Name: 德法差異會毀掉歐洲千億戰機計畫嗎？ | DW 新聞 (Will Franco‑German differences sink Europe’s €100bn fighter jet plan? | DW News)
Uploaded: 2026-02-19T17:09:45.000Z
Duration: 15 min 25 s

Europe is undergoing a transformational shift when it comes to defence spending.

歐洲在國防開支方面正經歷轉型。

After decades of under investment, many countries, including Germany, are pumping billions into their militaries as concerns mount over security.

經過數十年的投資不足，包括德國在內的許多國家正投入數十億資金用於軍隊，因為安全疑慮日益加劇。

But what does all of this mean for the economy?

但這一切對經濟意味著什麼呢？

Well, to consider this and other questions, we're delighted to be joined by Mike Schulhorn.

嗯，為了探討這個問題和其他問題，我們很高興邀請到 Mike Schulhorn。

He's the CEO of Airbus Defence and Space and one of the leading voices in the sector.

他是空中巴士國防航太的執行長，也是該領域的領導者之一。

Mike Schulhorn, thanks so much for joining us here on Deutsche Welle and welcome to the program.

Mike Schulhorn，非常感謝您來到德國之聲，歡迎您來到節目。

So obviously so much has changed in the four and a half years that you've been CEO of Airbus Defence and Space.

所以，顯然在您擔任空中巴士國防航太執行長這四年半裡，發生了很多變化。

In the defence sector itself, when you look at the numbers, when we look at a graph and we see the percentage of GDP that different countries like Germany, France, the uk, Poland have been spending historically on their defence and how that's changing at the moment and indeed projected to change over the coming years, going from where they were struggling to hit the 2% mark to trying to hit these new targets of 3.5%, 5%.

在國防產業本身，當您看數字時，當我們看圖表，看到像德國、法國、英國、波蘭等國家過去在國防上的 GDP 支出百分比，以及目前和未來幾年的預計變化，從過去努力達到 2% 的門檻，到試圖達到 3.5%、5% 的新目標。

How is Airbus and companies like Airbus adjusting to this new reality?

空中巴士和類似的空中巴士公司是如何適應這個新現實的？

Well, indeed that's quite a remarkable change that, that I have personally gone through and that the company has gone through.

嗯，這確實是一個相當顯著的變化，我個人經歷了，公司也經歷了。

When I joined mid 21, I think Germany was at a 1.6% of GDP spending.

我記得 2021 年中加入時，德國的 GDP 國防開支佔比大約是 1.6%。

Now we're above 2 already and we aim for 3.5.

現在我們已經超過 2% 了，目標是 3.5%。

So that's, that's basically doubling everything that the Germany is spending within a relatively short amount of time for the company has meant a major transformation.

所以，這基本上是在相對短的時間內將德國的國防開支翻倍，對公司來說意味著重大的轉變。

We came from a time where the spending was meant to sort of keep you in the race, but

我們過去的開支是為了讓你保持在競爭行列，但

spread out and delay everything as much as possible.

盡可能地分散和延遲所有事情。

And that's a huge change that sometimes underestimate in terms of the mindsets of people.

而且這是一個巨大的轉變，有時候人們的心態會低估這一點。

I think everybody's fired up and everybody's contributing.

我覺得每個人都充滿幹勁，每個人都在貢獻。

But, but yes, there are some growing pains in this.

但是，是的，確實會有一些成長的陣痛。

We've had very strong order intake, typically a book to bill of 1.4 ish in the last three years and that needs to be mastered.

我們過去三年的訂單量一直很強勁，通常是 1.4 倍左右，這需要好好掌握。

That leads to a big order book and now we need to deliver so big change.

這導致訂單量很大，現在我們需要交付，所以是個大轉變。

And one of the criticisms of all this new spending that has been clearly pumped in by the German government among others in the last few years, and

而且，過去幾年德國政府和其他國家明顯投入了這麼多新的開支，其中一個批評是，

this criticism has been particularly of Germany, that too much of that spending is on so called traditional defence equipment.

這個批評特別針對德國，認為這些開支中有太多是用在所謂的傳統國防裝備上。

So things that are obviously needed tanks and fighter jets and so on, but

像是顯然需要的坦克、戰鬥機等等，但是

that not enough is going towards the kind of innovative technologies which may boost innovation and the economy in the longer term.

投入到可能長期促進創新和經濟的創新技術方面的卻不夠。

And just to give you one, one figure, so Maurits Schulerik from the Keel Institute of the World Economy, I think he has come up with data that suggests, that suggests that between 95 and 98% of that new spending since 2022 has been on this traditional.

舉個數字給你參考，基爾世界經濟研究所的 Maurits Schulerik 提出了數據顯示，自 2022 年以來，這筆新增開支有 95% 到 98% 都花在傳統項目上。

So what do you think about this question, this issue?

Well, I know Morris well and I know his statement and I concur with him.

我很瞭解 Morris，也知道他的說法，我同意他的觀點。

I think this is not the end point of what it should be.

我認為這離我們應該達到的目標還有距離。

Now, we also have to recognize that Germany and the Bundeswehr, as the German armed forces, come from a time when there was huge holes in what they should have been able to do in the first place.

現在，我們也必須認知到，德國及其聯邦國防軍，過去在應有的能力上曾有很大的不足。

That does, at least initially, require a lot of spending of what you already have as systems.

這至少一開始需要花很多錢在你現有的系統上。

it's certainly not largely going towards AI, towards unmanned systems, towards all these, let's say, very innovative things.

顯然大部分並沒有投入到 AI、無人系統，以及這些，可以說是非常創新的事物上。

I think that's going to get ramped up pretty significantly in the near future.

我認為這在不久的將來，會大幅增加。

It's already gearing up the procurement process is already getting ready to also do a better job when it comes to these innovative things that you cannot plan so much, much in advance.

So I think it takes a little bit of time.

As always, we complain that everything's going too slow.

I think there's a reason why the current distribution is what it is, but it has to change.

One of the obvious comparison points with regard to this is obviously the us and when we look at the data there in terms of venture capital in defence spending and defence tech, I think more than 80% of it over the last five, six, seven years has been spent in the US.

So I'm wondering what do you think needs to change in that regard and do you subscribe to, to the idea that more innovative spending, so spending on those things we talked about would actually have a more meaningful impact on economic growth in the wider sense.

採購流程已經在準備，以便在這些無法預先規劃太久的創新事物上做得更好。

In fact, I mean, it was Moritz who came with the calculation with this institute that the more innovative the spending or the more towards innovation the spending goes, the more return you have for the economy, up to 1.€6 for every euro spent.

I think the return ratio is a little less favorable if it's more traditional stuff, even though there is a big return.

一如往常，我們抱怨一切都太慢了。

And I give you one example, that is an important thing that we observe in Airbus.

我認為目前的分配之所以是這樣，是有原因的，但它必須改變。

A lot of the reasons why Airbus is leading in commercial aircraft is actually coming from the military side.

這方面一個很明顯的比較對象就是美國，當我們看那裡的數據，就國防開支和國防科技的創投資金來看，我認為過去五、六年裡，有超過 80% 都花在美國。

One very simple example, but it's usually important, is the side stick.

一個很簡單但通常很重要的例子，就是側桿。

The A320 was the first aircraft that had a side stick that came from fighter aircraft.

A320 是第一架配備側桿的飛機，這個設計源自戰鬥機。

And we've seen a lot of these mutual benefits and this cross talk between defence innovation and commercial innovation.

我們看到了國防創新和商業創新之間許多互相的助益和交流。

But I agree with Moritz Schularek that if it's more towards areas that we have not been so good at in other sectors of the economy, the benefit would be greater.

但我同意 Moritz Schularek 的看法，如果能更多地朝向我們在經濟其他領域不太擅長的方面發展，效益會更大。

And I think then it also can be a lasting effect.

我認為這樣也會有持久的效果。

Clearly, the backdrop to so much of this is the war in Ukraine.

顯然，這一切的背景是烏克蘭戰爭。

Can you give me the perspective of someone in your position as the CEO of a major defence firm, as to how much what's been going on in the battlefield in Ukraine has affected your business in terms of production, the kind of things that are needed to succeed on a modern battlefield?

您能不能從您作為一家大型國防公司執行長的職位，給我一個觀點，關於烏克蘭戰場上發生的事情，在生產方面，以及在現代戰場上取得成功所需的物品種類，對您的業務影響有多大？

I would say there's the direct effect, which is coming from the battle, from the war in Ukraine itself, and

我會說，有直接影響，來自烏克蘭戰爭本身，

The indirect effect is, I guess, what we have talked about in the interview so far is it has been the reason, one big driver of why the defence budgets were upped and why we have now all this money available to invest.

我猜，間接影響就是我們在訪談中談到的，它一直是國防預算提高的原因之一，也是我們現在有這麼多資金可供投資的原因。

So it has been a big driver in that regard.

所以這在這方面確實是個很大的推手。

If you look at the more practical how is the war fought in Ukraine and what can we learn from it and how does it affect technology and companies?

如果你看看更實際的，烏克蘭的戰爭是如何進行的，我們能從中學到什麼，以及它如何影響科技和公司？

Space was the means with which the Russian mass troops could be seen and there could be predictions in terms of would something happen or not.

太空是俄羅斯軍隊能夠被偵測到的媒介，也能預測是否會發生什麼事。

I think politicians have learned how important space is, not only for warfare, but

我認為政治人物已經學到太空有多重要，不只是對戰爭，

for almost everything that we have in a modern economy.

而且對我們現代經濟中的幾乎所有事物都如此。

So that has been a huge effect in terms of discussions, but

所以這在討論方面產生了巨大的影響，

also business and orders and technical developments in that area.

也包括了生意、訂單以及該領域的技術發展。

The other obvious thing that comes to mind is drones, unmanned systems, to say, or uncrewed systems to speak in general.

另一個顯而易見的想法就是無人機，也就是無人系統，或者更籠統地說，是未載人系統。

There is a big learning coming from that, that these uncrewed systems, especially when they provide relatively inexpensive mass combat, mass will be a factor that will not go away.

從這點我們學到很多，這些未載人系統，特別是當它們能提供相對便宜的大規模戰鬥時，大規模將會是個不會消失的因素。

It will get more so to the very exquisite systems that typically have been the guarantee for the west for NATO to always have a leg up in the past over potential adversaries.

而且會對那些通常是西方、是北約過去相較於潛在對手總是佔有優勢的精緻系統，變得更加如此。

I think we need to add the mass component, so that's not going to go away.

我認為我們需要加入大規模的元素，所以這個不會消失。

On the other hand, I would say if we only look to Ukraine and forget, for instance, conflicts like rising Lion Israel, Iran, we also need to learn from those.

另一方面，我會說，如果我們只看烏克蘭而忽略了，例如，像以色列、伊朗崛起的衝突，我們也需要從中學習。

And it was extremely sophisticated and complex systems that made the difference there.

而且正是極度精密且複雜的系統在那裡造成了差異。

So I don't think NATO and Germany and Europe should be aiming to have to defend itself like Ukraine has to, because there's nothing else available.

所以我不認為北約、德國和歐洲應該以像烏克蘭那樣必須自衛為目標，因為沒有其他選擇了。

So we need to also have the upper hand in terms of technology, in terms of space dominance, in terms of air dominance.

是以我們在技術、太空主導權、空域主導權方面也需要佔有優勢。

But we also need, must not forget that the affordable mass is becoming a huge factor.

但我們也需要，絕不能忘記，負擔得起的大規模正在成為一個巨大的因素。

So a word that we commonly hear when we talk about EU problems, economic or otherwise, is fragmentation.

所以當我們談論歐盟問題，無論是經濟上的還是其他的，一個我們經常聽到的詞是「碎片化」。

It's obvious that when you have 27 different governments, it's very hard to work together in the same way that someone like the US one government can, can work.

所以我想，當你有 27 個不同的政府時，要像美國那樣單一政府一樣合作，真的非常困難。

First of all, can you tell me how much of an issue is this at present in practical terms for the defence industry in Europe?

首先，你能告訴我目前對歐洲國防產業來說，這在實際操作上有多大的問題嗎？

I mean all these factors, if you look at major battle systems, from tanks to aircraft to ships to whatever the average is, that the U.S.

我的意思是，所有這些因素，如果你看看主要的戰鬥系統，從坦克到飛機到船艦等等，美國的平均...

which still has a significantly higher defence budget than Europe, at least as we speak.

就我們目前所知，美國的國防開支仍然遠高於歐洲。

Europe on the other hand has five times more number of systems or types of systems.

另一方面，歐洲的系統或系統種類是歐洲的五倍。

So we sprinkle less money over more systems and that provides a factor of more than 10x.

所以我們把較少的錢分散到更多的系統上，這就造成了超過 10 倍的差異。

It's actually more in the ballpark of 50x in terms of money per system.

實際上，每套系統的經費差異大約是 50 倍。

So of course the US is better at scaling, is better at driving a cost point down, and

所以美國當然更擅長規模化，更擅長降低成本，而且

I think it's recognized and politicians have talked a lot about it.

我覺得這點大家都有共識，政治人物也討論了很多。

I think we need to be very careful that with all the money that's now being made available through national budgets, the reflex to then have that GEO return into your own country is not amplifying the problem.

我認為我們必須非常小心，現在國家預算提供了這麼多資金，如果我們只想著把這些錢導回自己的國家，這樣反而會加劇問題。

So I think it's something that's not very healthy.

所以我覺得這不是一個很健康的現象。

On the other hand, there's companies like mine that exists and they were created exactly to help fight fragmentation and come to European projects of scale that can then help improve the situation.

另一方面，也有像我這樣的公司存在，它們成立的目的就是為了幫助對抗碎片化，並推動歐洲的大型專案，進而改善現況。

Well, on that note, we visited the Eurofighter facility close to here and that's clearly a very good example of this type of cross border collaboration within Europe.

嗯，說到這個，我們參觀了附近的 Eurofighter 廠區，這顯然是歐洲跨國合作的一個很好的例子。

But Airbus is also involved in the FCAS program, the Franco German program, which is now 10 years old in its conception, but

不過空中巴士國防航太也參與了 FCAS 計畫，這是個法德計畫，構想已經有 10 年了，但是

which does not seem to be working out at the moment.

What can you tell us about how that project is going and what that tells us about the problems affecting this collaboration which we clearly need between the likes of France, Germany and the other major European defence powers.

您能跟我們談談這個計畫的進展嗎？以及這對我們目前歐洲國家（像是法國、德國和其他主要國防大國）之間迫切需要的合作所造成的影響，又能告訴我們些什麼？

Yeah, not totally unexpected, the question, but

嗯，這個問題一點也不意外，但

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德法差異會毀掉歐洲千億戰機計畫嗎？ | DW 新聞 (Will Franco‑German differences sink Europe’s €100bn fighter jet plan? | DW News)

stick

potential

struggle

obvious