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  • DENIS GOROKHOV: So I work at Morgan Stanley.

  • I run corporate treasury strategies at Morgan Stanley.

  • So corporate treasury is the business unit

  • that is responsible for issuing and risk management

  • of Morgan Stanley debt.

  • I also run desk strategies own the New York inflation desk.

  • That's the business which is a part of the global interest

  • rate business, which is responsible for trading

  • derivatives linked to inflation.

  • And today, I'm going to talk about the HJM model.

  • So HJM model-- the abbreviation stands for Heath-Jarrow-Morton,

  • these three individuals who discovered this framework

  • in the beginning of 1990s.

  • And this is a very general framework

  • for pricing derivatives to interest rates and to credit.

  • So on Wall Street, big banks make a substantial amount

  • of money by trading all kinds of exotic products,

  • exotic derivatives.

  • And big banks like Morgan Stanley,

  • like Goldman, JP Morgan-- trades thousands and thousands

  • of different types of exotic derivatives.

  • So a typical problem which the business faces

  • is that new types of derivatives arrive all the time.

  • So you need to be able to respond quickly

  • to the demand from the clients.

  • And you need to be able not just to tell

  • the price of derivative.

  • You need to be able also to risk manage this derivative.

  • Because let's say if you sold an option,

  • you've got some premium, if something

  • goes not in your favor, you need to pay in the end.

  • So you need to be able to hedge.

  • And you can think about the HJM model,

  • like this kind of framework, as something

  • which is similar to theoretical physics in a way, right?

  • So you get beautiful models-- it's like a solvable model.

  • For example, let's say the hydrogen atom

  • in quantum mechanics.

  • So it's relatively straightforward to solve it,

  • right?

  • So we have an equation, which can be exactly solved.

  • And we can find energy levels and understand this

  • fairly quickly.

  • But if you start going into more complex problems-- for example,

  • you add one more electron and you

  • have a helium atom-- it's already much more complicated.

  • And then if you have complicated atoms or even molecules,

  • it's unclear what to do.

  • So people came up with approximate kind

  • of methods, which allow nevertheless solve everything

  • very accurately numerically.

  • And HJM is a similar framework.

  • So you can-- it allows to price all kinds

  • of [INAUDIBLE] derivatives.

  • And so it's very general.

  • It's very flexible to incorporate new payoffs,

  • all kinds of correlation between products and so on, so forth.

  • And this HJM model-- [INAUDIBLE] natural [INAUDIBLE]

  • more general framework like Monte Carlo simulation.

  • And before actually going into details

  • of pricing exotic interest rates and credit derivatives,

  • let me just first explain how this framework appears

  • in the most common type of derivatives, basically

  • equity-linked product.

  • So like a very, very simple example, right?

  • So let's say if we have a derivatives desk at some firm,

  • and they sell all kinds of products.

  • Of course, ideally, let's say there's

  • a client who wants to buy something from you.

  • Of course, the easiest approach would be to find the client

  • and do an opposite transaction with him, so that you're market

  • neutral, at least in theory.

  • So if you don't take into account

  • counterparties and so on.

  • However, it's rather difficult in general,

  • so the portfolios are very complicated.

  • And there's always some residual risk.

  • So this is the cause of dynamic hedging.

  • So for this example, very simple example,

  • a dealer just sold a call option on a stock.

  • And if you do this, then in principle,

  • the amount of money which you can lose is unlimited.

  • So you need to be able to hedge dynamically

  • by trading underlying, for example, in this case.

  • So just a brief illustration of the stock

  • markets, you see how random it has been for the last 20 years

  • or so.

  • So first of all, this year, some kind of--

  • from beginnings of the 1990s to around 2000,

  • we see really very sharp increase.

  • And then we have dot-com bubble, and then we

  • have the bank [INAUDIBLE] of 2008.

  • And if you trade derivatives whose payoff depends,

  • for example, on the FTSE 100 index,

  • you should be very careful.

  • All right?

  • Because market can drop, and you need to be hedged.

  • So you need to be able to come with some kind of good models

  • which can recalibrate to the markets

  • and which can truly risk manage your position.

  • So the so the general idea of pricing derivatives

  • is that one starts from some stochastic process.

  • So in this example here, it's probably like the simplest

  • possible-- nevertheless a very instructive-- model,

  • which is essentially like these [INAUDIBLE] Black-Scholes

  • formalism, which is where we have the stock, which follows

  • the log-normal dynamics.

  • I have a question.

  • Do you have a pointer somewhere, or not?

  • It's just easier-- OK, OK.

  • PROFESSOR: Let's see.

  • There's also a pen here, where you can use this.

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: Oh, I see.

  • PROFESSOR: Have you used this before?

  • You press the color here that you want to use, say,

  • and then you can draw.

  • You press on the screen.

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: Oh, I see.

  • Excellent.

  • That's even better.

  • OK, so it seems like the market is very random.

  • We need to be able to come up with some kind of dynamics.

  • And it turns out that the log-normal dynamics

  • is a very reasonable first approximation

  • for the actual dynamics.

  • So in this example, we have stochastic differential

  • equation for the stock price.

  • And it consists-- it's the sum of two terms.

  • This is a drift, it's some kind of deterministic part

  • of the stock price dynamics.

  • And here, also, we have diffusion.

  • So here, dB is the Brownian motion driving the stock,

  • and S is the price of the stock here.

  • Mu is the drift.

  • And sigma is the volatility of the stock.

  • Particularly, it shows the randomness.

  • And it's the randomness impact on the stock price.

  • And using this model, one can derive the Black-Scholes

  • formula.

  • And the Black-Scholes formula shows

  • how to price derivatives whose payoff depends

  • on the price of the stock.

  • So here, if you look at this differential equation,

  • then you can answer the question.

  • Let's say if you started from some initial value

  • for the stock at time t.

  • And then we started the clock.

  • Which are now to be at time capital T.

  • And given that time T, then stock price is S_T.

  • So what's the probability distribution

  • for the stock at time T?

  • So this kind of equation can be very easily solved.

  • And one can obtain analytically the probability distribution

  • function at any [INAUDIBLE] moment of time.

  • So I mean, I just think I'll write a few equations,

  • because it's very important to understand this.

  • So I'm sure you probably have seen something like this

  • already, but let me just show you the main ideas

  • beyond this formula.

  • So if you have a random process--

  • let's say A is some process, stochastic process, which

  • is normal.

  • So it follows some drift.

  • Plus some volatility term.

  • Right?

  • So the difference between this equation

  • is that I don't multiply by A here and A here.

  • Especially, it's much simpler to solve.

  • So the solution for this equation

  • is very straightforward.

  • So at any moment of time T, if you start at moment 0,

  • the solution of the equation would be something like this.

  • Drift-- right?

  • I'm simply integrating.

  • Plus-- and I assume that B of t is standard Brownian motion,

  • so at time 0, it's 0.

  • And then it's very easy to see now that...

  • is equal to the Brownian motion.

  • But this is nothing else.

  • It's some random number, which is normally distributed,

  • times square root of time.

  • So epsilon is proportional to it.

  • OK, so basically, this means that this is normally

  • distributed.

  • And its-- and probability distribution for this quantity

  • is equal to-- we know it's exactly, right,

  • because this is like a standard Gaussian distribution.

  • And if you simply substitute A into here,

  • then you will obtain the probability distribution

  • for the actual quantity.

  • And I'll just write it for the completeness.

  • So basically, we obtain probability distribution

  • for the standard variable.

  • So this is straightforward.

  • So the only difference between the case I'm doing here

  • is that the dynamics is assumed to be log-normal.

  • Right?

  • And the interpretation is very simple.

  • If it's normal, then the price of the stock

  • can become negative.

  • Which is just a financial nonsense.

  • So the [INAUDIBLE] log-normal dynamics basically

  • is a good first approximation.

  • And in this case, what helps as a result is just

  • known as Ito's lemma.

  • So I just first of all write it, and then I

  • will explain how you can obtain it.

  • And if you look at this equation--

  • let me write it once again-- which is basically the drift

  • plus-- then it turns out that, of course, since--- it--

  • intuitively it's clear that the dynamics of logarithm of S is--

  • dynamic of logarithm of S is normal.

  • So essentially, we obtain something like this.

  • So if you now substitute this into this,

  • you locked in a very simple formula.

  • OK, so here, I used the result, which

  • is known as Ito's lemma, which I'm going to explain right now.

  • Like how it was obtained-- basically,

  • it tells us that when we differentiate the function

  • of a stochastic variable.

  • Then besides the trivial term, which is basically

  • the first derivative times dS, there's

  • an additional term, which is proportional

  • to the second derivative.

  • And it's non-stochastic, so I'll explain why it's this.

  • But if you do it-- if you look at this equation,

  • then you see essentially this formula.

  • It's very, very similar to this formula.

  • The only difference now is that alpha is just mu minus one half

  • of sigma squared.

  • So that's a how, if you iteratively use this solution,

  • and simply substitute A by log S,

  • you will come to this equation.

  • So this is very important.

  • So it's a very important effect, like-- yes?

  • AUDIENCE: The fact that it can't be negative,

  • does that exclude certain possibilities?

  • When there's a normal Gaussian, can go negative or positive?

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: Yes, but stock-- from a financial point of view,

  • stock cannot be a liability.

  • Right?

  • You buy a stock.

  • This means basically, you pay some money.

  • And you have basically some sort of, say, option

  • on the profit of the company.

  • So they can't charge you by default.

  • So it can't go negative for the stock.

  • Also, in principle, there might be

  • derivatives, which can be both positive or negative payoff,

  • but not the stock.

  • So it's fundamental financial restriction.

  • So very important thing.

  • So if you talk about the stock dynamics and Black-Scholes

  • formalism, it's very important that the probability

  • distribution for the stock can be found exactly.

  • And I'll just [INAUDIBLE] very briefly

  • go, again, through the Black-Scholes formalism,

  • it's very important just for understanding.

  • And I believe there are a couple of things which, at least when

  • I was studying this, it was not very clear to me,

  • so I want to go to some more detail.

  • So basically, here, this derivation

  • is almost like every textbook.

  • So the idea is that there is a very fundamental result

  • in stochastic calculus.

  • That if you have a stochastic function, function

  • of stochastic variable S and time, then

  • its differential can be written as the following form.

  • So this is all very clear, right?

  • This is standard calculus?

  • It's straightforward.

  • But there is an additional term that looks a bit suspicious.

  • And I will explain what it actually

  • means on the next slide.

  • So a very important thing is that when you calculate dC,

  • then you will obtain deterministic term which

  • is proportional to the second derivative.

  • And you see, there is no-- the fact is that you have here dt,

  • basically this looks like it's an additional contribution

  • to the drift.

  • We view this as drift, and this is a drift.

  • And there is no, any more, stochasticity.

  • It's very important.

  • This is like a crucial fact beyond the Black-Scholes

  • formalism and the Monte Carlo method in finance.

  • And then, the idea, you can read, for example,

  • in Hull's book, its standard proof.

  • So if we issue an option, then we hedge it--

  • by having a certain position in the underlying.

  • So the idea is like this.

  • Let's say I sold a call option of the stock.

  • So when the stock market goes, up I make some money.

  • And then, in the same time, I short the stock,

  • so I lose money on my hedge.

  • And wherever the market goes, I don't make or lose money.

  • So that's the idea, basically, beyond hedging.

  • And basically, what happens if I calculate

  • the change in my portfolio, then since there

  • is no risk involved, I assume I am perfectly hedged.

  • Then I simply obtain the risk-free return.

  • So r here is the risk-free interest rate.

  • So if you simply look at this equation

  • and substitute the Ito's lemma result here,

  • then you obtain like a very simple equation,

  • which is basically Black-Scholes differential

  • equation for the stock-- for the price of the option.

  • So this equation is very fundamental.

  • And it's very elegant.

  • So you can see although originally, right,

  • if you started from something with some arbitrary risk,

  • with some arbitrary drift mu.

  • Right?

  • Which is basically-- it could be anything.

  • Which is that this drift mu drops out of the equation.

  • And it depends on the interest rate.

  • And this is a very interesting fact.

  • So and this very interesting fact has to do with hedging.

  • Again, you have position in an option,

  • and you have an opposite position in underlying.

  • And that's how the drift disappears.

  • If you look at the movement of both the positions,

  • then you see that there that the drift will disappear.

  • So it's a very important and striking fact.

  • And the second thing, which is truly a miracle,

  • is that risk is eliminated completely.

  • So this equation has absolutely no stochasticity.

  • So you can just solve it.

  • If you specify the option payoff,

  • and if you know your volatility, which

  • is a measure of your-- basically often how the stock fluctuates.

  • And if you know the risk-free interest rate,

  • you can just price the options.

  • And this is a true miracle that occurs.

  • And when I was studying this, I couldn't really

  • understand this-- maybe because I

  • was coming from theoretical physics,

  • and all this result called Ito's lemma is buried somewhere

  • in stochastic calculus.

  • And I would just try to understand in [INAUDIBLE] what

  • it all means.

  • And let them just explain here, basically

  • how one can understand this result, Ito's lemma,

  • in a very simple term.

  • [INAUDIBLE] terms.

  • So let me just write-- let me remind you.

  • So Ito's lemma basically tells the following-- once again,

  • so if C is the function of stochastic variables,

  • of stochastic variable S, then its differential

  • is not just equal to some standard result from calculus.

  • But we also get some kind of very exotic term, which

  • is basically very nontrivial.

  • And let me just try to explain to you how actually it appears.

  • So just to understand this, I recommend everybody

  • after this lecture, look at this derivation,

  • because it really explains what this Ito's lemma means.

  • So the idea is very simple.

  • So let's start from electrons for the first principles.

  • And let's say we have an interval of time,

  • with length dt.

  • And let's say we divide it into n intervals,

  • and each interval length is dt prime.

  • Right?

  • And I assume that the ratio of dt over dt prime

  • is sufficiently large.

  • So first, we know that our stock, as we know,

  • follows the log-normal dynamics.

  • So this means that if I go from from time i to time i plus 1,

  • here you need to exchange i and i minus 1.

  • So then, you can always [INAUDIBLE] the following form,

  • right?

  • So S at time i plus 1 minus S at time i

  • is equal to the drift term-- right?

  • Which is a discrete version of the stochastic differential

  • equation.

  • Plus the randomness.

  • So here again, sigma is volatility.

  • It's the measure of how the stock fluctuates,

  • which is the stock price, which is square root of dt,

  • because Brownian motion fluctuation is

  • proportional to the time.

  • And also here, we have epsilon, and epsilon

  • is a standard normal variable.

  • Then-- OK, so we have this.

  • This is pretty straightforward.

  • Basically, I just throw stochastic differential

  • equation on the latest.

  • And I go from point i to point i plus 1.

  • Now, let's see what it means for the price of the option.

  • So again, so C is the price of the option.

  • At time T, when the stock price is equal to S_(i+1).

  • So the change in the option price

  • is equal to-- like the first term, just

  • something very standard, standard calculus.

  • Plus the first derivatives and the difference in the stock

  • price, plus I take the second-order term,

  • this is the second derivative, and I

  • have here S times i plus 1, minus S times i squared.

  • So this is approximate, because I'm taking only the main terms.

  • Or the other terms, given that both times dt and dt prime

  • are very small, they can be neglected.

  • So you can check it carefully at home if you want to.

  • But I guarantee that there is no miracle here.

  • Everything we need is here.

  • Now let's do the following.

  • So we have this equation.

  • And let's look at this term.

  • So this term, basically, is the cornerstone of the Ito's lemma.

  • So let's take this equation for the difference

  • and substitute into here.

  • And you see here, again, you can look-- what is important,

  • against the time scales.

  • So dt prime is very small.

  • Therefore, the term, which is random, dominates here.

  • Right?

  • Because [INAUDIBLE] square root of dt.

  • And square root for small times is much bigger

  • than the linear function.

  • Therefore, we simply neglect this term compared this term.

  • And with linear accuracy in dt prime,

  • we can approximate this just by this term.

  • Now, what to do-- so again, we wrote the same equation,

  • that latest difference for the option price

  • of two neighboring points.

  • And what I'm doing right now, I have all this equation,

  • and I will simply sum them-- basically from 0 to N.

  • So let's say I have all these equations from 0 to N minus 1,

  • and I sum them.

  • And again, it's very straightforward

  • and obtains the full equation.

  • And again, what is very interesting is that we will

  • obtain-- you look at this term.

  • So this term is very complicated.

  • It's essentially stochastic right?

  • Because-- it looks like very stochastic.

  • And because-- remember that this is

  • the standard normal variable.

  • And all of them are independent.

  • So in principle, we have the sum of N

  • independent normal variables squared.

  • And it turns out-- it's really a very beautiful result,

  • and I recommend everybody also do it at home,

  • I try to show you right now on the blackboard--

  • that if you sum up all this epsilon squared,

  • that in the limit when N goes to infinity,

  • this term becomes deterministic.

  • So let me just show you basically

  • what exactly is meant.

  • So what I mean by deterministic is that of course,

  • if I have epsilon squared, then it's-- there is some

  • probability distribution, right?

  • It's distributed between 0 and infinity, right?

  • So this is some kind of function.

  • But my claim is that once I start

  • adding more and more numbers-- and so on, and so on-- then

  • this function will become more and more and more narrow.

  • So it behaves like a deterministic random--

  • like a completely deterministic variable in the large N limit.

  • And to do this, let me just write a very simple--

  • write explicitly of what I mean.

  • So essentially, remember that we have the sum of variables.

  • Right?

  • And for us to show that it's become deterministic,

  • we need to show that it squared--

  • The width of the distribution, which I defined as-- let's say

  • you have a variable, right?

  • And if I defined the dispersion in the following way,

  • now I define here the dispersion for this random variable which

  • is equal to the sum of epsilon squared.

  • So if I write it here, then it turns out

  • that each term in this equation is

  • proportional to N squared, which is natural.

  • But it turns out that the difference in the large N limit

  • is proportional only to N. Therefore,

  • if you have this variable, which-- if you sum up

  • more and more terms, then we'll have a variable.

  • We have a distribution for this variable, which

  • is moving in this direction.

  • And of course it moves this direction,

  • but it becomes more and more and more narrow, basically.

  • So as the limit of N tends to infinity,

  • it becomes a deterministic.

  • So I'd recommend everybody at home just do

  • this very simple exercise.

  • And you will see that essentially, the sum behaves

  • as a deterministic quantity.

  • So just to do this, you need to you

  • need to know the very simple properties

  • of the standard normal distribution.

  • First of all, the average expected value of epsilon

  • is equal to 1, right?

  • For a standard normal variable.

  • And also, you need to know that the fourth moment

  • of the normal variable is equal to 3.

  • So if you have this, then you can calculate this,

  • which is trivial to calculate.

  • And then you can come to this property that, once again,

  • probability distribution function, in the large N limit,

  • behaves deterministic.

  • It essentially becomes like a delta function.

  • So this is a very interesting result,

  • because it basically explains why in the Black-Scholes

  • equation, we have this very weird by deterministic term.

  • And that's why the option pricing is possible.

  • Because if you started pricing options--

  • like if you don't know anything about Black-Scholes,

  • it might be that there's no price for the option,

  • because it might be that although you do hedge,

  • you still cannot eliminate your randomness completely.

  • Maybe hedge helps you with just too narrow the distribution

  • of your outcome, but we're just not guaranteed at all.

  • So it's really very-- Ito's Lemma, which is usually

  • in every book on derivatives, probably

  • like the first equation ever written,

  • basically is given without any proof.

  • But this-- in reality, it's a very interesting limit.

  • So it can be realized only if you have two different time

  • scales.

  • So the small time scale, which is dt prime

  • is-- in the business sense, it corresponds

  • to your hedging frequency.

  • It's when you rebalance your hedging portfolio.

  • And the time dt, there's a time scale dt, which

  • is much bigger than dt prime.

  • It's at the time at which you look at your portfolio.

  • So only in this very weird limit, when dt over dt prime

  • goes to infinity, you strictly have Ito's Lemma.

  • So actually, if you look even like is most famous book

  • on derivatives.

  • If you look at this edition, you will see actually

  • that the proof actually isn't correct.

  • So just look at it and find what's wrong there.

  • AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE] normal?

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: Sorry?

  • AUDIENCE: That's what it is?

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: Yeah, this is what [INAUDIBLE] means.

  • So if you use these two results here,

  • you will see that your it's proportional only

  • to N, not to N squared.

  • So that's why your distribution becomes more and more narrow.

  • Because when you sum up, what it means

  • is you sum up more and more variables.

  • Each of them was like random normal variables.

  • So the average-- average goes like N.

  • But the dispersion-- the dispersion, right?

  • That's the standard deviation, right?

  • You have a square root of N. That's

  • why basically, square root of N over N is small.

  • So by increasing N, basically you

  • become more and more and more deterministic.

  • So that's the main fact beyond Ito's lemma.

  • So that's it's obtained.

  • So I recommend everybody just look in detail, because this

  • is the cornerstone of derivatives pricing theory,

  • but at many books it's not really well-written.

  • So when I was studying, it was like I couldn't

  • understand for a while.

  • So it took me a time just to understand.

  • What else?

  • And a very interesting thing now is

  • that remember that we used Ito's lemma--

  • and basically, we are able to obtain this equation.

  • And this equation is very well known in literature.

  • It's very similar to the heat equation.

  • And heat equation can be solved using standard methods.

  • And I don't want to write any derivation here,

  • it's relatively straightforward.

  • Maybe a bit cumbersome but straightforward.

  • And if payoff of your option at maturity

  • is given by some function, which is not really important here.

  • Because you can write a very general solution.

  • So what is here is essentially Green's function

  • of this equation.

  • And this Green's function, if you look at this equation,

  • is very similar to the probability distribution

  • function, which we have on this slide in the very beginning.

  • So this function is identical to this function,

  • and the only difference is that the drift of stock

  • in the real world disappears.

  • And we are left only with the interest rate.

  • And so this equation, which is again, also very important

  • for the derivatives pricing, is how

  • we come up with the whole idea of Monte Carlo simulation.

  • So this is nothing else as a Green's function, which

  • basically tells us how the stock evolves

  • in the risk-neutral space.

  • Risk-neutral space is essentially some kind

  • of imaginary world, like [INAUDIBLE] world,

  • where all the assets' drift is just the interest rate and not

  • the actual drift.

  • So it's very fundamental.

  • So it's very important things that the drift in real world

  • drops out of all the equations.

  • So the only parameter which actually does matter for option

  • pricing is volatility.

  • So this parameter's relatively easier to understand, right?

  • Because that's how much money your deterministic investment

  • basically makes.

  • So [INAUDIBLE] is the [INAUDIBLE] parameter.

  • So naively, you could expect I need both mu-- let

  • me just remind you what mu is.

  • Mu and sigma, two independent parameters.

  • But it turns out mu completely drops out of the picture.

  • And this is because of dynamic hedging,

  • because we hedged the position.

  • And so now this equation-- since this

  • is basically Green's function, and Green's function

  • tells us what's the probability density

  • of the stock at some time in the future,

  • if the stock were at some point initially,

  • then basically this means that we can simulate the stock

  • dynamics.

  • And we can price derivatives, like,

  • using a very simple framework.

  • So what do we do?

  • We simply write the equation for the stock

  • in the risk-neutral world.

  • Remember, the difference is that instead of the actual drift

  • of the stock, mu, we substitute here by the interest rate.

  • And this is basically how much money, roughly speaking,

  • the bank account makes.

  • And what we do-- we start from some stock value at time 0,

  • and then we simulate stock along different paths.

  • So there are like three paths here.

  • There could be like thousands.

  • So now-- and you know, now, let's

  • say we know the stock payoff at maturity.

  • And what you do-- then the price of derivative is very simple.

  • Essentially, you take the average of this payoff,

  • over the distribution.

  • And you know distribution, because you just

  • simulated the stock price.

  • And you just discount it with the interest rate.

  • So it's extremely simple.

  • So in principle, implementing this--

  • I'd say if you have package like MATLAB,

  • it probably takes like maybe one hour at most,

  • implement let's say pricing of Black-Scholes formula

  • via a Monte Carlo simulation.

  • So maybe if you have time, you can try this

  • and see how your Monte Carlo solution converges

  • to the exact result which was first obtained by Black-Scholes

  • and Merton.

  • So basically, this is a super powerful framework,

  • which basically tells us something like this.

  • So it's not applicable just to the stock prices,

  • but it's also applicable to interest rate derivatives,

  • credit derivatives, and foreign exchange derivatives,

  • so on and so forth.

  • Basically, the idea is like this.

  • You have some-- the payoff of your derivative

  • depends on various financial variables.

  • And you simply simulate all of them in the risk-neutral world.

  • Right?

  • So you simulate all of them, and then you

  • could calculate the average of the payoff.

  • And you just discount it.

  • And that's how you can price derivatives.

  • So in principle, if you have a flexible IT infrastructure,

  • like a financial institution, so you can implement it.

  • And then you can price pretty much everything.

  • That's basically how exotic derivatives

  • are priced, whose prices are not easy to obtain

  • using analytical methods.

  • Which is the case for a large amount of derivatives.

  • So this is the whole idea, right?

  • So Monte Carlo simulation is a very fundamental concept.

  • So we do the simulation in the risk-neutral world,

  • and there are certain rules how to write these equations

  • for different asset classes-- could be stock again,

  • could be foreign exchange, could be credit, could be rates,

  • whatever.

  • And then you do some kind of sampling, you find average,

  • and then basically you are done.

  • So this is how it works with the stock,

  • and let me just explain how to generalize

  • all these ideas for the case of interest rates and credit

  • derivatives.

  • So and-- let me just start from the very basics of the interest

  • rate derivatives.

  • So of course the whole point of these derivatives

  • is to allow financial institutions or individuals

  • to manage their interest rate risk better.

  • So businesses need money to run their business.

  • So big institutions, big corporations,

  • have billions, [INAUDIBLE] hundreds of billions of dollars

  • of debt, and they know how to risk manage

  • it, [INAUDIBLE] efficiently.

  • And just to make money, and not even necessarily financial

  • institutions.

  • So of course if you borrow money,

  • then you need to pay some interest.

  • So you can think about interest rate derivatives

  • as some kind of option on the stochastic interest,

  • because let's say say today, you can borrow money at 5%.

  • But tomorrow, this rate can change.

  • So in order to control this uncertainty,

  • you need to be able to buy some derivatives,

  • just to hedge your exposure, for example.

  • Or it might just speculate.

  • Maybe you just have some view that rates will go up or down.

  • So it depends on the type of investor or speculator,

  • whatever.

  • And so I mean this is a very simple concept

  • of present value of money.

  • If I have dollar today, it's definitely

  • better than the dollar one year from now.

  • Let's say I have a dollar, right?

  • But I will get it only in one year from now.

  • So how much does it cost?

  • It's clear that if the interest rate is 5%,

  • it roughly costs $0.95.

  • Right?

  • Because what do I do?

  • If the interest rate is 5%, then I take $0.95,

  • and I'd put it into bank account, and I'd make 5%.

  • So I will get like $1 in one year from now.

  • So there exists very important concept of the present value.

  • Or like time value of money.

  • Depending on where in the future you

  • are, how much money it costs today.

  • And people talk about-- it's very often a fundamental notion

  • of the fixed income derivative, is the discount factor.

  • So it essentially tell you that OK,

  • if you have one dollar today, it costs one dollar.

  • But if you have one dollar in the future,

  • basically it costs something else.

  • So this is a very important notion in finance.

  • So I'll tell a little bit more how [INAUDIBLE]

  • them together, this functional [INAUDIBLE].

  • So another very important thing in the interest rate

  • derivatives is the forward rate.

  • So remember, okay, so we have discount factor.

  • And the very important thing about discount factor

  • is it should start at 1.

  • Because a dollar today is a dollar.

  • There is no uncertainty, right?

  • Thus it's clear that this function

  • should be decaying, or at least non-increasing, with time.

  • So that's why it's very convenient

  • to parametrize this kind of function with forward rates.

  • So this is some positive forward rates.

  • And [INAUDIBLE] very convenient.

  • And remember, let's say, in the example

  • below, like on this page, if all maturities earn 5%,

  • then this is simply 5% a year.

  • So for this example, basically your forward rate is just flat.

  • OK, so if this is an example-- and when

  • you talk about interest rate derivatives,

  • it's very convenient to model the dynamics

  • of the forward rates.

  • So again, it's very different from the stock,

  • because it's got an additional dimension.

  • So if you model the stock dynamics,

  • it's just a point process.

  • Right?

  • Let's say it's $100 today, and then you start modeling.

  • Next, they'll go to $95, could go to $105, so on and so forth.

  • But interest rates, it's more about curve.

  • So it has an extra dimension-- it's a one-dimensional object.

  • And the reason is very simple.

  • In general, let's say if you borrow money for one year,

  • then let's say you pay one percent.

  • But if you borrow for two years, it

  • might be that you borrow it for 2%, and so on.

  • So there's a concept of the yield curve.

  • And here basically tells us how much different maturities make.

  • So in a typical situation, with your curve,

  • if you don't have some [INAUDIBLE]

  • of recession, which sometimes happens,

  • it's usually upward sloping.

  • This basically means if you borrow money for longer term,

  • you pay higher interest.

  • You can see it very easily.

  • Like for those who have mortgages right there,

  • it's always like 15-year mortgage rate is lower

  • than 30-year mortgage rate.

  • And just here I just show-- to give you

  • a [INAUDIBLE], of where we are right now in terms of interest

  • rates, basically I just show you the yield of a 10-year US

  • Treasury note.

  • So what is 10-year Treasury note?

  • Basically, the US government borrows money

  • to finance its activities.

  • And then it works like this.

  • Let's say I'm an investor.

  • I'm giving the US government $100.

  • And then every year, like for the next 10 years--

  • more exactly, like twice a year--

  • let's say they are paying me some coupon.

  • Let's say if the interest rate per year is 5%,

  • this means that if I give the US government $100,

  • then the government pays me $2.50 every half a year.

  • And at the very end, in 10 years from now,

  • they must return $100, the notional.

  • And basically, if you look again how stochastic the rates are

  • right and what kind of environment

  • we are in right now, you can see that over the last about 50

  • years, we see very interesting picture.

  • From about '60s to about '80, '82,

  • we can see a tremendous increase in interest rates.

  • And this is something which looks very unbelievable right

  • now.

  • So this problem nowadays.

  • If one takes, let's say a mortgage,

  • now a 30-year mortgage is maybe 4%, 4.5% nowadays.

  • But let's say here, about 30 years ago, it

  • was like a [INAUDIBLE] interest rate-- very high inflation.

  • And mortgage rates were in double digits.

  • It was not uncommon to pay like 15%

  • if you would take mortgage somewhere here.

  • So the rates were increasing.

  • But since then, we live in a very different environment,

  • when interest rates gradually go and go down.

  • So essentially, here, basically it shows in 1980,

  • the US Government would pay 12% a year

  • each year to borrow money for 10 years.

  • So at the end of 2012, it paid less than 2%-- just 1.7%.

  • So there like a very clear trend, you know?

  • Something's going down.

  • So in recent years, there is some kind of uptick here.

  • But you know, we always get some kind of situation here.

  • So where are we going?

  • Nobody knows.

  • But really, we're in this situation where interest rates

  • are extremely low.

  • It was nothing like this, basically

  • for the last 50 years.

  • So it's very unusual, and you have these very low interest

  • rates.

  • This means that the economy is very weak,

  • because this means there's not much demand on borrowing,

  • right?

  • Because corporations, like individuals,

  • they don't want to borrow a lot, because once [INAUDIBLE] again,

  • like supply-demand, right?

  • Because if you want to borrow, basically you're

  • willing to pay higher rate.

  • So also, of course another reason for this

  • is because-- we live in a very unusual environment,

  • because the government interferes a lot on the market.

  • So they're trying to make the rates as low as possible,

  • just to make the interest rates burden for corporations,

  • for private individuals as small as possible.

  • And hopefully, we'll go out of this recession.

  • But as I said, this is very singular, very

  • unusual environment-- just to understand what's going on.

  • And there a whole world of interest rate-- yes?

  • AUDIENCE: But it pays to invest in a non-productive access,

  • like real estate, which are expected

  • to rise with time, without, for example, [INAUDIBLE].

  • Doesn't it skew whatever investment

  • is made toward assets which are expected to rise with time?

  • It may not be productive access--

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: Yes, yes, but right now, I

  • mean I think even right now, lots of people

  • are just scared to buy real estate.

  • You never know what's going on, right?

  • Because prices are still pretty high, so

  • who knows what will happen?

  • So you're right.

  • There is some kind of psychology [INAUDIBLE].

  • But many people who bought like 2006, whatever-- like before,

  • they basically lost tons of money.

  • You never know.

  • So it's like when you buy some assets,

  • you've got some finance.

  • Let's say fixed rate finance.

  • So you know how much you're going to pay,

  • but where is the guarantee that, you know--

  • I mean, long term, it goes up, of course,

  • but long-term basically means tens of years.

  • But if you look at the real estate prices, for the last,

  • whatever, seven years.

  • We are going up right now, but still, we didn't go through

  • for the minimum.

  • Like the [INAUDIBLE] maximum, which you had before,

  • basically.

  • So you never know.

  • Yes, and so there's a whole world of interest rate

  • derivatives.

  • So I'm just very briefly explaining what it all means.

  • So usually-- here I mentioned it's all about Treasury.

  • So it's all like government-- it's

  • kind of yield implied from the government bonds.

  • But usually, all the derivatives are linked to another

  • very famous rate, which is called LIBOR.

  • And LIBOR-- roughly speaking, it's

  • a short-term rate at which financial institutions

  • in London borrow money from each other on an unsecured basis.

  • So there's a lot of caveats here on this definition,

  • but that's roughly what that means.

  • And there is like a fundamental derivative in the interest rate

  • world is a LIBOR swap.

  • So the standard USD LIBOR swap is something like this,

  • basically.

  • It's paying-- once a three months,

  • it's paying three months LIBOR rate.

  • And so this is stochastic, right?

  • So basically, every day, there is this certain procedure,

  • which tells us what this LIBOR, this short-term borrowing rate

  • is.

  • And in exchange for this, if you're

  • paying out this LIBOR swap, this LIBOR rate,

  • you are receiving the fixed rate, which is diminished.

  • So this is like fundamental interest rate basically.

  • It's like, essentially, if you believe that rates will go up

  • and you just want to speculate, basically

  • you're trying to be long LIBOR and short fixed rate,

  • and vice versa.

  • So this is a very important instrument for pricing.

  • And it's all kinds of derivatives

  • linked to this LIBOR rate.

  • For example, you can talk about a swaption.

  • What is a swaption?

  • Swaption is a derivative to enter an interest rate

  • swap in the future.

  • Remember like in the equity option world,

  • let's say if I have a call option on a stock, that's

  • the right to buy a stock at a fixed

  • price-- it's fixed today-- like at some time in the future.

  • Here, this is basically the same idea.

  • If you're here today, at sometime in the future

  • you can enter a swap, a kind of contract,

  • which pays various legs and there

  • is some price given for today.

  • And there are also all kinds of false derivatives.

  • You can talk about rates.

  • Basically you can buy or sell options on a particular LIBOR

  • rate.

  • Or there's also cancel-able swaps,

  • which basically are you can enter a swap,

  • but if you don't want to pay, like, let's say, high rate

  • anymore, you can cancel it.

  • Of course, it's affecting the price so on and so forth.

  • So, very important idea if you think about all these

  • that it turns out that when you price all these derivatives,

  • they all depend-- Their price depends on these discount

  • factors.

  • And the discount factors depend on these forward rates,

  • which is basically trivial parametrization.

  • But it's very important, very convenient, to work

  • with these forward rates.

  • And when we model interest rate derivatives, using Monte Carlo

  • simulations, and there are no analytical models available,

  • then [INAUDIBLE] model of dynamics of forward rates.

  • And you can ask a question.

  • So how can we get, basically, this curve in practice,

  • or this curve?

  • And it turns out that the swap market tells us

  • how to obtain this curve.

  • So here I show some quotes, real market quotes,

  • for interest rate swap of different maturities.

  • Let's say two years, three years, four years,

  • and so on and so forth.

  • And then if you add this number and this number,

  • then you obtain the swap rate.

  • So if you take these swap rates, then it

  • turns out that you can show very easily that if you

  • know all these numbers, then you will

  • be able to obtain this curve in a pretty unique way.

  • So because of this market of swaps--

  • so once again, if you add these two numbers here,

  • then basically it tells you that, for example,

  • for this instrument, let's say, five years.

  • For the next five years, I'm going to pay roughly

  • like 0.75% a year.

  • Right.

  • So these two payments, basically,

  • correspond to like 0.75% in exchange for the LIBOR payment,

  • right?

  • So if I enter a swap-- so I know that the I will

  • be paying fixed-- but I'll receive

  • floating, which is random, because we

  • don't know what it is.

  • And [INAUDIBLE] is a pretty complicated concept.

  • The idea is very simple.

  • So basically the swap market allows

  • you to obtain this discount factor-- basically

  • this function-- which tells you how much your dollar

  • in the future is today.

  • So if you know how much a dollar is,

  • then you know how much C dollars, basically, cost.

  • Then basically, let's say you have C dollars.

  • Then you simply multiply them by the discount factor,

  • and that's what the present value of your fixed rate

  • payment is.

  • So remember that finance [INAUDIBLE]

  • very important things.

  • In finance, at least in the derivative world,

  • we typically-- what is called PV or present value of all

  • our future payments, right?

  • So we have some future liability, which

  • is something very complicated.

  • I say, I'll pay you something very complicated,

  • pay off in 10 years from now.

  • But we are trying to understand how much it's worth today.

  • Because idea for this business is clients come to the bank.

  • And they say, I want this derivative.

  • You sell this derivative.

  • You charge the money right now, and you

  • spend this money on hedging.

  • Of course, you try to charge them a little bit more

  • because you need to still make living.

  • But in [INAUDIBLE] basically is like you've spent

  • most of your money on hedging.

  • But you to try to come up with a number today.

  • Here's, again, a very simple example.

  • So if you know, once again, how much your dollar is

  • in the future, then you can present

  • value, PV, every payment.

  • So let's say in 10 years from now, d is equal to 0.5,

  • then if you payoff's $1,000, the present value is equal to $500.

  • Because, again, the argument is very simple, right?

  • You take $500 today and invest for 10 years,

  • and you get $1,000 in the future.

  • This is the replication argument.

  • Another very important thing here,

  • is that if you have an interest rate

  • swap, which is paying LIBOR.

  • And let's say on a notional.

  • Let's say I pay you LIBOR, which is some rate which

  • is measured in percent.

  • LIBOR is like a 1% a year, for example.

  • Then notional of the swap is $1 million

  • which means that the floating rate payment is based on $1

  • million times 1% is $10,000.

  • So it turns out that very interesting thing

  • is that if you pay LIBOR rate and if you

  • pay the notional at the very end,

  • then the present value of this is equal to the notional.

  • So it's the beauty of floating rate is security.

  • [INAUDIBLE] is basically that if you pay the current market

  • rate all the time, then the price of your security

  • is always equal to the notional.

  • It's very nice fact which is also fundamental here.

  • And very interesting thing would happen

  • after crisis is that all the derivatives have become

  • what's called collateralized.

  • So you need to post some money all the time.

  • So there's another concept of OIS discounting,

  • which I don't talk about here.

  • The main idea which you need to understand here

  • is that we have this function, like discount function, which

  • shows us again how much the dollar is worth in the future.

  • And using this function, we can price all kinds of swaps.

  • So we can PV the value of the swap today using this.

  • So the idea of interest rate derivatives

  • it's all about dynamics of the yield curve.

  • It's basically how your discount function

  • or how your yields, future yields, evolve.

  • The whole idea is similar to the stock.

  • So again, at time 0 you start from some curve.

  • For example, something like this, right?

  • From some curve which is shown here.

  • And then it stopped evolving and you

  • want to be able to model it mathematically and price

  • all kinds of derivatives.

  • So there is like a very interesting difference

  • between stock options and interest rate options

  • because for the stock options, we know the price today.

  • If it's a liquid stock, it's just known.

  • We know what it's trading right now.

  • But for the yield curve, it's different.

  • We first need to take the swap markets quotes

  • and do what is called bootstrapping

  • to get the function d of t.

  • The next step, we need to specify

  • the volatility of different forward rates in the future

  • and we need to come up with some kind of dynamics

  • which describes the future dynamics of forward rates.

  • And then once we have this, we can

  • use the Monte Carlo framework to price all kinds of derivatives.

  • So before I start talking about the HJM framework here,

  • I just want to mention that there

  • are some other more simple models which are historically

  • appear before the HJM model which basically describe

  • the dynamics of the short rate.

  • And so the most famous ones are the Ho-Lee model,

  • Hull-White model, and so-called CIR model.

  • And basically, the idea is that if you

  • have this function for forward rates-- which I wrote here.

  • So they describe dynamics, instantaneous dynamics,

  • of this rate.

  • So instead of modeling the whole curve,

  • you model only just this short rate and so on.

  • So some of these models are particular case

  • of the HJM model.

  • Some of them are not.

  • But just to mention.

  • And basically the idea, then, of the interest rate derivatives,

  • for example, let's say I want to price an option that in five

  • years from now, I enter a particular interest rate

  • swap which pays 5% on the fixed leg and receives LIBOR.

  • So I need to model the dynamic of future yields.

  • And remember, it's a very important thing that, again,

  • because we have the curve, now we

  • have two different times here.

  • For the stock derivatives, we just basically write dynamics,

  • d of S_t is equal to something.

  • And t is just basically instantaneous time.

  • Here t stands for instantaneous time.

  • And T, capital T, stands for the future time.

  • Here.

  • So essentially if you're here, you're

  • looking at the forward rate somewhere here.

  • And then you basically describe with dynamics.

  • I don't want to go into details, but again,

  • using this very fundamental result in pricing theory

  • like Ito's Lemma, you can derive the equation for this drift.

  • So the problem is it turns out it's always

  • the case in the Monte Carlo simulation.

  • So you [INAUDIBLE] some time equation and you have drift

  • and you have volatility.

  • So it turns out that this drift, the real time

  • drift, because you hedge, drops out of your equation.

  • And it turns out that for the interest rate,

  • there is some complication.

  • In the risk-neutral world, this real-world drift [INAUDIBLE]

  • by some equation which depends on sigma.

  • So if you do the calculation, then you

  • will see that in the risk-neutral world,

  • if you [INAUDIBLE] of following form,

  • which is some non-local equation.

  • But it is what it is.

  • So it's very straightforward.

  • I encourage you just to, if you have time, to go through this

  • and really understand how it works.

  • But now once we have this, the model for interest rate

  • derivatives is very simple.

  • And remember that in the stock world--

  • let me go back just to this equation.

  • So we started from some stochastic differential

  • equation.

  • And then we simulate different paths.

  • And then basically we average over the pay-off

  • here at maturity of the derivative,

  • when actually we do the payment.

  • And here the situation is very similar.

  • So we have some initial curve which we

  • obtain from the market today.

  • And this curve dynamics is described by this equation.

  • Then we have distribution of this curve in the future,

  • and then you can price all kinds of derivatives.

  • So again, it's a very fundamental framework.

  • So very general.

  • So once the curve and the volatility are known,

  • you simply run this simulation and you get your pay-off.

  • So basically that's how it works.

  • And now another example, which is basically--

  • of this HJM model, is basically credit derivatives.

  • So I don't have much time, but just

  • mention-- I'll go very briefly what's going on.

  • So if you give money just to someone,

  • like to the corporations, then there

  • is a probability that you won't get your money back.

  • So corporations issue bonds, financial instruments

  • to raise capital.

  • It's, again, very similar to the US treasuries.

  • And so you give them $100 and they pay you 5% < every year.

  • And then let's say in 10 years, if it's a 10 year bond,

  • they are supposed to give your money back.

  • But this might not happen.

  • Corporations default because they make their own decisions.

  • Like something went wrong with economy,

  • and so on and so forth.

  • It happens.

  • So there is some risk which is indicated here.

  • We just call it default risk.

  • So corporations or private individuals,

  • they have a right to default. So they can default.

  • And this is reflected in the coupons which they pay.

  • So for the US government at the end of 2012.

  • A 10 year bond would pay just 1.7% a year.

  • Again, we are in extremely low environment which

  • looks like almost nothing.

  • And remember that even if you're an investor and if you

  • buy this bond, then you get your 1% interest

  • but then you need to pay taxes on the profit.

  • So the return is really very small.

  • So then, of course, if you're an investor, then OK.

  • The US government securities are assumed to be risk-free,

  • so you won't be able to lose money.

  • So this is a very important benchmark.

  • But then you can buy bonds of corporations.

  • But, of course, to compensate for possible default,

  • they pay higher coupon.

  • For example, at the end of 2012, Morgan Stanley bonds

  • would pay around, let's say 5% a year.

  • Significantly higher.

  • Some governments are right now very

  • close to default. So some time ago,

  • for example, when Morgan Stanley bonds would pay 5% a year.

  • But say, Greece bonds would pay 25%, 30% a year.

  • Because nobody knows what's going to happen there.

  • It's clear that the economy is not in good shape

  • and it all depends on the bailouts.

  • Or these bailouts are conditioned, for example,

  • that the right government-- if you'll

  • be in power and the [INAUDIBLE] is unclear.

  • So there's lots of uncertainty.

  • Such uncertainties, that's why, essentially, the yield--

  • investors tell you would require very high yield.

  • And in the credit derivatives, the fundamental instrument,

  • is credit default swap.

  • So if you have a risky bond, then in order

  • to protect from default you can go, let's say to a bank,

  • and buy a credit default swap.

  • It basically means that if you hold

  • a bond and default happens, then the seller of this protection

  • will compensate you for the loss.

  • For example, let's say you bought a bond at $100.

  • And then, let's say, in one year the corporation defaults.

  • And then what happens in this event?

  • Then court.

  • Court happens.

  • And the judge decides how much money is recovered.

  • And this money is distributed to the bond investors.

  • They're first in the queue.

  • And then if, let's say, $0.70 on the dollar were recovered,

  • then the default swap will pay you $32 which you lost.

  • And very fundamental concept in the world of credit derivatives

  • is market implied survival probability.

  • So in principle, credit default swaps

  • are available for different entities.

  • Let's say like Morgan Stanley.

  • It could be Verizon.

  • Could be AT&T and so on and so forth.

  • And [INAUDIBLE] require different payments.

  • For example, let's say if credit default

  • swap for Morgan Stanley, probably

  • is like 5 year maturity, you pay around 100 basis points.

  • And if there is some-- like Greece,

  • probably, you pay like 500, maybe 1,000 basis points

  • or something like this.

  • So market differentiates.

  • And based on this, you can then do a very simple calculation.

  • And you consider, it's very easy to come with a concept

  • of the survival probability.

  • Roughly speaking if, let's say, default protection

  • on some reference entity is worth 1% a year.

  • And then what do we see?

  • Then with probability 99% a year, you will get your money.

  • If probability 1% per year, you will get nothing.

  • So you can think about it like this.

  • This means you can say the probability to default

  • is roughly 1% a year, in this case.

  • And then we could talk about survival probabilities,

  • which is basically one [INAUDIBLE]

  • default probability.

  • And you can then come up with the concept

  • of survival probabilities, which you can again

  • parametrize with forward rates which are called hazard rates.

  • So credit derivatives, in a sense,

  • they're similar to interest rate derivatives.

  • Remember, in the case of interest rate derivatives,

  • we were talking about discount factors.

  • So this is like the present value.

  • Present value of money.

  • In terms of world of credit derivatives-- besides this,

  • because of course interest rates are also

  • very important for credit derivatives--

  • we talk about survival probability.

  • Today it's equal to 1, but then it decays.

  • And let's say if you have a US government,

  • basically it always stay at one.

  • And let's say if it's like Morgan Stanley,

  • it goes like this.

  • If it's some distressed European sovereign,

  • it will go like this.

  • So basically it's market-implied probability

  • of default based on the credit default swap market.

  • And the idea of the HJM model for the credit derivatives

  • is that-- similar to the dynamic of forward rates in interest

  • rate case-- you simply describe the dynamics of hazard rates

  • which parametrize your survival probabilities.

  • And now let me see.

  • Let me show an example of very important type of derivatives,

  • which are priced using credit models.

  • Let's talk about the corporate callable bonds.

  • So it's a very simple instrument.

  • Again, I'm a corporation.

  • I borrow $100 from you.

  • And let's say I'm paying you 5% every year.

  • But I have the right at any time--

  • or, let's say, once in three months-- return you this $100,

  • and basically close the deal.

  • So why is that so valuable for the corporations?

  • Because today's environment is such

  • that I borrow at a very high rate.

  • In this example, let's say I am paying 5% a year.

  • And I issued a 10 year bond and there's $100 million notional.

  • So basically this means that every year, I

  • am paying to the investor 5%.

  • $5 million.

  • But let's say I'm paying 5%.

  • I need this money to run my business and so on.

  • So it's some burden, but usually all the corporations

  • have significant amount of debt.

  • So it's good to have debt if you know how to manage it.

  • Now let's say in three years from now, situation changed.

  • So now I can borrow money for seven years,

  • because initially I issued the bond for 10 years.

  • And now I have seven years remaining,

  • but it turns out I can issue just a 3%.

  • Basically this means if I do this,

  • if I exercise my call option, then I will save 5 minus 3--

  • 2%-- times $100 million times seven years.

  • So it's $14 million.

  • So that's kind of why callable debt, it's good to issue it,

  • because you can save money.

  • It's very similar to what's happening right now also

  • for private individuals.

  • Because in recent year or couple of years,

  • there was lot of refinancing activity in the US.

  • Remember rates are at historical low right now.

  • So rates are going down, down, down.

  • So let's say if you took out a mortgage here at 6%,

  • it was like you could refinance at here, for example,

  • the same mortgage.

  • You could [INAUDIBLE] like at 3.5%.

  • So the same [INAUDIBLE] has happened to corporations.

  • So in the US, by default, all mortgages are callable.

  • And basically by default, everybody

  • has a right to refinance.

  • So it's not like you issue a 30 year bond

  • and then even you're paying a huge coupon,

  • even you can refinance lower percent-- which

  • might be the case for corporation, by the way.

  • But by law in the US, all the mortgages can be refinanced.

  • So basically, that's the idea.

  • So if you price this kind of instrument as callable bond

  • then you need to take into account,

  • of course, the interest rate risk because you need

  • to understand what is the current level of interest rate

  • you can charge.

  • And also you need to take into account

  • the quality of the issuer.

  • So if, let's say again, Greece.

  • Or, let's say, Morgan Stanley issue debt right now,

  • then Morgan Stanley would pay significantly less.

  • It's all [INAUDIBLE] on the fair market.

  • [INAUDIBLE] result and subsidies.

  • And, of course, Morgan Stanley would pay significantly less

  • in the interest because for the case of Greece,

  • it is a much higher default risk.

  • And as I mentioned, the idea is that you,

  • in the world of credit derivatives,

  • there is the concept of hazard rates

  • which, again, some curve which shows how risky the issuer is

  • at some point in the future.

  • And here I show the dynamics for the forward rates,

  • and here is the dynamics of hazard rates.

  • It shows you, basically, how risky the issuer is.

  • And then using similar approach-- I show, give you

  • as an exercise-- you can prove again--

  • it turns out if you know the volatility of hazard rates,

  • then you know how to simulate the dynamics of hazard rates.

  • So essentially, it's the dynamics of all this.

  • So again, it's the idea-- let me go back just to the stock

  • case-- again, it's the idea, it's very simple.

  • So you have all the dynamic variables

  • like rates and [INAUDIBLE], in this case.

  • Then what you do, you simulate that in risk-neutral world.

  • You have different path.

  • And then you simply average over the pay-off.

  • So this is the beauty of the risk-neutral pricing.

  • There is a visual framework which is basically implemented

  • at all the major banks.

  • Which is really like the right approach

  • to price very exotic derivatives for which

  • it's very hard to find the exact analytical formulas.

  • And let me show you one example of securities

  • which are issued by big banks.

  • And that's where this HJM model and Monte Carlo simulation

  • are used all the time because the pay-offs are

  • very complicated.

  • And example of such a product is called structured note.

  • So what's a structured note?

  • It's-- again, corporations need to raise money just to run this

  • business.

  • But, of course, I cannot just get this money for free.

  • I need to pay some interest.

  • And again, if you look at what happened last year.

  • Again, at the end of last year, for example a US 20 year bond

  • would pay 1.7%.

  • And if you also pay all the taxes,

  • then you probably get something like 1.1%.

  • And this might be even lower than inflation.

  • So investors, especially long-term investors,

  • they are not interested in investing in the US treasuries

  • because although it's risk free, but there's no return.

  • So you want to generate some money.

  • So what can you do, then?

  • OK, so you don't want to invest into treasuries.

  • So then you can try to find some corporate bonds.

  • Again, corporates are risky compared to the United States

  • government.

  • So typical coupon paid by the corporate bonds

  • would be higher.

  • So let's say 5% for a non-distressed typical US

  • corporation.

  • But again, 5%.

  • Then you need to pay, let's say, 30% tax top of this.

  • So you're left 3.3%.

  • There's inflation and so on and so forth.

  • So it still looks like a low return.

  • Of course, [INAUDIBLE] below, you

  • can buy some distressed bonds, say from Greece or maybe

  • from some distressed corporations, which

  • is a much higher.

  • But it becomes more like gambling.

  • There's so much uncertainties there,

  • so it's more like you can get very high return,

  • but you can lose everything because basically you're

  • bearing very high credit risk.

  • So what to do in this situation?

  • Turns out that banks issue very special securities called

  • structured notes which are very attractive to some investors.

  • So let's say Morgan Stanley-- but instead

  • of issuing vanilla bond, I am issuing-- and at 5%,

  • let's say for 10 years-- I issue a bond which pays 10% a year.

  • So much higher coupon.

  • But I pay you 10% only if certain market conditions

  • are satisfied.

  • So let's say market condition like this.

  • 30 year swap rate is higher than two year swap rate.

  • Let's go back to the picture which I drew.

  • So essentially this means that if you borrow money, then

  • the short term borrowing rate is smaller

  • than the long term borrowing rate, which

  • usually is the case.

  • So basically, let's assume I pay you 10% percent

  • if two conditions are satisfied.

  • 1% is the 30 year borrowing rate in the economy right

  • now is higher than two year borrowing

  • rate, which is this condition.

  • Plus this second condition.

  • S&P 500 index is higher than 880.

  • So now if these conditions are satisfied,

  • then the investor will get 10%.

  • If one of these conditions breaks down,

  • the investor would get nothing.

  • So there are many investors who would

  • like to bear this kind of risk because they

  • have certain view on how the economy would develop.

  • Because right now, for example, S&P 500 index

  • is pretty close to 2,000.

  • So it's very unlikely that it'll go down

  • by the factor of two, which is 880.

  • So it's very low probability.

  • And then also investor believes that this will never happen.

  • So we always will be in the economy

  • where it's still more expensive to borrow long-term

  • than short term.

  • So in this case, it turns out that the coupon

  • can be enhanced.

  • This is a whole idea of the structured note.

  • So instead of setting like a plain coupon, 5%,

  • I am selling [INAUDIBLE] the derivative.

  • And if investors like it, it's kind of gambling

  • but in educated way because there's

  • certain economic meaning of these conditions.

  • But this can get high return.

  • And this is a very popular way of financing because it turns

  • out that investors are buying this kind of instruments,

  • but they are very unique.

  • There's a lot very liquid.

  • Therefore when issue this kind of instrument,

  • even if you price it correctly using all the models,

  • the bank or financial institution

  • which issues these instruments can make some extra money.

  • So effectively it's cheaper to issue these instruments

  • than to issue vanilla bonds.

  • And all of these big banks, they have all the machinery

  • to risk manage this kind of [INAUDIBLE] derivatives.

  • So they know what they are doing.

  • So they sell this kind of product,

  • and they're hedging their exposure.

  • And they realize some profit because you

  • can't identify how much [INAUDIBLE] instrument is.

  • So it's good for banks.

  • And it's also good for investors because they

  • are looking for this kind of yield enhancement.

  • They want to have a higher yield.

  • And they are taking-- and they're

  • willing to take this risk.

  • But again, it's an educated risk because like,

  • this condition, for example, here, they

  • have a very clear economical meaning.

  • So if an investor understands what's going on,

  • then it's a reasonable risk.

  • And, of course, what do you do in this case

  • if you want to model something like this?

  • Then it's very complicated to find

  • any kind of analytic approximations

  • here in the real world.

  • So what do we do?

  • We simulate the stock market price.

  • We simulate the 30 year yield and 10 year yield.

  • And we simulate Morgan Stanley's credit spread.

  • And we do it all simultaneously, at the same time.

  • And then we see in the Monte Carlo simulation

  • if this condition is satisfied for every coupon date,

  • then we're paying 10%.

  • If something is broken, then we are paying 0.

  • So if we simulate many, many paths like this

  • and then we calculate the average value of it.

  • And then we come up with the price

  • and then we quote this price to the investor.

  • And again, I say, these products are very nonstandard.

  • That's fine.

  • You can make some extra money.

  • And as a firm, you save money because it's

  • cheaper than to issue plain vanilla bonds.

  • And just to give you the idea where

  • we are in terms of numbers.

  • So here there is a graph of difference

  • between 30 year borrowing rate and two year borrowing

  • rate for the last decade.

  • So you see, this difference always positive.

  • It was negative only very shortly for some time

  • around 2005, 2006.

  • So it's very interesting thing.

  • So when you price derivative, then there's

  • a notion of market-implied numbers.

  • It turns out if you look at how different instruments are

  • priced on the market, then the probability--

  • Then you can ask a question: What

  • is the probability that this-- Let's

  • say if I run, for example, this stochastically for the last 10

  • years, then how-- what the probability

  • that this difference is positive.

  • And then it turns out probability is only

  • 80% percent.

  • Whereas in reality, it was realized only for a few days.

  • So it's significantly lower.

  • So basically, then, the investor says like this.

  • So market give me the discount, like 80%.

  • But I know that this almost never happen in the past.

  • Therefore I believe that it will not happen in the future.

  • Maybe it will happen, but I will still

  • make some extra money because of this.

  • So basically we have [INAUDIBLE] enhancement by a factor 1

  • divided by 0.8.

  • 1.25%.

  • Second thing is about S&P 500.

  • If you look at the history of this index, which is basically

  • the main US market index, then you

  • see that it was historically above 880 level for 94 days out

  • of 100 days.

  • So very, very high probability.

  • But the market implies this will be the case only in 75% case.

  • The credit investor would say like this.

  • OK, now S&P 500 is around 1,800.

  • So what the probability it's going to drop below 880?

  • Of course there is some probability,

  • but if it's going to happen because it will mean

  • a very serious recession, and it looks

  • like the economy is improving.

  • The market might drop down, but maybe

  • to the level of 1,500, 1,400.

  • But not that low.

  • Therefore the investor believes that he, by taking this risk,

  • he will again get a higher coupon.

  • So [INAUDIBLE] very popular instruments which are

  • solely price by Monte Carlo simulation, which-- we have

  • big businesses, for example,

  • like Morgan Stanley, whose goal is to raise capital

  • by selling these exotic products and hedging them using

  • the Monte Carlo framework.

  • And if the interest rates are crucial for dynamics,

  • then we use the HJM model for simulating interest rates.

  • So that's everything I wanted to tell you

  • about today, so thank you very much.

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: Yeah?

  • AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE] simulation.

  • Is there some choice-- you might make certain choices

  • based on historical precedence?

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: It's a very good question.

  • So, in reality.

  • So here's what happens.

  • So let's go to a very simple case of stock prices.

  • So again, r here basically is just the borrowing rate.

  • It's like, let's say, whatever the bank account gives.

  • Which is known.

  • So the only parameter which isn't known is volatility.

  • So usually, you have liquid stocks, for example.

  • Like IBM, Apple.

  • Then there are a lot of derivatives traded,

  • which are very liquid.

  • This means that you can imply this sigma from the price

  • of liquid derivatives.

  • Because you know, for example, that this particular option--

  • let's say today Apple traded at 600--

  • and you know that at the money option, so option with a strike

  • 600, in one year now, for example, it's worth whatever.

  • Like $50, for example.

  • By knowing this, you can imply this sigma.

  • So the whole idea is like this.

  • So you take very liquid derivatives, like standard call

  • options, and you imply this sigma.

  • And then you use this model to price

  • really truly exotic derivatives, which are not vitally

  • available.

  • That's how big banks make money.

  • Because we know how to price them.

  • We have clients come in.

  • And we see the prices of very liquid instruments

  • and we buy them to hedge.

  • So very often what we do is that we do some very complicated

  • deal, but we have an ability to off-load it

  • into simpler contracts, which we know how to price.

  • That's the idea.

  • And the same is true for all the other derivatives,

  • from credit derivatives or [INAUDIBLE] derivatives.

  • So you try to imply the sigma from the market.

  • If there is no way to do this-- which

  • is very often the case for credit derivatives because

  • for the credit derivatives, credit vol--

  • is not very liquid, not liquidly traded.

  • Then the best thing that you can do

  • is to take historical estimates.

  • So we also do this.

  • There is nothing else.

  • Yeah.

  • Yeah?

  • AUDIENCE: On your last slide where

  • you talked about the implied frequency of the S&P 500

  • being lower than 880?

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: Yeah.

  • AUDIENCE: Was that from historical quotes

  • or current quotes?

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: OK This number, I

  • think, if you go to the end of 2012 and go back to 2002.

  • 10 years into the past.

  • Then I think it was above 880 in 94% of case.

  • We can go back.

  • So remember, just to the slide I showed in the very beginning.

  • Here it was, right.

  • So 880 is somewhere here.

  • 2012 is here.

  • You go back 2002.

  • It was below 880 around 2000, internet bubble.

  • And around, say, 2008, 2009 when we had major banking crisis.

  • [INAUDIBLE] just now.

  • So you can see probability is not

  • very high based on historicals.

  • These kind of people believe that in the future

  • it might happen, but then the stock

  • will go back again because the government will intervene

  • and so on and so forth.

  • That's the way of thinking of these investors

  • who invest into structured notes like this.

  • AUDIENCE: So for the implied frequency,

  • that's from the current--

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: Exactly.

  • AUDIENCE: --option prices--

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: Exactly.

  • Exactly.

  • Exactly.

  • Exactly.

  • So now that's how historical was obtained.

  • Ah, let me see.

  • [INAUDIBLE]

  • Yeah.

  • Well, let me see.

  • So, yes.

  • So it's like this.

  • So you're today and you have your Monte Carlo model.

  • And you simulated going forward for 10 years

  • and you see what the probability to be below 880.

  • And actually, much higher because usually

  • the market is extremely risk-averse.

  • So if you're buying a deep out of the money option

  • you usually-- there is-- everybody requires premium.

  • Because if this happens, if you don't really like

  • charge enough money, basically that you're out of business.

  • That is how I obtain this number, what, 75%.

  • Whatever.

  • OK.

  • Yeah?

  • AUDIENCE: So is the pricing of these more exotic products

  • totally reliant upon Monte Carlo,

  • or are there other techniques?

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: I mean, usually it's Monte Carlo.

  • So there are some derivatives where analytical approximations

  • are available.

  • For example, for interest rate derivative.

  • Swaps are like a very simple linear product.

  • To price them, you need discount function.

  • So it's just arithmetic.

  • Of course, it's all done, just simple arithmetic.

  • For swaptions, standard swaptions,

  • there is a model called SABR model which

  • allows some kind of semi-analytical solutions,

  • which are approximate but of high quality.

  • Then you can do it.

  • But there are different schools of thought.

  • Because with some approximations,

  • which might fail for some if maturity is very long,

  • or it's very-- very deep out of the money option.

  • So very often what traders do, even if their official numbers

  • are only-- more simplified models which kind of has

  • some formula, they still round the Monte Carlo simulation

  • for the whole portfolio to understand

  • what the most complicated model, like in terms

  • of your present value of your portfolio,

  • in terms of the risk.

  • But, of course, this kind of double

  • range accruals, which are just [INAUDIBLE].

  • It's impossible to build any meaningful analytical model.

  • You can do something, but you won't

  • be able to be competitive.

  • It's just all Monte Carlo simulation.

  • AUDIENCE: So you said usually this whole simulation

  • process takes an hour on a MATLAB program?

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: No.

  • No.

  • It takes probably like one hour just

  • to write the whole program, because it's very simple.

  • So what you do, you have Brownian motion.

  • But what you do.

  • MATLAB generates Brownian motion.

  • So you just do it.

  • And then you write the change in your price

  • is equal to your drift, which you know,

  • plus some random number.

  • And you basically just simulate different path.

  • And then if you price a call option,

  • you know the distribution of your stock prices,

  • let's say, in one year from now with maturities.

  • And you just do average.

  • So it might take someone 15 minutes

  • to write this kind of program.

  • This is so you can verify numerically the accuracy

  • of the-- verify numerically Black-Scholes formula,

  • for example.

  • But the idea fits very simple here.

  • But, of course, for these complicated models,

  • which you-- for term structure process like HJM,

  • because it's already one-dimensional object.

  • And, of course, it's much more complicated

  • because besides pricing, you need

  • to have this idea of calibration as you mentioned,

  • because these volatilities are not just usually historical.

  • They're implied from other instruments.

  • So what you do in practice, like this.

  • So if you have liquid instruments, liquid options,

  • you have the model.

  • But the model has unknown parameters.

  • First, we do the calibration.

  • So we make sure that our model prices all

  • the simple instruments.

  • And then we take the derivative whose price

  • is unknown because it's just something very complicated.

  • And then we just price it, but our model's

  • calibrated to simple derivatives.

  • And this tells us-- then this model,

  • after pricing it and running sensitivity

  • with respect to market parameters,

  • tells us how to hedge it.

  • That's the idea.

  • AUDIENCE: You ought to do post-hoc analyses

  • to see how the models did in the past so you can adjust them.

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: Yeah.

  • Yeah.

  • AUDIENCE: Is that a big part of what you have to do?

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: I will say in general we

  • are moving to this direction.

  • In general, of course, for Monte Carlo-- from the [INAUDIBLE]

  • point of view for complicated Monte Carlo model,

  • it's very difficult to do technically.

  • It's very difficult. But if you do it,

  • you cannot afford simple models like for swaps and so on.

  • AUDIENCE: --historical experience

  • with the projection that you made.

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: No.

  • But the situation, it's very different.

  • So we don't make any predictions here, remember.

  • It's risk-neutral pricing.

  • Just no prediction here.

  • What we do here is like this.

  • If we are a bank and we want to trade

  • all kinds of very exotic derivatives

  • which nobody knows how to price but

  • we have clients who want to buy them with different reasons.

  • Might want to speculate or they want

  • to manage their risk exposure and so on and so forth.

  • So nobody knows except for like 10, 20 banks,

  • how to price them.

  • Because this is like, you need to have infrastructure.

  • You need to know how to do this.

  • Then you need to have some business channels,

  • how to off-load this risk.

  • So this is some very exotic products.

  • So now the idea of dynamic hedging is like this.

  • Remember, in the case of Black-Scholes.

  • You buy an option and then you hedge it

  • by holding a certain amount of the underlying.

  • So you don't make any money.

  • But you want to make sure that whatever happens to the market,

  • you're fully hedged.

  • So the market moves here, you don't make any money.

  • The market moves down, you don't make any money.

  • So the way how you make money in this situation, basically

  • this Black-Scholes formula, in this case, the price which

  • you charge for the option is the price

  • of executing the hedging strategy.

  • So if you charge a little bit more,

  • this is extra money which you can make.

  • So it's very different.

  • So what you just mentioned is like proprietary business.

  • Big banks, they are not supposed to do this.

  • It's more like a hedge fund world.

  • Very different models.

  • What we do, we try to manage big portfolios of derivatives,

  • all kinds of derivatives.

  • And we try to price them and charge a little bit extra so

  • that we can make our living.

  • But on the other hand, we don't take any risk.

  • That's the idea.

  • [INAUDIBLE] just models.

  • So from point of view in terms of testing historically,

  • you can still ask a question.

  • Let's say if I go back 10 years.

  • And let's say 10 years ago, I would sell,

  • for example, this stock option.

  • And for the next 10 years, using historical data,

  • I see basically how-- my model then

  • tells me what my Greeks or like what my sensitivity

  • with respect to the underlying-- what

  • my sensitivity with respect to underlying is.

  • And then you can ask a question.

  • How was this delta H performing historically?

  • Which is a reasonable question because maybe you

  • assume that the model pretty much continuous.

  • But maybe if your dynamics is very jerky,

  • then you can just lose money because you just don't take

  • into account these effects.

  • This is an example of historical analysis which we may run,

  • but it has nothing to do with prediction here.

  • So it's a whole different world.

  • So it's risk-neutral pricing.

  • So we don't take any risk.

  • That's the whole idea.

  • But due to the fact that derivatives are very complex,

  • even in this case, still banks bear some residual risk,

  • because remember we cannot exactly off-load it, the risk.

  • So we still have some assumptions

  • that we can re-balance our position dynamically and move

  • forward, basically, and not lose money.

  • That's the idea of it.

  • AUDIENCE: I have a question about the Monte Carlo pricing.

  • You can set up the Monte Carlo using implied parameters

  • from current prices of various derivatives

  • in the market, which gives you a good baseline price.

  • I'm wondering what other Monte Carlos

  • do you do to have a robust estimate of pricing, hedging

  • cost.

  • I would think that there would be, I don't know,

  • maybe some stress scenarios in the market or alternatives.

  • You probably don't just do one Monte Carlo

  • study with current parameters.

  • You probably have different sets.

  • And I'm wondering how extensive is that?

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: Absolutely.

  • You are right.

  • So if you just do the Monte Carlo,

  • then you just know the price.

  • But price is nothing, because dynamic hedging,

  • all this business of derivatives,

  • it's not just about how much it's right now,

  • but what to do if the market behaves this way.

  • So of course you could collate all your Greeks.

  • That's very important.

  • But Greeks is like, say, your delta.

  • It's all about linear terms.

  • So of course it's a very important thing.

  • What happen to the portfolio, let's

  • say, if there is a very sharp, for example,

  • jump in interest rate.

  • So let's say, what happens if rates jump forward by 1%.

  • Or if they jump down.

  • What happens if volatility in a particular time,

  • region, for example, blows up.

  • You run all these kind of analyses.

  • So it's big departments at the banks who

  • look at all this kind of risks.

  • So it all comes to one business unit

  • which looks all kinds of risks of the firm.

  • It's a very big thing for the bank.

  • This notion of stress test.

  • Basically right now, all of the banks

  • are very heavily regulated by the government.

  • So the government can tell us what happens.

  • For example, for the whole bank--

  • not just for a particular desk which trades,

  • whatever, swaptions.

  • What happens to all your bank, to all kinds of cash flows

  • which you can have if, let's say,

  • interest rates jump by 100% percent.

  • We have a huge group of people, quants, IT, risk managers,

  • who are looking at all these numbers trying

  • to understand it.

  • And for a big bank, very non-trivial problem, actually.

  • So it's very good point.

  • But, of course, we do as good as we can.

  • Yeah.

  • AUDIENCE: Well, thanks again.

  • And for a little time afterwards for--

  • [APPLAUSE]

  • DENIS GOROKHOV: Thank you.

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B1 中級

24.利率和信貸的HJM模型 (24. HJM Model for Interest Rates and Credit)

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    林宜悉 發佈於 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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