He now frequently leaves North Korea

他現在經常離開北韓，

and welcomes top officials in Pyongyang.

並在平壤迎接高級官員。

And when looking at the dictator's high-profile public appearances,

看到獨裁者高調公開露面時，

it would be difficult not to notice that they all share something in common:

很明顯注意到他們都有共同點：

Mercedes.

賓士。

Mercedes.

賓士。

Rolls-Royce and more Mercedes.

勞斯萊斯和賓士。

But how did Kim manage to get these luxury, bulletproof

但是，金正恩是如何設法得到這些奢侈的防彈車，

vehicles — in open violation of an international ban

還在公開違反國際奢侈品禁令的情況下，

on luxury goods — to North North Korea?

將車輛送到北韓？

To answer this question,

為了解開這個問題，

we teamed up with the non-profit research group

我們與非盈利研究小組，

Center for Advanced Defense Studies,

高級國防研究中心共同合作，

which published a detailed report on sanctions evasions.

其公佈了規避制裁的詳細報告。

Using shipping and corporate data,

使用航運、公司數據

satellite images and interviews,

衛星圖像和採訪，

we investigated a shipment of two bulletproof Mercedes.

我們調查到兩台防彈賓士的運送。

These vehicles cost at least $500,000

這些車輛至少花費 50 萬美元，

and are primarily marketed to world leaders.

主要是銷售給國家領導者。

We followed them through a circuitous network of ports,

我們透過複雜的港口網來追蹤他們，

apparently designed to cloak their movement,

他們顯然要掩蓋自己的行動，

and onto a ghost ship owned by a Russian businessman

而我們在一艘俄商所有的鬼船上發現，

whose company has been accused of evading sanctions.

該公司因規避制裁而被控告。

Our story offers a glimpse into how North Korea skirts

我們的故事讓大家一窺北韓如何

sanctions and how it likely uses

規避制裁，以及如何利用

similar techniques to procure far more dangerous goods.

類似的技術來獲取更多危險物品。

So first, let's take a look at the actual route.

首先，我們來看看實際的路線。

And the trail starts:

追蹤開始：

in a shipping terminal in Rotterdam in June 2018.

2018 年 6 月在鹿特丹航運碼頭。

The first part of the journey looks like a regular shipment.

這趟旅程的第一部分看起來像是定期出貨。

Nothing out of the ordinary.

沒有什麼不尋常。

The cars are on two of the containers on this ship.

汽車就在這艘船的兩個貨櫃中。

From here, they're transported on a major international shipping line.

從這裡，它們在主要的國際航線上運輸。

After a 41 day journey, the cars arrive in China.

經過 41 天的航程，汽車抵達中國。

We track them to the port of Dalian.

我們追蹤到了大連港。

From here, the cars are shipped to Japan,

從這裡，汽車運送到日本，

and from there they are sent in yet another ship

又從那裡，由另一艘船送到

to another port in Busan, South Korea.

南韓釜山的港口。

And here, the Russian-owned ship at the center of our investigation enters the picture.

在這裡，我們調查中心所查到的俄羅斯船進入到畫面。

It picks up the containers and when it leaves the port, mysteriously vanishes,

貨櫃上了這艘船，而就在離開港口時，卻神奇消失了，

turning off its required transponder.

關掉船上的應答器。

Eighteen days later, the ship reappears,

18 天後，船重新出現了，

but now the cars are gone.

但現在汽車卻消失不見。

And instead, it's carrying coal.

相反的是，它正在運煤。

So, what just happened?

所以，究竟發生什麼事？

Let's take a closer look at this ghost ship.

讓我們仔細看看這艘鬼船。

Its convoluted background offers clues

其錯綜複雜的背景提供了線索，

as to why it was not at all a regular transport.

這艘船根本不是常規運輸船。

It used to be called Xiang Jin and had links to North Korea.

這艘船起初叫祥金號，與北韓有所關聯。

But shortly before it gets the cars,

但當它裝上汽車不久後，

its name changes to DN5505

就改名為 DN5505，

and its ownership is transferred

所有權也轉移到

to Do Young Shipping, a shell company in the Marshall Islands.

都洋運輸，一間位於馬紹爾群島的空殼公司。

It's Do Young Shipping that's owned by the Russian national.

都洋運輸就是由俄羅斯所有。

But you'd never know it because it sails under the flag of the West African nation Togo.

但你永遠不可能知道這事，因為船上掛的是西非國家多哥的旗子。

And its safety manager is based in Hong Kong.

其安全管理總部位於香港。

Confused? That's the idea.

搞不懂嗎？這就是他們要的。

Using that many jurisdictions is a classic sanctions evasion strategy.

牽扯到許多管轄區是規避制裁的老套路。

Our reporting also shows that this ship

我們的報告也顯示出，

was trailing the cargo as soon as it entered China.

這艘船一進入中國後，就把貨物拖走了。

Do you see it?

看見了嗎？

It's right here.

就在這裡。

Satellite images we found suggest

我們發現的衛星圖像指出，

that it tried to pick up the cars at other ports in Asia.

它試圖在亞洲其他港口把汽車裝上船。

But the handoff happens weeks later in South Korea.

但貨物幾週後在南韓交換了

So where did the containers go?

所以貨櫃跑去哪了？

Vladivostok, Russia.

俄國海參威。

And here is why we think that:

這是我們認為的原因：

First, the ship's last reported destination

首先，該船在關掉應答器前，

before the transponder was turned off

最後報告的目的地是

was a coal port next to Vladivostok.

海參威旁的裝煤港。

We think the cars were offloaded in this area.

我們認為汽車是在此區卸貨。

Second, the owner of the Russian ghost ship is based in Vladivostok.

其次，俄羅斯鬼船的所有人就位於海參威。

His name is Danil Kazachuk.

他叫丹尼爾．卡扎丘克。

And he confirmed that he bought and sold the Mercedes

他在電話中告訴《紐約時報》的記者，他證實，

in a phone call to a Times reporter, but offered no further details.

有進行賓士的買賣，但並未提供進一步的細節。

Four months after the cars disappeared,

汽車消失四個月後，

South Korean officials seized

南韓官員扣押了

two of Kazachuk's ships, including the ghost ship,

卡扎丘克的兩艘船，也包括那艘鬼船，

for alleged illicit trade of coal and oil with North Korea.

因為涉嫌與北韓進行煤炭和石油的非法貿易。

Third, we tracked these North Korean transport planes,

第三，我們追蹤這些北韓運輸機，

which made a rare visit to Vladivostok on Oct. 7 — perfectly timed with the arrival of the containers.

這些飛機於 10 月 7 日罕見出訪至海參崴，完美與貨櫃的到達時間同步。

They are the very planes that normally carry Kim's

它們正常來說載著金正恩的高級車，

luxury vehicles and a possible direct transportation link to North Korea.

也可能是直接通往北韓的交通連結。

Our final clue: In January 2019,

最終線索：2019 年 1 月，

the same exact model of armored Mercedes

在北韓新聞網站上的平壤街道，

was spotted on the streets of Pyongyang by the website North Korea News.

發現了同樣型號的裝甲賓士。

The route to Asia.

亞洲的路線。

The ghost ship in Busan.

釜山的鬼船。

The North Korean planes.

北韓的飛機。

It's not possible to say if every part of this journey was illicit.

不能說這趟航程的每一部分都違法。

But since 2016, sanctions experts

但自 2016 年以來，

say that North Korea has used similar techniques

制裁專家表示，北韓利用相似的手法，

to bring in vital fuel sources and technology for its weapons program.

為其武器計畫引入重要的燃料來源和技術。

Which raises the question: How effective are sanctions as a tool to pressure Kim Jong-un to end his nuclear ambitions?

這也引起質疑：逼迫金正恩終止核計畫的制裁，究竟能有多大效益？