Name: 美國為何在中東泥足深陷？｜費裡德專欄 (Why America keeps getting bogged down in the Middle East | Fareed's Take)
Uploaded: 2026-03-15T21:35:39.000Z
Duration: 10 min 4 s

基礎被動語態

For around 15 years, many American leaders, including all three presidents in that period, have believed that the country was too deeply entangled in trying to reorder the societies of the Middle East.

大約十五年來，包括當時在任的三位總統在內，許多美國領導人都認為美國過度深陷於重塑中東社會的泥沼中。

They felt the more pressing challenges were rebuilding America's industrial base at home and confronting the rise of China.

他們覺得更迫切的挑戰是重建美國國內的工業基礎，以及應對中國的崛起。

Yet here, America is once again fighting a war to reorder a society in the greater Middle East.

然而在這裡，美國又再次為了重塑大中東地區的社會而戰。

And and like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, this seems unlikely to turn out quite as its proponents hoped.

而且，就像伊拉克、阿富汗和利比亞一樣，這場戰爭似乎不太可能像支持者期望的那樣結束。

To understand the present, let's look at the past.

要了解現在，我們就來看看過去。

The only country in modern history whose global reach matched that of the United States.

在現代歷史上，唯一一個全球影響力能與美國匹敵的國家。

Britain, at the turn of the 20th century, was the world's sole superpower.

在二十世紀初，英國是當時世界上唯一的超級強權。

The British Empire's share of global GDP reached roughly 25% in the late 19th century, about the same as the US today.

在十九世紀末，大英帝國在全球 GDP 中的佔比約為 25%，這和現在的美國差不多。

And London was the world's financial capital.

而且倫敦是當時世界的金融中心。

Britain had thwarted Napoleon's bid to rule the European continent and Russia's effort to expand more into southeastern Europe.

英國挫敗了拿破崙統治歐洲大陸的企圖，也阻止了俄羅斯進一步擴張到東南歐。

During the Crimean War, it presided over a vast empire that spanned the globe and set the agenda for international life, much as Washington does today.

在克里米亞戰爭期間，英國主導著一個橫跨全球的龐大帝國，並制定國際事務的議程，這和現在的華盛頓差不多。

Over the course of those decades, roughly from the 1880s through the 1920s, Britain found itself responding to instability, nasty regimes and power vacuums all over Asia and Africa.

在那些幾十年間，大約從 1880 年代到 1920 年代，英國發現自己必須應對亞洲和非洲各地的不穩定、惡劣政權以及權力真空。

It sent troops and asserted control in places like Sudan and Somalia, Iraq and Jordan.

他們派遣軍隊並在蘇丹、索馬利亞、伊拉克和約旦等地建立控制。

These missions all seemed compelling at the time, but

當時這些任務看起來都很重要，但

had the effect of keeping London distracted by an endless sea series of local crises in peripheral parts of the world, often at great cost.

卻讓倫敦分心於世界邊緣地區無窮無盡的局部危機，而且往往付出高昂代價。

The Iraqi Rebellion of 1920 required more than 100,000 British and Indian troops and tens of millions of pounds to put down at a time when the estimated total budget for education in Britain was roughly the same as the cost of that Iraqi excursion.

1920 年的伊拉克叛亂，需要動用超過 10 萬名英國和印度部隊，以及數千萬英鎊才能平息，而當時英國教育的總預算估計，大約就等於鎮壓這次伊拉克行動的開銷。

While British leaders passionately debated their strategy in Mesopotamia, they fundamentally neglected the real economic and technological challenge that they faced as Britain battled with tribes in the Middle east and Africa.

當英國領導人熱切辯論他們在美索不達米亞的戰略時，他們卻徹底忽略了他們所面臨的真正經濟和技術挑戰，因為英國正在與中東和非洲的部落作戰。

Across the Atlantic, the United States was quietly building the most advanced industrial economy the world had ever seen.

在大西洋的另一邊，美國卻在悄悄地建立起世界上最先進的工業經濟體。

In Europe after World War I, a defeated Germany steadily rebuilt its industry and a highly mechanized military apparatus.

第一次世界大戰後，戰敗的德國在歐洲穩步重建了工業和高度機械化的軍事體系。

Britain, distracted by the chaotic periphery, was being systematically surpassed at its core.

英國則因為被混亂的邊緣地區牽制，核心實力被系統性地超越。

The result over time was that Great Britain collapsed as the world's leading power.

長此以往的結果就是，大英帝國作為世界領導強權的地位崩潰了。

America today is at least as powerful as Britain ever was, but

如今的美國，至少和當年英國一樣強大，但是

it is succumbing to some of the same imperial temptations it responds to genuine crises.

它卻正在屈服於一些和當年英國一樣的帝國誘惑，來應對真實的危機。

In the Middle east, it sees a logic that is political, military, and

在中東，美國看到了政治、軍事和

moral in responding, but ultimately grand Strategy is about prioritizing finite resources.

道德上的回應邏輯，但歸根究柢，大戰略就是關於如何優先分配有限的資源。

The US does not possess infinite political capital, bandwidth, military capacity or economic resilience.

美國並沒有無限的政治籌碼、處理能力、軍事能力或經濟韌性。

Every airstrike on Tehran, every anti drone interceptor shot over the Persian Gulf, and

每一次對德黑蘭的空襲、每一次在波斯灣上空擊落的無人機攔截器，以及

every hour administration officials spend debating the nuances of of Iranian political succession is energy diverted from the true tectonic challenges defining the 21st century.

行政官員花費的時間去爭論伊朗政治繼承的細微差別，這些都是從定義 21 世紀的真正重大挑戰中轉移出來的精力。

The primary indispensable role of the United States is to anchor the global system against the revisionist ambitions of Beijing and Moscow.

美國不可或缺的主要角色，就是穩定全球體系，對抗北京和莫斯科的修正主義野心。

China is not getting bogged down in Middle Eastern quagmires.

中國並沒有在中東的泥沼裡停滯不前。

It is relentlessly investing in artificial intelligence, quantum computing science, solar and wind power, batteries and robots, the technologies that will determine the balance of global power.

中國正不懈地投資於人工智慧、量子運算科學、太陽能和風力發電、電池和機器人，這些科技將決定全球權力的平衡。

Russia remains fiercely committed to disrupting the European security architecture and undermining Western democracies through hybrid political military warfare that has proved hard to detect and even harder to defeat.

俄羅斯依然堅定地致力於瓦解歐洲安全架構，並透過難以偵測、更難擊敗的混合政治軍事戰爭來削弱西方民主國家。

But while Moscow and Beijing challenged the basic architecture of America's world order, Washington is preparing once again to spend blood and treasure policing the Middle east and trying to pick the leaders of one of its countries.

然而，當莫斯科和北京挑戰美國世界秩序的基本架構時，華盛頓卻又一次準備投入血汗來維護中東的秩序，並試圖決定其中一個國家的領導人。

History suggests that great powers often succumb to the allure of small wars precisely because they tempt the strongest nation to use its awesome military might and offer the illusion of quick political and moral victories.

歷史顯示，大國經常屈服於小戰爭的誘惑，正是因為這些戰爭會誘使最強大的國家動用其強大的軍事實力，並提供快速的政治和道德勝利的幻覺。

Unfortunately, these tactical successes rarely translate into strategic gains and more often serve as the first step toward long term exhaustion.

遺憾的是，這些戰術上的成功很少能轉化為戰略上的收益，反而更常是長期耗竭的第一步。

Even if the intervention in Iran succeeds, it would require that America get deeply involved in the fate of that country.

即使介入伊朗的行動成功了，這也將要求美國深入參與該國的命運。

Is that ultimately where America's time and energy would be best devoted over the next decade?

在接下來的十年裡，這最終會是美國最能有效運用時間和精力的去處嗎？

從英國的經驗中，我們學到了清楚的教訓。

Great powers do not usually fall because they are conquered by foreign armies.

大國通常不是因為被外國軍隊征服而滅亡。

They fall because they overextend themselves on the periphery while neglecting the core.

他們滅亡是因為過度擴張邊緣地區，而忽略了核心。

Joining me now is Karim Sajdapur, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment focusing on Iran and US Foreign policy.

現在加入我們的是卡林．薩傑德普爾，他是卡內基國際和平基金會的高級研究員，專注於伊朗和美國外交政策。

And Lisa Anderson, professor of International Relations at Columbia and a former president of the American University in Cairo.

還有麗莎．安德森，哥倫比亞大學國際關係學教授，曾任開羅美國大學校長。

Karim, so explain to us what Iran is thinking right now, as best you can tell, because they seem to have gone for this.

卡林，所以請盡你所能地解釋一下伊朗現在在想什麼，因為他們似乎已經採取了行動。

This widen the war strategy, attacking a whole bunch of Arab countries, mostly in the Gulf, even places like Dubai, where a lot of Iranian money is laundered and it runs through.

這個擴大戰爭的策略，攻擊了許多阿拉伯國家，大多在中東灣區，甚至像是杜拜這種伊朗資金洗錢和流通的地方。

Is this a kind of blow it all up strategy?

這是一種「玉石俱焚」的策略嗎？

I think so fari this is a regime which came to power in 1979 by taking American diplomats hostage and they've now taken the global economy hostage.

我認為到目前為止，這是一個在1979年透過挾持美國外交官人質上臺的政權，現在他們挾持了全球經濟。

And their game is obviously to divide American public opinion, turn American public opinion against this war by spiking the price of oil and asking Americans to ask their members of Congress and President Trump, how on earth have we gotten into another conflict in this region?

他們的策略顯然是分化美國公眾輿論，透過推高油價來讓美國公眾輿論反對這場戰爭，並要求美國人去問他們的國會議員和川普總統，我們到底為什麼又捲入了這個地區的另一場衝突？

You know, these economies in the Gulf, they are spending trillions of dollars on transport and AI and other kinds of technology.

你知道嗎，這些海灣國家的經濟，他們在運輸和AI和其他科技上花費了數兆美元。

And Iran has come by with $20,000 drones and threatened their existence.

而伊朗卻帶著兩萬架無人機來威脅他們的存在。

So when you look at that issue, Lisa, the way in which Iran has been attacking the Gulf states, is it a miscalculation?

所以當你看到這個問題時，麗莎，伊朗攻擊海灣國家的方式，這是一種誤判嗎？

Because it seems to me that what the Iranian strategy was will attack the Gulf states.

因為在我看來，伊朗的策略是攻擊海灣國家。

They will run to Washington and say, stop this war.

他們會跑去華盛頓說，停止這場戰爭。

In fact, what's happened is the Gulf states have become increasingly incensed at Iran and.

事實上，現在的情況是，海灣國家越來越對伊朗感到憤怒。

And are in some way giving the United States and Israel a kind of legitimacy to wage the war.

並且在某種程度上給予美國和以色列發動戰爭的合法性。

I think that's true, at least in the short run.

我認為至少在短期內，這是真的。

I think one of the strategies for Iran is also, of course, to keep this going for a long time.

我認為伊朗的策略之一，當然也是讓這場衝突持續下去。

That makes it more expensive for the world, and

這會讓全世界付出更多代價，而且

it makes it more expensive for all of the Gulf states as well.

也讓所有海灣國家付出更多代價。

So if it had been as the Trump administration and the Netanyahu.

所以，如果像川普政府和納坦雅胡。

Netanyahu government clearly thought it would be quick, then it was a miscalculation.

納坦雅胡政府認為會很快結束，那他們就錯估了。

But over the course of time, it doesn't seem unlikely that many of these countries will start pressuring the United States to say, you know, we've had enough.

但隨著時間過去，這些國家裡很多人開始向美國施壓，說「我們受夠了」，這似乎不是不可能。

This is too hard now, because for places like Dubai, the instability is killing the entire raison debtor.

現在太難了，因為像杜拜這樣的地方，不穩定性正在摧毀它存在的意義。

All of the promises that this was a stable, open, easy place for obviously have evaporated.

那些關於這裡穩定、開放、便利的承諾，顯然都消失了。

So the oil and gas producers are unhappy and the sort of business community is unhappy.

所以產油產氣的國家不高興，整個商業社群也不高興。

What do you think it tells us about Iran that Mujtaba Khamenei was appointed, elected.

你覺得這件事告訴我們關於伊朗什麼，穆罕默德·穆罕默迪被任命、被選上。

It feels to me like this is almost like a coup by the Revolutionary Guard.

我覺得這根本就像是革命衛隊的政變。

What is if A, would you agree, and B, what does it mean?

如果A，你同意嗎？B，這代表什麼意思？

The Revolutionary Guards are the main power in Iran and they have closed ranks around the son of the supreme Leader.

革命衛隊是伊朗的主要勢力，他們已經團結在最高領袖的兒子周圍。

And this is a regime which has gone back to original principles.

這是一個回歸原始原則的政權。

If you read the maiden speech of Mojtab Al Khamenei, there was no new ideas.

如果你讀了穆罕默德·穆罕默迪的處女演講，裡面沒有什麼新想法。

他一次都沒提過現代化這個詞。

He used the word martyrdom and resistance, something which a majority of Iranian society is not interested in.

他用了殉道和抵抗這些詞，但大部分伊朗社會對這些不感興趣。

And I don't expect Farid that he is going to be a powerful leader like his father who ruled for 37 years.

而且我也不認為法瑞德會像他當了37年總統的父親那樣，成為一個強而有力的領導人。

You know, Lisa is one of the great scholars of North Africa and wonderful observation which a North African scholar made in the 14th century Ibn Khaldun that empires are built and destroyed over three generations.

你知道，麗莎是北非的頂尖學者之一，她引用了14世紀北非學者伊本赫勒敦的一段很棒的觀察：帝國的興衰通常是三代人的事。

First generation are the builders, second generation consolidate, third generation squander.

第一代是建立者，第二代是鞏固者，第三代則是揮霍者。

Moshebah Khamenei is a third generation leader of this Islamic Republic.

穆罕默德·穆罕默迪是這個伊斯蘭共和國的第三代領導人。

I don't expect he's going to be anything more than a transitional figure.

我認為他只會是一個過渡性的人物。