Name: 中國如何利用漁船擴張軍事實力？| DW 新聞 (How China uses fishing boats for military power | DW News)
Uploaded: 2026-03-27T16:59:24.000Z
Duration: 10 min 10 s

Christmas Day last year, viewed from the heavens it looks uncanny, like an alien life form taking shape.

去年 Christmas Day，從天上往下看，景象有點詭異，就像有外星生物正在成形。

But what these satellite images show is around 2,000 fishing boats grouping together to form an ocean barrier more than 450 kilometers long.

但這些 satellite images 顯示的是，大約有兩千艘漁船聚集在一起，形成一道長達四百五十公里的 ocean barrier。

副詞型分詞構句

Boats like these held a formation in heavy seas for some 30 hours before dispersing.

這些船在惡劣海況下維持 formation 大約三十小時後才解散。

Two weeks later they were back for a formation of around 1,000 boats.

兩週後，他們又回來了，這次 formation 有大約一千艘船。

It was the third of its kind, as far as we know.

據我們所知，這是第三次出現這種情況了。

Those fishing boats were Chinese, and that ocean flash mob was a display of power, a threat.

那些漁船是中國的，而這個 ocean flash mob 是一種力量的展示，一種威脅。

It's the latest flex of Beijing's grey zone militia strategy.

這是 Beijing 最新展示的 grey zone militia strategy。

Observers have been watching what's going on as carefully as they can.

Observers 們正盡可能仔細地觀察著正在發生的事情。

For every one Chinese military vessel, there are five Chinese fishing vessels in the area.

在該區域，每有一艘中國 military vessel，就有五艘中國漁船。

That becomes an enormous burden, particularly if you care about preserving civilian life, which, if you're Taiwan or the U.S., you probably do.

這對我們來說是個沉重的負擔，特別是如果你關心要保護 civilian life，而臺灣或美國當然會關心。

But also, they don't always just have nets on board.

I think it falls into two categories: specialized and general.

我認為這可以抽成兩類：specialized 和 general。

Specialized would be the militia units who have been trained,

specialized 的話，就是那些受過訓練的 militia units，

and training for years probably, to do specific jobs, whether that's help with logistics, bringing supplies for a landing force, or whether that's intelligence collection, or mine sweeping is an example that also occasionally gets brought up.

而且可能訓練了好幾年，來執行特定的任務，像是支援 landing force 的 logistics、運送 supplies，或是 intelligence collection，mine sweeping 也是一個偶爾會被提到的例子。

Those would probably be relatively small in number.

I think the more general problem would be the way that they could flood the zone and complicate surveillance and targeting for the U.S.

我認為更 general 的問題是，他們可以如何淹沒該區域，讓美國的 surveillance 和 targeting 變得複雜。

or Taiwan or Japan, meaning if there was, say, an invasion scenario, which I think is maybe more problematic here than a blockade or a quarantine,

或是臺灣、日本，也就是說，如果發生了入侵的狀況，我認為這比封鎖或隔離更令人擔憂，

and you were trying to degrade Chinese forces crossing the strait and you're, say, Taiwan.

而你正試圖削弱跨越海峽的中國軍隊，假設你是臺灣。

We've seen exactly that in skirmishes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, that although most are ordinary fishing boats, some have reinforced hulls and carry jamming equipment.

我們在中國和菲律賓在南海的衝突中，已經看到類似的情況了，雖然大多數都是普通的漁船，但有些船體經過強化，並攜帶了幹擾設備。

They've been seen supporting the Chinese Navy by swarming, maneuvering dangerously close, and physically bumping other boats.

他們被發現透過蜂擁、危險地靠近以及物理性碰撞其他船隻來支援中國海軍。

It's so effective in the Philippines that there's talk of an iron triangle around the archipelago, where fishing vessels, coast guard ships, and

這在菲律賓非常有效，以至於人們談論著在群島周圍形成一個鐵三角，漁船、海岸巡防艦和

An Australian Naval Institute report calls these boats "warships in fishermen's clothing." The Chinese have talked for decades about the importance of harnessing civilian resources to support national security objectives, whether warfighting objectives or what the Chinese call sovereignty enforcement operations.

澳洲海軍學院的一份報告將這些船隻稱為「披著漁民外衣的戰艦」。中國幾十年來一直在談論利用民間資源支持國家安全目標的重要性，無論是戰鬥目標還是中國所稱的主權執行行動。

And that's what they call, for example, all the use of fishing boats in the South China Sea to harass Vietnamese oil drilling operations or Malaysian fishing operations or whatever.

這就是他們所說的，例如，在南海利用漁船騷擾越南鑽油行動或馬來西亞捕魚行動等等。

They have organized those boats into maritime militia organizations and mobilized them to conduct operations in support of the national interest.

他們已將這些船隻組織成海上民兵組織，並動員他們來執行支持國家利益的行動。

So they've been talking about it for a long time.

所以他們談論這件事已經很久了。

They don't tell us how many boats they have enlisted in the maritime militia,

他們沒有告訴我們有多少艘船加入了海上民兵，

but it's many hundreds, if not thousands, of small vessels and a couple of hundred large vessels that are definitely involved in the militia.

但有數百艘，甚至數千艘小型船隻，以及數百艘大型船隻，肯定都參與了民兵行動。

Taiwan has experienced this swarm as part of the ongoing campaign of Chinese pressure.

臺灣已經經歷了這種作為中國持續施壓行動一部分的蜂擁戰術。

The democratic island was occupied for decades by Japan until 1945,

這座民主島嶼曾被日本佔領數十年，直到1945年，

but is claimed by China as its territory.

The idea with this is that if there was a Taiwan contingency, that China's demonstrating that not only could it control the area around Taiwan, it could also kind of stop other actors, whether that's the U.S.-aligned Japan or U.S.

這樣做的目的是，如果發生臺灣突發事件，中國就能展現其不僅能控制檯灣周邊地區，還能阻止其他國家，無論是與美國結盟的日本，還是來自菲律賓的美國

forces coming from the Philippines, stop them from coming to Taiwan's aid.

部隊，阻止他們前來援助臺灣。

Non-military boats from China have popped up in incidents in other places.

來自中國的非軍用船隻曾在其他地方的事件中出現。

In 2023, a Chinese-registered vessel named New New Polar Bear, not a fishing boat in this case, reportedly damaged two subsea data cables and a gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea in northern Europe.

2023年，一艘中國註冊的船隻「New New Polar Bear」，這次不是漁船，據報在北歐波羅的海損壞了兩條海底數據纜線和一條燃氣管道。

A second incident occurred in November 2024 when two subsea communications cables connecting Germany and Finland and Lithuania and Sweden, respectively, were reportedly severed by the Chinese civilian vessel Yi Pang.

第二起事件發生在2024年11月，連接德國與芬蘭，以及立陶宛與瑞典的兩條海底通信纜線，據報被中國民用船隻「Yi Pang」切斷。

But now the military militia is sailing in other waters.

但現在，這些軍事民兵正在其他海域航行。

That swarm we saw at the start of the video was close to Japan.

我們在影片開頭看到的那個蜂擁現象，發生在日本附近。

Most international attention focuses on China's ambitions for Taiwan,

大多數國際關注的焦點都集中在中國對臺灣的野心上，

but China and Japan have a long rivalry with an intense dispute over the Tokyo-administered Senkaku Islands, which China calls the Diaoyu Islands.

但中國和日本之間有長久的競爭，對於東京管轄的釣魚臺列嶼，中國稱之為釣魚臺，有激烈的爭議。

And last November, new Prime Minister Sanei Takaichi enraged Beijing by suggesting she'd come to Taiwan's aid if China were to try and take it by force.

去年十一月，新任首相高市早苗建議，如果中國試圖武力奪取臺灣，她將會援助臺灣，這激怒了北京。

We don't have that soundbite, but it's clear China's approach to Taiwan is on her mind.

我們沒有那段錄音，但很明顯中國對臺灣的態度是她心裡想的。

Analysts believe the maneuver near Japan was part of a broader strategy of building up the fishing boat fleet.

分析家認為，在日本附近的這個演習，是擴大漁船隊更大策略的一部分。

The formations on Christmas Day were first spotted by geospatial analysis company IngeniSpace, based in the U.S.

Christmas Day 的隊形，是由美國的地理空間分析公司 IngeniSpace 最早發現的。

Chief Operating Officer Jason Wang told me in a telephone interview that things were getting bigger fast.

首席營運長 Jason Wang 在電話訪談中告訴我，事情正在快速擴大。

So, yeah, the Chinese use the maritime militia every they practice on a regular basis.

所以，是的，中國人會定期演練海上民兵。

And we see as few as a dozen ships to as many as 200, 300 ships.

我們看到從少數十幾艘船到多達兩百、三百艘船。

What's unusual about this last couple of months is that we've seen it scale beyond 1,000 ships.

過去幾個月比較不尋常的是，我們看到規模擴大到一千多艘船。

And in this case, Christmas Day was over 2,000.

而這次，Christmas Day 就有兩千多艘。

Like a flash mob, the fishing boat swarm near Japan didn't stay for long.

就像 ocean flash mob 一樣，日本附近聚集的漁船群沒有停留太久。

But it was a signal that could be interpreted as putting pressure on Japan.

但這是一個可以被解讀為對日本施壓的信號。

As I call it, a symbolic blockade, a kind of a blockade gesture and not an actual physical warfighting blockade where you are going to physically prevent people getting through at whatever cost.

我稱之為象徵性的封鎖，一種封鎖姿態，而不是真正意義上不惜一切代價阻止人員通過的實質性作戰封鎖。

So it might be done because this exercise might represent something they think about doing in some future crisis.

所以這可能是因為這次演習可能代表著他們在未來某次危機中會考慮做的事情。

If so, it's probably not a Taiwan crisis.

如果是這樣，那可能不是 Taiwan 的危機。

It's probably something like yet another confrontation with the Japanese over access to the Senkaku Islands or the Diaoyu Islands, as the Chinese call them.

可能是像中國人稱的釣魚臺或日本稱的尖閣諸島，又一次與日本的對峙。

The fishing boat swarm has been followed by other incidents.

漁船群之後還發生了其他事件。

In February this year, Japanese authorities seized a Chinese fishing boat that tried to flee when ordered to stop for an inspection.

今年二月，日本當局扣押了一艘中國漁船，該船在被勒令停船檢查時試圖逃離。

The vessel was in Japan's exclusive economic zone off Nagasaki Prefecture, in the southwest, when it was intercepted and its captain arrested.

船隻在日本西南方長崎縣的專屬經濟區內被攔截，船長也遭到逮捕。

The subsequent row prompted a sharp drop in visits to Japan by Chinese tourists.

隨後引發的爭議導致中國遊客赴日旅遊人數大幅下降。

Japan even sent its last two pandas back to China.

日本甚至將最後兩隻熊貓送回了中國。

China employs widespread toolbox of different ways to intimidate countries.

中國運用廣泛的工具箱，以各種方式恐嚇其他國家。

They've been using that toolbox against Japan.

他們一直對日本使用這個工具箱。

So alongside, particularly, incursions into islands claimed by both Japan and China, as well as economics, some sanctions being put on Japanese exports and also kind of encouraging Chinese tourists not to visit Japan.

是以，除了侵入日本和中國都聲稱擁有主權的島嶼，以及經濟制裁、對日本出口施加某些限制，並鼓勵中國遊客不要前往日本之外，

That toolbox includes these grey zone tactics: militarized but not military actions that are well short of attacks,

這個工具箱還包括了這些 grey zone tactics：軍事化但非軍事行動，遠未達到攻擊程度，

but are still intentional and intimidating.

但仍然是故意的、帶有恐嚇意味的。

China is working on building the capability to conduct various large-scale military operations.

中國正努力建立執行各種大規模軍事行動的能力。

This is one component, a rather small component, of the overall effort to be ready and able to conduct a large-scale operation, whether combat operation or non-combat, in the vicinity around China.

這是整體準備和執行大規模行動的其中一個組成部分，而且是個相當小的部分，無論是戰鬥行動還是非戰鬥行動，都在中國周邊地區進行。

The fishing militia are part of a war-without-gunsmoke strategy in the region.

這些漁業民兵是該地區「無煙戰」策略的一部分。

Japan cannot directly engage any of these vessels.

日本無法直接與這些船隻中的任何一艘發生衝突。

That would break international rules for preventing collisions at sea.

It's currently doubling its defense spending to 2% of GDP.

日本目前正將國防開支翻倍，達到國內生產總值的2%。

Part of that will go to expand and modernize the Japanese coast guard.

其中一部分將用於擴大和現代化日本海上保全廳。

Tokyo has also been deepening security ties with the United States and has staged joint exercises with the Philippines and the United States, increasing patrols and surveillance.

東京也一直在深化與美國的安全關係，並與菲律賓及美國進行聯合演習，增加巡邏和監視。

We've seen how these fishing boat militias are putting pressure on governments and their navies in several areas of Chinese interest.

我們已經看到這些漁船民兵如何在中國感興趣的幾個地區對各國政府及其海軍施加壓力。

而現在看來，這也延伸到了日本。

I think it's certainly relevant in that it makes the Japanese sit up and take notice.

我覺得這確實引起了日本的注意。

And it wasn't that far from Korea's exclusive economic zones either.

而且這離韓國的專屬經濟區也不遠。

The question is: just how dangerous are these tactics?

Could they go wrong and end up starting something military by accident?

會不會出錯而意外引發軍事衝突？

For every one Chinese coast guard vessel or navy vessel out there, you have multiple militia vessels, these professional militia vessels, that sometimes are ramming Filipino or Vietnamese boats just like the Chinese coast guard are, except that they're only half-trained and they're under perhaps looser command and control.

中國海警船或海軍船每出現一艘，就有好幾艘民兵船，這些專業的民兵船，有時會像中國海警一樣衝撞菲律賓或越南的船隻，只是他們只受過一半的訓練，而且指揮和控制可能比較鬆散。

And so the last thing you want in a highly tense environment where maybe the difference between escalation and peace wrestling a knife's edge is some nationalistic half-trained fisherman deciding that he wants to be a hero.

所以，在一個高度緊張的環境裡，緩和局勢與衝突可能只是一線之隔，你最不希望的就是一個民族主義的半吊子漁民決定他想當英雄。