Name: 美國和以色列是在伊朗的 terms 下開戰嗎？| DW 新聞 (Are the US and Israel waging a war on Iran's terms? | DW News)
Uploaded: 2026-03-18T17:06:10.000Z
Duration: 8 min 10 s

What if your enemy could beat you without winning a single battle?

如果你的敵人能在不贏一場戰鬥的情況下擊敗你，那會怎麼樣？

Picture a war where $30,000 drones force million dollar intercepts.

想像一場戰爭，3萬架 drones 迫使百萬美元的攔截。

Where a handful of naval drones and fast boats can threaten the global oil supply.

幾架 naval drones 和 fast boats 就能威脅全球石油供應。

And where proxy militia, cyber attacks and disinformation allow a country to strike without necessarily ever showing its own flag.

而 proxy militia、cyber attacks 和 disinformation 讓一個國家能夠發動攻擊，卻不必亮出自己的旗幟。

They're making up for their conventional military disadvantage with acts of asymmetric warfare.

他們正透過非對稱作戰來彌補他們 conventional military disadvantage。

The result is a situation so chaotic and volatile that it's hard to predict and much harder to control.

結果就是一種混亂且 volatile 的情況，難以預測，更難以控制。

Does Washington know how to respond to a form of warfare designed to drain it slowly?

Washington 知道該如何回應這種旨在緩慢消耗它的作戰方式嗎？

Or has Donald Trump stepped into a trap that's far easier to enter than to escape?

還是 Donald Trump 掉進了一個比進入時更難逃脫的陷阱？

這就是我們今天要 unpacking 的。

It's something that we've seen being developed and refined over many years in Iran, and

這是我們在伊朗看到多年來不斷發展和精進的策略，

it is their primary way of responding to hostilities.

這也是他們回應敵對行動的主要方式。

She's a security analyst for the Middle east and Africa with the consulting firm Sibylline.

她是 Sibylline 這家 consulting firm 的中東與非洲地區 security analyst。

And to her, none of this is surprising because asymmetric warfare has long been central to Iran's grand strategy.

對她來說，這一切都不令人意外，因為非對稱作戰長期以來一直是伊朗 grand strategy 的核心。

So Iran's use of asymmetric warfare really has its roots in the fallout from, from the Iran Iraq war in the 1980s.

所以，伊朗使用非對稱作戰，其根源可以追溯到 1980 年代伊朗伊拉克戰爭的後果。

Essentially, this was a war that emerged almost immediately after the Islamic Republic came into power.

基本上，這場戰爭幾乎發生在伊斯蘭共和國掌權後不久。

We saw the then leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, launching an invasion of Western parts of Iran.

我們看到當時的伊拉克領導人薩達姆·海珊，對伊朗西部發動了 invasion。

And Iran responded in a conventional way.

而伊朗則以 conventional 的方式回應。

And this led to effectively a war of attrition for over eight years in Iran, this was extremely detrimental.

這導致了長達八年多的消耗戰，對伊朗來說，這極其不利。

There were hundreds of thousands of deaths.

The use of chemical weapons and mines were widespread, spread.

化學武器和地雷的使用非常普遍，到處都是。

And really, this was a very informative conflict for the Islamic Republic.

實際上，這場衝突對伊斯蘭共和國來說是個非常重要的教訓。

It taught it that in terms of its conventional capabilities, it would not be able to deter attacks on its territory or be able to respond to them in kind in a way that would rapidly end any conflict.

它讓伊朗瞭解到，就其常規軍事能力而言，它無法阻止對其領土的攻擊，也無法以牙還牙的方式迅速結束任何衝突。

What we therefore saw was Iran increasingly relying on non conventional and asymmetric methods for responding to hostilities.

是以，我們看到伊朗越來越依賴非傳統和非對稱的方法來應對敵對行動。

Iran has continued to adapt its strategy to developments in the region.

伊朗持續根據該地區的發展調整其戰略。

And that is why we're seeing this deployment is something that Iran internally refers to as Mosaic defense, something that is somewhat decentralized, but

這也是為什麼我們看到伊朗內部稱這種部署為「馬賽克防禦」，它有點去中心化，但

aims to attack all aspects of conflict parties in order to undermine their capacity in a way that conventional conflict could not.

目的是攻擊衝突各方的所有面向，以削弱其常規衝突無法達到的能力。

The Iranian regime is fighting for its very survival.

So since the start of the war, we've seen them really lean into these tried and tested methods, and

是以，自戰爭開始以來，我們看到他們真的開始運用這些經過考驗的方法，

in doing so, they have caused extreme global disruption.

這麼做，他們已經造成了極大的全球動盪。

Iran's goal for this war is simply not to lose.

伊朗在這場戰爭的目標很簡單，就是不能輸。

Many analysts have commented that in order to win, the Islamic Republic simply needs to remain in place.

許多分析師都說，伊斯蘭共和國要贏，就必須維持現狀。

And at the time that we're talking, it is still in place.

而就在我們談話的當下，它仍然維持現狀。

And so, in terms of success, if we're measuring it against regime survival, thus far it has been successful.

所以，如果我們以政權生存來衡量成功與否，到目前為止，他們算是成功的。

However, if we look at the aspect of Iran's defence and response to these hostilities, which is essentially attempting to maximize pressure on the Gulf so that the Gulf will then call on the United States to call off the airstrikes, that hasn't been successful.

不過，如果我們看看伊朗的國防和對這些敵對行動的回應，也就是試圖最大化對波斯灣的壓力，讓波斯灣進而要求美國停止空襲，這方面就沒有成功。

Rather, we've seen a deterioration of relations between neighbors that Iran used to trade with.

相反地，我們看到伊朗過去有貿易往來的鄰國關係惡化了。

We've seen Qatar's foreign minister yesterday stating that diplomacy will not progress as long as Iranian hostilities targeting the Gulf persist.

我們看到卡達外長昨天表示，只要伊朗針對波斯灣的敵對行動持續不斷，外交就無法取得進展。

And so, whereas Iran possibly hoped that its asymmetric pressure campaign on the Gulf would result in rapid de escalation and the signature of a ceasefire, that approach thus far seems to have been a failure.

所以，雖然伊朗可能希望，它對波斯灣的非對稱壓力攻勢能迅速緩和局勢並簽署停火協議，但到目前為止，這種做法似乎失敗了。

Now, it's really no secret that the Iranian are masters at waging asymmetric warfare.

現在，伊朗擅長進行非對稱作戰，這真的不是什麼祕密。

So you might think that Donald Trump could, or rather should have predicted this kind of reaction.

所以你可能會覺得，唐納·川普應該能預料到這種反應。

Well, it would appear that Donald Trump did not see Iran's response coming, based on statements that we've seen being made to the press over the past 48 hours.

嗯，從過去 48 小時內我們看到他對媒體發表的聲明來看，唐納·川普似乎沒有預料到伊朗的反應。

Trump has repeatedly stated that he was surprised by Iran's response, that he was surprised by the fact that Iran has effectively blockaded the Strait of Hormuz and has been targeting the Gulf so intensely.

川普一再表示，他對伊朗的反應感到驚訝，對伊朗實際上封鎖荷姆茲海峽並如此強烈地針對波斯灣感到驚訝。

Now, there are reports emerging from the New York Times today that would indicate that several national security briefers did tell Trump that this was a possibility when it came to the conflict.

現在，紐約時報今天有報導指出，有幾位國家安全簡報官員確實告訴過川普，在衝突中這種情況是可能發生的。

Miscalculation or misunderstanding, it really doesn't matter because the result is the same.

誤判或誤解，其實都無所謂，因為結果是一樣的。

pretty much the entire world is paying a tremendous price for this war.

幾乎全世界都為這場戰爭付出了巨大的代價。

So the protraction of the conflict in the Middle east is certainly a concern.

所以，中東衝突的延長確實令人擔憂。

We've seen major price volatility on international energy markets, and

我們看到國際能源市場價格出現劇烈波動，

Brent crude for the past two days has traded at above $100 a barrel, which is extremely concerning when we're looking at, say, energy costs.

布蘭特原油這兩天都交易在每桶一百美元以上，這在我們看來，像是能源成本，是個非常令人擔憂的狀況。

So that's one way in which Iran's asymmetric warfare is driving up costs for the world.

所以這就是伊朗的非對稱作戰推升全球成本的一種方式。

Another is when we look at the use of interceptors in the Gulf and the use of interceptors in the region.

另一種方式是，當我們看到在波斯灣使用攔截器，以及該區域使用攔截器。

Now, interceptors like Patriot missiles and THAAD systems are extremely expensive.

現在，像愛國者飛彈和終端高空防禦系統（THAAD）這樣的攔截器，是非常昂貴的。

If we're looking at certain models, it can cost over A million dollars to produce a battery to fill these types of interceptor systems, whereas shahed drones are estimated to cost between 20 and 30 thousand dollars to produce.

如果我們看某些模型，生產一個電池來填補這類攔截系統的成本可能超過一百萬美元，而據估計，Shahed drones 的生產成本在兩萬到三萬美元之間。

If we're having to use multiple interceptors to take out single shahed drone attacks targeting, say, oil fields or gas fields, as we're routinely seeing in the UAE and in Saudi Arabia, that is an economic cost that is going to continue to grind on the Gulf and that's going to continue to grind on the US Military industrial complex.

如果我們必須使用多個攔截器來摧毀單架針對油田或氣田的 Shahed drone 攻擊，就像我們在阿聯酋和沙烏地阿拉伯經常看到的那樣，這將是一個經濟成本，會持續壓垮波斯灣，也會持續壓垮美國的軍工複合體。

And as you can imagine, this creates all sorts of pressure for the U.S.

而且，你可以想像，這給美國帶來了各種壓力。

the Defense Department has vowed that this will not become another forever.

國防部誓言，這不會成為另一個無止盡的戰爭。

But could Iran's brazen defense strategy drag the US And Israel into a drawn out, complex campaign they have very little control over?

但是，伊朗的大膽防禦策略會不會把美國和以色列拖入一場他們幾乎無法控制的、漫長而複雜的戰役？

I think there is certainly a bit of a sense of being trapped effectively within Iran.

我認為，確實有一種被伊朗困住的感覺。

When we're seeing statements emerging from the White House that Trump is surprised by the way that Iran has responded, that does speak to potentially a sense of being trapped in the Middle east, of being drawn into this conflict for far longer than the Trump administration would have wanted to be.

當我們看到白宮傳出川普對伊朗的回應方式感到驚訝的說法，這確實可能暗示著一種被困在中東的感覺，被捲入這場衝突的時間遠比川普政府希望的要長。

In the early days of the conflict, we saw Trump stating that the conflict would potentially essentially take about a week.

在衝突初期，我們看到川普表示這場衝突大概只需要一個星期。

We then saw estimates increasing to four to five weeks.

接著我們看到預估時間增加到四到五週。

And then over the past few days, we've seen Trump repeatedly stating that the conflict will end, quote, soon, but

然後在過去幾天，我們看到川普不斷表示，這場衝突「很快」就會結束，但

These kinds of moving timelines are very concerning when it comes to regional stability because there's almost no clarity on when exactly the conflict will end.

這種不斷變動的時間表，對於區域穩定來說非常令人擔憂，因為幾乎沒有明確的跡象顯示衝突究竟何時會結束。

Donald Trump's confidence, at least publicly remains undimmed.

至少在公開場合，唐納·川普的信心依然不減。

He has repeatedly claimed that the war is very complete, pretty much, or already won.

他一再聲稱這場戰爭已經「非常完整」、「差不多了」或「已經贏了」。

But Megan Sutcliffe says these assessments have very little to do with reality.

但梅根·薩特克利夫表示，這些評估與現實幾乎沒有關係。

And even if we tried to look at, say, U.S.

即使我們試著看看，比如說，美國

war goals, that again, does not give us more clarity on when this conflict will end.

戰爭目標，這同樣無法讓我們更清楚衝突何時會結束。

Wiping out Iran's military in a country as vast and as mountainous as Iran is simply not something that's going to be demonstrably achieved in the short term.

在伊朗這樣廣闊又多山的國家，要徹底消滅伊朗軍隊，在短期內根本不可能有明顯的成果。

So I think rather the situation that we're looking at is that the United States is more likely to declare a unilateral victory over Iran as and when it sees fit.

所以我認為，我們現在看到的情況更像是，美國會在認為適當的時候，單方面宣佈勝利。

Now, another aspect of this conflict, of course, is a discussion about regime change.

那麼，這場衝突的另一個面向，當然是關於政權更迭的討論。

But particularly from the Trump administration, we've seen that being warped back slightly over the past few weeks.

但特別是從川普政府那邊，我們看到過去幾週，這點被稍微扭曲了。

Essentially, our most likely scenario is that the United States declares unilateral victory in Iran, pulls out, and

基本上，我們最有可能的情況是，美國在伊朗單方面宣佈勝利，然後撤軍，

if the regime does not change, unfortunately attributes blame for that development to the Iranian people themselves.

如果政權沒有改變，不幸的是，會將這個發展的責任歸咎於伊朗人民自己。

How success is defined clearly depends on who's measuring it.

成功如何定義，顯然取決於誰在衡量。

In the first weeks of this war, one thing has become obvious.

這場戰爭的前幾週，有一件事已經很明顯了。

Iran is giving the US And Israel a run for their money.

伊朗讓美國和以色列吃盡苦頭。

How it all plays out, that's, of course, something we'll be covering here at DW News.

這一切如何發展，當然是我們在 DW 新聞會繼續探討的。

I'm Nicole Froehlich, and until next time,

我是 Nicole Froehlich，下次再見！