Name: 【國際時事】血腥鎮壓下的轉捩點：為什麼伊朗這波抗議與以往不同 (Why Iran’s Protests Feel Different This Time)
Uploaded: 2026-01-15T14:08:45.000Z
Duration: 8 min 48 s
Description: 【看影片學英語】數萬部 YouTube 影片，搭配英漢字典即點即查，輕鬆掌握單字發音與用法，長久累積看電影不必再看字幕。

程度副詞

For nearly the past three weeks, protests have been rumbling on in Iran.

在過去將近三週的時間裡，伊朗各地持續爆發抗議活動。

Originally triggered by a decline in Iran's currency, the rial, the protests have since spiralled out into a wider push for regime change.

這些抗議最初是因伊朗貨幣里亞爾大幅貶值而引發，但隨後迅速演變成要求推翻政權的更廣泛行動。

情態副詞

Unsurprisingly, they've been met with a brutal response from Iran's security services, and

不出所料，伊朗的安全部隊對此做出了極其殘酷的回應，

at least 500 people have already been killed, although accurate estimates are hard to come by given the ongoing Internet blackout.

至少已有 500 人喪生，但由於網路持續遭到封鎖，實際死亡人數難以準確統計。

But despite the bloodshed, the protests have been accompanied by an optimistic sense that Iran,

然而，儘管流血不斷，抗議活動中卻伴隨著一種相對樂觀的情緒，認為伊朗的政權，

even if it doesn't happen imminently, the regime's demise really does feel inevitable.

即便不會立刻垮台，也似乎終究難逃崩潰的命運。

So in this video, we're going to explain why today's protests feel different to their predecessors and what might happen next.

因此，在這支影片中，我們將說明為什麼這一波抗議與過去不同，以及接下來可能會發生什麼。

We sometimes make mistakes in our videos, and

when we do, we think it's really important for us to be as open and transparent as possible.

而一旦犯錯，我們認為保持公開與透明非常重要。

That's why we have a fortnightly podcast called the Editorial where we respond to your criticisms, answer your questions, and

這也是為什麼我們有一個每兩週更新一次的 Podcast《Editorial》，在其中回應你的批評、回答問題，

Watch the show by clicking the link in the description.

點擊說明欄中的連結即可收聽節目。

The first sense in which these protests feel different is they seem to enjoy remarkably widespread support across Iran.

第一個讓這次抗議感覺不同的地方在於，它似乎在伊朗全國獲得了極為廣泛的支持。

For context, previous waves of protests were often driven by particular factions or sections of Iranian society.

作為對照，過去的抗議浪潮通常是由伊朗社會中特定派系或群體所主導。

The 2019 protests, for instance, were driven by poorer Iranians who were particularly upset at a reduction in fuel subsidies,

例如 2019 年的抗議，主要是由對燃料補貼削減感到不滿的低收入族群發起，

while the 2021 protests were driven by Iranians living in regions that were more acutely affected by water shortages, including most notably Khuzestan.

而 2021 年的抗議，則主要來自受水資源短缺影響最嚴重的地區，尤其是胡齊斯坦省。

Even the 2022 protests, which were triggered by the killing of Mahsa Amini at the hands of Iran's so-called morality police

即便是 2022 年、因馬赫薩・阿米尼遭所謂「道德警察」殺害而引發的抗議，

and did spiral out into wider anti-regime protests, were originally driven by more liberal elements of Iranian society, especially in big cities like Tehran.

雖然後來也演變成更大規模的反政權行動，但最初仍主要由較自由派的伊朗人所推動，特別是在德黑蘭等大城市。

This essentially allowed the Islamic Republic to stem the protest by making targeted concessions.

這基本上讓伊斯蘭共和國能夠透過針對性讓步來遏止抗議。

After the 2019 protests, for instance, they introduced a new subsidy for poorer households.

例如在 2019 年抗議之後，政府推出了新的補貼來安撫低收入家庭。

In 2021, they redirected the water back to Khuzestan, exacerbating water shortages in other regions but stemming the immediate unrest.

2021 年時，他們將水資源重新引回胡齊斯坦，雖然加劇了其他地區的缺水問題，但成功平息了當下的不滿。

And since the 2022 protest, the regime has relaxed enforcement of some of its more odious morality laws.

而在 2022 年抗議之後，政權也放鬆了對某些最令人反感的道德法規的執行。

Women are no longer required to wear the hijab, and

女性不再被強制要求佩戴頭巾，

at least in big cities like Tehran, public art and performances aren't uncommon.

至少在德黑蘭這樣的大城市，公共藝術與表演也變得並不罕見。

And there were even a couple of bars serving alcohol, which would have been unimaginable only a few years ago.

甚至還出現了幾家供應酒精的酒吧，這在幾年前幾乎是不可想像的事。

To be clear, we're definitely not saying Tehran is some sort of liberal paradise, but

當然，我們並不是說德黑蘭已成為自由派天堂，

the regime has quietly permitted some degree of social liberalisation.

但政權確實悄悄允許了一定程度的社會自由化。

Previous protests were led by specific factions of Iranian society,

以往的抗議由特定社會群體主導，

which meant the regime could at least partly appease the protesters by making concessions in specific areas.

這讓政權至少能透過在特定領域讓步來部分安撫抗議者。

These protests, however, seem to enjoy pretty widespread and even support across Iranian society.

但這次的抗議，似乎在伊朗社會各階層都獲得了相當廣泛且平均的支持。

They're squarely aimed at toppling the regime and they're happening pretty evenly across the entire country, in both rural and urban areas.

抗議的目標明確指向推翻政權，且在全國各地、無論鄉村或城市都同步發生。

So why do these protests enjoy more widespread support than previous protests?

那麼，為什麼這次抗議能獲得比以往更廣泛的支持呢？

Well, as we see it, there are two obvious reasons.

在我們看來，原因主要有兩個。

The first is Iran's all encompassing economic crisis, which was actually the proximate trigger of these protests.

第一個原因是伊朗全面性的經濟危機，而這正是引爆抗議的直接導火線。

The which began amongst merchants in Iran's bazaars after the Central Bank allowed a massive depreciation of Iran's currency.

抗議最早從伊朗各地市集的商人開始，因為央行放任貨幣大幅貶值。

For context, Iran has been suffering through a slow-burning economic crisis since at least 2018,

作為背景，伊朗自至少 2018 年以來就一直處於一場緩慢惡化的經濟危機中，

when Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal or the JCPOA

當時川普退出伊朗核協議（JCPOA），

and imposed further sanctions as part of his maximum pressure campaign against the regime.

並以「極限施壓」政策對伊朗政權施加更多制裁。

Since then, year on year, inflation has averaged at about 30% and the real has consistently depreciated.

自那之後，伊朗年通膨率平均約 30%，貨幣持續貶值。

But the crisis has become particularly acute in the past year or so,

但在過去一年左右，這場危機變得尤為嚴重，

both because of Iran's war with Israel and the US and because of the recent fall in global oil prices,

一方面是因為伊朗與以色列及美國的戰爭，另一方面則是全球油價下跌，

which has been particularly bad for Iran, given oil revenues account for a majority of its foreign currency earnings.

這對高度依賴石油外匯收入的伊朗尤其不利。

Iran is now mired in a deep recession, with the World bank forecasting a contraction of 1.7% in 2025 and then 2.8% in 2026.

伊朗如今已深陷衰退，世界銀行預測 2025 年經濟將萎縮 1.7%，2026 年再萎縮 2.8%。

At the same time, inflation has risen in recent months, peaking at a new high of about 50% in October.

同時，通膨在近幾個月持續上升，並於 10 月攀升至約 50% 的新高。

Unsurprisingly, this combination of recession and inflation,

毫不意外地，經濟衰退與高通膨的雙重打擊，

all exacerbated by chronic corruption in government, has hurt basically every Iranian household,

再加上長期存在的政府貪腐，幾乎傷害了每一個伊朗家庭，

which is why these protests enjoy support across the economic spectrum in Iran.

這正是抗議能橫跨所有經濟階層的原因。

The second reason that these protests enjoy widespread support,

第二個原因是，政權在戰略上已顏面盡失。

which we mentioned in our previous video on this topic, is that the regime has been strategically embarrassed.

正如我們在前一支影片中提到的，

The Ayatollah and his clerical cronies used to justify much of their political and economic repression,

過去，最高領袖與其教士集團常以「對抗以色列與美國」為由，

on the grounds that this was all necessary to protect Iran against Israel and or the us.

為政治與經濟壓迫辯護，聲稱這一切都是為了保護伊朗。

But they've utterly failed in this respect.

但在這方面，他們徹底失敗了。

Iran's proxy network, which was supposed to deter Israel or the US from a direct attack on Iran, has fallen apart.

原本用來威懾以色列與美國的代理人網絡已經瓦解。

Iran's main regional ally, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, was suddenly ousted a year and a bit ago,

伊朗最重要的區域盟友、敘利亞獨裁者巴沙爾・阿塞德，在一年多前突然被推翻，

and Iran's military was unable to defend against the Israeli and American air assault we saw last year.

而伊朗軍方也無力防禦去年以色列與美國的空襲。

This strategic failure was very visible to ordinary Iranians.

這些戰略失敗，普通伊朗人都看在眼裡。

Israeli missiles were literally landing in Tehran while the Ayatollah was hiding in a bunker.

以色列飛彈實際落在德黑蘭時，最高領袖卻躲在地堡裡。

This means that the regime no longer has the excuse it once did for exercising its repressive apparatus.

這使得政權再也無法用過去的理由來合理化其鎮壓手段。

And there aren't many Iranians defending the regime on pragmatic or strategic grounds anymore.

也幾乎沒有伊朗人再基於務實或戰略理由為政權辯護。

So that's the first way in which these protests feel different.

這就是抗議顯得不同的第一個原因。

They do seem to enjoy wider and more even support than usual.

它們確實獲得了比以往更廣泛、更平均的支持。

The second way in which they feel different is that they're coming on the back of the regime, making certain concessions.

第二個不同之處在於，這波抗議發生在政權已經做出部分讓步之後。

after the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests, the regime quietly made a number of concessions,

在 2022 年馬赫薩・阿米尼抗議之後，政權悄悄做出多項讓步，

including, most notably, permitting a degree of social liberalisation, something they'd previously refused to even countenance.

其中最重要的是允許一定程度的社會自由化，這在過去甚至是不可想像的。

This was clearly in the hopes of appeasing more liberal minded Iranians.

這顯然是為了安撫較自由派的伊朗人。

But history suggests that once they start making concessions, autocratic regimes are usually on their way out.

但歷史顯示，一旦威權政權開始讓步，往往就離垮台不遠了。

Most obviously, Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika,

最明顯的例子是戈巴契夫的「公開化」與「改革」政策，

essentially concessions to a Soviet public demanding more freedom, preceded the collapse of the Soviet Union by barely a couple of years.

這些對蘇聯民眾要求自由的讓步，在短短幾年後便導致蘇聯解體。

Similarly, in East Germany, the GDR legalised certain opposition groups and relaxed its trade and travel restrictions in late 1989, only months before the fall of the Berlin Wall.

類似地，東德在 1989 年底合法化部分反對派並放寬旅行限制，幾個月後柏林圍牆便倒塌。

The third way in which these protests feel different is there's more focus on candidates who might succeed the Ayatollah,

第三個不同之處在於，外界開始更關注可能接替最高領袖的人選，

especially the eldest son of the last Shah, Reza Pahlavi, who is a polarising but singular figure amongst the Iranian opposition.

特別是末代國王的長子禮薩・巴列維，他在反對派中極具爭議，但地位獨特。

This is not to say that Pahlavi is likely to succeed the Ayatollah.

這並不是說巴列維真的有可能接班。

He lives in the US without a ground game in Iran.

他長居美國，且在伊朗境內缺乏實際組織基礎。

But his apparent relevance reflects both the fact that the protests are squarely focused on toppling the regime and that it feels more possible than it once did.

但他的「被討論度」反映出抗議已明確指向推翻政權，而且這個目標看起來比以往更有可能實現。

Now, to be clear, we're not saying these protests will definitely succeed.

需要強調的是，我們並不是說這些抗議一定會成功。

And it's worth keeping in mind that the regime has survived recurrent protests since, really, the early 2010s.

畢竟，自 2010 年代初期以來，該政權已多次挺過抗議浪潮。

Nonetheless, today's protests do feel different in certain respects.

但不可否認的是，這一次的抗議在某些方面確實不同。

And more and more Iranians are apparently thinking about what might come after the Ayatollah.

而且越來越多伊朗人開始思考「後最高領袖時代」可能會是什麼樣子。

Whether or not you believe that the New Year's brings a new you,

無論你是否相信新年能帶來全新的自己，

there's always pressure to find some way to better yourself as January rolls around.

每到一月，總會有一股想要自我提升的壓力。

Building new, healthy habits isn't always easy to jump straight into.

建立新的健康習慣，往往並不容易立刻上手。

So that's why we always turn to Brilliant.

這也是為什麼我們總是選擇 Brilliant。

That's because Brilliant focuses on real transformative learning, all while adapting to your own already established skill set.

因為 Brilliant 專注於真正具有轉變性的學習，同時會依據你既有的能力調整內容。

It starts you at the right level based on your background, designs, practice sets and reviews personalized for you.

它會依你的背景安排合適的起點，設計專屬的練習與回饋。

Brilliant helps you advance at your ideal pace, giving you the best chance at sticking to your learning goals.

Brilliant 讓你以最適合自己的步調前進，提高達成學習目標的機率。

For example, if you think you're not a maths person, Brilliant will push you towards achieving what you didn't think possible.

例如，如果你覺得自己不擅長數學，Brilliant 會幫助你突破自我設限。

Their comprehensive catalogue takes you from foundational maths through algebra all the way to college level calculus.

他們完整的課程涵蓋從基礎數學、代數到大學程度的微積分。

With more and more courses being added each month,

而且每個月都會新增更多課程，

Brilliant has truly helped us expand our skill set and kept us coming back every day to create those habits that help us grow.

Brilliant 確實幫助我們擴展技能，並每天回來培養能持續成長的習慣。

Certainly, it's not so hard to stick to resolutions.

堅持新年目標，其實沒有想像中那麼困難。

To start the new year right and begin or continue your learning journey, you can try Brilliant for free for a full 30 days.

你可以免費試用 Brilliant 整整 30 天，為新的一年開個好頭。

scan the QR code on screen, or you can click the link in the description.

掃描畫面上的 QR Code，或點擊說明欄連結即可。

Brilliant's also given our viewers 20% off an annual premium subscription, which gives you unlimited daily access to everything on Brilliant.

Brilliant 也為我們的觀眾提供年度高級方案 8 折優惠，讓你每天不限次數使用所有內容。