Name: 伊朗的無人機製造能力有多強？| DW 新聞 (How strong is Iran's drone manufacturing capacity? | DW News)
Uploaded: 2026-03-04T06:16:53.000Z
Duration: 12 min 16 s

What is the question few people seem to be asking about the war in Iran?

伊朗戰爭這個問題，好像很少人會問？

Donald Trump says he has the determination and the weapons to keep hitting Iran for another four weeks, maybe longer.

川普說他有決心和武器，可以再打四個星期，甚至更久。

Israel is a big buyer and producer of weapons, so maybe they too have enough supplies to keep working their way through their long list of targets in the Islamic Republic.

以色列是個大武器買家和生產國，所以他們可能也有足夠的補給，來持續處理他們在伊斯蘭共和國的長長目標清單。

But the question I have for my guest, Thomas Juneau is can Israel keep intercepting, keep defending, when Iran has enough drones and missiles to send them by the hundreds every day into Israel, into Oman, into Bahrain, into the United Arab Emirates and Qatar?

不過，我今天要問 Thomas Juneau 的問題是，當伊朗有足夠的無人機和飛彈，每天數百架次地飛往以色列、阿曼、巴林、阿拉伯聯合大公國和卡達時，以色列能夠持續攔截、持續防禦嗎？

Do these countries have enough defensive weapons to keep Iran's drones and missiles at bay?

這些國家有足夠的防禦武器來抵擋伊朗的無人機和飛彈嗎？

Will the air defence systems, is the overarching questions you see in action here, determine how long this war actually lasts for and whether the Iranian regime stays in power?

空防系統，這才是你看到的關鍵問題，將決定這場戰爭實際上會持續多久，以及伊朗政權是否能保住權力？

So far, missile interceptors have ensured that the damage and the casualties from Iranian strikes have been limited.

到目前為止，飛彈攔截系統確保了伊朗攻擊造成的損害和傷亡是有限的。

But they are costly and at some point, supplies will run out.

但它們很昂貴，總有一天補給會用完。

The US and Israel have been targeting drone bases like this one.

美國和以色列一直在瞄準像這樣的無人機基地。

Iran has been launching waves of these drones across the region, using them to overwhelm defense shields.

伊朗一直在該區域發射成群的無人機，試圖壓倒防禦系統。

The Shahed, as they are known, are relatively inexpensive to produce, especially compared to many of the systems used to shoot them down.

這些無人機，也就是「見證者」，生產成本相對便宜，尤其是跟許多用來擊落牠們的系統相比。

Viewers on this channel know about the Patriot system sent to Ukraine.

本頻道的觀眾都知道我們曾介紹過送往烏克蘭的「愛國者」系統。

One system costs hundreds of million dollars on its own.

其中一個系統本身就要數億美元。

It's really good at bringing down drones and missiles, but it's also really expensive.

它非常擅長擊落無人機和飛彈，但同時也非常昂貴。

烏克蘭擁有好幾個這樣的系統。

They would like many more, but they can't get them.

他們希望有更多，但卻拿不到。

Part of the reason they can't have more is that the US is using them to defend its bases in the Gulf, the same bases that are now under attack.

他們拿不到更多部分原因在於，美國正利用這些系統來防禦波斯灣的基地，而這些基地現在正遭受攻擊。

Thomas Junot is a professor at the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs.

Thomas Junot 是渥太華大學公共與國際事務研究院的教授。

Your research, Thomas, is on the Middle east and in particular Iran and Yemen.

Thomas，你的研究是關於中東，特別是伊朗和葉門。

With previous experience with Canada's Department of National Defence well qualified for this chat.

你在加拿大國防部有豐富的經驗，非常適合這次的對談。

Thomas, can we start with the wide view, I guess, trying to work out what happens in Iran.

Thomas，我們能不能先從宏觀的角度來談，試著瞭解伊朗會發生什麼事？

Are we right to be looking for answers in this area of weapons stockpiles?

我們應該從武器庫存這個方面來尋找答案嗎？

There are multiple variables that will determine where things evolve in the coming days and perhaps weeks.

未來幾天甚至幾週的發展，將取決於許多變數。

But one of the most important variables that will shape decision making on both sides is this race, this balance between, on the one side, missiles and drones in Iran and the the capability to intercept them on the American, the Israeli side, but

但其中一個最重要的變數，將會影響雙方的決策，那就是這場競賽，也就是伊朗的飛彈和無人機，以及美國和以色列的攔截能力之間的平衡，

也包括波斯灣阿拉伯國家這邊。

So the American friends in The Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, uae, who will run out first will have a major impact on, on how long this goes.

所以，美國在波斯灣的朋友，像是沙烏地阿拉伯、卡達、阿聯酋，誰先耗盡資源，將會大大影響這場衝突會持續多久。

And that is why, for example, among the main targets that the US And Israel have been focusing on in Israel, in Iran, are the missile launchers and the stockpiles of missiles to make sure that they get an advantage in that race.

這也是為什麼，例如，美國和以色列在伊朗的主要目標之一，就是飛彈發射器和飛彈庫存，以確保他們在這場競賽中取得優勢。

My next question, is that does Iran have enough drones and missiles to keep making life uncomfortable for its neighbors for weeks?

我的下一個問題是，伊朗的無人機和飛彈夠不夠，讓他們能持續幾週讓鄰國感到不安？

Or at least as long as Trump says he can keep up the attacks on Iran?

或者至少像川普說的，能持續攻擊伊朗多久？

Well, in practice, the challenge is that it's very difficult for you or me to answer that question because most of the numbers are not known publicly.

嗯，實際上，挑戰在於，對你我來說，要回答這個問題非常困難，因為大部分的數字都不是公開的。

Obviously in wartime, adversaries do not want the other side to know how much weapons they have left.

顯然在戰時，敵對雙方都不希望對方知道他們還剩下多少武器。

So on the Israeli side, for example, we don't know what is the stockpile of interceptors.

所以舉例來說，在以色列這邊，我們不知道攔截飛彈的庫存有多少。

We know that Israel used a lot of these interceptors, for example, in June of 2025 during the 12 Day War.

我們知道以色列在 2025 年 6 月的 12 天戰爭中，就用了不少這些攔截飛彈。

Israel used some of them at instances or rounds of violence against Iran or against Hezbollah in the past.

以色列過去在對伊朗或對真主黨的暴力衝突中，也用了一些。

We also know that because of that vulnerability, Israel worked very hard to replenish its stockpiles in the past few months, clearly in anticipation for what is going on now.

我們也知道，正因為有這種脆弱性，以色列在過去幾個月非常努力地補充庫存，顯然是為了預期現在正在發生的事情。

But exactly how many are left, we don't know.

但確切還剩下多少，我們不知道。

Similar on the Gulf Arab side, uae, Qatar, Saudi Arabia.

同樣地，在波斯灣的阿拉伯國家這邊，像是阿聯酋、卡達、沙烏地阿拉伯。

How many do they have left is also not clear.

他們還剩下多少，這點也一樣不清楚。

我們知道嗎？或者有辦法得到一些想法嗎？

In that last war of 2025, how close did Israel get to running out of interceptors?

在 2025 年那場最後的戰爭中，以色列離攔截飛彈用罄還有多近？

And sometimes people will focus on certain indicators, but that may be misleading.

有時候大家會關注某些指標，但那可能會誤導人。

So for example, right now there are rumors that Iran may be slowing down some of its missile launches.

所以舉例來說，現在就有傳言說伊朗可能會放慢一些飛彈發射的腳步。

Is it because it doesn't want to show where its launchers are?

是因為它不想讓人家知道發射器的位置嗎？

Is it because it wants to wait for another element?

There's a lot of fog of war right now that prevents us from reaching any kind of firm conclusions.

現在戰場迷霧重重，讓我們無法得出任何確切的結論。

But what is very clear clear is that a, this notion of a race is very important between interceptors and missiles themselves.

但非常清楚的是，a，這種競賽的概念在攔截器和飛彈本身之間非常重要。

And it is causing a lot of anxiety on multiple sides.

The Iranian built shahed drone famously exported to Russia, taking life and making life really uncomfortable in Ukraine through a cold winter.

伊朗製造的Shahed無人機，曾出口到俄羅斯，在寒冷的冬天裡給烏克蘭帶來了生命損失，讓生活非常難熬。

Is that singular piece of equipment a major player in this Iranian conflict?

那單一的裝備在這次伊朗衝突中扮演了重要角色嗎？

You know, the starting point here is really that the Islamic Republic of Iran has long known that in military terms it is much weaker than the US and Israel fighter aircraft, frigates, submarines, tanks, and

你知道，這裡的起點是，伊朗伊斯蘭共和國早就知道，在軍事上它遠比美國和以色列的戰鬥機、護衛艦、潛艇、坦克等弱，而且

And that's why in the past few decades, Iran has really focused on, in particular missiles and drones, because these are what we can call equalizers.

這也是為什麼過去幾十年來，伊朗特別專注於飛彈和無人機，因為這些可以說是「均勢器」。

That despite Iran's overall vulnerability, it allows it to threaten to inflict a cost on its adversaries.

儘管伊朗整體上很脆弱，但這讓它能夠威脅要讓對手付出代價。

The missiles have been hugely important, but so have the drones.

And that's a bit of a more recent development.

We have seen Iran really develop a very strong indigenous capacity to not only build its own drones, to export them.

我們看到伊朗真的發展出非常強大的本土能力，不僅能製造自己的無人機，還能出口。

So we've seen, for example, the Houthis in Yemen develop a very strong drone capacity to a large degree thanks to Iran.

所以我們看到，例如葉門的胡塞武裝，在很大程度上得益於伊朗，發展出了非常強大的無人機能力。

And as you mentioned, we've also seen Iran export that capacity to Russia, not only selling or providing Russia with drones, but

而且正如你提到的，我們也看到伊朗將這種能力出口到俄羅斯，不僅是賣或提供俄羅斯無人機，

also even going so far as to help Russia building its own drone manufacturing capacity inside Russia for its own war against Ukraine.

甚至還協助俄羅斯在俄羅斯境內建立自己的無人機製造能力，用於對烏克蘭的戰爭。

What's being used to typically bring down these drones?

通常是用什麼來擊落這些無人機？

And what is the cost of a shahed drone compared to the cost of a Patriot interceptus?

那一架 Shahed 無人機的成本，跟愛國者飛彈的攔截成本相比是多少？

So the cost of a shahed drone, which is not the only, but

所以，Shahed 無人機的成本，它不是唯一，但

the most common drone that Iran uses, is in the several tens of thousands of American dollars.

是伊朗最常用的無人機，大約是幾萬美元。

The precise cost is difficult to say, but we're in that range.

確切的成本很難說，但大概就在這個範圍。

An interceptor, whether Patriot or of other types.

攔截器，不管是愛國者飛彈還是其他類型的。

There are multiple types of interceptors.

Cost about a million dollars, varies a lot, but again, we're in that range.

大約要一百萬美元，變動很大，但同樣地，我們就在這個範圍。

In addition, to shoot down one drone, you will often need more than one interceptor to make sure that you get it, perhaps two or three.

此外，要擊落一架無人機，你通常需要不只一個攔截器，才能確保擊落它，可能需要兩到三個。

So if you only look at the numbers, there's a very clear imbalance here.

所以如果只看數字，這裡就很明顯有失衡。

Two to three million dollars perhaps for two or three interceptors against 50ish thousand dollars for the drone itself.

兩到三百萬美元，可能要用兩三個攔截器，對比無人機本身大概五萬美元。

But that's a bit misleading in this or incomplete in the sense that the financial capacities are not the same.

但這樣看有點誤導，或者說不完整，因為財政能力不同。

Iran is a country, yes, a large country, but strangulated by economic and financial sanctions.

伊朗是一個國家，是的，一個大國，但卻受到經濟和金融制裁的鉗制。

Whereas on the Gulf side, Qatar, the uae, very rich countries, the US obviously, with a massive defence budget of almost a trillion dollars.

而海灣這邊，卡達、阿聯酋，都是非常富有的國家，美國當然也是，擁有近兆美元的龐大國防預算。

So, yes, these numbers matter in terms of dollar figures, but

所以，是的，這些數字在金額上很重要，但是

they do have to put in to be put into a broader context.

它們必須放在更廣泛的脈絡裡。

So the big question I referred to earlier, how long can these countries keep defending against Iran's weapons and how long before they might have to put pressure on the US and Israel to stop attacking Iran?

所以，我之前提到的那個大問題，這些國家還能防禦伊朗的武器多久，或者多久之後他們可能得向美國和以色列施壓，要求停止攻擊伊朗？

Well, in the case of the Arab Gulf states, we know that they were putting pressure before the war on the US and Israel not to attack, because clearly, and

嗯，就阿拉伯海灣國家來說，我們知道在戰爭之前，他們就已經向美國和以色列施壓，不要發動攻擊，因為很明顯，而且

as we're seeing now, no, they're not friends of Iran at all, but

正如我們現在看到的，他們根本不是伊朗的朋友，但是

they're at the front lines, unlike Israel and even less so the us.

他們在前線，不像以色列，更不像美國。

As soon as they started being attacked by Iran, they started aligning themselves more closely with the us they are right now.

一旦他們開始受到伊朗的攻擊，他們就開始更緊密地與美國結盟，就是現在這樣。

And this is an important point to make, absolutely furious at Iran.

這點很重要，他們對伊朗感到非常憤怒。

But they have, according to some media reports, already started putting some pressure on the US to seek an off ramp because again, they are the ones that are at the front line here.

但是，根據一些媒體報導，他們已經開始對美國施壓，要求尋求緩和局勢的途徑，因為，他們才是這裡的前線。

But one thing that I do expect to happen, if the war does go on in terms of weeks, which is one possible scenario, a real possible scenario, I would expect the pace of, of Iranian missiles and drones to somewhat slow down because there's the interceptor issue on the side of those being shot at.

但我預期會發生的事是，如果戰爭持續數週，這是一種可能的情況，一種非常可能的情況，我預期伊朗飛彈和無人機的發射速度會稍微減慢，因為被攻擊方有攔截的問題。

But on the Iranian side, their missile stocks are not endless.

但在伊朗這邊，他們的飛彈庫存並非無限。

Their intermediate missiles, those able to reach Israel are actually maybe about 2000 at the beginning of this war and that is fast going down.

他們的中程飛彈，那些能打到以色列的，戰爭初期可能約有兩千枚，而且這個數字正在快速下降。

Some are being used, some are being destroyed.

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伊朗的無人機製造能力有多強？| DW 新聞 (How strong is Iran's drone manufacturing capacity? | DW News)

vulnerable

absolutely

significant

scenario