Name: 伊朗策略：避免被迫談判 | DW 新聞 (Iran’s strategy is ‘avoid being coerced into negotiations’ | DW News)
Uploaded: 2026-03-16T17:08:56.000Z
Duration: 15 min 16 s

We're entering the third week of the U. S.

Israeli war against Iran, and so far there's no end of the conflict in sight.

以色列與伊朗的戰爭已經進入第三週，目前還看不到衝突的盡頭。

進階形容詞比較級句型

Iran's supreme leader has been killed as well as some 3,000 other Iranians.

伊朗的最高領袖以及約三千名伊朗人已經被殺。

The US claims its ultimate goal is to destroy Iran's ability to project its military power beyond its borders.

美國聲稱其最終目標是摧毀伊朗將軍事力量投射到國境以外的能力。

However, US President Trump himself has repeatedly called on Iranians to topple their own government inside the United States.

然而，美國總統川普本人曾多次呼籲伊朗人推翻他們在美國境內的政府。

Polling indicates most Americans oppose the war, and

民意調查顯示大多數美國人反對這場戰爭，

some US Officials have hinted that the conflict could end in a matter of weeks.

一些美國官員暗示，這場衝突可能在幾週內結束。

But let's take a listen to what the Israel Defense Forces spokesman had to say today about Israel's war plans.

但我們來聽聽以色列國防軍發言人今天怎麼說以色列的戰爭計劃。

We have an orderly, well planned combat strategy.

我們有條理、計劃周詳的作戰策略。

We have thousands more targets in Iran, and we generate additional targets every day.

我們在伊朗有數千個目標，而且我們每天都會產生新的目標。

The regime is already weakened and we continue to weaken it more and more each day.

政權已經變得虛弱，我們每天都在讓它變得更虛弱。

But despite the confidence on the side of the United States and Israel, Iran seems ready to dig in.

但儘管美國和以色列方面很有信心，伊朗似乎準備好要堅守陣地。

Let's bring up the latest comments from Iran's foreign minister.

我們來聽聽伊朗外交部長最新的說法。

他說，這不是一場為了生存而打的戰爭。

We're defending our people from this act of aggression.

我們正在保護人民免受這場侵略。

We don't see any reason why we should talk with the Americans.

我們看不出有任何理由要跟美國人談判。

We were talking with them when they decided to attack us.

當他們決定攻擊我們的時候，我們曾經和他們談過。

There's no good experience talking with the Americans.

和美國人談判沒有什麼好的經驗。

Let's bring in Sarah Harmouche to answer some of those questions.

我們請 Sarah Harmouche 來回答一些問題。

She's founder of H9 Defense and a defense policy researcher.

她是 H9 Defense 的創辦人，也是一位國防政策研究員。

Sarah，非常感謝你來參加我們的節目。

As we just heard there, there seems to be no interest in peace talks in Tehran despite the heavy strikes.

就像我們剛才聽到的，儘管德黑蘭遭受了猛烈的打擊，但似乎沒有和談的意願。

What logic do you think that the regime is following?

你認為這個政權在遵循什麼樣的邏輯？

The regime's logic is avoid appearing coerced into negotiation.

這個政權的邏輯是避免被強迫談判。

It's been its entire history, Iran's always relied on deterrence and regime logic, like regime survival logic rather than immediate battlefield victory.

這一直是伊朗的歷史，伊朗總是依賴威懾和政權邏輯，像是政權生存邏輯，而不是立即的戰場勝利。

So Iran's strategy emphasizes absorbing punishment or while preserving regime authority and deterrence credibility.

所以伊朗的策略強調承受打擊，同時維持政權的權威和威懾的可信度。

Iran's military posture is entirely built around endurance and retaliation rather than conventional dominance.

伊朗的軍事姿態完全建立在忍耐和報復之上，而不是常規的優勢。

So entering right now during active time of escalation and after immediately heavy strikes could be interpreted domestically as a strategic weakness.

所以現在在這個緊張升級的時期，並且在剛經歷了猛烈打擊之後進行談判，可能會被國內解讀為戰略上的弱點。

And Iran does not want to communicate that and tries to avoid appearing weak or signaling any vulnerability.

而且伊朗不想傳達這種訊息，並試圖避免顯得軟弱或露出任何脆弱。

So Tehran tends to signal resilience but at first and then explore diplomacy if it believes it has restored deterrence.

所以德黑蘭傾向於先展現韌性，然後在認為已經恢復威懾力後再尋求外交途徑。

So if I'm understanding you correctly, their current goal is to extend the war until the campaign is, what, too costly or too unpopular to continue.

所以如果我理解得沒錯的話，他們目前的目標是延長戰爭，直到這場戰役變得太昂貴或太不受歡迎而無法繼續為止。

Will they be Looking to negotiate a peace deal.

他們會尋求談判達成和平協議嗎？

The short answer is yes, I do think Iran is trying to extend the war.

簡單的答案是肯定的，我確實認為伊朗正試圖延長戰爭。

Iran knows and its leadership, they know they cannot defeat Israel and the United States in a conventional war.

伊朗及其領導層知道，他們無法在常規戰爭中擊敗以色列和美國。

So instead they rely on increasing the political and economic cost of continuing conflict.

所以他們轉而依賴增加持續衝突的政治和經濟成本。

And which is why they've also invested heavily in missiles, drones and proxy networks specifically to sustain prolonged pressure.

這也是為什麼他們大力投資於飛彈、無人機和代理人網絡，專門用來維持長期的壓力。

So the objective is not necessarily military victory for Iran.

所以目標不一定是伊朗的軍事勝利。

Iran wants to change the political calculus of its adversaries by increasing the cost of continued operations.

伊朗希望透過提高持續行動的成本，來改變其敵對者的政治算計。

And we've seen them do that and focus on economic targets, whether it was striking the Gulf countries, oil refineries, gas facilities threatening with the Strait of Hormuz.

我們也看到他們這樣做，並專注於經濟目標，無論是打擊海灣國家、煉油廠、天然氣設施，或是威脅荷姆茲海峽。

And we've seen gas prices increase, we've seen oil prices increase.

我們也看到汽油價格上漲，油價上漲。

So Iran seems to be focused on targeting the economic and the luxury land, land and locations in the Gulf in order to increase the cost of this, this war and focus on war of attrition and strategies of attrition and cost imposition in order to pressure the US and pressure Israel to alt the war.

所以伊朗似乎專注於攻擊海灣地區的經濟和奢侈品土地、地點，以提高這場戰爭的成本，並專注於消耗戰、消耗戰策略和成本施加，以便向美國和以色列施壓，讓他們停止戰爭。

Now, as we heard there just a moment ago, Iran's foreign minister says this isn't a war of survival.

現在，正如我們剛才聽到的，伊朗外交部長說這不是一場生存之戰。

伊朗在戰略訊息傳達方面做得很好。

It does not always communicate what is actually happening and it will never say publicly that it is a war of survival or it's losing or it's weak because then that would weaken its domestic narrative of strength.

它不一定會傳達實際發生的情況，而且它絕不會公開表示這是一場生存之戰，或者它正在輸掉，或者它很弱，因為那樣會削弱它國內強大的敘事。

So publicly acknowledging a war of survival would signal vulnerability and potentially weaken the regime's domestic.

所以公開承認一場生存之戰，會顯露出脆弱，並可能削弱政權的國內。

And also Iranians have long framed conflicts as defensive but manageable confrontation.

而且伊朗人長期以來一直將衝突描繪成防禦性的、但可控的對抗。

They would not want to frame it ever as an existential struggle.

他們絕不會想將其描繪成一場生死存亡的鬥爭。

Domestically it assures the people that the state remains stable and strong.

在國內，它向人民保證國家依然穩定和強大。

And internationally it communicates that.

而在國際上，它傳達了這一點。

It communicates that it's ready to escalate.

But this escalation could still be controlled.

但這種升級仍然是可以控制的。

Now let's turn our eyes to the domestic front.

In Iran, before the war, we saw the government put down popular protests against the regime with deadly efficiency, killing thousands.

在伊朗，戰爭爆發前，我們看到政府以致命的效率鎮壓了人民對該政權的抗議，造成數千人死亡。

How tight is the government's grip on power inside the country?

Despite the strikes and the leadership targeting and the death of Ali Khamenei and the the no appearance of Mushtaba Khanmini, who the new supreme leader, the Iran state retains significant coercive capacity.

儘管遭受了打擊，領導層的目標鎖定，阿里·哈梅內伊的死亡，以及新任最高領袖穆什塔巴·卡姆內尼的未露面，伊朗政權仍然保有強大的強制能力。

Iran's security apparatus includes the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the besieged militias which are entrenched and remain deeply entrenched in the political system.

伊朗的安全機構包括伊朗革命衛隊以及被圍困的民兵組織，這些組織根深蒂固，在政治體系中盤根錯節。

So while the public dissatisfaction is real, the regime still maintains strong internal security institutions in capable of suppressing unrest.

所以，雖然民眾的不滿是真實的，但該政權仍然擁有強大的內部安全機構，能夠鎮壓動亂。

Now, if the current trajectory continues, do you see this conflict being over in a matter of weeks like some officials have indicated, or do you think we're looking at a much larger conflict and longer conflict rather that is uncertain.

那麼，如果目前的軌跡持續下去，你認為這場衝突會在幾週內結束，就像一些官員所說的那樣，還是我們將面臨一場更大、更長的衝突，而且是不確定的。

This war has many actors and it has many different variations of what could happen.

這場戰爭涉及許多參與者，並且有許多不同的可能發展。

We've seen Iran's strikes on the Gulf countries.

我們已經看到了伊朗對海灣國家的打擊。

Whether they decide to strike back and retaliate, that would definitely expand the war.

所以，如果他們決定反擊報復，那肯定會擴大這場戰爭。

Also seen the front in Lebanon with Hezbollah open and we've seen the war expand there.

我們也看到了黎巴嫩前線真主黨的開戰，以及那裡的戰爭擴大。

We have not seen it, seen it expand yet in Yemen with the Houthis.

我們還沒看到葉門胡塞武裝的戰爭擴大。

However, statements of Houthi officials last week have stated that they are ready to fight militarily if Iran, if Iran wants them to join.

不過，胡塞武裝官員上週的聲明表示，如果伊朗需要他們加入，他們已準備好在軍事上開戰。

So there are different actors to consider.

所以，有不同的參與者需要考量。

There seems to be a little gap between what each wants.

似乎每個國家想要的之間有點差距。

President Trump does not seem to necessarily care about regime change where Israel does care about regime change.

川普總統似乎不一定在意政權更迭，而以色列則在意政權更迭。

Also we've seen missile exchanges and limited strikes, which those can continue for weeks and months because they do not require large troop deployments.

而且，我們也看到飛彈交換和有限的打擊，這些可能會持續好幾週甚至好幾個月，因為不需要大量部隊部署。

But the sustainability of the conflict also depends on munition stockpiles, political tolerance for risk and international pressure.

但衝突的持續性也取決於彈藥庫存、政治風險承受能力以及國際壓力。

And in many regional conflicts, wars end not because one side wins decisively, but because the cost becomes.

而且在許多區域衝突中，戰爭的結束不是因為一方決定性獲勝，而是因為成本變得。

The cost of escalation becomes unacceptable.

So it will depend on all of these factors and then how long can Iran impose cost and how long are other actors willing to tolerate it and when do they stop?

所以這將取決於所有這些因素，以及伊朗能承受多久的代價，其他參與者又願意容忍多久，以及他們何時會停止？

So do you see any possible diplomatic off ramp at this hour?

所以，你現在有看到任何可能的和平出路嗎？

Diplomacy right now, especially during times of active escalation, is difficult, but it's not impossible.

外交在目前，尤其是在衝突升級期間，是很困難的，但並非不可能。

We've seen them, but we've seen them happen before.

我們看過，而且我們以前也看過。

There could be indirect mediation talks via Qatar or Oman.

可能會透過卡達或阿曼進行間接調解談判。

We've seen this before happen where they facilitated communication between the US and Iran there.

我們以前也看過類似的情況發生，他們促成了美國和伊朗之間的溝通。

Also during war times there are back channel diplomacy which could also happen.

在戰爭期間，也會有祕密外交的可能性。

Or there could also be another scenario of a mutual de escalation formula where all sides start to de escalate, escalate strikes without formally acknowledging a ceasefire.

或者也可能出現另一種情況，就是一個相互降級的公式，所有各方開始降級，在沒有正式承認停火的情況下，減少打擊。

But most conflicts in the region eventually de escalate through back channel and quiet diplomacy rather than public negotiations.

但該地區的大多數衝突最終都會透過祕密外交和低調的溝通來降級，而不是公開談判。

All right, we're going to have to leave it there.

That was Sarah Harmouch defense policy researcher and founder of H9 Defense.

這就是國防政策研究員兼 H9 Defense 創辦人 Sarah Harmouch。

And let's take a look now outside of Iran's borders with Mehrzad Borrer Jardi.

接著我們來看看伊朗邊境以外的情況，有請 Mehrzad Borrer Jardi。

He's an expert on Iran and Middle Eastern politics at Missouri University University of Science and Technology.

他是密蘇里科技大學伊朗和中東政治專家。