Name: 羅伯特·馬利談伊朗戰爭：「川普總統很緊張」 | UpFront (Robert Malley on war in Iran: “Donald Trump is nervous” | UpFront)
Uploaded: 2026-03-21T23:05:54.000Z
Duration: 13 min 41 s
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Foreign Robert Mali，歡迎來到 Upfront。

情態副詞

So Israel has recently attacked the South Pause gas field, part of the world's largest natural gas reserves, shared by both Qatar and Iran.

所以以色列最近攻擊了 South Pause gas field，這是卡達和伊朗共享的全球最大天然氣儲備的一部分。

Iran has retaliated by attacking the Qatari side, Ras Laffen.

伊朗則透過攻擊卡達的 Ras Laffen 進行了報復。

This has caused widespread spread damage.

We are now seeing ramped up attacks on key energy infrastructure, although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly said Israel will hold off of attacking further infrastructure at the request of President Donald Trump.

我們現在看到針對關鍵能源基礎設施的攻擊升級，儘管總理班傑明·納坦雅胡據報表示，應總統唐納·川普的要求，以色列將暫停進一步攻擊基礎設施。

What are the implications of this escalation that we saw this week?

我們這週看到的這次升級，有什麼樣的影響？

Listen, first of all, I think what you were seeing are two actors who are behaving according to type, exactly as one would expect.

聽著，首先，我認為你們看到的是兩個 actors，他們 behaving according to type，就像大家預期的那樣。

Israel, whose goal is to decimate as much as possible, not just Iran's military, ballistic, naval missile, drone capability, nuclear capability, but

以色列的目標是盡可能 decimate，不僅是伊朗的軍事、彈道、海軍飛彈、無人機能力，核能力，而是

And therefore they're seeking state collapse, collapse of the regime if they can.

是以，他們如果能的話，正在尋求國家崩潰，政權崩潰。

And chaos is not simply a possible outcome, it's the outcome that they are seeking.

混亂不僅是可能的結果，而是他們正在尋求的結果。

And therefore going after infrastructure makes sense.

是以，攻擊基礎設施是有意義的。

Going after every layer of the leadership makes sense.

攻擊領導層的每一個層級都是有意義的。

This is what I would call a policy of not just mowing the lawn, but

我會稱之為一種政策，不僅是修剪草坪，而是

pounding the soil beneath the lawn, beneath the grass, on a regional scale and in an intensified way.

在區域範圍內，以加劇的方式，去敲打草坪、草皮底下的土壤。

Iran is also reacting exactly as it had previewed and as it had worn, which is it's, if it's, if it is attacked, particularly if it's attacked in a way that threatens or designed to threaten the regime, it will retaliate by regionalizing, even internationalizing the war.

伊朗的反應也完全符合他們事先預告和展現的，也就是說，如果他們受到攻擊，特別是如果受到威脅或旨在威脅政權的攻擊，他們將透過區域化，甚至國際化戰爭來報復。

I would call this a guerrilla warfare at state level, attacking all the nodes of the world economy that are most vulnerable and that will hurt others, so that it externalizes the cost of the war.

我會稱之為一種國家層級的遊擊戰，攻擊世界上最脆弱的經濟節點，讓他人受傷，從而將戰爭的成本外部化。

They're not the only ones who are going to bear it.

他們不是唯一會承受這一切的。

And it means that they're also targeting countries like Tatar, like Saudi Arabia, like uae, that may have nothing to do with the war, but

這也意味著他們也將目標鎖定在像卡達、沙烏地阿拉伯、阿拉伯聯合大公國這些國家身上，這些國家可能跟戰爭毫無關係，但

are the targets they find the most vulnerable and therefore the most logical, however much one may dispute that logic.

卻是他們認為最脆弱、是以最合乎邏輯的目標，儘管有人可能對這種邏輯有爭議。

The most unpredictable and more moody actor, if you will, in that sense is the United States.

如果你願意這麼說的話，在這個意義上，最難預測、情緒也最不穩定的 actors 就是美國。

And when I say the United States, I really mean President Trump.

當我說美國時，我其實是指總統川普。

And he has his finger in a way that, on the, on a, in a way that can either escalate the war or de escalate it.

在某種程度上，他握有決定戰爭升級或降級的關鍵。

And what just happened is we saw that it was escalating in yet more dangerous, perilous way in terms of the attacks on the gas fields in South Kores.

剛剛發生的事是，我們看到在 South Kores 的 gas field 遭受攻擊，戰爭正以更危險、更嚴峻的方式升級。

And President Trump then decided to de escalate.

What we don't know is whether this is a sign of a further de escalation or whether it's just one interlude.

我們不知道這是否是進一步降級的跡象，或者僅僅是一個過渡期。

And the United States will continue in the hopes of achieving some still unidentified goal which will then allow the President to declare victory and go home.

而美國將繼續抱持希望，達成某個尚未明確的目標，這樣總統就能宣佈勝利並回家。

Both US President Donald Trump and the Secretary of Defense Pete Hexseth say they were unaware of Israel's planned attack on South Pas gas field.

美國總統唐納·川普和國防部長彼得·赫塞斯都表示，他們不知道以色列計畫攻擊 South Pas gas field。

In fact, President Trump, Trump said, I quote, the US knew nothing about this particular attack.

事實上，川普總統說，我直接引用他的話：「美國對這次攻擊毫無所悉。」

However, Israeli officials told Reuters that it was done with the coordination of Washington.

不過，以色列官員告訴路透社，這次行動是與華盛頓協調進行的。

I mean, this is the President of the United States.

我的意思是，這位是美國總統。

How credible is his account of not knowing?

他說他不知道，這說法有多可信？

Like most of his accounts, not particularly credible.

就像他大多數的說法一樣，不太可信。

I think in this case what appears to have happened is that the President may be encouraged, convinced by Prime Minister Netanyahu that by hitting Iran where it hurts, they will be forced to either surrender or capitulate or that it would lead unrest in the country which could lead to the collapse of the regime very quickly.

我認為在這件事上，看起來是總理班傑明·納坦雅胡說服了川普總統，認為攻擊伊朗的痛處，會迫使他們投降或屈服，或者會引發國內動亂，進而能迅速導致政權崩潰。

Of course, the way Iran reacted, which I think was extremely predictable and in fact predicted by most analysts and I suspect most governments around the world, is that it took it out against gas fields in Qatar.

當然，伊朗的反應方式，我認為這是非常可以預料的，而且事實上，世界上大多數分析師和政府都預料到了，那就是伊朗將攻擊卡達的 gas field。

That was again, it's not a matter of justifying it, but expecting it.

這再次強調，這不是要為攻擊辯護，而是可以預料到的。

I think President Trump is nervous about the impact on the price of oil, the price of gas.

我認為川普總統擔心這會影響油價、氣價。

He is nervous about the impact it has on the domestic, on the stock market, and

他擔心這會影響國內、影響股市，而且

he's nervous about the impact that all of this has on the prospects for the outcome of the congressional midterm elections which will take place in November, which is why he's now saying that he didn't know anything about it and he's now asking for de escalation.

他擔心這一切會影響到國會期中選舉的結果，期中選舉會在十一月舉行，這就是為什麼他現在說他對這件事一無所知，而且他現在要求降級。

I think there's every reason to believe the accounts that we heard that the US knew very well that this was coming and had acquiesced in it.

我認為我們聽到的說法，也就是美國很清楚這件事即將發生，並且默許了這件事，這一切都是有理由相信的。

The global economy is feeling this viscerally.

全球經濟正切身感受到這一切。

There's a global oil shortage, fuel prices have just shot up and there are predictions that this could get even more perilous.

全球石油短缺，燃料價格飆升，而且有預測說情況可能會變得更加危險。

So my question is, does Iran's strategy of exacting maximum economic damage, does it help or hurt the chances of negotiations towards ending this war?

所以我的問題是，伊朗採取最大化經濟損害的策略，這對結束這場戰爭的談判機會是有幫助還是有損？

I don't think this war is going to end with negotiations.

我認為這場戰爭不會以談判結束。

It's very hard to see, first of all, Iran trusting anything that the US would set the negotiating table, since at least twice already the US in the mid negotiations chose to bomb Iran.

首先，伊朗很難相信美國會在談判桌上提出任何條件，因為美國至少已經兩次在中途談判時選擇轟炸伊朗。

So I don't believe there's even enough common ground between the two.

所以我認為兩者之間甚至沒有足夠的共同點。

I think this will end, as I said earlier, when President Trump decides that the economic, financial, political costs are too high, he can then declare victory.

我認為，就像我之前說的，當川普總統認為經濟、財政和政治上的代價太高時，他就可以宣佈勝利。

And by the way, it will be relatively easy for him to declare victory because he's never stated clear objectives.

而且順帶一提，他要宣佈勝利相對容易，因為他從來沒有設定明確的目標。

So we could always invent an objective that he will say will have been met.

所以我們隨時都可以編造一個他會說已經達成的目標。

所以我認為戰爭就會在那時候結束。

And then the question is ensuring that Iran doesn't continue the war because it is said so far that it will not accept, you know, that will cease fire.

然後問題是，要怎麼確保伊朗不會繼續這場戰爭，因為到目前為止，他們說不會接受，你知道的，不會停火。

Okay, let's just talk about the Gulf states themselves.

好的，我們來談談海灣國家本身。

They're being attacked in these retaliatory actions by Iran.

他們正遭到伊朗這些報復行動的攻擊。

I mean, they're in an impossible situation.

說真的，他們現在處於一個進退兩難的困境。

I mean, you know, they're victims, twice victims, twice over.

說真的，你知道，他們是受害者，雙重受害者。

First by victims of the US And Israeli attack, which exposed them more than anyone else.

首先，他們是美國和以色列攻擊下的受害者，這讓他們比任何人都更加暴露。

I think all of them or the vast majority of them were against this war.

我認為他們所有人，或者絕大多數人，都反對這場戰爭。

And yet they are the ones who are now paying the greatest price for war that they had nothing to do with and that most of them, I believe, if not all of them, tried to prevent.

然而，他們卻是現在為這場與他們無關、而且他們大多數人（如果不是全部的話）都試圖阻止的戰爭付出最大代價的人。

And now they're being targeted by Iran for the reasons I gave earlier.

而現在，因為我剛才說的原因，他們正遭到伊朗的攻擊。

Iran is implementing a scorched earth policy and it is going after the earth that is closest to them that is most vulnerable, and

伊朗正在實施焦土政策，並且針對離他們最近、最脆弱的地區下手，

而這些地區碰巧就是海灣合作委員會的國家。

And also going after them helps them in their strategy of externalizing and exacerbating the costs, because their financial and trade and economic costs associated with attacking GCC states.

同時攻擊 GCC 國家，也有助於他們將成本外部化並加劇成本的策略，因為這與他們的財務、貿易和經濟成本有關。

So they are in a very difficult position right now.

They need, they want this war to end at the same time, of course, they're worried about their relationship with Iran in the wake of this war.

他們需要，他們當然希望戰爭結束，同時他們也擔心這場戰爭後與伊朗的關係。

But I suspect that most of them, again, if not all of them, would prefer to see this war and now rather than have it continue at a great cost to their economic future, economic stability, and, as you said, the world economy.

但我懷疑他們大多數人，如果不是全部的話，寧願看到戰爭現在就結束，而不是讓它以巨大的經濟未來、經濟穩定以及你說的世界經濟為代價繼續下去。

I think one of the paradoxes, of course, is that they've discovered that two of their gambles, one was an American security umbrella and the other was improving relations with Iran.

我認為其中一個矛盾是，他們發現他們的兩個賭注，一個是美國的安全保護傘，另一個是改善與伊朗的關係。

Both of those gambles proved to be hollow.

這兩個賭注都被證明是空洞的。

Security umbrella with the US had holes in it and they ended up being targeted despite their security relationship with the US and improved relations with Iran turned to be of very little use when Iran chose to strike them.

美國的安全保護傘漏洞百出，他們最終還是遭到攻擊，儘管他們與美國有安全關係，而改善與伊朗的關係在伊朗選擇攻擊他們時也幾乎沒有用處。

And yet they really don't have much choice.

At the end of this war, they probably going to still be dependent on that umbrella and still banking on somewhat improved relations with Iran, however disappointing both gambits turned out to be.

這場戰爭結束後，他們可能仍然依賴那把保護傘，並仍然寄望於與伊朗的關係有所改善，儘管這兩個策略都令人失望。

You've dealt with Iranians extensively and they've been assassinations in the last couple of days of key figures of the Iranian leadership.

你與伊朗人打交道很多，過去幾天發生了伊朗領導層關鍵人物被暗殺的事件。

What are your thoughts of Israel's strategy to assassinate key figures, namely the Iranian security chief, the intelligence minister was also killed.

你對以色列暗殺關鍵人物的策略有何看法，尤其是伊朗安全主管、情報部長也被殺了。

Your thoughts on that as a military strategy?

你對此有什麼軍事策略上的看法？

So again, it goes to the strategy I describing earlier, which is that Israel feels like dismembering, decapitating, fragmenting, weakening Iran in any way possible serves their interest.

所以這又回到了我之前描述的策略，也就是以色列覺得，透過任何方式肢解、斬首、分裂、削弱伊朗，都符合他們的利益。

And so they're not thinking so much in terms of who are we going to negotiate with in the future or who is more pragmatic, less pragmatic, more radical.

是以，他們不太考慮未來要跟誰談判，或者誰比較務實、誰比較不務實、誰比較激進。

Anyone in that system who has a political responsibility that they could get rid of.

體制內任何有政治責任、他們可以擺脫的人。

你知道，我試著站在他們的立場想。

And their view is we just need to weaken, systematically weaken so that the state is not able to govern and certainly is not able to project any threat beyond its borders.

他們的觀點是，我們只需要削弱，系統性地削弱，讓國家無法治理，當然也無法向國界以外投射任何威脅。

So, you know, is it short sighted in terms of the possibility of one day having an interlocutor in Iran that could negotiate with the United States or others?

那麼，就短期而言，關於未來伊朗可能出現一個可以與美國或其他國家談判的對話者，這是不是目光短淺？

Potentially, yes, but that's not their objective.

可能會是，但那不是他們的目標。

They're not thinking in those terms and they don't believe that it's the right way to think about it.

他們不是這樣想的，也不認為這樣想是正確的。

他們認為他們正在打一場戰爭。

Where they have the opportunity to weaken Iran in an unprecedented way, the regime in an unprecedented way.

他們有機會以前所未有的方式削弱伊朗，削弱這個政權。

And if they are not constrained by the United States, which so far they have not been truly constrained, they will take this to the next level.

而且如果美國沒有約束他們，而到目前為止美國也確實沒有真正約束他們，他們就會把事情推向另一個層級。

Which is why it is interesting at least that President Trump called on them to stop targeting infrastructure.

這就是為什麼至少很有趣的是，總統唐納·川普呼籲他們停止攻擊基礎設施。

He's not told them to stop targeting regime figures.

他並沒有要他們停止攻擊政權人物。

我懷疑這情況很可能會持續下去。

I think the other observation, sorry, is that even though clearly these are significant losses from the Iranian regime's point of view, it is still striking that the regime is able to continue to act and to react very quickly in terms of their response both to Ayerl Al Rajani's assassination and to the strike on their energy infrastructure to respond right away, which shows that the regime has decentralized decision making and has prepared for this day.

我想另一個觀察是，抱歉，即使這些對伊朗政權來說是重大的損失，但令人驚訝的是，這個政權仍然能夠迅速採取行動和做出反應，無論是針對艾爾·拉賈尼的暗殺，還是針對其能源基礎設施的襲擊，他們都能立即做出回應，這表明該政權已經分散了決策權，並且為這一天做好了準備。