Name: 臺灣為何比日韓更富裕？😲 (Why Taiwan Is Richer Than Japan and Korea)
Uploaded: 2026-02-25T13:41:06.000Z
Duration: 22 min 44 s
Description: 【看影片學英語】數萬部 YouTube 影片，搭配英漢字典即點即查，輕鬆掌握單字發音與用法，長久累積看電影不必再看字幕。

Imagine a small, unremarkable neighborhood bar in a suburb of Seattle.

想像一下，在西雅圖郊區，有個不起眼的小酒吧。

They are a representative sample of the American middle class.

A teacher, a plumber, a mid level software manager, perhaps a nurse.

一位老師、一位水管工、一位中階軟體經理，或許還有一位護士。

If you were to freeze time and audit the net worth of every person in that room, counting their home equity, their 401 s, their savings accounts, and

如果你凍結時間，盤點房間裡每個人的淨資產，包含房地產價值、401(k)、儲蓄帳戶，

subtracting their debts, the average wealth would likely hover around $100,000.

再減掉他們的債務，平均財富大概會落在十萬美金左右。

It is a room of stability, but certainly not one of luxury.

這是一個穩定的空間，但絕對稱不上奢華。

But then the door opens and Elon Musk walks in to order a beer.

但這時門開了，馬斯克走了進來點一杯啤酒。

Suddenly, the statistical reality of that room breaks.

突然間，這個房間的統計現實就改變了。

If you were to now calculate the mean average wealth of the 11 people in that bar, every single person is now statistically a billionaire.

如果你現在計算這間酒吧裡十一人的平均財富，每個人在統計上都成了億萬富翁。

But in the real world, their lived experience hasn't changed by a single cent.

但在現實生活中，他們的實際感受並沒有改變一毛錢。

This is the fundamental flaw of contemporary economic analysis.

這是當代經濟分析的根本缺陷。

The arithmetic mean is a utilitarian metric for assessing the aggregate power of an economy.

算術平均數是衡量經濟總體實力的實用指標。

It tells you how many aircraft carriers a nation can build or how many semiconductor fabs it can subsidize.

它告訴你一個國家能建造多少艘航空母艦，或能補助多少座半導體晶圓廠。

But it is a deeply flawed instrument for measuring the lived experience of the citizenry.

但它卻是衡量公民生活經驗的嚴重缺陷工具。

In an era of increasing global inequality, the mean is susceptible to massive distortion by the extreme outliers at the top of the distribution curve, the ultra high net worth individuals whose fortunes pull the average upwards, masking stagnation in the lower deciles.

在這個全球不平等日益加劇的時代，平均數極易受到分配曲線頂端極端離群值的嚴重扭曲，這些超高淨值人士的財富拉高了平均值，掩蓋了較低百分位數的停滯。

The 2024 UBS Global Wealth Report provided a stark illustration of this distortion.

2024 年瑞銀全球財富報告就提供了這種扭曲的鮮明例證。

當我們看每位成年人的平均財富時。

The United States and Switzerland unsurprisingly, dominate the rankings.

美國和瑞士不出所料地主導了排名。

These nations are the homes of the guys walking into the bar, the immense concentrations of capital, the tech moguls and the dynastic banking families.

這些國家是那些走進酒吧的人的所在地，是龐大資本的集中地，是科技巨頭和銀行家族的發源地。

Under this metric, the island of Taiwan appears prosperous.

在這個指標下，臺灣島看起來很富裕。

Yet it still trails the massive aggregate wealth of the United States and Australia.

但它仍然落後於美國和澳洲龐大的總體財富。

However, the data reveals a historic shift.

不過，數據揭示了一個歷史性的轉變。

Even in this mean metric, Taiwan has quietly surged past its primary industrial competitors.

即使在這個平均指標上，臺灣也悄悄地超越了主要的工業競爭對手。

While it trails the financial city states of Singapore and Hong Kong, Taiwan now boasts a higher mean wealth per adult than the major economies of East Asia, surpassing both South Korea and Japan.

雖然它落後於新加坡和香港這些金融城市國家，但臺灣現在的成年人平均財富卻高於東亞的主要經濟體，超越了韓國和日本。

Yet the true divergence is not found in the average, but in the median.

然而，真正的差異不在於平均值，而在於中位數。

Shifting the lens to median wealth, the value that divides the population into two perfectly equal halves, reveals a dramatically different landscape.

將視角轉向中位財富，也就是將人口抽成兩個相等一半的數值，會揭示一個截然不同的景象。

Data derived from that same 2024 report highlights a pivotal realignment in global prosperity.

來自同一份 2024 年報告的數據突顯了全球繁榮的關鍵重新調整。

While the United States boasts a massive mean wealth driven by the top 1% sitting at over half a million dollars, its median wealth sits at roughly US$112,000.

雖然美國擁有龐大的平均財富，其中頂層 1% 的人擁有的財富超過五十萬美元，但其財富中位數約為 112,000 美元。

In contrast, Taiwan presents a phenomenon we might call the median anomaly.

相比之下，臺灣呈現了一種我們稱之為「中位數異常」的現象。

Despite having a lower nominal GDP per capita than the U.S.

taiwan's median wealth per adult stands at approximately US$110,000.

臺灣的成年人財富中位數約為 110,000 美元。

This figure is statistically significant for several reasons.

這個數字在統計上有著幾個重要的意義。

First, it places the typical Taiwanese adult on par with the typical American in terms of net assets, a feat achieved without the benefit of the US Dollar's reserve currency status or the American endowment of natural resources.

首先，這讓臺灣的典型成年人，在淨資產方面與美國的典型成年人相當，而且這是在沒有美元作為儲備貨幣地位，以及沒有美國豐富的自然資源的情況下達成的。

Second, and perhaps more relevant to the regional context, it places Taiwan well ahead of its primary competitors.

其次，也許對區域情勢更為相關的是，這讓臺灣遠遠領先於它的主要競爭對手。

It has surged past Japan, long considered the bastion of Asian stability, by nearly 15% and maintains a distinct lead over South Korea.

臺灣的表現已大幅超越長期以來被視為亞洲穩定堡壘的日本近 15%，並且持續領先南韓。

Even traditionally wealthy European nations like Germany lag behind Taiwan in this metric.

即使是像德國這樣傳統上富裕的歐洲國家，在這個指標上也落後於臺灣。

To understand the wealth of 2024, we first have to understand the inequality gap.

想要了解 2024 年的財富狀況，我們得先了解貧富差距。

In economics, the ratio between the mean and the median is often used as a proxy for inequality.

在經濟學上，平均值與中位數的比例常被用來衡量不平等程度。

In the United States, that ratio is roughly 5 to 1.

在美國，這個比例大約是 5 比 1。

This reflects a society where the vast majority of wealth gains are captured by the top 1%.

這反映了一個社會，絕大多數的財富增長都被頂層的 1% 所掌握。

This implies that the wealth generated by Taiwan's export machine is sticky.

這表示臺灣出口機器的財富是黏著的。

It sticks to the middle class rather than flowing exclusively to the top.

它黏住了中產階級，而不是隻流向頂層。

But if you talk to a young person in Taipei, they won't tell you they feel rich.

但如果你問臺北的年輕人，他們不會說自己感覺很富有。

In fact, for the last two decades, Taiwanese political discourse has been haunted by the memory of the 22k curse.

事實上，過去二十年來，臺灣的政治論述一直被「22K魔咒」的陰影籠罩。

This references a controversial government subsidy program launched post 2008 which effectively pegged starting salaries at 22,000 new Taiwan dollars.

這指的是 2008 年後推出的一項爭議性政府補貼計畫，該計畫實際上將起薪釘在 22,000 新臺幣。

While the nominal wage floor has since risen to nearly 28,000 new Taiwan dollars, wage growth in Taiwan remains anemic compared to the soaring cost of real estate.

雖然名目最低工資至今已漲到近 28,000 新臺幣，但與房地產飆漲的成本相比，臺灣的薪資成長仍然疲軟。

If you are a mid career manager at Samsung or Hyundai in South Korea, you earn a salary significantly higher than your counterpart at a Taiwanese manufacturing firm.

如果你是南韓三星或現代的中階經理人，你的薪水會遠高於在臺灣製造業公司的同業。

You wear a more expensive suit, but statistically the Taiwanese counterpart has a healthier balance sheet.

你穿的西裝比較貴，但從統計數據來看，臺灣的同業擁有更健康的資產負債表。

This discrepancy, high assets despite low wages is not a contradiction but a feature of a specific economic model.

這種資產很高但薪資很低的差異，並非矛盾，而是特定經濟模式的特色。

It is the result of what we define as the boss culture multiplier.

這是我們所定義的「老闆文化乘數」的結果。

In Taiwan, a significant portion of household income is not derived from wages which are suppressed, but

在臺灣，大部分的家庭收入並非來自被壓抑的薪資，

from entrepreneurial profits, capital gains and tax advantaged shadow economy activity.

而是來自創業利潤、資本利得以及稅務優惠的影子經濟活動。

While the Korean salaryman relies on a paycheck that is heavily taxed and eroded by high living costs.

而韓國的上班族則依賴薪水，但薪水卻被重稅和高昂的生活成本侵蝕。

The Taiwanese boss relies on equity, dividend yields and asset appreciation.

臺灣的老闆則依賴股權、股息收益和資產增值。

To see where this divergence began, we have to go back to the architectural blueprints of these economies drawn in the rubble of 1945.

要了解這種差異是如何開始的，我們必須回到 1945 年廢墟中繪製的經濟藍圖。

Both Taiwan and South Korea emerged from Japanese colonization in 1945 with a shared set of advantages.

臺灣和韓國在 1945 年擺脫日本殖民統治時，都擁有共同的優勢。

High literacy rates, a familiarity with industrial bureaucracy, and

高識字率、熟悉工業官僚體系，以及

a fierce anti communist alignment that secured them massive amounts of American aid.

強烈的反共立場，為他們爭取了大量的美國援助。

However, as they began to industrialize in the 1960s, their governments chose two radically different paths to capitalism.

然而，當他們在 1960 年代開始工業化時，兩國政府選擇了兩條截然不同的資本主義道路。

In South Korea, under the authoritarian leadership of Park Chung Hee, the state pursued a strategy of unbalanced growth.

在朴正熙的威權領導下，韓國政府採取了不平衡成長策略。

They selected specific industrial conglomerates, the chaebol, to spearhead modernization.

他們挑選了特定的工業集團，也就是財閥，來帶頭現代化。

Companies like Samsung, Daewoo and LG were granted preferential low interest loans, import protection and massive government contracts.

像三星、大宇和 LG 這樣的公司獲得了優惠的低利貸款、進口保護和龐大的政府合約。

Park believed that to compete with Mitsubishi or General Electric, Korea needed companies of equal size.

朴正熙認為，為了與三菱或奇異競爭，韓國需要規模相當的公司。

It transformed South Korea into a global powerhouse in shipbuilding, automobiles and memory chips.

它將韓國轉變為造船、汽車和記憶體晶片的全球強權。

The chaebol vacuumed up capital and talent, relegating small and medium enterprises SMEs to a subservient role in the Korean model.

財閥吸納了資本和人才，讓中小企業在韓國模式中扮演附屬角色。

The SME became a supply chain vassal, dependent on contracts from the giants and lacking the autonomy to export independently.

中小企業成了供應鏈的附庸，依賴大企業的訂單，缺乏獨立出口的自主權。

The chaebol would lead the nation and the citizen would serve as the employee.

財閥將領導國家，而公民則扮演員工的角色。

Wealth accumulation would occur at the corporate level and trickle down through wages across the strait.

財富的積累將在企業層級發生，並透過工資流向海峽對岸。

The Kuomintang government in Taiwan operated under a completely different paranoia.

臺灣的國民黨政府則是在完全不同的憂慮下運作。

Having just lost mainland China to the communists, they were deeply suspicious of private capital accumulation.

在剛失去中國大陸給共產黨後，他們對私人資本的累積深感懷疑。

They feared that if private tycoons became too wealthy, they would challenge the state's political power.

他們擔心，如果私人巨頭變得太有錢，就會挑戰國家的政治權力。

Consequently, while the KMT retained state control over the commanding heights of the economy, utilities, banking, steel and petrochemicals, they left the export sector largely open to the private sector.

是以，國民黨雖然保留了對經濟、公用事業、銀行、鋼鐵和石化等關鍵產業的國家控制權，但卻讓出口部門在很大程度上對私營部門開放。

Crucially, the government did not pick winners in the export sector to the same extent as Seoul.

關鍵是，政府在出口部門並沒有像首爾那樣去「挑選贏家」。

Instead, they fostered an environment conducive to small business.

相反地，他們培養了一個有利於小型企業的環境。

The kingdom of SMEs was born not just from policy, but

中小企業王國的誕生，不僅是政策使然，

from the lack of a crushing corporate monopoly.

更是因為沒有被龐大的企業壟斷所壓垮。

Taiwan's industrialization was driven by tens of thousands of family owned firms producing everything from plastic toys to umbrellas, then bicycle parts and eventually PC motherboards.

臺灣的工業化，是由成千上萬的家族企業推動的，他們生產從塑膠玩具、雨傘，到自行車零件，最終到電腦主機板等各式各樣的產品。

This decentralized structure meant that the profits of industrialization were distributed across thousands of balance sheets rather than dozens.

這種分散式的結構意味著工業化的利潤，是分配到成千上萬的資產負債表中，而不是僅限於幾十家。

When Taiwan began its export boom in the 1970s.

到了1970年代，臺灣開始了出口熱潮。

The wealth generated was business income for hundreds of thousands of families, not just wage income for workers.

創造出來的財富，是數十萬個家庭的營利收入，而不僅僅是工人的薪資收入。

This structural reality reinforced a cultural algorithm that dictates Taiwanese economic behavior to this day.

這個結構性的現實，強化了一種文化演算法，至今仍主導著臺灣的經濟行為。

Better to be the head of a chicken than the tail of a cow.