Name: 為什麼北約不急著幫川普處理伊朗問題？ (Why NATO isn't jumping to help Trump with Iran)
Uploaded: 2026-03-20T16:09:12.000Z
Duration: 5 min 16 s

5000 pound bombs designed to blast deep into Iranian missile sites underground.

5000 磅炸彈，設計用來深入炸毀伊朗地下的飛彈基地。

And the target sites here on the map near the Strait of Hormuz, where oil is the lifeblood and the artery.

而地圖上的目標區域就在荷姆茲海峽附近，那裡是石油的命脈和動脈。

Of course, this news comes as President Donald Trump seems frustrated with NATO allies, even floating the idea of just leaving other countries to be responsible for securing that strait.

當然，這個消息傳出的時候，川普總統似乎對北約盟友感到沮喪，甚至提出讓其他國家自行負責確保海峽安全的想法。

Joining us now is Neil Ferguson, CBS News contributor and the senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.

現在加入我們的是尼爾·弗格森，他是 CBS新聞特約撰稿人，也是胡佛研究所的高級研究員。

So what's the resistance the president seems to have as he's pretty angry with America's allies today?

那麼，總統似乎有什麼阻力，因為他今天對美國的盟友非常生氣？

Well, if you try to understand the European and British response to this war, there are three things you have to bear in mind.

嗯，如果你想了解歐洲人和英國人對這場戰爭的反應，有三件事你必須記在心裡。

The first is that the opinion polling on the war in Europe and the UK is very negative.

首先，歐洲和英國對這場戰爭的民意調查非常負面。

There is very little support indeed for the President and for the war in Iran.

對於總統以及在伊朗的這場戰爭，其實支持度非常低。

Secondly, the Europeans and the Brits don't have an enormous array of military assets that they can in fact, put at the disposal of the United States even if they wanted to.

其次，歐洲人和英國人並沒有太多軍事資產可以提供給美國，即使他們想這麼做。

But the third thing is that President Trump really antagonized Europeans since he returned for his second term, even more than in the first.

但第三點是，自從川普總統連任後，他真的激怒了歐洲人，比第一任期時更甚。

And there's just a great deal of lingering resentment, for example, over the great row over Greenland that dominated events back in January.

而且仍然存在很多怨恨，例如，一月份主導事件的格陵蘭爭議。

So these are the three reasons that nobody's particularly enthused to get involved.

所以，這就是為什麼沒有人特別熱衷於參與的這三個原因。

Is there a sense that goodwill is indeed political capital worth protecting?

大家是否覺得善意確實是值得保護的政治資本？

Well, I think, having spent the day in London, there is a growing realisation, particularly in this Labour government, that quarreling with President Trump, while it might seem politically expedient, could have a very high price tag after this war is over.

嗯，我認為，在倫敦待了一天後，大家越來越意識到，特別是這個工黨政府，與川普總統爭吵，雖然看似政治上方便，但戰爭結束後可能會付出非常高的代價。

Nobody expects the war to last very long after the war.

I think President Trump is going to be very aggrieved at the fact, for example, that the Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, hesitated to make UK bases available at the beginning of the war.

我認為川普總統會對首相基爾·斯塔莫爵士在戰爭初期猶豫是否提供英國基地感到非常不滿。

But like the Europeans, Keir Starmer has been in no hurry to provide significant military assistance.

不過，就像歐洲人一樣，基爾·斯塔莫一直沒有急著提供重要的軍事援助。

And in particular, nobody wants to be responsible for escorting tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, which the US Navy is rather too busy to do itself.

特別是，沒有人想負責護送油輪通過荷姆茲海峽，因為美國海軍自己也太忙了。

The I think it's beginning to dawn on people here that this could become a major problem and that what we may be witnessing is one of the great breaches in the transatlantic alliance of its entire existence.

我認為這裡的人們開始意識到，這可能會成為一個大問題，而我們可能正在見證跨大西洋聯盟在其整個存在期間的一大裂痕。

So I think one has to remember President Trump is still going to be president until January 2029 European leaders may live to regret having crossed him on this issue in the way that they have.

所以我認為我們必須記住，川普總統將一直擔任總統直到2029年1月，歐洲領導人可能會後悔以這種方式惹惱了他。

I want to ask you about this because in the free press you write the result is the potentiality that President Trump is opening strategic opportunities for China and Russia may be an unintended consequence.

我想問你這個問題，因為在您撰寫的自由媒體文章中，川普總統可能無意中為中國和俄羅斯打開了戰略機會，這是一個潛在的後果。

Well, nearly all major conflicts have unintended consequences, and this is no exception.

嗯，幾乎所有重大衝突都會有意外後果，這也不例外。

I think it's only fair to say that at least some people in the administration underestimated the economic implications of the Strait of Hormuz closing.

我認為公平地說，至少政府裡有些人低估了荷姆茲海峽關閉的經濟影響。

That's 10% of the world's oil supply stopped dead in its tracks, roughly speaking, as big an oil shock as anything in the 1970s.

這相當於全球10%的石油供應突然中斷，差不多是1970年代以來最大的石油衝擊。

But the unintended consequences geopolitically seem to me even more important.

但地緣政治上的意外後果，在我看來更為重要。

In Ukraine, the Russians are, in effect, no longer incentivized to settle because with much higher oil prices, their budgetary problems are eased.

在烏克蘭，俄羅斯實際上已經沒有動力去達成協議了，因為油價上漲，他們的預算問題也減輕了。

And China is looking on with great interest as the US Runs down its already fairly sparse stocks of precision missiles.

而中國正密切關注著，美國正在消耗其本已相當稀少的精準飛彈庫存。

The Chinese will be calculating just how many we have left in certain categories, such as Tomahawks.

中國人會計算我們在某些類別，像是戰斧飛彈，還剩下多少。

So I have to say that at least in one respect, the Europeans have a point.

所以，我得說，至少在某一方面，歐洲人說得有道理。

There are ways in which this war can go wrong, both economically, not just for the U.S.

這場戰爭有許多可能出錯的方式，不僅是經濟上，不只對美國。

but for the world, but also geopolitically for the U.S.

也對全世界，還有地緣政治上對美國。

of course, if the Iranian regime obligingly collapses, if somebody appears waving a white flag at some point in the next two weeks, then President Trump will look like the strategic genius and everybody else will have to eat some crow.

當然，如果伊朗政權很配合地垮臺，如果在接下來兩週內有人揮舞著白旗出現，那麼川普總統就會像戰略天才一樣，而其他人就得吞下苦果。

If the war looks like it's going to drag on beyond that, or if President Trump carries out his threat simply to walk away, leaving the Strait of Hormuz to others, the then I think that's going to be interpreted as an Iranian victory and it will be again, a very heavy blow for relations between the US and its allies, including its allies in the Gulf.

如果戰爭看起來會拖過那個時間點，或者川普總統真的履行他揚言要抽身離開、把荷姆茲海峽留給別人管的威脅，那麼我認為這將被解讀為伊朗的勝利，而且這將再次對美與其盟友，包括海灣盟友的關係造成沉重打擊。

You really get a sense history is being written in real time and we are all having a front row seat to it.

你真的能感覺到歷史正在即時被書寫，而我們都坐在前排親眼見證。

尼爾·弗格森，很高興能跟你聊。