Name: 《新削減戰略武器條約》終止！全球戰略核平衡將如何改變？ (End of 'New START' — How will it shift the global strategic nuclear balance?)
Uploaded: 2026-02-05T17:22:26.000Z
Duration: 10 min 42 s

情態副詞

The New START nuclear arms treaty between Russia and the US has expired, technically leaving both countries free to develop nuclear weapons without limits.

美國和俄羅斯的「新戰略武器裁減條約」已經過期，技術上來說，這讓兩國都能不受限制地發展核武器。

The United States has refused an offer by Russia's Vladimir Putin to extend warhead limits and says that any new deal would have to include China.

美國拒絕了俄羅斯總統普丁提出的延長彈頭限制的提議，並表示任何新協議都必須包含中國。

Beijing has rejected calls to enter the talks at this stage, Experts warn China's nuclear arsenal has been growing faster than any other countries.

北京方面拒絕在此階段參與談判，專家警告中國的軍火庫成長速度比其他任何國家都快。

Nuclear New Start was signed in 2010 by then US President Barack Obama and then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

核不擴散條約是在2010年由當時的美國總統歐巴馬和俄羅斯總統梅德維傑夫簽署的。

Russia and the US control more than 80% of the world's nuclear warheads.

俄羅斯和美國掌控著全球超過80%的核彈頭。

But the absence of any treaty is prompting fears of a new arms race.

但任何條約的缺席，正引發人們對新一輪軍備競賽的擔憂。

She researches nuclear policy at the Royal United Services Institute in London.

她在倫敦的皇家聯合軍事研究所研究核政策。

Daria, this was the last U. S. Russia nuclear treaty.

Daria，這是美俄之間最後一份核武條約。

Does that mean there are no guardrails whatsoever anymore?

這是不是代表已經沒有任何約束了？

Well, this is the last arms control treaty between Russia and the United States.

嗯，這是俄羅斯和美國之間最後一份軍備控制條約。

There are still measures in place that will help with risk reduction.

還是有一些措施可以幫助風險降低。

The Nuclear Non Proliferation treaty is still in place.

This is the full collapse of efforts to try to limit the salience of nuclear weapons in global strategic dynamics.

這代表著我們在試圖限制核武器在গুলির全球戰略動態中的重要性方面，所有努力都徹底崩潰了。

But it is nevertheless concerning and certainly in the US Russia relationship.

但這仍然令人擔憂，尤其是在美俄關係方面。

As you said, this does take off the guardrails in the development of new delivery systems and fielding of new delivery systems that might destabilize the strategic balance between the two countries and in the deployment of additional nuclear warheads to existing delivery systems as well.

就像你說的，這確實移除了在新型運載系統開發和部署，以及在現有運載系統上部署更多核彈頭方面可能破壞兩國戰略平衡的約束。

Let's talk about the strategic nuclear balance.

How has that shifted in recent years, especially since the war in Ukraine broke out?

這幾年來，尤其是在烏克蘭戰爭爆發後，情況有什麼變化呢？

Yeah, so the biggest, I mean, the concerns on the two sides vary slightly, but

嗯，所以最大的，我是說，雙方的擔憂略有不同，但是

there are drivers both on the Russian side and on the American side to be concerned about the sufficiency over their strategic capabilities.

俄羅斯和美國都有理由擔心他們戰略能力的充足性。

So in the case of the United States, the main concern is over the growing arsenal of China and whether the United States has sufficient nuclear weapons and the types of nuclear weapons that the US has, whether it's sufficient are both Russia and China.

所以就美國而言，主要的擔憂在於中國日益增長的軍火庫，以及美國是否擁有足夠的核武器，以及美國擁有的核武器種類，是否足以應對俄羅斯和中國。

So we're dealing with what we call a two peer, increasingly a two peer environment.

所以我們正在面對一個我們稱之為雙邊對等、日益雙邊對等的環境。

For Russia, the concern is slightly different.

對俄羅斯來說，擔憂稍微不同。

We have seen for some time, even before the war in Ukraine, the emergence of a Russian perception of vulnerability over the survivability of its strategic assets, both as a result of potential nuclear attacks by the United States, but

我們已經看到一段時間了，甚至在烏克蘭戰爭之前，俄羅斯就開始感覺到其戰略資產的生存能力受到威脅，這既是因為美國潛在的核攻擊，也是因為

also growing conventional capabilities in the United States and in Europe.

美國和歐洲日益增長的常規能力。

That has obviously been exacerbated by the war in Ukraine.

這顯然因為烏克蘭戰爭而加劇了。

And equally, the Russians seem to perceive vulnerabilities with regards to the ability of their strategic systems to penetrate missile and air defenses.

同樣地，俄羅斯似乎也認為他們的戰略系統穿透飛彈和防空系統的能力存在漏洞。

Hence the development of these, what they call novel nuclear systems, the nuclear propellant, torpedoes, cruise missiles, etc.

所以這才發展出他們所謂的新型核武系統，像是核動力魚雷、巡弋飛彈等等。

I want to look at the role China plays here in a second.

我等一下想來看看中國在這裡扮演的角色。

But first we heard it earlier, Russia offered an extension of the New START deal to keep negotiating with the U.S.

但首先，我們剛剛有聽到，俄羅斯曾提議延長「新戰略武器裁減條約」(New START)，希望能繼續和美國協商。

Yeah, so President Putin had made an offer to the United States to continue complying with the quantitative limits that New START had set out.

是的，普丁總統確實向美國提出要繼續遵守「新戰略武器裁減條約」所設定的數量限制。

So the caps on deployed warheads, on deployed and non deployed launchers.

也就是說，對已部署的彈頭、以及已部署和未部署的運載系統設上限。

The offer that was put on the table, in my opinion, was, was a bit half baked.

依我看，擺上檯面的這個提議，有點不太成熟。

I, I don't think it should have been accepted at face value.

The Russians did not offer to return to data exchanges and inspections of strategic systems which had been provided for under the New START treaty.

俄羅斯並沒有提議恢復「新戰略武器裁減條約」中所規定的，關於戰略系統的數據交換和檢查。

The Russians were also expecting, I don't remember the exact wording, but

俄羅斯那邊也預期，我不太記得確切的說法了，但是

they were expecting that the strategic, that the US Would not do anything that would unbalance the, the strategic, the strategic equations.

他們預期美國不會做出任何會破壞戰略平衡的舉動。

That was most likely referring to US plans to develop stronger air and missile defense with their Golden Dome initiative.

這很可能指的是美國透過「金穹計畫」發展更強大的空防和飛彈防禦系統的計畫。

So I don't think the United States should have taken that offer at face value, but

所以我不認為美國應該照單全收這個提議，但是

it was an opening for further negotiations to try to extend to the limit somehow, potentially, or continue compliance with them.

這是一個進一步協商的機會，試圖設下某種限制，或者繼續遵守現有的條約。

And as you said, the United States does not seem to have taken that up.

就像你說的，美國似乎沒有接受這個提議。

The reasons for that are a little bit hard to say.

The administration seems to be spread across quite a few things at the moment.

目前政府似乎有很多事情要處理。

And one of the reasons seems to have been the fact that China is at this point not willing to join negotiations.

其中一個原因似乎是中國在這個階段不願意加入協商。

Their nuclear arsenal has been growing faster than any other countries.

他們的核武軍火庫的成長速度比任何其他國家都快。

Do they have to be part of any future nuclear deal?

他們必須參與未來的任何核武條約嗎？

If we were talking about an extension of New START limits or continued compliance with New START limits, then perhaps we could let the Chinese that conversation.

如果我們討論的是延長「新戰略武器裁減條約」的限制，或是持續遵守「新戰略武器裁減條約」的限制，那麼或許我們可以讓中國參與協商。

But now that the board has been or the slate has been kept clean, I think it'll be very difficult to have any kind of conversation on arms control without considering the Chinese involving the Chinese.

但現在既然底線已經劃好，或者說情況已經保持乾淨，我認為在沒有考慮中國、沒有讓中國參與的情況下，很難就軍備控制進行任何協商。

The Americans expect the Chinese to have 1500 nuclear weapons by 2035.

美國預計中國到 2035 年將擁有 1500 枚核武器。

That's basically where the caps were on deployed nuclear warheads for Russia and the US under New start.

這基本上就是「新戰略武器裁減條約」下，俄羅斯和美國部署的核彈頭的上限。

So I don't see how you have arms control negotiations, or at least not sustainable ones without the Chinese at the table moving forward.

所以我看不出來，如果沒有中國在場參與協商，軍備控制談判要如何進行，或者至少如何可持續地進行。

Daria Delshakova at Britain's Royal United Services Institute.

來自英國皇家聯合軍事研究所的 Daria Delshakova。

Thank you so much for all those insights.

And Suzy Snyder is joining us now from the Netherlands.

現在加入我們的是來自荷蘭的 Suzy Snyder。

She is the program coordinator at the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.

她是國際廢除核武運動的計畫協調員。

Welcome to the program and thank you for joining us.

歡迎來到節目，謝謝你的參與。

Could the US And Russia still reach an agreement at the last minute at such a crucial moment for nuclear proliferation?

在核武擴散如此關鍵的時刻，美俄是否仍有可能在最後一刻達成協議？

It would be absolutely fantastic if they would reach such an agreement.

如果他們能達成這樣的協議，那將會是太棒了。

But unfortunately, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that Donald Trump will not seek to maintain this bilateral limit with Russia and is not looking to do something right now, but

但很可惜，美國國務卿 Marco Rubio 證實，Donald Trump 不會尋求維持與俄羅斯的雙邊限制，目前也沒有打算這麼做，而是

So while there could be a last minute reprieve or a last minute agreement to Russia's offer to extend the existing plan for a while, it's not looking very likely.

所以，雖然俄羅斯提議延長現有計畫一段時間，或許有機會在最後一刻獲得緩解或達成協議，但看起來可能性不高。

And that is extremely concerning to everyone in the world.

這點讓全世界所有人都非常擔心。

Did the US And Russia still respect the limits set by New Start even after cooperation was suspended?

即使合作暫停了，美俄之間是否還尊重《新削減戰略武器條約》設下的約束？

Well, we did miss the bilateral consultation committee.

嗯，我們確實錯過了雙邊協商委員會。

It's really important to have technical experts talking to one another about the arsenals.

讓技術專家互相討論軍火庫的內容，這真的很重要。

But according to our open source estimates, we've seen that the limit of numbers of nuclear weapons, the numbers of delivery systems have been maintained in the requirements under the New START treaty.

不過根據我們的公開資訊估計，我們看到核武器的數量、運載系統的數量，都維持在《新削減戰略武器條約》的要求之下。

But I do want to note those requirements were higher than what's existing even in the rapidly growing Chinese arsenal.

但我確實想指出，這些要求比中國快速成長中的軍火庫現有的數量還要高。

So it's not like the numbers are coming down to the level of the UK or France.

所以並不是說數量已經降到英國或法國的等級了。

They still have some six, nearly 6,000 warheads each which are ready and can be used at any moment.

他們各自仍有大約六千枚隨時準備好、可以使用的彈頭。

We have seen that Russia is also developing hypersonic missiles, which it's already being used in the war in Ukraine.

我們看到俄羅斯也在開發高超音速飛彈，這已經在烏克蘭戰爭中使用了。

How significant has this shifted the strategic balance now?

這對現在的戰略平衡造成了多大的影響？

The introduction of hypersonic missiles, which is not solely a Russian issue.

高超音速飛彈的出現，這不只是俄羅斯單方面的問題。

The US Is also developing hypersonic missiles, as are France and other nuclear armed countries.

美國也在開發高超音速飛彈，法國和其他核武國家也是。

But what this does is it confronts, uses the battlefield.

但這會做的事情是，它會對戰場產生對抗、加以利用。

It makes what is easily identifiable, the parabolic arc from an intercontinental ballistic missile.

它讓洲際彈道飛彈那種容易辨識的拋物線彈道變得不再如此。

It's no longer makes it less predictable, which means that ideas of missile defense are also less likely to work in these situations.

這會讓它的不可預測性降低，這意味著飛彈防禦的想法在這些情況下也比較不可能奏效。

So it decreases stability, it decreases transparency, and

所以它降低了穩定性，降低了透明度，而且

unless we have some new efforts to negotiate limits and open access to information, we're going to see some real problems.

除非我們有新的努力來協商限制並開放資訊的取得，否則我們將會看到一些真正的問題。

And one of my big concerns here is that those who are watching and ready to respond, should they detect an incoming missile, will not know if that missile is conventionally or nuclear armed.

我在這裡一個很大的擔憂是，那些正在觀察並準備好回應的人，如果他們偵測到有飛彈來襲，將不知道這枚飛彈是常規武裝還是核武武裝。

And they may indeed fire a nuclear weapon in response, leading to the worst conflagration the world has ever seen.

他們確實可能會以核武作為回應，這將導致世界前所未見的最糟浩劫。

Okay, so the threat of miscalculation has gone up then significantly, I'm hearing from you, there are many fears that we are in a new nuclear arms race.

好的，所以誤判的風險就大幅增加了，我聽到你的意思是，有許多人擔心我們正處於一場新的軍備競賽。

And I'm wondering where that ranges on your spectrum of fears right now.

我想知道這在你擔憂的清單中，目前排在哪個位置。

And if so, how could this differ or compare to the Cold War era?

如果有，這跟冷戰時期有什麼不同或相似之處呢？

So what we saw in the Cold War was a rampant and quick buildup of technology and capabilities on both sides, but

所以我們在冷戰時期看到的是，雙方技術和能力的快速、猖獗的累積，但

Now there are more actors involved and there are more hotspots involved.

現在有更多參與者，也有更多熱點。

Nevertheless, the US And Russia still remain the biggest actors on the nuclear playing field, and

儘管如此，美俄兩國仍然是核子領域裡最大的玩家，而且

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《新削減戰略武器條約》終止！全球戰略核平衡將如何改變？ (End of 'New START' — How will it shift the global strategic nuclear balance?)

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slightly

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