根據總統 Vladimir Putin 的說法是這樣。

More worrying, Moscow has built a vast regional nuclear arsenal.

更令人擔憂的是，莫斯科已經建立了一個龐大的區域性核武庫。

Experts estimate some 1,500 tactical weapons deployable from land, air and sea.

專家估計約有 1,500 件可從陸海空部署的戰術武器。

These systems fell outside New Start altogether.

這些系統完全不在 New Start 的範圍內。

During the war in Ukraine, Putin has repeatedly invoked nuclear threats, engaging in a scary game of nuclear blackmail.

在烏克蘭戰爭期間，Putin 反覆提及核威脅，進行了一場令人恐懼的核勒索遊戲。

China's trajectory may be even more consequential.

When Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China possessed roughly 240 nuclear warheads.

當 Xi Jinping 在 2012 年上任時，中國擁有約 240 枚核彈頭。

Today it has more than 600 and is on track to reach 1,000 by 2030.

如今，中國已超過 600 枚，並有望在 2030 年前達到 1,000 枚。

According to US estimates, China is fielding a full nuclear triad.

根據美國的估計，中國正在部署一支完整的核三位一體。

Land based missiles, ballistic missiles, submarines and air launched weapons and moving toward more regular, high alert levels, including the capacity for launch on warning launching while an adversary's missiles are still in the air.

包括陸基飛彈、彈道飛彈、潛艦和空中發射武器，並朝向更常態、更高層級的戒備狀態邁進，包括在敵方飛彈仍在空中時就進行預警發射的能力。

The Biden administration sought to slow this buildup through dialogue, pressing Beijing to enter nuclear arms discussions.

拜登政府試圖透過對話來減緩這項擴張，向北京施壓，希望他們能參與核武討論。

China would seriously talk only when its arsenal matched more closely that of the US And Russia.

中國表示，只有當他們的核武庫與美俄兩國更為接近時，才會認真談判。

As Edelman and Miller note, Beijing views transparency and verification not as confidence building measures.

正如 Edelman 和 Miller 指出的，北京將透明度和核查視為漏洞，而非建立信任的措施。

But as vulnerabilities, arms control is seen as a constraint to be avoided.

武器管制被視為一種應避免的約束。

The result is a three sided nuclear competition, far more complex than the bipolar standoff of the Cold War.

結果就是一場三方核武競賽，比冷戰時期的兩極對峙複雜得多。

The Economist captures the shift with a vivid image.

《經濟學人》用一個生動的比喻捕捉了這種轉變。

What Robert Oppenheimer, the father of the atomic bomb, once called two scorpions in a bottle has become three.

曾經被原子彈之父羅伯特·歐本海默稱為「瓶中的兩隻蠍子」，如今已變成三隻。

The bottle more crowded, the scorpions less predictable.

瓶子裡越擠，蠍子就越難預測。

This matters because deterrence grows more fragile as the system grows more complex.

這很重要，因為系統越複雜，威懾就越脆弱。

A bipolar nuclear world was dangerous but legible.

兩極的核世界雖然危險，但卻清晰可見。

Russia and China are cooperating more closely, exchanging technology and conducting joint military exercises, and

俄羅斯和中國的合作日益緊密，交換技術並進行聯合軍事演習，

sometimes involving nuclear capable forces.

有時還會涉及具備核能力的部隊。

A bipartisan US Strategic Posture Commission warned in 2023 of the risk of opportunistic aggression or even coordinated pressure across multiple theaters.

美國兩黨戰略態勢委員會在 2023 年警告，存在機會主義侵略甚至多戰區協調壓力的風險。

American nuclear forces, designed for a largely bilateral rivalry, weren't meant to deter two peer adversaries simultaneously.

美國的核力量是為應對主要雙邊對抗而設計的，並非要同時威懾兩個對等對手。

數量悄悄增加，準則變得模糊。

The risk of miscalculation rises not just in war, but in crises, exercises or moments of panic.

誤判的風險不僅在戰爭時上升，在危機、演習或恐慌時刻也會增加。

Modern nuclear systems are increasingly entangled with cyber networks, space based sensors and compressed decision timelines.

現代核系統越來越與網路、太空感測器和壓縮的決策時間交織在一起。

A false alarm or misread signal can escalate far faster than in the past.

錯誤警報或誤讀的訊號，可能比過去更快地升級。

The danger doesn't stop with the major powers.

According to the New York Times, about 40 countries have the technical skill to produce nuclear weapons.

根據《紐約時報》報導，約有 40 個國家擁有製造核武器的技術能力。

For decades, non proliferation rested on a bargain.

幾十年來，核不擴散建立在一項交易之上。

Most countries would forego nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees or the promise that nuclear states would manage their arsenals responsibly.

大多數國家會放棄核武器，以換取安全保證或核國家將負責任地管理其武庫的承諾。

Both pillars are now under strain as doubts grow about America's willingness to protect allies consistently.

隨著對美國是否願意持續保護盟友的疑慮加深，這兩根支柱都面臨壓力。

Some are quietly reassessing their options.

有些國家正悄悄地重新評估他們的選項。

In South Korea, debate about acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent has moved from the margins toward the mainstream.

在南韓，關於發展獨立核威懾力的討論已從邊緣轉向主流。

In Japan, once unthinkable, discussions are now whispered among strategists.

在日本，過去無法想像的討論，現在戰略家們都在私下低語。

If such moves begin in Northeast Asia, they will not end there.

如果東北亞開始出現這種舉動，它們不會僅止於此。

We are drifting from managed deterrence to its competitive rearmament, from limits toward accumulation, from predictability toward improvisation.

我們正從受管理的威懾轉向競爭性的重整軍備，從限制轉向累積，從可預測性轉向即興發揮。

For decades, we lived under the shadow of the most powerful weapons in history and learned imperfectly how not to use them.

幾十年來，我們活在史上最強大武器的陰影下，並學到了不完美地如何不使用它們。

That achievement is a landmark, but may prove to be fragile and temporary.

這項成就是一座里程碑，但可能證明是脆弱且暫時的。

On Friday, the US and Iran held high level but indirect talks over the Islamic Republic's nuclear program.

週五，美國和伊朗就伊斯蘭共和國的核計畫舉行了高級別但間接的會談。

The meeting came less than eight months after American bombers and submarines attacked three nuclear sites in Iran.

這次會談發生在美國轟炸機和潛艦襲擊伊朗三個核設施不到八個月後。

And as American might musters around, Iran prepared to strike at the President's behest.

隨著美國的軍力集結，伊朗準備遵照總統的訓示發動攻擊。

Earlier today, Iran's top diplomat pushed back on international pressure by saying that Tehran reserves the right to enrich uranium.

今天稍早，伊朗最高外交官表示德黑蘭保留濃縮鈾的權利，以此回擊國際壓力。

The issue has been a major sticking point between Iran and the US let's bring in today's panel to discuss this.

這個問題一直是伊朗和美國之間的一大僵局，讓我們請今天的專家小組來討論這個議題。

Wendy Sherman was the lead negotiator in the Obama administration when the U.S.

溫蒂·謝爾曼是歐巴馬政府時期，美國

and other powers negotiated a nuclear agreement with Iran in 2015.

和其他國家在2015年與伊朗談判核協議時的主要談判代表。

And Kim Gaddas is a Beirut based journalist who is a contributing editor to the Financial Times.

Kim Gaddas 是一位駐貝魯特的記者，也是《金融時報》的特約編輯。

Wendy, you know, as it turns out, Arachi, you know, there was Kerry and you and Zarif and Arachi.

溫蒂，你知道，結果是，Arachi，你知道，有 Kerry、你、Zarif 和 Arachi。

So the current top negotiator for Iran is the guy you negotiated with for, I'm assuming, hundreds of hours.

所以伊朗目前的首席談判代表，就是你和他談了，我猜是數百小時的那位。

And just bottom line, does it look like a deal is possible or likely?

總而言之，協議看起來有可能達成，或者很可能嗎？

So Abbas Arachi is a really tough and capable negotiator.

Abbas Arachi 是一位非常強悍且有能力的談判代表。

He knows every inch of Iran's nuclear program and quite frankly, everything else in Iran.

他對伊朗的核計畫瞭若指掌，坦白說，對伊朗的一切也都瞭解。

He has bona fides with the supreme leader because he was part of the revolution in 1979.

他因為參與了1979年的革命，所以與最高領袖有淵源。

So he is quite a match for Wyckoff and Kushner, who certainly don't begin to know the level of detail that Arachi does.

所以他跟 Witkoff 和 Kushner 旗鼓相當，他們倆絕對比不上 Arachi 對細節的掌握程度。

So I think this will be a very tough go for Witkoff and Kushner.

所以我認為 Witkoff 和 Kushner 這邊會打得很辛苦。

And the president, as we all know, likes to have a quick and swift victory.

而總統，大家都知道，喜歡快速又乾脆的勝利。

I do think that it's important always to have a credible use of force on the table to put pressure on.

我認為隨時準備好可信的武力來施加壓力是很重要的。

The president has to decide what he wants and war is absolutely on the table.

總統必須決定他想要什麼，而戰爭絕對是選項之一。

Kim, you say in the Financial Times that It feels like 45 years of lessons with the US and Iran are being sort of packed into this one negotiation.

金，你在《金融時報》上說，感覺像是 45 年來美國和伊朗的經驗教訓都被濃縮到這次談判中了。

Well, the US And Iran have been, you know, enemies and foes for 47 years.

嗯，美國和伊朗已經是敵人，你知道，已經 47 年了。

And if you add Israel to the mix, then over the last four decades, five decades as well, Israel has been at odds with Iran through its proxies, whether Hezbollah in Lebanon or Shia militias in Iraq, but

如果把以色列也算進來，那麼過去四十年、五十年來，以色列一直透過其代理人，無論是黎巴嫩的真主黨還是伊拉克的什葉派民兵，與伊朗對抗，但

of course, also Hamas, a partner of Iran.

當然，還有哈瑪斯，伊朗的夥伴。

And both the US And Iran have learned a lot of lessons about how to deal with Iran, but

美國和伊朗都從中學到了很多關於如何與伊朗打交道的經驗，但是

they have not figured out yet how to bring these negotiations to a conclusion or which Israel would like to see how to bring down the regime in Iran.

他們還沒想出如何讓這些談判達成結論，或者以色列想看到如何推翻伊朗政權。

But Israel has deployed its firepower and its technical prowesses over the last two years, since October 7th to decapitate and diminish a lot of Iran's regional capabilities and you can see that there is perhaps a strategy.

但以色列在過去兩年裡，自 10 月 7 日以來，已經部署了它的火力與技術能力，來削弱伊朗的區域實力，你可以看到這或許是一種策略。

I don't want to be too positive in terms of giving credit, too much credit to the Trump administration at this stage.

在這個階段，我不想對川普政府給予太多正面評價。

There is more knowledge on the table how to negotiate under pressure, how to approach it, than we've seen in the past.

現在有更多關於如何在壓力下談判、如何著手的知識，比我們過去看到的要多。

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費裡德的觀點：新核武競賽帶來危機！ (Fareed’s Take: New nuclear arms race brings peril)

tough

fragile

acquire

complex