Name: 俄羅斯海軍怎麼輸給一個沒有船的國家？😲 (How the Russian Navy Lost to a Country Without Any Boats)
Uploaded: 2026-03-27T17:13:37.000Z
Duration: 40 min 24 s

There's something fascinating happening in the Black Sea right now that could change the future of warfare in the 21st century forever.

現在黑海正發生一件令人著迷的事，這可能會永遠改變 21 世紀的戰爭未來。

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began more than two years ago, the war on the land has extended into a war at sea as well, and

自從俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭兩年多以來，陸地上的戰爭也延伸到了海上，

程度副詞

the Russian Navy has not been having a very good time.

而俄羅斯海軍的日子過得並不太順遂。

The Ukrainians have managed to sink ship after ship after ship in the Black Sea to the point where, two years into this war, the entire Russian Black Sea fleet that operates in the region has collectively lost around a third of all its vessels and 40% of all its tonnage to the bottom of the sea.

烏克蘭人設法一艘又一艘地擊沉了黑海的船艦，到了戰爭進行到第二年的現在，該地區的整個俄羅斯黑海艦隊總共損失了約三分之一的船艦和 40% 的總噸位沉入海底。

And faced with such catastrophic losses largely inflicted in the seas around Crimea, the Ukrainians have forced the majority of the remaining Russian ships in the Black Sea to retreat from their centuries-old headquarters at Sevastopol in Crimea towards a new operating headquarters on the Black Sea's eastern rim at Novorossiysk, hundreds of kilometers away from the military front lines around Crimea.

面對這些主要是在克里米亞周邊海域造成的災難性損失，烏克蘭人迫使黑海中大多數剩餘的俄羅斯船艦，從他們位於克里米亞的百年總部塞凡堡，撤退到位於黑海東緣新羅西斯克的新作戰總部，距離克里米亞周邊的軍事前線數百公里遠。

The Ukrainians have shattered the Russian naval blockade on their coastline so thoroughly by this point that the country is now, as of 2024, exporting even more goods to the global market than it was before the invasion even began.

到了這個階段，烏克蘭人徹底粉碎了俄羅斯對他們海岸線的海上封鎖，以至於到了 2024 年，該國出口到全球市場的貨物甚至比入侵開始前還要多。

And what's most impressive about all of this is that Ukraine has managed to effectively checkmate the Russian Navy in the Black Sea without even having a navy of their own, and

而這一切最令人印象深刻的是，烏克蘭在沒有自己的海軍，

甚至沒有一艘現役戰艦的情況下，成功地讓俄羅斯海軍在黑海陷入了戰術上的僵局，

Ukraine has pulled off what appears to be nothing less than a naval miracle, and

烏克蘭人實現了看似海上奇蹟般的成就，

how they've managed to do it will be studied at naval war colleges for generations to come.

他們是如何做到的，將會在海軍戰爭學院被研究好幾代。

And there are some analysts who have even begun to suggest that Ukraine's unprecedented destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet has shown that big, expensive surface warships like cruisers, destroyers, and

有些分析師甚至開始認為，烏克蘭對俄羅斯黑海艦隊前所未有的摧毀，已經證明瞭像巡洋艦、驅逐艦，

even aircraft carriers could be obsolete weapons of war in the high-tech world of the 21st century.

甚至航空母艦這種大型昂貴的水面戰艦，在 21 世紀的高科技世界裡可能已經是過時的戰爭武器了。

This is how Ukraine, a nation without a navy, managed to effectively destroy an enemy navy that was, on paper, vastly more powerful and capable, and

這就是烏克蘭，一個沒有海軍的國家，是如何成功地摧毀了一支在紙面上遠比它強大和有能力的敵方海軍，

以及這一切可能會如何永遠改變世界。

First of all, it's important for you to understand Russia's inherent geographic disadvantages when it comes to its ability to wage naval warfare.

首先，我們要讓大家瞭解俄羅斯在進行海軍作戰時，固有的地理劣勢。

Throughout Russian history, Russian naval planners have had to contend with the fact that their coastlines on the Arctic, the Pacific, the Baltic Sea, and

在俄羅斯歷史上，俄羅斯海軍的規劃者們必須面對一個事實，那就是他們在北極、太平洋、波羅的海和

the Black Sea are all separated from each other by hundreds or even thousands of kilometers.

黑海的海岸線彼此之間都相隔數百甚至數千公里。

It is very geographically difficult to transport warships between the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Arctic Ocean, or the Pacific Ocean, and

在黑海、波羅的海、北極海或太平洋之間運輸戰艦，地理上非常困難，

in some cases it takes literally months' worth of travel to accomplish, and

在某些情況下，完成運輸甚至需要長達數個月的時間，

the ships have to pass through multiple potentially dangerous narrow choke points all along the way.

而且船艦一路上都必須通過好幾個潛在危險的狹窄瓶頸點。

Because of this, Russia has never been able to effectively concentrate its naval forces in a single theater the same way that the British, the Japanese, or the Americans have been able to do, and

這也讓俄羅斯沒辦法像英國、日本或美國那樣，把海軍力量集中在一個戰區，

so Russian naval strategy has always had to contend with this so-called four seas problem for centuries.

所以俄羅斯的海軍戰略幾個世紀以來，都得面對這個所謂的「四大洋問題」。

Rather than having a single large operating navy, Russia has been geographically forced to divide its naval forces and operate four separate, smaller, largely independent regional navies in the Arctic, the Pacific, the Baltic, and

俄羅斯的海軍並不是集中一個大型艦隊，而是地理上被迫將海軍力量分散，在北極、太平洋、波羅的海和

the Black Sea instead, which has always made the Russian Navy more vulnerable to getting overwhelmed by foreign powers who can more easily concentrate their naval forces into a single location.

黑海各自獨立運作，這讓俄羅斯海軍更容易被能夠集中海軍力量到單一地點的外國勢力壓制。

The most classic example of this was during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 to 1905.

最經典的例子就是1904到1905年的日俄戰爭。

The Japanese began the war by concentrating all of their naval forces in the Pacific and launching a surprise attack against the numerically inferior Russian Pacific Fleet that, at the time, was headquartered in Port Arthur in modern-day China.

日本人開戰時，將所有海軍力量集中在太平洋，並對當時駐紮在中國旅順的、數量較少的俄羅斯太平洋艦隊發動突襲。

Then the Russians responded to the attack by assembling additional warships that were all the way over on the other side of Eurasia, in the Baltic and Black Seas, and

接著俄羅斯為了應對這次攻擊，集結了遠在歐亞大陸另一端的波羅的海和黑海的戰艦，

over a period of 18 months painstakingly transported them all the way around the world on a journey of 18,000 kilometers to rendezvous in the South China Sea and attack the Japanese Navy in the Pacific.

並花了18個月的時間，艱辛地將它們運送到世界各地，航程長達18,000公里，在南海會合，準備攻擊太平洋的日本海軍。

And once they finally got there, the new Russian fleet in the Pacific was exhausted, and

而當他們終於抵達時，新抵達太平洋的俄羅斯艦隊已經筋疲力盡，

it was promptly engaged by the combined Japanese fleet.

The new Russian fleet in the Pacific was then almost completely destroyed down to the very last ship in the process, in one of the most catastrophic naval defeats ever suffered in human history, that also offered a prelude to what is currently going on in the Black Sea between Russia and Ukraine today.

而當時新抵達太平洋的俄羅斯艦隊，在整個過程中幾乎全軍覆沒，無一船艦倖免，這場戰役是人類史上最慘痛的海軍敗仗之一，也預示了現今俄羅斯與烏克蘭在 Black Sea 的局勢。

The modern Russian Black Sea Fleet was founded in 1783 almost immediately after the Crimean Peninsula, was first conquered by the Russian Empire from the Ottomans.

現代的俄羅斯黑海艦隊成立於 1783 年，就在克里米亞半島被俄羅斯帝國從鄂圖曼帝國手中征服後不久。

For more than 240 years since then, the Russian and Soviet Black Sea Fleets have always been headquartered in the port of Sevastopol because it is the most strategically significant natural harbor that can be found anywhere in the entire Black Sea.

從那時起，超過 240 年的時間裡，俄羅斯和蘇聯的黑海艦隊一直以塞凡堡港為總部，因為它是 Black Sea 中最具有戰略意義的天然良港。

It's a warm water port year-round that doesn't freeze over during the winter, meaning that it can be accessed by ships without needing icebreakers year-round, and

它是一個全年不結冰的溫水港，這意味著船艦全年都可以進出，不需要破冰船，而且

it's also a deep water port, which means that its waters are deep enough to house larger displacement warships and submarines.

它也是一個深水港，這表示它的水足夠深，可以停泊排水量較大的戰艦和潛艦。

It's a large and well-protected natural harbor that cuts into the Crimean landmass that can accommodate a very large number of ships and submarines, and

它是一個大型且受保護良好的天然港口，深入克里米亞陸地，可以容納非常多的船艦和潛艦，而且

it sits in a highly strategic commanding location at Crimea's southern tip almost precisely in the geographic center of the Black Sea, enabling warships and submarines based inside to rapidly sortie out and access any threats across the region.

它位於克里米亞南端的戰略要衝，幾乎正處於 Black Sea 的地理中心，讓駐紮在內的戰艦和潛艦能夠快速出擊，進入該區域的任何威脅。

Because of these natural advantages, whoever has been able to control Sevastopol has been able to effectively dominate the entire Black Sea region for centuries, and

由於這些天然優勢，幾個世紀以來，誰能控制塞凡堡，誰就能有效主宰整個 Black Sea 區域，而且

these natural advantages have been compounded by the fact that over the centuries that the Black Sea Fleet has been based there, Sevastopol has more critical naval infrastructure and repair and support facilities than anywhere else in the Black Sea too, which cements its location as the most ideal place in the region to keep a navy at.

這些天然優勢又因為幾個世紀以來黑海艦隊一直駐紮在此，塞凡堡擁有比 Black Sea 其他任何地方都更關鍵的海軍基礎設施和維修支援設施，這鞏固了它作為該區域最理想海軍駐地的地位。

But the Black Sea Fleet's very existence and centuries-long presence in Sevastopol first came into open question a little more than 30 years ago in 1991, after the Soviet Union collapsed and dissolved.

但黑海艦隊的存在以及幾個世紀以來在塞凡堡的駐紮，在 30 多年前的 1991 年，隨著蘇聯的崩潰和解體，首次受到公開質疑。

Crimea and Sevastopol each found themselves as a part of the newly independent Ukraine, and

克里米亞和塞凡堡都成了新獨立的烏克蘭的一部分，

by extension so did virtually the entire Soviet Black Sea Fleet that found itself headquartered there.

順理成章地，幾乎整個蘇聯黑海艦隊也以那裡為總部。

There were significant arguments and disagreements on the fate of the hundreds of ships in the Black Sea after the Soviet Union dissolved, with both Russia and Ukraine claiming to be the fleet's legal inheritors.

蘇聯解體後，關於黑海數百艘船艦的命運，俄羅斯和烏克蘭之間出現了重大的爭執和分歧，雙方都聲稱是艦隊的合法繼承者。

In 1995, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma agreed on a temporary interim solution that placed the entire Black Sea Fleet under a joint Russian-Ukrainian command, still based out of Sevastopol, until a more long-term solution could be agreed upon.

1995年，俄羅斯總統葉爾欽和烏克蘭總統庫奇馬達成了一項臨時解決方案，將整個黑海艦隊置於俄烏聯合指揮下，總部仍設在塞凡堡，直到達成更長期的解決方案。

That more long-term solution came two years later in 1997 with the Black Sea Fleet Partition Treaty, which divided the old Soviet Black Sea Fleet's assets 82% to Russia and 18% to Ukraine, while Russia retained the right to lease naval facilities in the port of Sevastopol from Ukraine for an annual fee of $97 million for a period of 20 years until 2017.

這個更長期的解決方案在兩年後的1997年隨著《黑海艦隊分割條約》而來，該條約將前蘇聯黑海艦隊的資產分配給俄羅斯82%，烏克蘭18%，同時俄羅斯保留以每年9700萬美元的費用，從烏克蘭租賃塞凡堡港海軍設施的權利，為期20年，直到2017年。

From then on, the separate Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy remained jointly headquartered in Sevastopol as they had been for centuries, but

從那時起，獨立的俄羅斯黑海艦隊和烏克蘭海軍就像幾個世紀以來一樣，繼續共同駐紮在塞凡堡，但

In 2009, the then pro-Western and pro-EU President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, announced that he would not extend the Russian Black Sea Fleet's lease to Sevastopol after it expired in 2017, stating that the Russian Black Sea Fleet would have to move elsewhere outside of Ukraine by that point, likely to Russia's other port further to the east at Novorossiysk.

2009年，當時親西方和親歐盟的烏克蘭總統尤先科宣佈，他不會延長俄羅斯黑海艦隊在塞凡堡的租賃合同，該合同將於2017年到期，他表示屆時俄羅斯黑海艦隊將不得不遷往烏克蘭以外的其他地方，很可能是俄羅斯東部更遠的新羅西斯克港。

But while Novorossiysk is a large natural harbor, it's not as large or as well protected as the harbor at Sevastopol is.

但新羅西斯克雖然是一個大型天然港口，卻不如塞凡堡的港口那麼大或那麼受保護。

It also has a major civilian merchant marine port that competes in the harbor for the smaller amount of available space that's absent in Sevastopol.

它還有一個主要的民用商船港口，在港口內爭奪著塞凡堡較少可用的空間。

It lacks the commanding position in the center of the Black Sea that Sevastopol occupies, and

它不像塞凡堡那樣擁有黑海中心的戰略位置，

it lacks the same kind of expensive naval infrastructure and facilities that have been built up in Sevastopol over decades, which all makes Novorossiysk just a much less attractive port to headquarter a fleet at than Sevastopol.

也沒有像塞凡堡那樣幾十年來建立起來的昂貴海軍基礎設施和設備，這使得新羅西斯克作為艦隊總部遠不如塞凡堡有吸引力。

So the Russians didn't really want to leave Sevastopol, and

所以俄羅斯人其實不想離開塞凡堡，

so then, after the more pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych became Ukraine's next president in 2010, the Russians wasted no time at all in negotiating with him to secure their access to Sevastopol for the foreseeable future.

於是，在親俄的亞努科維奇於2010年成為烏克蘭下一任總統後，俄羅斯人立即與他協商，確保他們在可預見的未來都能使用塞凡堡。

Less than two months after assuming the Ukrainian presidency in April of 2010, Yanukovych renegotiated the terms of Russia's lease to their naval facilities at Sevastopol, dubbed the Kharkiv Pact.

亞努科維奇在2010年4月就任烏克蘭總統不到兩個月後，就重新談判了俄羅斯租賃塞凡堡海軍設施的條款，這就是所謂的哈爾科夫協議。

The new terms extended the Russian Navy's lease at Sevastopol for decades until 2042, with an additional option baked in to extend the lease for another five years longer until 2047, with considerations for even further renewals after that.

新的條款將俄羅斯海軍在塞凡堡的租賃期限延長了幾十年，直到2042年，並額外包含了一個選項，可以再延長五年，直到2047年，之後還有進一步續約的可能性。

At the time, the Russian Black Sea Fleet's continued presence in Sevastopol seemed to be legally secured for all of the foreseeable future, but

當時，俄羅斯黑海艦隊繼續駐紮在塞凡堡，似乎在法律上得到了可預見的未來的所有保障，但

in less than four years after the Kharkiv Pact was signed in 2010, it would all be thrown into chaos.

在哈爾科夫協議於2010年簽署後不到四年，這一切都將陷入混亂。

In November of 2013, protests began in Ukraine against Yanukovych's pro-Russian foreign policy that eventually culminated into a full-blown revolution by February of 2014 that ousted Yanukovych from power and sent him into exile in Russia.

2013年11月，烏克蘭爆發了反對亞努科維奇親俄外交政策的抗議活動，最終在2014年2月演變成一場全面的革命，將亞努科維奇趕下臺並送往俄羅斯流亡。

Then, worried that the new incoming Ukrainian government that took over afterwards would revoke the terms of the Kharkiv Pact and return to the previous Yushchenko-era policy of expelling the Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol, the Russians quickly decided to invade Crimea with special forces and occupied it before unilaterally declaring to annex it the following month.

接著，俄羅斯擔心接任的新烏克蘭政府可能會撤銷哈爾科夫協議的條款，並恢復尤先科時代將黑海艦隊驅逐出塞凡堡的政策，是以俄羅斯迅速決定派特種部隊入侵克里米亞並佔領它，並在下個月單方面宣佈吞併。

Russia's rapid takeover of Crimea and Sevastopol back then suddenly put the majority of the Ukrainian Navy that was inherited from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and that was also headquartered in Sevastopol under Russian control.

俄羅斯當時迅速接管克里米亞和塞凡堡，使得從蘇聯黑海艦隊繼承下來、總部也在塞凡堡的大部分烏克蘭海軍，落入了俄羅斯控制之下。

About 5,000 of the Ukrainian Navy sailors either defected and joined with Russia, fled, or were captured, and

大約有五千名烏克蘭海軍的船員，要嘛叛逃加入俄羅斯，要嘛逃離，要嘛被俘，

the vast majority of Ukraine's naval assets were captured and seized intact, which combined cut the Ukrainian Navy's size down by about two-thirds virtually overnight.

而烏克蘭絕大多數的海軍資產也被完整地繳獲和扣押，這使得烏克蘭海軍的規模幾乎在一夜之間縮減了約三分之二。

The only warships that Ukraine had left over after the Russian seizure of Sevastopol were four small corvettes and one frigate that became their flagship, the Hetman Sakhaydachny, along with a few smaller patrol boats, and

在俄羅斯佔領塞凡堡之後，烏克蘭僅剩下四艘小型巡防艦和一艘旗艦「赫特曼·薩蓋達奇內」號，以及幾艘較小的巡邏艇，

they were all forced to relocate their operating headquarters away from Sevastopol further west to Odessa.

他們被迫將海軍的運營總部從塞凡堡遷往西邊的敖德薩。

And then in the years that followed after Russia's takeover of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine continued suffering even further naval setbacks too, especially in the Sea of Azov region.

接著，在俄羅斯於2014年接管克里米亞後的幾年裡，烏克蘭在海軍方面持續遭受更多挫折，尤其是在亞速海地區。

Two years after their Crimea takeover in February of 2016, the Russians began building out their Crimean Bridge to link the Russian mainland with Crimea across the narrow Kerch Strait, the only maritime passing between the Sea of Azov and the Greater Black Sea.

在他們於2016年2月接管克里米亞的兩年後，俄羅斯開始建造克里米亞大橋，以連接俄羅斯大陸與克里米亞，橫跨連接亞速海和黑海的狹窄刻赤海峽。

When the bridge was finished two years later in 2018, it became the longest bridge in Europe, and

這座橋於兩年後的2018年完工時，成為歐洲最長的橋樑，

Russia was able to use the bridge and some of their own warships to effectively enforce a light blockade of the Ukrainian Azov ports like Berdyansk and Mariupol.

俄羅斯得以利用這座橋和他們自己的部分船艦，對別爾江斯克和馬裡烏波爾等烏克蘭亞速海港口實施了有效的輕度海上封鎖。

Shortly after the bridge's completion in 2018, the Russians temporarily blocked all Ukrainian merchant vessels from traveling through the Kerch Strait, and

橋樑於2018年完工後不久，俄羅斯暫時阻止所有烏克蘭商船通過刻赤海峽，

they even seized three of Ukraine's small number of remaining naval vessels.

他們甚至扣押了烏克蘭僅存的幾艘海軍船艦中的三艘。

And even though the Russians didn't end up enforcing the blockade for long and even returned the ships they seized back to Ukraine, the incident still highlighted how weak and vulnerable the Ukrainian Navy had truly become by that point.

雖然俄羅斯並沒有長期實施封鎖，甚至將扣押的船艦歸還給烏克蘭，但這起事件仍然凸顯了當時烏克蘭海軍的弱小與脆弱。

Then, in the buildup toward Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that began in February of 2022, the Russians relocated six of their warships from elsewhere in January, the month before they invaded, to reinforce the Black Sea Fleet further because they knew that after they started the invasion, they probably wouldn't be able to send any additional warships into the Black Sea to replace any losses they might end up suffering, and

接著，在2022年2月俄羅斯全面入侵烏克蘭之前，俄羅斯在入侵前一個月的1月，將六艘軍艦從其他地方調往黑海，進一步增強黑海艦隊的實力，因為他們知道一旦入侵開始，他們可能無法再將額外的軍艦調入黑海來彌補任何損失。

this is because of the intricacies of a nearly century-old international treaty known as the Montreux Convention.

這是因為一份近百年歷史的國際條約「蒙特勒公約」的複雜性。

Signed all the way back in 1936, Montreux has remained in force ever since, and

蒙特勒公約簽署於1936年，至今仍然有效，

it regulates all maritime passage through the strategically important Turkish Straits, the Bosphorus in the northeast, and

它規範了連接東北部的博斯普魯斯海峽和

the Dardanelles to the southwest, which together form the only navigable passageway between the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea, and

西南部的達達尼爾海峽這兩個戰略要地的所有海上通行，它們共同構成了黑海與愛琴海之間唯一的航行通道，

from there the Mediterranean and the Greater World Ocean.

並從那裡連接到地中海和廣闊的世界海洋。

The Straits are the only possible way that vessels from Georgia, Ukraine, Romania, and

這兩個海峽是喬治亞、烏克蘭、羅馬尼亞和

Bulgaria can access the global ocean, and

保加利亞的船艦進入全球市場的唯一可能途徑，

the only way that Russia's regional vessels in the Black Sea can access the global ocean too.

俄羅斯在黑海的區域船艦也能進入全球海洋的唯一途徑。

Under the terms of Montreux, civilian merchant vessels of any flag are granted unrestricted access through the Turkish Straits whenever they want as if they're international waters, but

根據《蒙特羅公約》的條款，任何國家的民用商船，只要想通過土耳其海峽，都可以不受限制地通行，就好像是國際水域一樣，但是

warships have much heavier restrictions placed on them.

During peacetime, nations that don't have a coast on the Black Sea have restricted access on sending warships through the Straits, limited both by tonnage and by the amount of time that they can actually stay in the Black Sea, which has always restricted navies from the U.S., U.K., or France from being able to access the sea.

在和平時期，沒有黑海海岸線的國家，在派遣戰艦通過海峽時會受到限制，無論是噸位還是實際停留在黑海的時間都有限制，這一直限制了美國、英國或法國的海軍進入該海域。

The nations around the Black Sea, including Russia, enjoy fairly free and open access for their warships to use the Straits during peacetime, and

包括俄羅斯在內的黑海周邊國家，在和平時期可以相對自由地讓戰艦通過海峽，而且

only the Black Sea nations themselves are ever allowed to send submarines through the Straits, while aircraft carriers are always banned regardless of what nation they belong to.

只有黑海國家自己被允許派遣潛艇通過海峽，而航空母艦則無論屬於哪個國家，一律禁止通行。

And most importantly, the terms of Montreux grant Turkey, who controls the Straits, the legal right to heavily restrict the passage of warships through the Straits during a time of war.

最重要的是，《蒙特羅公約》的條款賦予了控制海峽的土耳其，在戰爭時期嚴格限制戰艦通過海峽的合法權利。

When any of the Black Sea nations are at war, Turkey reserves the right to close the Straits off to any of the warships of the nations at war, and

當任何黑海國家處於戰爭狀態時，土耳其保留權利關閉海峽，禁止任何交戰國家的戰艦通行，

so within days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 beginning, Turkey exercised this right to block off any additional Russian warships from the Baltic, Arctic, or Pacific Fleets from being able to get into the Black Sea and replace any of their losses, which has meant that ever since the war began, Russia has not been able to replace any of their lost ships in the Black Sea from anywhere else, so whatever they started with there is whatever they'll have to fight and finish the entire war with.

是以，在2022年俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭開始的幾天內，土耳其就動用了這項權利，阻止來自波羅的海、北極或太平洋艦隊的額外俄羅斯戰艦進入黑海以補充損失，這意味著自戰爭開始以來，俄羅斯一直無法從其他地方補充其在黑海損失的船艦，所以他們一開始擁有多少，就得用多少來打完整場戰爭。

Regardless, there were very few people who initially thought that Russia would suffer any devastating losses in the Black Sea when the invasion began, and

無論如何，戰爭剛開始時，很少有人認為俄羅斯會在黑海遭受任何毀滅性的損失，

the general consensus among analysts at the time was that the vastly larger and more powerful Russian Black Sea Fleet, recently reinforced by a few more ships from elsewhere, would easily overwhelm the much smaller Ukrainian Navy and put the whole country under a withering blockade.

當時分析師普遍認為，規模更大、實力更強的俄羅斯黑海艦隊，最近又從其他地方補充了幾艘船艦，將輕易擊潰規模小很多的烏克蘭海軍，並對全國實施嚴酷的海上封鎖。

The Russian Black Sea Fleet began the war with the battlecruiser Moskva, the flagship, five frigates, 13 heavy-duty tank landing ships, six modern attack submarines, and

俄羅斯黑海艦隊在戰爭開始時擁有巡洋戰艦莫斯科號（旗艦）、五艘巡防艦、十三艘重型坦克登陸艦、六艘現代攻擊潛艇，

dozens of smaller vessels and patrol boats.

還有數十艘小型船艦和巡邏艇。

In total, the fleet had at its disposal around 74 surface warships and six submarines, compared to the paltry Ukrainian fleet of one frigate and four smaller corvettes.

總計，該艦隊可調動約74艘水面戰艦和六艘潛艇，相比之下，烏克蘭艦隊僅有一艘巡防艦和四艘較小的護衛艦。

Within just the first two weeks of the invasion beginning, the naval war already wasn't looking very good from Kyiv's perspective.

入侵開始後的短短兩週內，從基輔的角度來看，海戰的局勢已經不太妙了。

Nearly all of Ukraine's smaller naval vessels were damaged or outright sunk by Russian missiles, while the Ukrainian Navy's flagship, the frigate Hetman Sakhaydachny, was deliberately scuttled and destroyed by the Ukrainians themselves while it was in port in Mykolaiv to prevent it from getting potentially captured by the Russians and used against them, as at the time, the Russian army had advanced far enough to be on the city's outskirts and they were threatening to capture it.

烏克蘭幾乎所有的小型海軍船艦都遭到俄羅斯飛彈損壞或直接擊沉，而烏克蘭海軍的旗艦「薩蓋達奇尼號」巡防艦，則被烏克蘭人自己故意鑿沉銷毀，當時它停泊在尼古拉耶夫港，是為了防止被俄羅斯俘獲並用來對付自己，因為當時俄羅斯軍隊已經推進到城市郊區，並威脅要佔領該城。

Moreover, the fear of the Russian Navy orchestrating an amphibious landing near Ukraine's most major port remaining, Odessa, was so great in the early weeks of the invasion that the Ukrainians were forced to reinforce the area around the coast with an additional 5,000 troops and 100 tanks that were pulled from the battles that were raging around Ukraine's capital and two largest cities, Kyiv and Kharkiv.

此外，在入侵初期，俄羅斯海軍可能在烏克蘭仍保有最主要港口敖德薩附近發動兩棲登陸的恐懼如此之大，以至於烏克蘭被迫從圍繞烏克蘭首都和最大兩座城市基輔、哈爾科夫的激戰中抽調了五千名額外的部隊和一百輛坦克來加強該海岸地區的防禦。

The Russian Navy captured Ukraine's Snake Island early on into the invasion that strategically sits nearby to major Ukrainian trade routes from Odessa toward the Turkish Straits and the global ocean, while the Russian army captured all of the remaining Ukrainian coastline on the Sea of Azov, including the ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol.

俄羅斯海軍在入侵初期就佔領了烏克蘭的蛇島，該島戰略位置靠近烏克蘭從敖德薩通往土耳其海峽和全球海洋的主要貿易航線，而俄羅斯軍隊則佔領了亞速海所有剩餘的烏克蘭海岸線，包括別爾江斯克和馬裡烏波爾港口。

That enabled the Russian Black Sea Fleet to begin enforcing a near-total maritime blockade of Ukraine's remaining coastline and ports in the west, choking off Ukraine's ability to export or import just about anything by sea.

這使得俄羅斯黑海艦隊能夠開始對烏克蘭西部剩餘海岸線和港口實施近乎完全的海上封鎖，切斷了烏克蘭幾乎所有透過海運進出口的能力。

And notably, the Russian blockade choked off Ukraine's ability to export any of their grains or agricultural products by sea, which usually represents more than 40% of Ukraine's export income and around 14% of all Ukrainian jobs.

尤其值得注意的是，俄羅斯的封鎖切斷了烏克蘭透過海運出口任何穀物或農產品的能力，這通常佔烏克蘭出口收入的40%以上，以及約14%的烏克蘭就業機會。