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  • Uncertainty and confusion over Putin's authority now

  • front and center following this weekend of

  • rebellion in Russia.

  • Putin had one of his worst weekends ever.

  • This act, one of a five act play.

  • And is there more to come?

  • The future of Wagner Group and its mercenary leader,

  • Yevgeny Prigozhin, remains murky following

  • the armed mutiny against the Russian state.

  • Until recently, Russia denied the existence of

  • Wagner. There was an.

  • Incentive to not make the footprint of the

  • organization too big.

  • But over time, that sort of went out of the window.

  • The Wagner Group's activity isn't limited to

  • war torn Ukraine.

  • These are.

  • Mercenaries. And, you know, they sell their

  • services to people who are willing and able to

  • pay them.

  • So the big countries where they're operating today

  • are Mali and Central African Republic.

  • They also operate in Libya and Sudan.

  • But those are kind of smaller deployments.

  • Securing access to lucrative resources

  • appeared to be a key motivator of Wagner Group

  • business operations there.

  • In diamonds, gold, forestry, coffee and

  • alcohol and probably other sectors that we

  • don't know about yet.

  • If we're talking about Syria.

  • There was certainly other business related things,

  • such as agreements to liberate oil fields, quote

  • unquote, in exchange for revenue cuts.

  • Once the war in Ukraine reached a new stage with

  • the full on invasion by Russia in 2022, Vladimir

  • Putin's failure to rapidly take over the

  • country led to a need for more troops.

  • He tried to outsource a lot of the burden of

  • fighting the war to Wagner, but.

  • Heavy losses led to a drop in recruiting standards.

  • What was once an organization made up of

  • former Russian military members started to take on

  • more employees without a military background,

  • including convicts.

  • Heavy fighting continued to take its toll, and

  • Wagner's leader bemoaned the lack of support from

  • the Russian state on the front lines in Ukraine.

  • The military increasingly saw the Wagner group of

  • mercenaries as a threat.

  • Questions remain If Wagner started the armed mutiny

  • as a way to force a contract negotiation with

  • the Kremlin, or if this was a desperate ploy by

  • Prigozhin to stay relevant in the world of

  • Russian power politics.

  • But whatever happens next could have big

  • implications for Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin.

  • How did it get to this point?

  • Right. Months of tension between the head of

  • Wagner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and the Russian

  • military came to a head in late June.

  • A private Russian military organization is accusing

  • the Russian military of launching strikes on its

  • training camps and killing troops.

  • After marching on Rostov on Don.

  • He sent an armed convoy towards Moscow that caused

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin to declare

  • an armed mutiny was underway in a video

  • statement. The mercenary force ended its rebellion

  • after the leader of Belarus, Alexander

  • Lukashenko, brokered a deal with Yevgeny

  • Prigozhin. The details of this deal and the long

  • term effects remain unknown.

  • Over the longer term.

  • I think that this probably has done some

  • damage to Putin politically.

  • And the murky missions Wagner is involved in

  • across the globe are likely another factor in

  • this brokered deal. These operations bring in huge

  • sums of money.

  • It's in the millions and billions of dollars

  • definitely moving towards the billions.

  • The issue is that it's it's very hard to kind of

  • kind of get an exact idea just because of the

  • illicit channels that that Wagner is using in

  • order to export things.

  • And also the number the sheer number of shell

  • companies that they use, because not only do they

  • change their names in the businesses that they're

  • running, but all of the companies that they then

  • export out of also have shell names and then they

  • use a variety of middle traders.

  • A camp has been reportedly laid out in Belarus, which

  • could end up housing Wagner members who are not

  • absorbed into the Russian military. But what comes

  • next for the group and its leaders has yet to

  • play out. Private military companies are

  • nothing new. Governments have hired mercenaries

  • throughout history to provide security guard

  • elites and fight in wars during the global war on

  • terror. The US used private military companies

  • and security contractors extensively.

  • Blackwater was sent in to fulfill specialist

  • functions. It wasn't set in to just become a force

  • multiplier, you know.

  • Yes, to some degree.

  • Russia was imitating a phenomenon that it first

  • saw in the West.

  • It did so in a in a highly distorted, much

  • more disorganized, much more unscrupulous way.

  • Hal Wagner operates in countries such as the

  • Central African Republic are what sets it apart

  • from other modern PMCs.

  • Wagner group will get involved in these

  • countries at the same time that the Russian

  • state is involved in large kind of military

  • assistance programs.

  • Often they kind of get into these side operations

  • that are more building their own business.

  • So basically a lot of resource extraction

  • projects, which is often how they finance

  • themselves or how they kind of make economic

  • agreements with the with the state in order to stay

  • in these countries.

  • Having an organization that isn't officially

  • under Russian government control has open doors to

  • agreements that otherwise would likely remain

  • closed.

  • The resources that they generally go after are

  • precious metals.

  • That's that's the biggest one because it's

  • relatively easy to export and relatively easy to

  • smuggle. We can surmise that a lot of it is in

  • fact going back to the Russian state.

  • So in that way it's it's helping the Russian state

  • at a time where their precious metal reserves

  • are incredibly low.

  • The core of Wagner's troops included the battle

  • hardened personnel who gained their expertise by

  • serving in the Russian military. As the war in

  • Ukraine wore on, Wagner losses began to mount, and

  • the group was forced to turn to convicts to

  • bolster numbers. Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin

  • found himself with a manpower shortage in the

  • regular Russian military.

  • He did not want to impose martial law.

  • He did not want to impose a widespread conscription

  • on the Russian people.

  • So he tried to wage this war on the cheap, so to

  • speak.

  • The combination of well-trained soldiers and

  • convicts with nothing to lose created an

  • organization that at times was effective on the

  • battlefield. But high losses and a new strategy

  • by Russia changed the dynamic for Wagner.

  • Late last summer, early last fall, Putin bit the

  • bullet, so to speak, and imposed a partial

  • conscription.

  • This new wave of mobilization and a change

  • to Russian strategy made Wagner less critical to

  • Putin's war in Ukraine.

  • And I think that's part of the reason why the regular

  • Russian military finally said to Wagner, okay,

  • enough. Your fighters are going to have to sign

  • contracts with us because they weren't as dependent

  • on Wagner today as they were a year ago.

  • Wagner's mutiny may stand out as a warning to other

  • countries that outsource war fighting to private

  • companies. But it's also possible that Wagner

  • emerges from this critical juncture in an

  • entirely new position than before.

  • One of the challenges that the Russian government has

  • is that you don't build up an organization like

  • Wagner overnight. So if they do plan to liquidate

  • the whole organization, which I'm skeptical of, it

  • would be a very costly, cumbersome process that

  • I'm not sure the Russian state wants to take on

  • right now.

  • As for Prigozhin and his senior commanders, my

  • guess is no.

  • They are not willing to be subordinate to the

  • regular Russian military.

  • There's no love between them and the Russian high

  • command. There's a great deal of of animosity.

  • Whatever happens to Wagner, it's unlikely that

  • there will be a decrease in demand for mercenaries

  • around the globe.

  • You're going to have a scenario where you see a

  • lot more of these groups popping up that look like

  • Wagner. They could be state sponsored.

  • They could not be. But sort of the expansion of

  • of the the mercenary phenomenon on the African

  • continent, it could be very problematic because

  • they tend to commit a lot of human rights

  • violations.

  • As immune as Vladimir Putin has seen during his

  • time in power. It's possible this armed mutiny

  • could create cracks in the facade.

  • Putin is scheduled to face a presidential election in

  • March of 2024.

  • That's only a few months from now.

  • And I'm relatively certain that at least some

  • Russian elites are wondering whether he is

  • the horse to back in that election campaign or not.

  • I think a lot of this is going to depend on what

  • happens in the battlefield.

Uncertainty and confusion over Putin's authority now

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What's Next For Russia After Wagner's Mercenary Revolt

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    林宜悉 發佈於 2023 年 07 月 16 日
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