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  • Kim Jong-un is becoming a more prominent figure on the world stage.

    金正恩在世界舞台上逐漸變得重要。

  • He now frequently leaves North Korea

    他現在經常離開北韓,

  • and welcomes top officials in Pyongyang.

    並在平壤迎接高級官員。

  • And when looking at the dictator's high-profile public appearances,

    看到獨裁者高調公開露面時,

  • it would be difficult not to notice that they all share something in common:

    很明顯注意到他們都有共同點:

  • Mercedes.

    賓士。

  • Mercedes.

    賓士。

  • Rolls-Royce and more Mercedes.

    勞斯萊斯和賓士。

  • But how did Kim manage to get these luxury, bulletproof

    但是,金正恩是如何設法得到這些奢侈的防彈車,

  • vehiclesin open violation of an international ban

    還在公開違反國際奢侈品禁令的情況下,

  • on luxury goodsto North North Korea?

    將車輛送到北韓?

  • To answer this question,

    為了解開這個問題,

  • we teamed up with the non-profit research group

    我們與非盈利研究小組,

  • Center for Advanced Defense Studies,

    高級國防研究中心共同合作,

  • which published a detailed report on sanctions evasions.

    其公佈了規避制裁的詳細報告。

  • Using shipping and corporate data,

    使用航運、公司數據

  • satellite images and interviews,

    衛星圖像和採訪,

  • we investigated a shipment of two bulletproof Mercedes.

    我們調查到兩台防彈賓士的運送。

  • These vehicles cost at least $500,000

    這些車輛至少花費 50 萬美元,

  • and are primarily marketed to world leaders.

    主要是銷售給國家領導者。

  • We followed them through a circuitous network of ports,

    我們透過複雜的港口網來追蹤他們,

  • apparently designed to cloak their movement,

    他們顯然要掩蓋自己的行動,

  • and onto a ghost ship owned by a Russian businessman

    而我們在一艘俄商所有的鬼船上發現,

  • whose company has been accused of evading sanctions.

    該公司因規避制裁而被控告。

  • Our story offers a glimpse into how North Korea skirts

    我們的故事讓大家一窺北韓如何

  • sanctions and how it likely uses

    規避制裁,以及如何利用

  • similar techniques to procure far more dangerous goods.

    類似的技術來獲取更多危險物品。

  • So first, let's take a look at the actual route.

    首先,我們來看看實際的路線。

  • And the trail starts:

    追蹤開始:

  • in a shipping terminal in Rotterdam in June 2018.

    2018 年 6 月在鹿特丹航運碼頭。

  • The first part of the journey looks like a regular shipment.

    這趟旅程的第一部分看起來像是定期出貨。

  • Nothing out of the ordinary.

    沒有什麼不尋常。

  • The cars are on two of the containers on this ship.

    汽車就在這艘船的兩個貨櫃中。

  • From here, they're transported on a major international shipping line.

    從這裡,它們在主要的國際航線上運輸。

  • After a 41 day journey, the cars arrive in China.

    經過 41 天的航程,汽車抵達中國。

  • We track them to the port of Dalian.

    我們追蹤到了大連港。

  • From here, the cars are shipped to Japan,

    從這裡,汽車運送到日本,

  • and from there they are sent in yet another ship

    又從那裡,由另一艘船送到

  • to another port in Busan, South Korea.

    南韓釜山的港口。

  • And here, the Russian-owned ship at the center of our investigation enters the picture.

    在這裡,我們調查中心所查到的俄羅斯船進入到畫面。

  • It picks up the containers and when it leaves the port, mysteriously vanishes,

    貨櫃上了這艘船,而就在離開港口時,卻神奇消失了,

  • turning off its required transponder.

    關掉船上的應答器。

  • Eighteen days later, the ship reappears,

    18 天後,船重新出現了,

  • but now the cars are gone.

    但現在汽車卻消失不見。

  • And instead, it's carrying coal.

    相反的是,它正在運煤。

  • So, what just happened?

    所以,究竟發生什麼事?

  • Let's take a closer look at this ghost ship.

    讓我們仔細看看這艘鬼船。

  • Its convoluted background offers clues

    其錯綜複雜的背景提供了線索,

  • as to why it was not at all a regular transport.

    這艘船根本不是常規運輸船。

  • It used to be called Xiang Jin and had links to North Korea.

    這艘船起初叫祥金號,與北韓有所關聯。

  • But shortly before it gets the cars,

    但當它裝上汽車不久後,

  • its name changes to DN5505

    就改名為 DN5505,

  • and its ownership is transferred

    所有權也轉移到

  • to Do Young Shipping, a shell company in the Marshall Islands.

    都洋運輸,一間位於馬紹爾群島的空殼公司。

  • It's Do Young Shipping that's owned by the Russian national.

    都洋運輸就是由俄羅斯所有。

  • But you'd never know it because it sails under the flag of the West African nation Togo.

    但你永遠不可能知道這事,因為船上掛的是西非國家多哥的旗子。

  • And its safety manager is based in Hong Kong.

    其安全管理總部位於香港。

  • Confused? That's the idea.

    搞不懂嗎?這就是他們要的。

  • Using that many jurisdictions is a classic sanctions evasion strategy.

    牽扯到許多管轄區是規避制裁的老套路。

  • Our reporting also shows that this ship

    我們的報告也顯示出,

  • was trailing the cargo as soon as it entered China.

    這艘船一進入中國後,就把貨物拖走了。

  • Do you see it?

    看見了嗎?

  • It's right here.

    就在這裡。

  • Satellite images we found suggest

    我們發現的衛星圖像指出,

  • that it tried to pick up the cars at other ports in Asia.

    它試圖在亞洲其他港口把汽車裝上船。

  • But the handoff happens weeks later in South Korea.

    但貨物幾週後在南韓交換了

  • So where did the containers go?

    所以貨櫃跑去哪了?

  • Vladivostok, Russia.

    俄國海參威。

  • And here is why we think that:

    這是我們認為的原因:

  • First, the ship's last reported destination

    首先,該船在關掉應答器前,

  • before the transponder was turned off

    最後報告的目的地是

  • was a coal port next to Vladivostok.

    海參威旁的裝煤港。

  • We think the cars were offloaded in this area.

    我們認為汽車是在此區卸貨。

  • Second, the owner of the Russian ghost ship is based in Vladivostok.

    其次,俄羅斯鬼船的所有人就位於海參威。

  • His name is Danil Kazachuk.

    他叫丹尼爾.卡扎丘克。

  • And he confirmed that he bought and sold the Mercedes

    他在電話中告訴《紐約時報》的記者,他證實,

  • in a phone call to a Times reporter, but offered no further details.

    有進行賓士的買賣,但並未提供進一步的細節。

  • Four months after the cars disappeared,

    汽車消失四個月後,

  • South Korean officials seized

    南韓官員扣押了

  • two of Kazachuk's ships, including the ghost ship,

    卡扎丘克的兩艘船,也包括那艘鬼船,

  • for alleged illicit trade of coal and oil with North Korea.

    因為涉嫌與北韓進行煤炭和石油的非法貿易。

  • Third, we tracked these North Korean transport planes,

    第三,我們追蹤這些北韓運輸機,

  • which made a rare visit to Vladivostok on Oct. 7 — perfectly timed with the arrival of the containers.

    這些飛機於 10 月 7 日罕見出訪至海參崴,完美與貨櫃的到達時間同步。

  • They are the very planes that normally carry Kim's

    它們正常來說載著金正恩的高級車,

  • luxury vehicles and a possible direct transportation link to North Korea.

    也可能是直接通往北韓的交通連結。

  • Our final clue: In January 2019,

    最終線索:2019 年 1 月,

  • the same exact model of armored Mercedes

    在北韓新聞網站上的平壤街道,

  • was spotted on the streets of Pyongyang by the website North Korea News.

    發現了同樣型號的裝甲賓士。

  • The route to Asia.

    亞洲的路線。

  • The ghost ship in Busan.

    釜山的鬼船。

  • The North Korean planes.

    北韓的飛機。

  • It's not possible to say if every part of this journey was illicit.

    不能說這趟航程的每一部分都違法。

  • But since 2016, sanctions experts

    但自 2016 年以來,

  • say that North Korea has used similar techniques

    制裁專家表示,北韓利用相似的手法,

  • to bring in vital fuel sources and technology for its weapons program.

    為其武器計畫引入重要的燃料來源和技術。

  • Which raises the question: How effective are sanctions as a tool to pressure Kim Jong-un to end his nuclear ambitions?

    這也引起質疑:逼迫金正恩終止核計畫的制裁,究竟能有多大效益?

Kim Jong-un is becoming a more prominent figure on the world stage.

金正恩在世界舞台上逐漸變得重要。

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金正恩如何獲得他的50萬美元奔馳車|視覺調查 (How Kim Jong-un Gets His $500,000 Mercedes | Visual Investigations)

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    于鈞 發佈於 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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