Name: 荷姆茲海峽3艘商船疑遭「不明投射物」擊中！BBC新聞追蹤報導 (Three commercial ships damaged by ‘unknown projectors’ in Strait of Hormuz | BBC News)
Uploaded: 2026-03-11T16:58:14.000Z
Duration: 10 min 55 s

But let's talk about what's happening in the Persian Gulf because we've very clearly had a demonstration this morning, had anyone doubted it, of the dangers to shipping.

不過，我們來聊聊波斯灣發生的事，因為今天早上我們已經清楚地看到，如果有人還懷疑的話，運輸的危險性。

Three cargo vessels struck in short order, one of them currently on fire off the coast of Dubai.

短時間內有三艘貨船受損，其中一艘目前在杜拜外海起火。

The critical pinch point, as we've been telling you throughout, is the Strait of Hormuz, just 21 miles across at its narrowest point.

正如我們一直告訴大家的，關鍵的瓶頸點就是荷姆茲海峽，最窄處只有 21 英里寬。

And in normal times, around a fifth of the world's daily supply of oil and gas passes through that strait.

在正常時期，全球每天約有五分之一的石油和天然氣供應都通過這條海峽。

There is some evidence that ships have been moving in spite of the risk, with transponders turned off.

有一些跡象顯示，船隻在關閉應答器的情況下，冒險前行。

But clearly the latest spate of attacks is going to force a rethink.

但顯然，最近這一連串的攻擊將迫使重新思考。

President Trump has talked about force protection of the convoys, but

川普總統談到了護航隊的部隊保護，但是

for how long and what does that military option look like?

這能持續多久？軍事選項看起來又是什麼樣的？

With me is Mikey Kay, military analyst for the security brief.

和我在一起的是軍事分析師 Mikey Kay，他負責安全簡報。

First of all, let's understand that properly before we talk about the response.

首先，在我們討論應對措施之前，先來好好了解一下。

I was speaking to a former commander of UK Mine countermeasures vessel who operated in the Persian Gulf.

我曾和一位曾在波斯灣服役的英國掃雷艇前指揮官聊過。

And the threat isn't what you think it is in terms of conventional.

威脅並不像你想像的那麼常規。

Okay, so the big conventional threats are ballistic missiles and anti shipping missiles.

好的，所以主要的常規威脅是彈道飛彈和反艦飛彈。

The Iranians, for example, have just purchased what's called the CM302.

例如，伊朗人剛購買了所謂的 CM302。

It's a supersonic anti shipping missile that, that the Iranians have just purchased from China.

這是一種超音速反艦飛彈，伊朗人剛從中國購買。

They don't have them yet, but they are potentially a potent threat.

他們還沒有，但這可能是一個強大的威脅。

The Iranians are the masters of what is called asymmetric warfare.

伊朗人是所謂不對稱作戰的大師。

Asymmetric warfare using tactics like sabotage, suicide bombings, hit and run attacks, urban warfare.

不對稱作戰使用像是破壞、自殺炸彈、打了就跑的攻擊、城鎮戰等戰術。

Basically the objective of asymmetric warfare is to aim to not destroy but disrupt the enemy so they can frustrate and outlast the enemy.

基本上不對稱作戰的目標不是摧毀敵人，而是擾亂敵人，讓他們能夠挫敗並耗盡敵人的精力。

So what does asymmetric warfare look like in the Straits of Hormuz?

那麼，在荷姆茲海峽，不對稱作戰會是什麼樣子呢？

Well, the major threat is what is called go fasts.

嗯，主要的威脅是所謂的「快艇」。

Go fast is what the terminology that, that, that he used.

「快艇」是術語，是，是，是他使用的。

I think we've got some video footage there.

我想我們有這方面的影片畫面。

And he even mentioned jet skis being used with the driver, with someone on the back with an RPG, for example.

他甚至提到噴射滑雪板，載著駕駛，後面還有一個人拿著 RPG，舉例來說。

Now you're not going to sink a vessel with an G, but

嗯，你不會用 RPG 擊沉一艘船，但是

So a vessel as small as that is useful in that context.

所以像那樣小的船在這個情境下很有用。

And the lanes are actually 3 kilometers wide inside that 21, 21 mile straight.

而且航道在 21 英里寬的海峽內，實際寬度是 3 公里。

So yeah, so, so that's the go fast are really interesting.

所以，對，所以，所以那些快速船隻真的很有趣。

Well, you literally have to put all hands on deck on the surface and those use things like machine guns, but

嗯，你真的必須讓所有人都上甲板，在水面上，而且他們會使用像機槍的東西，但是

also something called a close in weapon system.

還有一個叫做近距離武器系統的東西。

I think we've got some footage of a close in weapon system.

我想我們有一些近距離武器系統的畫面。

It's basically a gatling gun with six barrels that fires anything between 3,000 to 4,500 rounds a minute.

它基本上是一把六管的蓋特林機槍，每分鐘可以發射 3,000 到 4,500 發子彈。

And that can be used, that's out to about one to two kilometers.

而且它可以用，它的射程大約在一到兩公里。

But if they're coming with swarms again, it's really difficult.

但是如果他們又帶著蜂群來，那真的很難。

Now the other really interesting bit that he spoke about is something that we've, we've heard about going back decades is mining and how the Iranians mine the Straits of Hormuz.

現在另一個他提到的非常有趣的部分是，我們聽說了幾十年關於伊朗人如何佈設水雷，以及他們如何佈設荷姆茲海峽的水雷。

And this is fascinating because during this time of year when it gets hot, there becomes a humidity layer which reduces the visibility.

而且這很有趣，因為這時候的天氣會變熱，會有一層濕氣，降低了能見度。

So when it reduces the visibility, the radar finds it difficult to be able to see what's in the close proximity.

所以當能見度降低時，雷達就難以偵測近距離的目標。

This is why the fast swarming boats are really, really effective when the visibility is low.

這就是為什麼在能見度低的時候，這種快速蜂群式的小艇非常非常有效。

When it comes to mining and the visibility is low, you can't eyeball the mines.

當談到佈雷，而且能見度低的時候，你就無法用肉眼看到水雷。

Now we're talking about old World War II mines that have the spikes coming out that are basically contact fuses.

現在我們說的是二次世界大戰時期的老式水雷，上面有突出的尖刺，基本上是接觸式引信。

And what happens in the Gulf of Oman around the Straits of Hormuzes is that when the Iranians put mines in, the currents actually go in a circular motion.

在阿曼灣荷姆茲海峽周圍的情況是，當伊朗人佈下水雷時，洋流實際上會以圓周運動的方式流動。

So the minehunters can go and mine, hunt a specific area, but the currents are going round.

所以掃雷艇可以去掃雷，掃描特定區域，但洋流卻在打轉。

So he basically said it's a strategic game of chess.

所以他基本上說這是一場戰略性的西洋棋對弈。

And the big problem with mines are if the Iranians say that they have mined a certain area, it's now up to the US or whoever's patrolling to disprove that.

而且大問題是，如果伊朗人說他們已經在地雷區佈雷，那現在就得由美國或任何巡邏的部隊來證明這點。

And it's, it's not just about mine laying vessels that the Iranians have.

而且這不只是伊朗擁有的佈雷艦而已。

We know that the, you know, Pete, he says, has spoken about the Navy being one of the objectives.

我們知道，你知道，Pete 說過，海軍是其中一個目標。

The point here is coming back to asymmetric warfare, that any Iranian vessel can lay a mine, including a fishing, fishing vessel.

重點是回到不對稱作戰，任何伊朗船隻都可以佈雷，包括漁船。

That's why it's a big problem to target the threat.

這就是為什麼要鎖定威脅是個大問題。

According to rumors from Washington, they've talked about it, but

根據華盛頓傳來的傳言，他們已經談論過，但

there's not a cohesive plan of how to put it in the Persian Gulf.

並沒有一個連貫的計畫要如何在波斯灣實施。

Explain to me what you would have to put in place in order to defend the convoys passing through.

請跟我說明一下，為了保護通過的護航隊，我們需要部署哪些措施？

And the US does have some vessels that are actually designed for escort.

美國確實有一些船艦是專門設計來執行護航任務的。

I think we just had a picture up of one earlier.

我想我們剛才前面有放過其中一艘的圖片。

But the numbers, you just have to look at the ratios.

但數字方面，你只要看看比例就知道。

I think the US have currently 24 in service.

And if you look at the amount of vessels, maritime shipping that's going through the Straits of Hormuz on a daily basis, it's 40 to 60 vessels, although that number is down, I think.

如果看看每天通過荷姆茲海峽的船艦、海上運輸量，大約是 40 到 60 艘，雖然這個數字好像有下降。

I think we've got a time lapse just to show how much the shipping has actually decreased and bottlenecking, if you like.

我覺得我們有準備一個縮時攝影，來展示運輸量實際上減少了多少，以及如果喜歡的話，所謂的瓶頸現象。

But I mentioned that some of them are turning their transponders off, so there's more ships going through than we think are going through.

但我提到有些船艦會關閉應答器，所以實際通過的船隻比我們認為的還要多。

That's shipping that is using what's called going dark, as you say, by turning the transponders off.

這就是所謂的「關閉應答器」的運輸，就像你說的，關閉應答器。

You can see the bottleneck there on the screen of the lack of shipping that's going through.

你可以看到螢幕上的瓶頸，顯示通過的運輸量減少了。

What is getting through, as you say, is shipping that's going dark or it's spoofing.

正如你所說，通過的都是那些「關閉應答器」或使用偽裝的運輸。

Spoofing means that it's pretending to be someone else, for example, wearing a Chinese name or example that you see on radar.

偽裝的意思是冒充別人，例如，在雷達上顯示為中國的船名或例子。

So that's what is happening in order for those vessels to.

And what does that mean for insurance for Lloyds of London, who have to insure these vessels?

這對要為這些船隻投保的倫敦勞合社的保險意味著什麼？

Absolute nightmare, because the war premiums, which are traditionally at about.125 of whole value, are now going up to about 1 to 3%, which is a significant amount, to ensure a vessel of those of that size.

簡直是場惡夢，因為戰爭保費，傳統上大約是。船價的 0.125%，現在要漲到大約 1% 到 3%，這對為這麼大的船隻投保來說，是一筆相當可觀的金額。

The other bit is that the insurance companies use all the data that comes from the movement that's tracked on the transponders.

另外，保險公司會利用應答器追蹤到的所有航行數據。

And in order to draw up those premiums, that data is now going, we saw from the, from the time lapse image.

為了計算這些保費，這些數據現在會被用來，我們從延時影像中看到了。

So they're now having to use satellite imagery, synthetic aperture radar, geolocation to be able to sort of try and drum up these premiums of war premiums for these ships, which is just throwing the whole insurance premium policies off for every vessel that is going into the Persian Gulf.

所以他們現在必須使用衛星影像、合成孔徑雷達、地理定位，來試圖計算這些船隻的戰爭保費，這對進入波斯灣的每艘船的保險保單都造成了很大的影響。

Ironically, the vessels that are getting through, aside from those that can convince the IRGC they're Chinese, are Iranian vessels because they're not going to strike their own and they have a lot of oil that they can move.

諷刺的是，除了那些能讓伊朗革命衛隊相信他們是中國船隻的船之外，能夠通過的船隻是伊朗船隻，因為他們不會攻擊自己的船，而且他們有很多石油可以運輸。

And the centerpiece, or the center of gravity, if you like, of Iran's oil export is an island called Carg Island.

而伊朗石油出口的核心，或者說重心，是一個叫做卡格島的島嶼。

I think we've got, I think we've got a graphic to show you.

我想我們有，我想我們有圖卡可以給各位看。

Cog island is about 30 miles off the coast of Iran.

卡格島距離伊朗海岸約 30 英里。

And effectively it is a oil export facility.

它實際上是一個石油出口設施。