Name: 全球芯片短缺：微芯片如何成為世界上最珍貴的資源之一？ (Global chip shortage: How microchips became one of the worlds most precious resources)
Uploaded: 2021-02-28T21:10:25.000Z
Duration: 13 min 13 s

consumer electronics, cars, medical devices, planes, smart appliances, their common component chips.

消費電子、汽車、醫療設備、飛機、智能家電，其常見的元器件芯片。

情態副詞

You don't buy them directly, but trust me, you need them.

你不直接買它們，但相信我，你需要它們。

So when the silicon chips are down, what happens?

那麼，當硅芯片宕機的時候，會發生什麼？

The auto sector has been hit hard, with car companies around the world pulling the brakes on production, although they're not the only ones.

汽車行業受到重創，世界各地的汽車公司紛紛拉閘限產，不過並非只有他們。

Makers of gadgets and popular electronics are feeling it, too.

小工具和流行電子產品的製造商也感覺到了。

The chip shortfall is also feeding into existing international relations issues and demand linked to future uses doesn't really look like it's about to slow.

芯片缺口也在向現有的國際關係問題發展，與未來用途掛鉤的需求看起來並沒有真的要放緩。

Okay, so maybe that last bit is a bit tangential, but you get the picture.

好吧，也許最後一點是有點切題，但你懂的。

The chip shortage could be why you're having a hard time finding a PS five or a flex value percent.

芯片短缺可能是你很難找到PS五或彈性值百分比的原因。

About one trillion chips are made a year.

每年大約有一萬億個芯片被製造出來。

That's about 128 for every person on the planet.

Suffice to say, the world runs on chips slash semiconductors, so why are we coming up short?

可以說，這個世界是靠芯片和半導體來運轉的，那麼為什麼我們會出現不足呢？

Many factors contribute to the chip shortage that we see today.

導致我們今天看到的芯片短缺的因素很多。

The Covid 19 pandemic plays a significant role.

科維德19號大流行發揮了重要作用。

The pandemic change consumer behaviors were buying personal computers, new phones, new tablets Xboxes so we can work from home and to cope with the lockdowns and companies upgrading their digital infrastructure to enable remote working.

大流行的變化消費者的行為是購買個人電腦，新的手機，新的平板電腦Xbox，所以我們可以在家工作，並應對封鎖和公司升級他們的數字基礎設施，以實現遠程工作。

And all these purchases are driving up the demand for chips at the beginning of pandemic with estimated an economic downturn, industries such as the automakers they slashed the chip purchases.

而所有這些採購都推動了芯片的需求，在大流行之初，隨著估計經濟的不景氣，汽車製造商等行業他們削減了芯片的採購。

And but the economy in East Asia bounce back sooner than expected, with more demands for cars.

而但東亞的經濟反彈比預期的要快，對汽車的需求也更多。

So right now they're buying, buying, buying.

As the coronavirus crisis reshaped supply and demand chip companies are scrambling.

由於冠狀病毒危機重塑了供需關係，芯片企業爭先恐後。

And if there's an industry that can't simply quickly ramp up production or ask its clients to do without its products for a while, our shift that's manufacturing elsewhere rapidly, it's the chip industry.

而如果說有一個行業不能簡單地快速提升產量，或者要求客戶暫時不生產它的產品，我們的轉變是在其他地方快速製造，那就是芯片行業。

Supply chains have been spread across countries as the cost of communication has gone down, along with, you know, the cost transportation.

供應鏈已經遍佈各國，因為通訊成本已經下降，還有，你知道，運輸成本。

So this was largely seen as a good thing to spread the production of semiconductors and other high tech components across countries you know, kind of based on some sort of fundamental theories of economics, and that by doing so, you could reduce the cost of production, thereby increasing efficiency.

所以，這在很大程度上被認為是一件好事，可以將半導體和其他高科技元件的生產分散到各個國家，你知道，這是基於某種基本的經濟學理論，通過這樣做，你可以降低生產成本，從而提高效率。

But in the past several years, as concerns over technology and, you know, technological sovereignty have grown, uh, this has been coming to be viewed as a geopolitical risk rather than economic benefit.

但在過去的幾年裡，隨著對技術的關注，以及，你知道，技術主權的增長，呃，這已經被看作是一種地緣政治風險，而不是經濟利益。

Hold that thought geopolitical complexity is going to figure in this.

抱著這樣的想法地緣政治的複雜性要在這裡面找出。

所以，我們先來捋一捋基本情況。

One every country in the world needs chips to chips are complicated to produce.

一個世界上每個國家都需要芯片，芯片的生產很複雜。

And three, because the world economy runs on chips, who makes them and who is able to buy them goes a long way towards defining who stagnates and who progresses.

三是因為世界經濟是靠籌碼運行的，誰製造籌碼，誰能買到籌碼，在很大程度上決定了誰停滯不前，誰進步。

One expert likens it to one other commodity that's seen its own share of geopolitical contentiousness.

一位專家將其比喻為另一種商品，這種商品也有其自身的地緣政治爭議。

The artists have been called the new oil in the Digital Age everything from your phone to your air conditioning and everything in between, of course, uses chips.

藝術家們被稱為數字時代的新石油從你的手機到你的空調，以及中間的一切，當然，都使用芯片。

And, of course, as technology becomes more central, chips become more important.

當然，隨著技術越來越核心，芯片也越來越重要。

And most importantly, the ability to manufacture smaller and smaller chips that can do more is absolutely critical.

而最重要的是，能夠製造出越來越小的芯片，能夠做更多的事情，這絕對是關鍵。

Talking about smaller and smaller chips that can do more makes it a good time to introduce this guy.

談到越來越小的芯片，可以做更多的事情，就可以介紹這個傢伙了。

Gordon Moore, co founder of American chip champion Intel in 1965.

戈登-摩爾，1965年美國芯片冠軍英特爾的聯合創始人。

He said that the number of transistors the active component of chips that could fit onto one chip would double every two years or so, meaning computers can be expected to double their efficiency in that time as costs fall by half.

他說，每隔兩年左右，能裝在一塊芯片上的半導體（芯片的有源元件）的數量就會增加一倍，這意味著隨著成本下降一半，計算機的效率有望在這段時間內提高一倍。

It's not really a law, but it is kind of a guiding principle, increasing power but decreasing size.

這其實也不是什麼規律，但也算是一種指導原則，力量增大但規模減小。

你可能已經感覺到了這種情況的發生。

我們就是這樣從這個變成這個的。

As next generation Super Fast five G connectivity becomes more common, the Internet of things continues to expand an a I powered tech improves.

隨著下一代超快五G連接變得越來越普遍，物聯網不斷擴大一個I動力技術的提高。

The appetite for increasingly powerful chips of various kinds is going to grow accordingly, and the more powerful chips become, the more specialized their manufacturer, and the fewer the producers that are able to do it.

人們對各種越來越強大的芯片的胃口也會相應地增長，而且越是強大的芯片，其生產商越是專業化，能夠做到這一點的生產商就越少。

Here are the so called Big Three of chips producers Intel from the U.

這裡有所謂的三大芯片生產商英特爾從美國。

Samsung from South Korea and TSMC from Taiwan.

They're considered companies at the industry's leading edge, meaning they can make the world most advanced chips.

他們被認為是處於行業領先地位的公司，這意味著他們可以製造世界上最先進的芯片。

Samsung and Intel are what you would call integrated device manufacturers, meaning they can design, manufacture and sell the chips from start to finish.

三星和英特爾是你所說的集成設備製造商，這意味著他們可以從頭到尾設計、製造和銷售芯片。

TSMC is what you would call a foundry, meaning they make chips for companies without factories themselves or fabs, as they're known in industry parlance.

臺積電就是你所說的代工廠，也就是說，他們為企業生產芯片，本身沒有工廠，也沒有晶圓廠，用行業內的說法，他們就是在做芯片。

Those fabs, by the way, become more expensive with each generation of chip.

對了，那些晶圓廠，每一代芯片都會變得更貴。

The cost to build a facility with five nanometer production lines is at least $5.4 billion according to consulting firm McKinsey.

根據諮詢公司麥肯錫的數據，建造一個擁有5條納米生產線的設施，成本至少為54億美元。

One example of that five nanometer chip is the A 14 bionic Apple says it's the fastest available chip on a smartphone, and it's found in the iPhone 12.

五納米芯片的一個例子是A 14仿生蘋果說這是智能手機上最快的芯片，它在iPhone 12中就有。

It might not be a household name to most consumers the way Apple is, but Apple couldn't have done it all without TSMC.

對於大多數消費者來說，它可能不像蘋果那樣家喻戶曉，但如果沒有臺積電，蘋果不可能做到這一切。

For that matter, neither could Apple competitors like Chinese tech giant Huawei.

就這一點而言，蘋果的競爭對手也不可能，比如中國科技巨頭華為。

Now TSMC and its home country, Taiwan, is in a unique position.

現在，臺積電和它的祖國臺灣，正處於一個獨特的位置。

This is all part of the geopolitical complexity we were talking about earlier.

這都是我們之前所說的地緣政治複雜性的一部分。

So here you have this hugely important industry located in Taiwan.

所以你在這裡有這個位於臺灣的重要產業。

And Taiwan, of course, is you know, right in the center of this of geopolitical struggle, the Communist Party now make no clams about saying that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China that is only waiting for reunification.

而臺灣，當然，你知道，就在這個地緣政治鬥爭的中心，共產黨現在毫不掩飾地說，臺灣是中國不可分割的一部分，只是在等待統一。

They, whether they have they don't have publicly stated timetable per se, but they make no qualms about it.

他們，無論他們是否有他們沒有公開說明的時間表本身，但他們對此毫無顧忌。

They have not renounced violence to reunify the country.

他們沒有放棄以暴力統一國家。

You can certainly be see it being a very real flash point, really, whether or not China successfully invaded Taiwan, it's almost guaranteed that the semiconductor industry and you know the global supply chains would be disrupted by this.

你當然可以看到這是一個非常真實的爆發點，真的，不管中國是否成功入侵臺灣，幾乎可以保證半導體產業和你知道的全球供應鏈會是以而中斷。

There's also some concerns that, if successful, that China would take over Taiwan's manufacturing industry or the semiconductor industry, and because of Taiwan's critical role in the manufacturer of these chips, that could be relatively problematic for the companies that use TSMC, the Taiwan.

也有人擔心，如果成功的話，中國會接管臺灣的製造業或者是半導體產業，由於臺灣在這些芯片的製造商中扮演著至關重要的角色，這對於使用臺灣台積電的公司來說，可能會有比較大的問題。

So there's some discussions that if China did take over TSMC that China could put members of the Chinese Communist Party on the board or, you know, exert other influence through other ways chips being as important as they are, they figure prominently in the often intertwined discussion of security and technological advancement.

是以，有一些討論認為，如果中國真的接管了臺積電，中國可能會把中共黨員放在董事會中，或者，你知道，通過其他方式施加其他影響，芯片作為重要的芯片，它們在安全和技術進步的討論中經常交織在一起。

Just think of the US coming up with its special kind of list an entity list that places companies and persons for the for behaviors, contrary to U.

只要想想美國拿出其特殊的一種清單一個實體清單，將公司和個人的為行為，與U。

National security interests and foreign policy interests.

國家安全利益和外交政策利益。

So let's say human rights violation will account for one.

所以我們說侵犯人權會佔一個。

Um, I P theft will be another one, and one notable company you may have heard is the Chinese telecom giant Huawei.

嗯，I P盜竊將是另一個，你可能聽說過一個值得注意的公司，就是中國電信巨頭華為。

Also places list of Chinese and Russian military and users to the entity list.

同時將中俄軍方和用戶名單放入實體名單。

So China SMIC, the Short for Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, also made it onto the list because of its ties with the P l.

所以，中國中芯國際集成電路製造公司的簡稱，也因為與P l的關係而上榜。

By this point, US mid chips are essentially off limits to China.

至此，美國的中堅芯片基本不受中國限制。

Incidentally, this also contributed to the massive chip shortage we were talking about earlier when SMIC got blacklisted by the US That meant it couldn't purchase advanced manufacturing gear from the United States.

順帶一提，這也造成了我們之前說的大規模芯片短缺，當時中芯國際被美國列入黑名單，這意味著它無法從美國購買先進的製造裝備。

So the sanctions prompted some of mixed chip buyers to shift their orders to TSMC, thereby helping to create a bottleneck.

所以，制裁促使一些混雜的芯片買家將訂單轉移到了臺積電，從而有助於形成瓶頸。

China had also been stockpiling chips from elsewhere in order to circumvent US sanctions.

為了規避美國的制裁，中國也一直在從其他地方囤積芯片。

Now, its ambitions to become the world leader in tech are well established and semiconductors are a key part of that.

現在，其成為世界科技領域領導者的雄心已經確立，而半導體是其中的關鍵部分。

The restrictions are a threat to that plan, but China has been building its own strategy, So China has worked for several decades to develop its semiconductor industry.

這些限制對這一計劃是一種威脅，但中國一直在建立自己的戰略，所以中國幾十年來一直致力於發展半導體產業。

It has poured money into this, but really the past several years this drive has been accelerated as China's vulnerabilities in semiconductors has been made so clear by US sanctions.

它已經投入了資金，但真正過去幾年，隨著中國在半導體領域的弱勢被美國製裁得如此明顯，這種驅動力已經加速了。

We see this by companies like Huawei pouring money into Chinese startups and other semiconductor companies across the industrial value chain.

我們從華為等公司向中國初創企業和其他產業價值鏈上的半導體公司投入資金就可以看出這一點。

But it really remains seen whether or not China and the Chinese companies will be successful at doing this.

但中國和中國企業能否成功做到這一點，確實還有待觀察。

So they're starting from from certainly a backward position, and then they've got a lot of going to make up, and they also are now entering a phase a phase where there simply isn't the trust that is.

所以他們的出發點肯定是落後的，然後他們有很多的去彌補，他們現在也進入了一個階段一個階段，根本就沒有信任是。

Their chip design relies on a whole slew of components and inputs from global chains of engineers and companies, and that's a chain of trust which China is simply outside at the moment.

他們的芯片設計依賴於全球工程師和公司鏈條上的一系列元器件和投入，而這一信任鏈，中國目前根本在外面。

So it's going to be very difficult to simply say, in five years we're going to bleeding design companies you can look across the number of industries in China.

所以要簡單的說，五年內我們要出血的設計公司，你可以看一下中國的行業數量，是非常困難的。

Whether you know, high tech industries, difficult industries like airline commercial airlines.

無論是你知道的，高科技行業，困難行業，如航空商業航空公司。

China has been trying to do that for 30 years with very little success for the size of its economy.

30年來，中國一直在努力做到這一點，但以中國的經濟規模來說，成效甚微。

It may demand great things that may put them in the plan.

它可能會要求偉大的事情，可能會把它們放在計劃中。

There may be political imperatives, but it takes a lot of work to get there, and there is no certainty they're going to get there from where they are today.

也許有政治上的需要，但要達到這個目標需要做很多工作，而且從今天的情況來看，他們沒有把握能達到這個目標。

所以，再一次大刀闊斧的說，U。

S and China both want to be the tech superpower.

斯和中國都想成為科技超級大國。

The US has accused China, among other things, of intellectual property theft and of human rights violations, and has blocked certain Chinese companies from accessing U.

美國指責中國盜竊知識產權和侵犯人權等，並阻止某些中國公司進入美國。

China is spending billions in order to be able to decrease its dependence on tech imports, thereby also reducing its vulnerability to sanctions put in place in part to punish aggression and deter future belligerence like, say, towards Taiwan.

中國正在花費數十億美元，以便能夠減少對技術進口的依賴，從而也減少了對制裁的脆弱性，這些制裁部分是為了懲罰侵略和阻止未來的交戰，比如，對臺灣。

And that's why chips are the new economic security and geopolitical flashpoint.

而這也是為什麼芯片成為新的經濟安全和地緣政治熱點的原因。

I think much of the well the ideas behind some of the U.

我認為很多的井的想法背後的一些U。