Name: 川普、台積電——美國駐臺灣代表談日益薄弱的「矽盾」 (U.S. Taiwan Rep on a Thinning ‘Silicon Shield,’ Trump, TSMC and More | WSJ)
Uploaded: 2025-03-29T21:01:20.000Z
Duration: 6 min 38 s

Taiwan has long benefited from a silicon shield.

長期以來，臺灣一直受益於硅屏蔽。

程度副詞

It makes nearly all of the world's most advanced computer chips.

世界上最先進的計算機芯片幾乎都是由它製造的。

So other countries, like the U.S., have a vested interest in defending the island from a Chinese invasion.

是以，其他國家，如美國，在保衛該島免遭中國入侵方面擁有既得利益。

But the 2022 Bipartisan Chips Act brought TSMC, Taiwan's largest chip manufacturer, and others to build fabs in the U.S.

但是，《2022 年兩黨芯片法案》促使臺灣最大的芯片製造商臺積電和其他公司在美國建立晶圓廠。

Taiwan took our chip business away and will be taking back a big, big portion of that industry.

臺灣搶走了我們的芯片業務，並將奪回該產業的一大部分。

And if they don't bring it back, we're not going to be very happy.

如果他們不把它帶回來，我們會很不高興。

Now TSMC has announced an additional $100 billion U.S.

現在，臺積電宣佈再投資 1000 億美元。

We are going to build three more new fabs.

Alexander Yu, the Taiwanese representative to the U.S., sat down with Wall Street Journal trade reporter Gavin Bade in his first interview since Trump took office to talk about Taiwanese chip investment in the U.S. and how it could affect the shield.

臺灣駐美代表亞歷山大-餘（Alexander Yu）在特朗普上任後首次接受《華爾街日報》貿易記者加文-貝德（Gavin Bade）的採訪，談及臺灣在美國的芯片投資以及這可能對屏蔽產生的影響。

Well, Representative Yu, thank you so much for sitting down with The Wall Street Journal.

餘議員，非常感謝您接受《華爾街日報》的採訪。

We saw President Trump have some negative comments about the Chips Act.

我們看到特朗普總統對《芯片法案》發表了一些負面評論。

芯片法》是一件可怕、恐怖的事情。

How does your government view those comments?

And could TSMC actually be investing in building in the U.S. if those Chips Act incentives somehow went away?

如果《芯片法》的激勵措施取消了，臺積電還會在美國投資建廠嗎？

Obviously, the Chips Act is an incentive for them to be here.

顯然，《芯片法》是他們來這裡的一個激勵因素。

Obviously, companies will go to places where they think the revenues will be positive for them.

很明顯，公司會去他們認為能帶來收益的地方。

是以，它不僅僅是《奇普斯法案》。

Taiwan's investment 10 years ago, 83 plus percent was going to China, mainland China.

10 年前，臺灣的投資有 83% 以上流向了中國大陸。

But last year, our outbound investment to China was less than 9 percent.

但去年，我們對中國的對外投資還不到 9%。

But last year, 40 percent of that investment came to the United States.

This repositioning of Taiwan's presence in manufacturing is already occurring.

臺灣製造業的重新定位已經開始。

And with President Trump's calling for the resurgence of United States manufacturing, I think we're very happy to work together with the United States.

特朗普總統呼籲美國製造業重新崛起，我認為我們非常樂意與美國合作。

At the White House, President Trump was saying that the TSMC investment would allow the leading edge microchips, the most advanced semiconductors, to be made in the United States.

特朗普總統在白宮表示，臺積電的投資將使最先進的微芯片、最先進的半導體在美國製造。

That would be a shift from today when the most advanced microchips are made in Taiwan, on the island of Taiwan.

如今，最先進的微芯片都是在臺灣島上製造的，這將是一個轉變。

Is the Taiwanese government prepared to allow the most advanced, the leading edge microchips to be manufactured in the United States?

臺灣政府是否準備允許在美國生產最先進、最前沿的微芯片？

The need for more chips, especially the more advanced chips with the advent of AI, the need for those chips has increased exponentially.

隨著人工智能的出現，對更多芯片，尤其是更先進芯片的需求成倍增長。

So for manufacturing to be placed where our clients are, the United States mainly, it makes sense.

是以，把生產基地放在我們的客戶所在地，主要是美國，是非常合理的。

Also, by being part of the supply chain, Taiwan, U.S., and other friendly countries, we're actually better intertwined, better connected.

此外，作為供應鏈的一部分，臺灣、美國和其他友好國家，我們實際上更好地相互交織，更好地聯繫在一起。

So we can turn this shield into our silicon fortress.

這樣，我們就能把這面盾牌變成我們的硅堡壘。

From what I know, from TSMC's data, they spend a lot of effort and resources in technological investments to make the newest, most advanced chips as possible.

據我所知，從臺積電的數據來看，他們在技術投資方面花費了大量精力和資源，以儘可能製造出最新、最先進的芯片。

So we may be getting to the 1.5 nano, the one eventually.

是以，我們最終可能會達到 1.5 納米。

So once this technology is mature, they'll probably move it elsewhere.

是以，一旦這項技術成熟，他們很可能會將其轉移到其他地方。

So the newest technology will be first made in Taiwan, and eventually will go to other places, the United States includes.

是以，最新技術將首先在臺灣製造，最終會流向其他地方，包括美國。

It sounds like what you're saying is there will still be the most advanced chips will still be from Taiwan, correct?

聽起來你的意思是，最先進的芯片仍將來自臺灣，對嗎？

It will originate and start in Taiwan and eventually be placed elsewhere.

它將起源於臺灣，並從臺灣開始，最終被安置在其他地方。

The shield could also be thinning from the U.S.

來自美國的屏蔽也可能正在減弱。

President Trump, during the election, suggested Taiwan should increase its own national spending.

特朗普總統在大選期間曾建議臺灣增加自己的國家開支。

Is the security relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan as strong as it's ever been?

美國和臺灣之間的安全關係是否一如既往地牢固？

Or has it changed since Trump came back into power?

還是特朗普重新掌權後情況發生了變化？

We understand our friends' suggestions that Taiwan should spend more and we should increase our burden, our own burden, responsibly to defend ourselves.

我們理解朋友們的建議，即臺灣應該多花錢，我們應該增加負擔，增加自己的負擔，負責任地保衛自己。

For the last 10 years, our defense spending has almost doubled.

在過去 10 年裡，我們的國防開支幾乎翻了一番。

We can spend more and willing to spend more.

我們可以花更多的錢，也願意花更多的錢。

President Lai has announced that he will add at least 3% of GDP on defense.

賴總統宣佈，他將增加至少 3% 的國內生產總值用於國防。

For the last eight years, we spent $26 billion in purchasing weapons, mainly from the United States.

過去八年，我們花費了 260 億美元購買武器，主要是從美國購買。

There has been 48 announcements of weapons sell from the United States to Taiwan.

美國已宣佈向臺灣出售 48 件武器。

But a good chunk of that budget that we spent, those equipments have not reached Taiwan yet, for many reasons.

但是，由於種種原因，我們花費的預算中有很大一部分設備尚未運抵臺灣。

Obviously, we appreciate the United States making available these equipments, but it's the speed at which these equipments, which are in stock, can be made available to Taiwan.

顯然，我們對美國提供這些設備表示感謝，但問題是這些庫存設備能夠以多快的速度提供給臺灣。

And finally, Mr. Representative, I just wanted to ask you about some of the tenor and tone of the conversations we have in Washington about Taiwan.

最後，眾議員先生，我想請您談談我們在華盛頓就臺灣問題所進行的對話的主旨和基調。

For instance, we have had an ongoing conversation in public among members of Congress, members of the security community, that should the PRC come over the strait and try to invade, well, would it be better for the U.S. to blow up TSMC and destroy the Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturing industry, rather than letting it fall into the PRC's hands?

例如，我們在國會議員和安全界人士之間一直有這樣一個公開對話：如果中華人民共和國越過海峽試圖入侵，那麼美國是否最好炸掉臺積電，摧毀臺灣的半導體制造業，而不是讓它落入中華人民共和國之手？

I wonder what you think about those conversations.

我想知道你對這些對話有什麼看法。

If they get their hands on TSMC in Taiwan, in Hsinchu in particular, all they're getting are the machines, and those can be easily replicated.

如果他們在臺灣，特別是在新竹拿到臺積電，他們得到的只是機器，而這些機器很容易複製。

PRC has spent billions and billions of dollars trying to replicate TSMC in China.

中國已耗資數十億美元，試圖在中國複製臺積電。

They hired, even hired, TSMC managers, they hired engineers, but they have not been able to do so, and actually, most of these couple of companies that they've invested by the state probably are ruined.

他們僱傭了，甚至僱傭了臺積電的經理，他們僱傭了工程師，但他們沒有能夠做到這一點，實際上，他們由國家投資的這幾家公司中的大多數可能都毀了。

It's the human factor that makes TSMC work.

是人的因素讓臺積電得以運轉。

沒有臺灣，臺積電將無法運轉。

It's not Taiwan by itself, we may have a shield, but together with other friends, we'll have a fortress.

單槍匹馬不是臺灣，我們可能有一個盾牌，但與其他朋友一起，我們將有一個堡壘。

Fortress Taiwan.  I think we can leave it at that, Mr. Representative.

臺灣要塞。  我想我們可以就此打住了，代表先生。

Thank you so much for sitting down on the Wall Street Journal.   Really has been a fantastic conversation.

非常感謝您做客《華爾街日報》。   這真是一次精彩的對話。

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川普、台積電——美國駐臺灣代表談日益薄弱的「矽盾」 (U.S. Taiwan Rep on a Thinning ‘Silicon Shield,’ Trump, TSMC and More | WSJ)

eventually

ridiculous

positive

negative