Name: 衡量美國打擊伊朗的風險 (Gauging the risks of US strikes on Iran)
Uploaded: 2025-06-19T16:55:36.000Z
Duration: 5 min 35 s

A lot of the talk right now about the decision President Trump needs to make is whether to bring in U.S. assets to take out a specific facility that is in the mountains, the Fordow facility.

目前，關於特朗普總統需要做出的決定，很多人都在談論是否要引入美國資產來摧毀位於山區的一個特定設施--福爾道設施。

程度副詞

Tell us why that facility is so important and what it would mean if the U.S. were to actually take that out.

請告訴我們為什麼該設施如此重要，以及如果美國真的拆除該設施將意味著什麼。

Well, Fordow is really the linchpin of the Iranian nuclear program.

福爾道確實是伊朗核計劃的關鍵所在。

You have roughly 3,000 centrifuges buried about 300 feet underground encased in very solid cement, and there is no way that Israel can bomb this site into oblivion.

大約有 3000 臺離心機被埋在地下 300 英尺處，用非常堅固的水泥包裹著，以色列不可能用炸彈將其炸燬。

They just do not have the munitions to do it.

The only munitions that can do it are the 30,000-pound bunker busters, the massive ordnance penetrators that can be carried by a B-2 stealth bomber, and even those, it would take more than one of those to take down a site of this magnitude.

唯一能做到這一點的彈藥是重達 30,000 磅的掩體摧毀彈，也就是 B-2 隱形轟炸機能攜帶的巨型穿甲彈。

It would probably take multiple 30,000-pound bombs.

這可能需要多枚重達 3 萬磅的炸彈。

The big question now is, is President Trump going to authorize that airstrike?

現在最大的問題是，特朗普總統是否會準許這次空襲？

Even if he doesn't do it, Israel has other options, including the possibility of a commando raid because they now have complete air superiority over Iran.

即使他不這麼做，以色列也有其他選擇，包括突擊隊突襲的可能性，因為他們現在對伊朗擁有完全的空中優勢。

I think Israel could put boots on the ground because, again, they control the skies above Iran, so that gives them tremendous freedom of action.

我認為以色列可以把靴子放在地面上，因為他們控制著伊朗上空，這給了他們極大的行動自由。

But that would be risky, obviously, and the most surefire way to demolish the site would be to dispatch B-2 stealth bombers, and the question is, is President Trump going to do that or not?

但這顯然是有風險的，最萬無一失的拆除方法是派遣B-2隱形轟炸機，問題是特朗普總統到底會不會這麼做？

One of the other big questions here, and we alluded to it earlier in the show, is how close really is Iran to a nuclear bomb?

另外一個大問題是，伊朗距離核彈到底有多近？

There's some dispute between the Israeli intelligence assessment and the U.S. intelligence assessment, but I want to play for you, Max, this clip of just the history of this, of Israeli leaders talking about how close Iran is.  The deadline for attaining this goal is getting extremely close.

以色列的情報評估和美國的情報評估之間存在一些爭議，但我想為你播放一段視頻，馬克斯，這段視頻記錄了這段歷史，以色列領導人談到伊朗離我們有多近。  實現這一目標的最後期限已經非常接近了。

And Iran, by the way, is also outpacing Iraq in the development of ballistic missile systems that they hope will reach the eastern seaboard of the United States within 15 years.

順便提一下，伊朗在彈道導彈系統的研發方面也超過了伊拉克，他們希望在 15 年內將這些系統打到美國東部沿海地區。

By next spring, at most, by next summer, at current enrichment rates, they will have finished the medium enrichment and move on to the final stage.

到明年春天，最多到明年夏天，按照目前的濃縮速度，它們將完成中等濃縮，進入最後階段。

From there, it's only a few months, possibly a few weeks, before they get enough enriched uranium for the first bomb.

從那以後，只需幾個月，可能是幾周，他們就能獲得足夠的濃縮鈾來製造第一顆原子彈。

The foremost sponsor of global terrorism could be weeks away from having enough enriched uranium for an entire arsenal of nuclear weapons.

這個全球恐怖主義的最主要支持者可能只需幾周時間就能擁有足夠的濃縮鈾來製造整個核武庫。

That would place a militant Islamic terror regime weeks away from having the fissile material for an entire arsenal of nuclear bombs.

這將使一個好戰的伊斯蘭恐怖政權在幾周後就能擁有製造整個核彈武庫的裂變材料。

If not stopped, Iran could produce a nuclear weapon in a very short time.

如果不加以阻止，伊朗可以在很短的時間內生產出核武器。

It could be a year, it could be within a few months, less than a year.

可能是一年，也可能是幾個月，甚至不到一年。

So all the way back in 1996, it was weeks away, right?

是以，早在 1996 年，它就在幾周之後，對嗎？

So, I mean, the United States' assessment seems to be that's not actually the case.

是以，我的意思是，美國的評估似乎認為實際情況並非如此。

And secondly, if Israel doesn't take out Fordo, for example, has it really damaged Iran's nuclear program as much as it says that it wants to?

其次，舉例來說，如果以色列沒有幹掉福爾多，那麼它是否真的像它所說的那樣破壞了伊朗的核計劃？

Well, as that piece demonstrates, Prime Minister Netanyahu has been very alarmist for a long time about the Iranian nuclear program.

正如這篇報道所示，內塔尼亞胡總理長期以來一直對伊朗核計劃危言聳聽。

And obviously, in hindsight, a lot of that alarm was exaggerated.

顯然，事後看來，很多警報都被誇大了。

But I think it is the case that the Iranian nuclear program has accelerated since President Trump's disastrous decision in 2018 to exit the Iranian nuclear accord.

但我認為，自從特朗普總統在 2018 年做出退出伊朗核協議的災難性決定以來，伊朗的核計劃確實加快了。

At that point, we know that the Iranian breakout time, the amount of time they would take to have enough fissile material for a bomb, was over a year.

當時，我們知道伊朗的突破時間，即他們擁有足夠裂變材料製造炸彈所需的時間，超過了一年。

Now, I think everybody agrees, including U.S. intelligence, it's down to a week or two.

現在，我想每個人都同意，包括美國情報部門，它下降到一個或兩個星期。

I think the question mark is, how long would it take them to actually weaponize that material?

我認為問題在於，他們需要多長時間才能真正將這種材料武器化？

And that's, I think, where you have a dispute between the Israelis, who are saying they could weaponize very quickly, and the U.S. intelligence community, which is saying it would take a longer period of time.

我認為，這就是以色列人和美國情報界之間存在爭議的地方，以色列人說他們可以很快實現武器化，而美國情報界則說這需要更長的時間。

But I think you're onto a key point here, Abby, which is, what happens if the Israelis do not, or the U.S., or somebody does not take out the Fordo site?

但我認為你說到了一個關鍵點，艾比，那就是如果以色列、美國或其他國家不摧毀福爾多基地，會發生什麼？

And the reality is, the Iranian nuclear program will pretty much continue, despite all the damage that the Iranians are suffering in this Israeli air campaign.

而現實情況是，儘管伊朗人在以色列的空襲行動中遭受了重創，但伊朗的核計劃仍將繼續下去。

But even, keep in mind, even if Fordo is taken out, that doesn't mean that Iran will never be able to get a nuclear weapon, because the know-how, probably a lot of the enriched uranium, all that stuff will remain still in Iranian hands.

但即使如此，請記住，即使福爾多被除掉，也並不意味著伊朗永遠無法獲得核武器，因為技術訣竅、可能大量的濃縮鈾、所有這些東西仍將掌握在伊朗手中。

但很顯然，福爾多是一個非常重要的人物。

And I think what President Trump has to calculate is, is it worth going after Fordo, given the risk that the Iranians, who have so far been refraining from attacking U.S. bases or shipping in the region, given the risk that they will escalate?

我認為，特朗普總統必須計算的是，伊朗人迄今為止一直沒有攻擊美國在該地區的基地或航運，考慮到他們將升級的風險，是否值得追擊福爾多？

And so, you know, you see all these U.S. bases, which are very close to Iran, and in fact, much closer than Israel.

是以，你可以看到所有這些美國基地，它們離伊朗非常近，事實上，比以色列近得多。

And so, you know, Israel is about 1,000 miles from Iran.

是以，你知道，以色列距離伊朗大約 1000 英里。

So Iran has a lot more missiles that they can shoot at them.

是以，伊朗有更多的飛彈可以射向他們。

They also have the capability to sow mines in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

它們還有能力在波斯灣和紅海佈雷。

So there's a lot more damage they can probably do, even in their weakened state.

是以，即使它們處於虛弱狀態，也可能造成更大的破壞。

And so that's what I think President Trump has to balance here.

是以，我認為特朗普總統必須在這裡取得平衡。

Is it worth the risk of going after Fordo if it means getting the U.S. involved in the middle of these hostilities?

如果讓美國捲入這些敵對行動，是否值得冒險追擊福爾多？