Name: 為什麼航空公司離不開會員計畫？｜WSJ 深度解析 (Why Airlines Can’t Survive Without Loyalty Programs | WSJ Case Study)
Uploaded: 2026-02-18T23:01:43.000Z
Duration: 9 min 42 s

程度副詞

Fully booked flights, limited bag space, and

a kid kicking the window seat you paid an extra $100 for.

還遇到小孩踢你多付了 100 美元選的靠窗座位。

I have an extreme case of foc, fear of coach.

我有嚴重的 foc，就是害怕搭經濟艙。

But that's the reality for the majority of people flying today.

但這就是現在大多數人搭飛機的真實寫照。

A stark shift from the days where air travel included complimentary cocktails and an in flight piano performance.

這跟以前搭飛機還有免費雞尾酒和機上鋼琴表演的日子，真是天壤之別。

To understand, we have to go back to a decision made decades ago.

要了解這一切，我們得回到幾十年前的一個決定。

When deregulation allowed airlines to set their own flights and routes.

那時候的解除管制，讓航空公司可以自己決定班次和航線。

What was meant to make the industry more competitive ultimately set off a race to increase profits and cement an airline's market share, leading to the world's first airline loyalty program.

這本來是為了讓產業更有競爭力，結果卻引發了一場追求利潤和鞏固市場佔有率的競賽，催生了世界上第一個航空忠誠計畫。

It's hard to see how airlines could survive today without loyalty programs.

現在很難想像航空公司沒有航空忠誠計畫要怎麼生存。

If we just started from scratch without it, I don't know.

如果我們從零開始沒有它，我也不知道。

Today, airlines make on average only about $13 in profit per passenger.

現在，航空公司平均每位乘客只能賺取大約 13 美元的利潤。

But 2020 revealed that the loyalty program can hold a higher value than the airline itself.

但 2020 年揭示了，忠誠計畫的價值可能比航空公司本身還要高。

Here's the case study on how American Airlines created its own form of currency.

這就是美國航空如何創造自己一種貨幣的案例研究。

Changing the way the world flies and creating an entirely new business that has nothing to do with aviation.

改變了人們飛行的方式，並創造了一個與航空業無關的全新商業模式。

This was back in an environment where airlines weren't full.

那時候的航空公司並不是滿載的。

In the late 1970s, American Airlines was losing some of its grip on the market.

在 1970 年代後期，美國航空在市場上的影響力逐漸減弱。

Deregulation had meant that there were lots of new airlines.

解除管制意味著出現了許多新航空公司。

Suddenly, it's a little bit of a free for all.

突然之間，有點像是自由競爭。

Everybody was trying to figure out, how can we motivate people to fly more New smaller carriers began winning market share by offering lower prices.

大家都在想辦法，如何鼓勵人們多搭飛機，新的小型航空公司透過提供較低的價格贏得了市場佔有率。

And the competition forced the traditional carriers to rethink their business model.

而競爭迫使傳統航空公司重新思考他們的商業模式。

They wanted to keep flying the same routes while maintaining prices, but not lose customers to competitors.

他們想在維持票價的同時繼續飛相同的航線，但又不想失去客戶給競爭對手。

So our advertising agency said to us, why don't you guys see if you can come up with some kind of a prize?

所以我們的廣告公司就跟我們說，你們為什麼不試著想出某種獎勵呢？

The company brought together a small team to brainstorm Bob Crandall, he was the chief executive of American Airlines at the time.

公司召集了一個小團隊來腦力激盪，當時美國航空的執行長 Bob Crandall。

And they brought in an outside consultant named Hal Brierly.

他們找來了一位名叫 Hal Brierly 的外部顧問。

I definitely give Bob Crandall credit as the visionary who knew that incentives could drive behavior.

我絕對要歸功於 Bob Crandall，他是那位有遠見的人，知道獎勵能驅動行為。

The team was inspired by price stamps, which could be collected at various stores and then exchanged for rewards like a watch or a new camera.

團隊受到集點卡的啟發，集點卡可以在不同商店收集，然後換取手錶或新相機等獎勵。

And American transitioned that idea to give customers miles, the first iteration of Advantage.

美國航空將這個想法轉化為給予顧客里程，也就是 Advantage 的最初版本。

I think it did sound like a sort of simple idea at the time that if you give people some kind of prize, they might buy tickets.

我想當時聽起來是個很簡單的想法，如果給人們某種獎勵，他們可能會買機票。

In the early days, that simply meant a free flight.

在早期，這就只是意味著一張免費機票。

American Airlines was betting that the business the program attracted would be greater than the cost to redeem the reward.

美國航空賭的是，這個計畫吸引的生意會比兌換獎勵的成本來得高。

But to nail that, America needed to set the right benchmark.

但要做到這點，美國需要設定正確的基準。

The company knew that its average consumer flew about 40,000 miles a year.

公司知道他們的平均消費者一年大約會飛 40,000 英里。

Setting 50 meant concentrate your travel, fly on us more.

設定 50,000 英里是為了讓你集中你的旅遊，多搭我們的班機。

The team also implemented a specific one year time limit for the program and developed a way to track their customers.

團隊也為這個計畫實施了一年的期限，並開發了一種追蹤客戶的方式。

They knew this was Tom Jones who flew from Miami to New York.

他們知道這是從邁阿密飛往紐約的 Tom Jones。

They didn't know if this was the same Tom Jones who flew to Paris last month.

他們不知道這是不是上個月飛往巴黎的同一個 Tom Jones。

Computerized reservation systems were still new and innovative and just getting off the ground.

電腦訂位系統那時還很新穎，剛起步。

To solve this, American linked its reward and reservation system and assigned customers a specific number.

為瞭解決這個問題，美國航空將他們的獎勵和訂位系統連結，並為客戶分配了一個專屬號碼。

Inspired by rental car company Avis, the goal was to know which customers were the most profitable.

受到租車公司 Avis 的啟發，目標是知道哪些客戶的獲利最高。

Obviously, if I knew what you flew last year, I can design incentives that will reward you for incremental spend.

很明顯，如果我知道你去年搭了什麼班機，我就可以設計獎勵方案，鼓勵你增加消費。

After more than a year of planning, American Airlines launched Advantage on May 1, 1981.

經過一年多的規劃，美國航空於 1981 年 5 月 1 日推出了 Advantage 航空忠誠計畫。

It seemed like the reaction was almost immediate.

And shortly after, twa, Continental, Northwest, Orient, Braniff and Texas International all followed.

不久之後，TWA、Continental、Northwest、Orient、Braniff 和 Texas International 都紛紛效仿。

And literally by September, every airline but one had a program.

到了九月，幾乎所有航空公司，除了其中一家，都推出了自己的計畫。

But the secret weapon American had over its competitors at the time was just that time.

但當時美國航空比競爭對手擁有的祕密武器就是時間。

The other airlines had not done the planning necessary to keep track of the miles.

其他航空公司沒有做好必要的規劃來追蹤里程。

While they were figuring it out, we were signing up their customers.

當他們還在摸索時，我們已經在招募他們的客戶了。

American thought that we might have 500,000 people.

美國航空當時覺得我們可能有五十萬人。

We signed up in the first year, a million people.

But the influx of competitors threw a wrench in American's lead.

但競爭對手的湧入打亂了美國航空的領先優勢。

When United launched its program without a one year time limit on the miles, I think a lot of the airlines thought it was a one year promotion.

聯合航空推出計畫時，里程沒有一年期限，我想很多航空公司都覺得那是一年的促銷活動。

And it might have been a one year promotion had United not made it open ended.

如果聯合航空沒有讓它變成無限期，那可能真的只是一年的促銷活動。

American quickly removed its limit as well.

美國航空也很快地取消了期限。

And of course the consequence of that is that every frequent flyer wants to belong to every frequent flyer program, and

當然，結果就是每個常旅客都想加入每個航空公司的航空忠誠計畫，

And that's totally destroyed the initial economics.

這完全破壞了最初的經濟效益。

Without the time limit, the airlines found themselves once again one upping each other over and over and over again.

沒有了時間限制，航空公司發現自己又得不斷地互相較勁了。

We need something that recognizes the top 2%.

我們需要一個能辨識出頂尖 2% 的東西。

This created a system to determine levels of incentive.

這創造了一個決定獎勵等級的系統。

Like a complimentary first class upgrade, these upgrades were also a way to accustom flyers to the more expensive accommodations so that eventually they would buy that option on their own.

就像免費的頭等艙升等一樣，這些升等也是讓飛航旅客習慣更貴的住宿方式，以便他們最終能自己購買那種選項。

Now the Advantage program is hugely profitable because the value of the prize is proportional to the amount of business.

現在，Advantage 計畫非常賺錢，因為獎品的價值與業務量成正比。

Miles became a sort of currency as frequent flyer programs began attracting attention and capital from outside the aviation industry, specifically from banks.

隨著飛行常客計畫開始吸引航空業以外的關注和資金，特別是來自銀行，里程變成了一種貨幣。

The Airlines began selling miles to these banks in exchange for cash.

航空公司開始將里程賣給這些銀行換取現金。

The bank would then offer these miles to their cardholders as a reward.

銀行接著會將這些里程作為獎勵提供給他們的持卡人。

But this move meant that passengers aren't an airline's only customer.

但這一步意味著乘客不再是航空公司的唯一客戶。

I mean, for the airline, that's great because it means they get revenue from all sorts of goods and services that you buy that are totally independent from travel or travel demand.

對航空公司來說，這很棒，因為這代表他們能從你買的各種商品和服務中賺取收入，這些都跟旅行或旅行需求完全無關。

So the Advantage program has become a business in its own right, and a very profitable one.

所以 Advantage 計畫本身就成了一個獨立的業務，而且非常賺錢。

But by awarding miles for spending, these programs were no longer just about frequent flyers.

但透過獎勵消費里程，這些計畫就不再只是關於飛行常客了。

相反地，它變成是關於你花了多少錢。

How much did you spend on your ticket becomes more important than how far you're flying.

你在機票上花了多少錢，比你飛了多遠還重要。

So you don't necessarily need to be a road warrior whose boss sends you out on business travel four days a week to have a shot at this.

所以你不需要一定是那種老闆每週派你出差四天的空中飛人，才有機會獲得這些。

You can get there by spending on your credit card.

你可以透過刷信用卡消費來達成。

Prompting the debate, have airlines become more like banks that just happen to fly?

這引發了辯論：航空公司是不是變得更像只是剛好會飛的銀行？

I think the airlines disagree with that, and the flying is sort of the point.

我認為航空公司不同意這種說法，飛行本身才是重點。

沒有航空公司，就沒有這個計畫。

But in terms of the role that the programs play in their finances, I mean, they have become really prominent and it's hard to ignore.

不過就這些計畫在航空公司財務上的角色來說，它們變得非常重要，而且很難被忽略。

I mean, today, often in some quarters or some parts of the year, the actual airline operation doesn't make money.

說真的，現在很多時候，甚至一年中的某些時期，航空公司的實際營運是賺不到錢的。

You know, it costs more to fly passengers around than they pay the airline.

你知道嗎，載送乘客的成本比乘客付給航空公司的錢還要高。

What can fill in the gaps is the loyalty program and the co branded credit card that gives airlines a little bit of revenue every time a customer swipes that credit card.

能填補這些空缺的就是航空忠誠計畫，還有每次顧客刷信用卡的聯名信用卡，能為航空公司帶來一點收入。

In 2023, American Airlines brought in $5.2 billion from its credit card and other partnerships and Delta 6.6 billion.

2023年，美國航空從其信用卡和其他合作夥伴那裡獲得了52億美元，達美航空則有66億美元。

But the offerings promised in a loyalty program have become more competitive as the audience grows.

但隨著受眾成長，航空忠誠計畫中承諾的優惠也變得更具競爭力。

Now customers are paying for these accommodations.

現在顧客要為這些住宿付費了。

By 2022, ancillary revenues like that made from seat upgrades and baggage fees accounted for about 15% of total airline revenue.

到了2022年，像座位升級和行李費這類的附加收入，佔航空公司總收入的約15%。

When I started, when you bought a ticket, everything came with it, whether you consumed it or not.

我剛開始工作的時候，買一張機票就包含了一切，不管你用不用得到。

What we've been able to do over time is actually create more products that enable customers to pay for what they're going to consume.

隨著時間的推移，我們能夠創造更多產品，讓顧客為他們將要使用的東西付費。

And airlines are constantly recalibrating their programs to keep their economic edge.

而且航空公司也不斷調整他們的計畫，以保持經濟上的優勢。

Whether it's changing the benchmarks for a certain status or increasing the number of miles it costs for a flight, airlines have full control over how much a mile is worth and how much to charge for a flight.

無論是改變特定等級的標準，或是增加兌換機票所需的哩程數，航空公司完全掌控著哩程的價值以及機票的定價。

So you are kind of at their mercy when you're participating in this program.

所以當你參與這個計畫時，你有點任由他們擺佈。

Some consumers have called these changes devaluations, drawing scrutiny in 2024, the Department of Transportation launched a probe into the four largest airline loyalty programs, describing the rewards programs as potentially unfair, deceptive or anti competitive.

有些消費者稱這些改變是貶值，引起了關注，在2024年，交通部對四家最大的航空忠誠計畫展開調查，形容這些獎勵計畫可能不公平、具欺騙性或反競爭。

A lot of people really seem to believe that airlines want to make it as hard as possible to use the miles.

很多人似乎真的認為航空公司想盡可能地讓哩程難以使用。

And every airline executive I ever talked to has said that's not true.

而我訪談過的每位航空公司高層都說那不是真的。

I want them to find value when they use their miles.

我希望他們在使用哩程時能找到價值。

But I do think there's a frustration when airline miles get devalued and then suddenly you can't buy the flight that you thought you'd be able to buy because your miles are worthless.

但我確實認為，當航空哩程被貶值，然後你突然買不到原本以為能買到的機票，因為你的哩程變得一文不值時，那種挫折感是很真實的。

In response, an airline trade group said that loyalty programs are a way for airlines to compete for customers.

作為回應，一個航空產業團體表示，忠誠計畫是航空公司用來爭取客戶的一種方式。