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  • as if as he was anticipated.

  • I'm going to talk about women at work.

  • I'm gonna cover recent and historical trends, new perspectives in the discipline and also discuss policy options.

  • So women's involvement in the labor market has been one of the most important changes off the past century on this change has involved many aspect off the labor market.

  • So women have made very important in drugs in all dimensions of labor markets that has bean convergence in employment rates.

  • We respect to Ben convergence in earnings and also very important changes in the type of jobs on the commission that men and women do.

  • Despite this kind of very broad gender convergence, there are still important and persistent disparities between men and women in the labor market.

  • So to give you a very simple piece of data in the UK these days, women earn about 22% less than men and they're 12% points less likely to be in work in the U.

  • S.

  • The statistics are very similar to the UK, very big gender gaps and kind of smaller employment gaps in continental Europe.

  • The Petri sort of reversed the gender pay gap is smaller, but the gender employment gap is a lot larger.

  • So there are very big disparities in both prices on quantities between women and men in labor markets.

  • Which is kind of surprising because this is happening after decades off equalized education opportunities on equal pay legislation.

  • So this is a little bit the kind of framework in which I'm going to talk today.

  • The questions that I'm going to address today are sort off to be questions Festival The good news.

  • Why?

  • What are the factors?

  • The good side of it, what are the factors that East female entry into the labor market and, secondly, sort of the not so good news?

  • What are the factors that still hinder the full convergence between men and women in the workplace?

  • Now off course, as always, in economics and social sciences, we always need to ask, Why do we care?

  • Is it a problem?

  • Is it something that we should care about?

  • And then I'm going to give you a very simple answer to that is probably simplistic answer.

  • But yes, we do care about you.

  • We should care about it because men and women are equally productive.

  • If anything, girls these days invest more than boys in education.

  • They perform better in school, them boys.

  • And therefore, if the efficient allocation of workers to jobs requires that people are matched to the jobs that maximize the returns to their skills, there is really no point in selecting predominately from John one gender.

  • I suppose that from two genders, because they're strictly oneself to restrict from the male pool.

  • Toby.

  • Very simplistic about it, basically means that on average, the kind of people that we can select for a given job is of worst qualities, so that much quality would be worse.

  • So there is an issue of really efficient allocation off individuals, two jobs, really ensuring the men and women have equal assessed to labor markets.

  • Okay, a very simple answer to a huge question.

  • Yes, there is a problem if men and women's opportunities are not equalized.

  • As I said, this is a sort off, simple way to see that there's lots of caverns that are being discussed, even in research these days, to this kind of you.

  • First of all, educational attainment is equalized in terms of quantity, years of schooling, but certainly not in terms of quality So these days, girls on boys are still choosing different tracks and education on Does that happen?

  • Empathy, labor markets.

  • And secondly, if we're really serious about talking off economic efficiency, we should also take into account preferences, not only productivity.

  • And if we don't take into account preferences, we should really be asking ourselves to men and women have the same preferences or not.

  • So I'm going to be talking about a number off this aspect.

  • So the outline off the talk is first of all, starting from the facts.

  • I will talk about historical trends in education, labor, market on earnings.

  • Secondly, I will be talking about forces that works, explaining this trends and finally, the factors that underlie the remaining disparities in the labor market.

  • So the facts I will start from education.

  • I was saying before that these days there is no reason to believe that women are less productive than man, and this is probably the main reason behind that.

  • So this figure gives you the college graduation rates in the U.

  • S.

  • For, uh, by the age of 35 four people board between 18 70 in 1980.

  • So as you can see here at the very beginning of the sample period, late 19th century early 19 early 20th century, very few people were graduating among either men or women, so 5% graduation rate almost equal across genders.

  • Then, in the interwar period, educational attainment of both males and women started to increase extremely rapidly.

  • But as you can see, Mae's graduation rate very quickly surpassed, with females graduation right by a big chunk.

  • So between, say, 19 10th cohort on 1955 90 60 cohort man graduation rate were significantly higher than women's graduation rates.

  • Oh, man, we're investing in education a lot more than females.

  • But then, with the baby boom go horse, this gap actually reversed on in current cohorts female.

  • Her more likely to graduate from college in the US than that man.

  • And then they used to be before, of course, so there is absolutely no gender gap.

  • If anything, there is a reverse gender gap in favor for Mays in the rates of education.

  • This is about your city counters.

  • So this figure here is a snapshot off Corrine graduation rates among relatively young workers 25 to 34.

  • So this is for 2014 or most recent available data, and this is basically a cross section of a very large number of Voice City countries in these countries.

  • The sort of orange bars represent the graduation rate from college for men, and the blue diamonds represent the graduation rate for college for Sorry, they're Orange Line is for women on the Blue Diamonds is for men, as you can see everywhere except in a very small handful of countries like Switzerland.

  • Uh, China, Turkey Almost everywhere.

  • Women are more likely to graduate from college than men everywhere in the city.

  • Okay, now, this is really about the quantity off years of schooling, the probability to graduate from college If one looks so what women and men doing college.

  • Indeed, there are important disparities there.

  • So this picture here represents the fraction off female graduates and may graduates in heart sciences.

  • So here I am, talking about science, mathematics and computing.

  • So what is the distribution off men and women in the total number of graduates in this disciplines?

  • Why am I looking at this disciplines?

  • Because these are really the disciplines that tend to be associate ID with higher earnings in the labor market.

  • Okay, so that's processing that That That's the only reason why I'm looking for the moment that this discipline here.

  • So as you can see here, except again in a very small group off no representative countries here everywhere in the U.

  • S.

  • City women are much less likely than men to graduate from Stan subjects from hiring sort of majors.

  • Okay, so this is the sort off educational snapshots.

  • Let's move on to the labor market.

  • I'm gonna give you some data on the employment rate of women, which is basically the proportion of employed women over the total working age population in the U.

  • S.

  • And in a number of ways, city counter.

  • So let's start from the U.

  • S.

  • Here.

  • These sample starts at the beginning of the 20 century between the beginning of the century.

  • On the start of World War two, the employment rate of women is extremely low between 20 and 25% on also relatively stable, relatively stagnant with war war two after World War two, there's been a huge ramp up on this huge acceleration of female employment from 25% to nearly 70% in the 19 nineties, and then he has completely plateau or even slightly reversed after that.

  • But in ST in, say, 50 years between 1940 1990 female employment went from 25% to about 70%.

  • So huge increase.

  • These are six big European countries, so it's France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.

  • The red line here represents again the end the World War two.

  • As you can see after the end of World War Two, this country's look like each other a lot.

  • There's bean, an increasing training female participation in all these countries.

  • The levers were somewhat different, and in particular.

  • For example, if you compare, for example, Spain and the U.

  • K, you can see that the trend is a lot steeper than staying that in the UK, because in Spain, the sort off beginning level of female employment after World War two was a little lower than in the UK, So there's also been some sort of cross counter convergence in female employment rate, but very clear.

  • I'm positive trends after World War Two, this is Scandinavia, even more the transit some Scandinavian countries have been extremely steep, like, for example, Norway and Sweden on the levers are also very different from the rest of Europe.

  • So, for example, if you compare Sweden and Norway to southern European countries, you see that these days women have unemployment rate in Sweden and Norway of about 80% while it's only 50 to 60% for example, in Italy and Spain.

  • Another very important takeaway point from those graphs is that this sustained increase in female employment rates that we have observed since World War Two is not really a sort of historical necessity before World War Two.

  • And this is the reason why I put a sort of red line divide.

  • Before that, the experience in this country's was relatively different.

  • So in many countries, female employment friends were kind of flat or even decreasing.

  • For example, like in the Netherlands, in Italy, in the UK and in some Scandinavian countries, too, this is the so called U shape pattern in female participation.

  • So if you really look at countries at very different stages in their development process, it's not always true that the association between development and female participation is Moloch tonic, in particular in societies in pre industrial societies, in which a big chunk of the labor force is employed in agriculture.

  • In this particular societies, women are actually working a lot.

  • They're working as much as men, and it's only when a certain economist has to industrialize.

  • Is the work moves from the household and from the field into factories that we must start to stay at home.

  • So the U shaped sort off picture, which you can see very clearly.

  • For example, in the Netherlands, here in France, in the UK, in Italy, the declining part off this kind of U shaped pattern corresponds to the decline of the agricultural sector on the expansion of the manufacturing sector and then the Rampak off.

  • Female participation corresponds instead of situation in which the manufacturing sector is shrinking on the service sector is expanded.

  • So this kind off traditional may breadwinner model and female housewife is a creation that is relatively modern, is something that is typical to industrialize in societies.

  • Okay, so these are the main takeaway points from this kind of historical trends.

  • I'm gonna talk about earnings a little bit.

  • Not as much as as I've been talking about employment, because on earnings there's much less state, especially not internationally comparable data and not very long historical trends.

  • But we can make a very similar consideration as we've made from female employment here.

  • So this to grass represents the relative female earnings, a set percentage of male earning.

  • So this is UK and US both in the UK and the US That has a very clear upward trend in female earnings.

  • So in the UK, the media woman was earning about 50% off the median man in 1970 on these days is about 83% similar in the U.

  • S.

  • So very strong convergence in earnings.

  • If you look at European countries here of sample France, Germany and Italy, there's been somewhat of a sort of increasing trend.

  • But there's two things that one need to notice.

  • First of all, the convergence is less pronounced than in Anglo Saxon countries, and also the level is a lot higher.

  • So in terms off relative earnings, women are doing a lot better.

  • In France, for example, 85% in Italy 85 to 90% and even in Germany than in the U.

  • S.

  • And in the UK, this is due to two main reasons one obvious reason is that these countries in continental Europe have a much more compressed wish distribution.

  • They're much more sort off.

  • They have more equal weight setting policies and a much more sort of concentrated wish distribution, which means that if you take a very brought a very wide and weight distribution, any given differences in the characteristics of working men and women becomes amplified in a country that has very big, for example, returns to educational returns to experience.

  • Why, where the register vision is very compressed, there is a much to sort off amplify differences in characteristics.

  • But there is another very important force going on here.

  • The fact that these figures here are coming from individuals worry work on.

  • There is a very strong selection effect, or women who are actually work.

  • So in these countries Italy, France and Germany, the employment rate a woman is markedly lower than the employment rate in Anglo Saxon countries.

  • So if working women tend to be over sample from the high part from the high wage section off the photo distribution, then it's no wonder why this country's the female wage gap is not that large simply because law, which women are less likely to feature in the observers distribution.

  • So it's really important to consider in conjunction gaps in employment and gaps in wages because, of course, selection effects in play, this kind of negative correlation between wage gaps, unemployment gaps.

  • Now there will be a lot to say about the type of jobs that men and women do.

  • But instead of sort of going at length for the second time, I'm giving you this one particular picture.

  • And this is probably the case in which a picture speaks 1000 words.

  • This is a picture that refers to young graduates in the in the U.

  • S.

  • Between 1940 on the core in days.

  • So these two lines here represent the proportion off female college graduates that work in sort off.

  • Typically females occupation, teaching, nursing librarian, social workers or, typically, male occupation, sort of professionals of managerial jobs.

  • So in 1940 about 70% off female graduates were becoming teaching nurses, librarians and social workers, and only like 13% were becoming doctors and lawyers and so forth.

  • These days, if you look at current graduates, there's actually more female graduates going into managerial and professional occupation than in traditional female occupations.

  • So the nature, the type of jobs on the sort of financial status of jobs at Burnham men and women are doing it.

  • The liberal market has incredibly converge in the past 50 years or so.

  • Okay, So having very briefly observed these trends, what can we say about the underlying economic and social forces that brought this this trans together again?

  • Here, the literature is huge.

  • I'm gonna touch upon a few things that I think that more interesting and more active.

  • You research these days.

  • So of course, I've already talked about human capital investment.

  • Women are investing in education as much as men these days.

  • But it wasn't definitely the case, say, 50 or 60 years ago.

  • And then there's been technological progress in all sorts of areas, off work and personal life.

  • For example, there's been important medical progress that has implied that, for example, there is birth control these days.

  • Maternal health has enormous improved.

  • So the whole incapacitation of women around the time of childbirth lactation is this is kind of minimize, So medical progress has been a very important factor.

  • But those who has been technological progress in the market.

  • So all sorts off, like Braun saving technologies have somehow undermined the comparative disadvantage of women in physical tasks.

  • So these days one can't really say the women have a disadvantage in sort of manufacturing jobs relative to men.

  • And also the same kind of technological progress that was making production in the market sort of more efficient was also making production at home or efficient.

  • So, for example, the introduction of household appliances has replaced in most cases.

  • Who human working the household on the human work has been historically predominately female work.

  • Now this kind of market technological progress or very fast productivity growth both in manufacturing and in service is was not even across market sectors.

  • In particular, technological progress was a lot faster in manufacturing vanities, and service is on now.

  • In my recent work with Rachel Guy, we argued that this was one of the important forces driving gender convergence in both employment on earnings on one very simple way to see that to see the intuition behind this idea is to basically look at this graph.

  • So this panel here represents aggregate transit working hours.

  • The black line is sort off aggregate working hours off men and women in the U.

  • S.

  • Between 68 2009.

  • They increase a little bit, but they're essentially pretty flat.

  • So there is some increase and you can see that this increase all called entirely, came about by an increasing working hours of women.

  • Okay, between, say, 700 hours per year to about 1200.

  • Sorry to around 1200 hours per year.

  • These days, if you look at men, there was actually a strong decline in the working hours off, man.

  • So this is the kind of aggregate treads we're talking about.

  • So why is that interesting to think about the industry structure?

  • If there's anything that this sort of gender biased in the industry structure in my probably explain why the transfer female men were actually symmetric, so for many was falling.

  • And for women it was rising.

  • So we argue, the one important sort of gender component of the industry structure was the rising service's.

  • So this is this second diagram here gives you the fraction off annual hours in service is this is increasing over role for the U.

  • S.

  • Economy here from about 57% to more than 70% about 78%.

  • But it's a lot higher for women on the lot lower for men.

  • So basically, the sector that was expanding in the U.

  • S.

  • Economy and in any other industrialized counter around the world was the sector that was over employing women relative to on.

  • Indeed, if you look at what was happening to each gender, you see that for women, the whole increase in female participation, which is the black line now to place by an increase in female hours and service is female hours in manufacturing will always very low and if anything declining, certainly not rising.

  • And they said, if you look at male hours, you see that the total decline in mail ours is entirely explained by the decline in the manufacturing sector.

  • So the fact that the service sector was expanding was basically pulling women out of the household and into the labor market into jobs for which they had a sort of historical comparative advantage.

  • While men who were historically working in manufacturing jobs, they were mostly bearing the burden off the industrialization.

  • This kind of process had a very interesting counterpart within the household, So what can think that there is a relatively close substitute?

  • Ability between service is produced in the household and service is produced in the market and women were essentially moving from producing.

  • Service is in the household to producing.

  • Service is in the market and we can find some evidence for that on time.

  • You state so in the same way in which market trends were converging.

  • Also, household trans were converging.

  • So what this picture is showing is well, first of all, the market trends.

  • So the red line is women hours in the markets on increasing trend on female and male hours in the market.

  • So this is women are and then the green line is many hours in the market which were decreasing.

  • So here we're just replicating the previous diagram that was just coming from the market.

  • But then what's happening in the home is the women's hour.

  • In the home.

  • The yellow line were declining quite sharply from 38 hours per week, so this is like a full time job, 30 hours 38 hours per week to about 26 27 hours per week these days, and we're actually stronger, increasing for men from 11 hours per week, which was very little in 1965 to about 16 hours these days, very far from a full time or river, a part time job.

  • But there is very strong convergence in the market.

  • So here the idea is that by expanding the market service sector, women left the household.

  • I started to work in the sector for which they had a comparative advantage, another very important force on which we will talk again more when it took about remaining disparities and I will talk again tomorrow.

  • Talking about gender norms and identity is that during this whole period there was a very important evolution of gender norms, expectations and identity.

  • So starting in 19 seventies, women started tohave expanding horizons.

  • So at the time in which women are making decision about how much to invest in education, they start imagining themselves, say, 15 20 years down the line on the Imagine that their labor market attachment will be long term and continues instead of like short lived and interrupted by my origin childbirth.

  • How do we know that?

  • Well, there are very important service of individuals attitude.

  • Some values are from this service Wheeler, for example, that in 1968 about 30% off young women imagine to be in work by the age 35 only 30% of them were thinking.

  • OK, I will be work in about 15 years time, only 12 hours.

  • 12 years later, in 1980 about 85% of women were thinking that they would be work at age 35 cents, a huge change in sort off career horizons and perspectives.

  • As a consequence of this changing horizons, girls are delaying the age of marriage, and they're delaying the age of first birth.

  • And, of course, they're also invested more in education.

  • So they're completely closing the gaps in terms of years of education on their sort of narrowing the gap, respect to men in the terms off types, off degrees that they're choosing and type of jobs they're gradually entering.

  • So, of course, there is an increasing women in sort of professional degrees, like medical school law degrees NBA's.

  • Now.

  • This also implied a very important changes identities on social norms.

  • So there is a transition from a situation in which we men work because the family really needs the income.

  • So a situation in which women work when the husband doesn't earn enough to a situation in which women work because their jobs are not only a way to sort of increased family income, but also a way to sort of characterize on define, once identity, work for society.

  • So again, using value Survey from the 19 seventies, we learned that women give a lot more emphasis to, say, coworker recognition the importance of what they do for society on in strictly economic terms, if one estimates, elasticity off female labor supply toe husband's earnings This elasticity switches from very strongly positive before the 19 seventies to actually negative after this.

  • Sorry to very strongly negative before the 19 seventies, actually positive after the 1970.

  • So once work is not just for the money, this is the main, the main lesson.

  • Well, Wheeler from this kind of elasticity.

  • So then the important thing is that what happened first, economic shocks of the change in identity on I'm afraid I'm not gonna be able to give you a definite answer on that.

  • But there's a lot off evidence that there's a lot of release suggesting evidence that there have been major economic on historical changes, not necessarily economic changes that happened during the 20th century.

  • The leg toe, a fast evolution, injured the North.

  • So the main idea put forward, for example, by Claudia Golding in her air lecturing 92,006 is that they have bean unexpected shocks.

  • And here the important thing is that the shock was very much unexpected that had long lasting consequences to women's identity.

  • So one thing, for example, was made mobilization during the Second World War.

  • In the Second World War, there were areas in the U.

  • S.

  • English A very high proportion of them were sort of mobilized to the war, and therefore they left jobs in typical male occupations like, for example, heavy manufacturing military industry transportation into So they were the left, those jobs vacant.

  • But given that those jobs had to be operated by somebody there were operated by women and women were sort off pulled in a completely unexpected and also substantial way into this jobs.

  • But this implied that the next generation off their sons and their daughter sort of learned that women can do their jobs and that can do this particular jobs on this imply the sort off, gradually evolving social norm about the kind of jobs that women and men doing the labor market another very important changes related to what I was talking before about the rise of the service economy.

  • The strong expansion of service is had created jobs like clerical jobs, white collar jobs that were perceived to be more appropriate and more desirable for women.

  • So they didn't have long hours as jobs in manufacturing there were clean, there were safe.

  • So jobs that were more female friendly than jobs in manufacturing.

  • On this off course pull women into the labor force on also taught the future generations that they should be prepared to enter the labor force in clerical jobs on get very well trained with appropriate education in order to be suitable for those jobs.

  • So that says these changes were partly unexpected.

  • But then they implied that the future generations have time to get years for the entry into the labor market.

  • Off course, this sort of became a vicious assault, a sort of a virtuous circle, because the exposure to working women in turn weaken stereotypes about the kind off jobs that women can do on.

  • There is some evidence that in these shows that observing women in the labor market and even more in sort of leadership positions in politics and the management has a beneficial effect on member sections about we miss productivity.

  • I will.

  • I will come to that in a bit.

  • So no, given that we have taken stock of a very broad variety of stories that explain gender convergence in the labor market, I'm gonna took a lot more about what really is kind of hindering further convergence.

  • And this is a very important question these days because despite all the nice trend that cash only so far, I was also showing you that starting from the sort of late 20 century to thousands, this convergence has very strongly decelerated, if not completely stopped, in some country.

  • So we need to understand what's going on there.

  • Um, so, as I said before, gender convergence doesn't seem to be very easily extrapolated to future decades on.

  • In particular, women remain underrepresented in high status, high income occupation, despite, as I said before, equalized education opportunities and equal pay legislation.

  • What kind of disparities we're talking about here.

  • So this finger I'm giving you here represents the earnings gap between men and women in obesity countries on DDE to have sort of comparable data across countries.

  • This is just differences in earning, so it's not just wages.

  • It also takes into account differences in hours on on lease elects full time employees.

  • So by selecting full time employees, this is very much a sort of understatement off the total which gap between men and women because, of course, part time workers sent or less on a nightly basis that full time workers and even more on a sort of burning spaces.

  • So as you can see here, if you take out the score sort of three hour liars with 20% of 30% which gap on another fewer liars here with the wage gap below 10% there is a huge middle section off countries in which the earning gap is a solid 15%.

  • Okay, so 15% strongly significant, strongly persistent, and then the main.

  • The main question is, why does that?

  • So I'm gonna talk here about three most active areas of research these days.

  • The 1st 1 is gender.

  • Differences in preferences are psychological attributes, so do men and women want different things, and if they want different things, there is nothing one can do about equal pay legislation, workplace practices and so on.

  • If they want to do different things, there is no reason to expect that men and women will behave equally in the labor market.

  • The second point is basically looking at the mirror image of what I've just said.

  • I've been talking about gender norms evolving substantially after World War Two, but apparently they haven't evolved enough.

  • So what is it about gender norms?

  • That it's hard to change and how our gender norms formed?

  • And also, I will talk about work, life balance considerations.

  • So given that men and women they typically take different roles in the household and especially different roles with child care, what kind of impact does he have in the labor market?

  • What are the sort of policy responses that we can think about?

  • So let's talk about preferences and psychological traits.

  • This is a relatively new area of research, So the state of the art up until, say, the 19 nineties waas most looking a primary factors of genders off gender inequalities like productivity and discrimination So if you take the 1999 Labor Economics Handbook chapter by Anthology on why I'm Blank.

  • There were most looking at differences in productivity related to differences in human capital accumulation on dhe discrimination in the workplace.

  • Okay, after the 19 nineties, there has been a very important change in this particular area of labor economics, not because this first order factors became less important.

  • If anything, discrimination is.

  • Some matters of the supermarket can be believed to be very much alive, but mostly because there have been developments in other area in other areas of economics that have enabled economies to ask completely new questions about gender differences.

  • So they have been very important advances in the psychology literature on the growing influence off this literature in economics that has pushed economies to ask you questions.

  • So, for example, asking question about do men and women one different things from their labor market experiences to men and women want different things in life are generally and also they have been very important.

  • Empirical developments, mostly in lab experiment field experiments but also, for example, on ministry today extremely reached new data becoming available that have put economists in the position to address those questions.

  • It's not that economists were probably nothing to sending those questions before.

  • It's just that they didn't have the evidence to make cause an inference on that.

  • So this literature, precisely by building up off this both theoretical and empirical developments, this literature has focused on different, gentle attitudes in risk loving behavior, competition, negotiation and sort off social preferences.

  • Altruistic prefaced.

  • Now why am I thinking about this particular traits?

  • Of course, men and women may differ in their food places, for example, but we don't care about that.

  • We really care about those faces that be mostly related, most strongly related to labor market success.

  • So we may think, for example, that attitudes towards risk or attitudes towards altruism may interfere with men's and women's libber market senses.

  • So let's start about risk here.

  • Is it true that men and women have different risk attitudes?

  • Is it through the women to safer options in general?

  • This is an important question because typically the labor market rewards very risky careers with higher expected earnings in any kind of sector.

  • On dhe, if you look at a number off experiments conducted in the lab, you can see the typically women are much less likely than men to choose risky payoff, for example, to choose payoffs that are denominated as lotteries, as opposed to sort off straight straight payoffs.

  • So there is a very interesting serving, my president Easy, the service bunch of experiments in this literature that showed the women are much more risk averse than man.

  • There's also the question about differences in competition, off course, high profile careers.

  • They build up in a highly competitive environment.

  • And if you look a lab experiments you typically see the women prefer not to compete against men, even when are equally able as men.

  • So it's not just the matter off off.

  • Believing that you're worst than the other jet is not the matter of being worse than the other gender, and therefore you don't want to compete against the other gender.

  • Even at sort of zero gaps in ability.

  • Women prefer not to compete, and again, there is a number of experiments here.

  • So there is this this very well known paper by needle that went Western.

  • Look at the way in which boys on girls perform in some very simple math game so it basically means adding up five numbers, two digit numbers having them up and then be rewarded according to whether the gather right answer or not.

  • So, first of all, what they do the test, all these kids, one by one by looking at how good they are in simple math.

  • And then they have a score for Richman, a woman about how they are a simple math.

  • And then they asked them, Would you like to be remunerated by only what you do in this test?

  • Or regenerate a relative to what everyone else does?

  • And then women are less likely to choose the sort off relative performance option.

  • Women are less likely to compete, so the most plausible explanation here is the mental to be more overconfident than women.

  • But again, we can't really extrapolated that much from this results, because all the research has shows that stakes matter, and also it matters against which you tend to compete.

  • So, for example, there is this paper that shows that went stakes are low.

  • Remember for better against women wear stakes are high.

  • Women perform better against man, as thinks, of course, a very important because whenever you want to extrapolate from a lab experiment to the labor market the kind of stakes we're talking about, a completely different.

  • There are other psychological traits that economists have been looking into, for example, women's attitude towards negotiation.

  • In many cases, you're not going to get a promotion or a pay rise unless you ask for it.

  • So if women don't ask off course, it would be really would remain behind your in his locker.

  • On There is some evidence that shows that women are less likely to initiate negotiations in lab games.

  • Also, in the same kind of lab experiment, women may be more likely to be sort off a socially minded.

  • They may care more about the payoff the other party on.

  • Therefore, they make sure, in a different way, a given endowment.

  • They make sure this kind of embalming the different way from the way which men butchered this endowment.

  • No.

  • Instead of sort of expanding my discussion about this kind of lab experiments, I would like to give you two main caveats towards the interpretation off this evidence on gender preferences.

  • First of all, where this preference is coming from and secondly water their consequences so what are the causes and consequences of gender preferences?

  • So the main question about the causes that is it nature or is it nurture?

  • And this is important for policy consideration?

  • Because, for example, if we see that the way in which boys and girls are nurtured say, in primary school induces different behavior in the labor market, that one missing how one my sort of design the proper appropriate intervention in primary schools.

  • So what do we know about nature or nurture differences between men and women?

  • One very important thing to notice is that although men and women are physically different technological progress, our medical progress has probably completely eliminated ideological differences, so not nobility.

  • But they have almost completely eliminated the impact off these biological differences in the labor market.

  • So, for example, the disruption, the kind of incapacitation around childbirth on breast feeding is these days probably minimized.

  • Okay, this is one thing.

  • But then, of course, there are more subtle differences between men and women that are not simply related toe having kids on breast feeding them that their instead related, for example, to the structure of sex hormones.

  • So this is something that is much more difficult to observe, and there's also sort of difficult to relate to labor market behavior.

  • But there are this day some studies that particularly correlate the presence of testosterone in one saliva to economic behavior.

  • So I'm just giving you the results from one experiment with about 80 men.

  • These 80 men are tested for the amount of testosterone taking a sample from the saliva on.

  • Then they're asked to perform some risk investment with a relatively limited endowment.

  • I think this show that in this diagram that there is a mile but positive correlation between the amount of testosterone in your saliva on the dollar amount investment in this kind of risky lottery.

  • Okay, so this would speak in favor, off sort of nature differences between men and women, although we really don't know where it comes from, this kind of difference in testosterone level.

  • So it may trace back to something that we don't know what it is, how much nature or nurture there is in that, speaking towards the opposite view, the view that there is a lot in terms of nurture differing between men and women is this paper here by nisi and co authors.

  • That takes a very ambitious experiment off testing competitive attitudes in two completely different societies.

  • One is a patriarchal society.

  • It's the Masai tribe in Tanzania, which is completely sort of traditional and patriarchal on the other.

  • One is instead that Catalina society.

  • Which is the cosy, huh?

  • The car's a tribe in northeast India.

  • On Just to give you the sort of stereotype description of these two tribes, I'm going to give you two quotes.

  • So in the Masai tribe, women sort of complaint because they say that they're treated like cattle while in the Casa Society, men complain because they say we just play the role of breeding bulls on baby sitters.

  • We don't do anything else aside.

  • So the experiment was performed in both scenarios.

  • So among the Masai people, a much bigger proportion off men here chooses to be remunerated in a very simple experiment by relative performance evaluations.

  • So with the competitive kind of option, while about half women do so so here, Traditional Patrick, a society, I'm very traditional choice off competitive pay off in the matter.

  • Alina society.

  • Actually, the gender gap is reversed.

  • Women in the matter Alina society choose the competitive option more often than men.

  • And even if even if Langley, more often than men in the Masai society.

  • So this very much speaks towards the importance of nurture forces importance to the social environment in which goes on, boys are brought up into making choices that are economically important.

  • The second, important sort off car via that one needs to make when learning lessons from lab experimental psychological traits is that what really needs to think about consequences in the labor market, not just in the lab or what are the consequences of the straight What are the consequences of this results for the real labor market scenario?

  • So the compression here is whether we're making a very long leap from the lab, a lab experiment in which the stakes are low, in which the subject might not be entirely representative off working men and working women and, most importantly, in wished the environment is short lived.

  • There isn't that sort off day today repeated a longer term interaction that we observe in the labor market.

  • So can we really extrapolate those results into situations that are indeed economically meaningful from men's and women's careers?

  • So the ultimate test for the psychological theories is whether they indeed get replicated in real life scenario, and the evidence here is very much in its emphasis.

  • There is a very why there isn't very strong evidence that the kind of psychological traits we observe in the lab they translate one for one for what reserve in the labor market.

  • I'm giving you just to example here, as I said before, there isn't a huge literature on this topic.

  • But, for example, if you take a sort of real life experiment in Israeli school, so this is an experiment.

  • Study by Victor Levy Recently, you can see the female and male teachers do equally well under tournaments, which is an extreme case off competitive performance evaluation.

  • So there is really no gender differences in very competitive evaluation scenarios.

  • Now, of course, one coming off a criticism of this kind of experiment it is through the lab experiments may not be fully representative of the labor market, but this experiment refers to the teaching profession, a professional that is historically like a female profession.

  • So if anything, this is very much the professional, which we expect women to behave sort of competitively and confidently more than, say, in investment banking, so we don't have a similar experiment for investment back.

  • This is again another very interesting field experiment in which different job ads are sort off the parasite randomized information about the process of reformation.

  • Some job ads stated that the seller is negotiable, our job ads that they just give a take it or leave it wage offer.

  • And in this case, it seems that women are more likely to apply to jobs in which there is no negotiation.

  • So as you can see, the evidence on the labor market consequences is air electively mixed.

  • So what can policy do if there are this kind of differences?

  • E think if really thes differences are confirmed in the labor market, Welcome policy do about it well.

  • Issues about negotiation or competitiveness can be properly addressed to some extent by human resource practices to some extent.

  • So humorous or practices, for example, relating to information that is given to employees can somehow undo to some extent the kind of competitive and negotiating behavior off women.

  • A man in the workplace, for example, if one has in place information policies giving feedback on relative performance off various employees.

  • Prevalence of negotiation.

  • Pay rise.

  • Which structures are so on?

  • This probably helps women and men to find the sort of right position in the kind off distribution of employees and then another.

  • Issues, of course, affirmative action's affirmative action or quarters targeted a high performance women within organizations, for example, quarters in politics quarters on company boards.

  • Now we should stress here that this kind off affirmative action policies are strong distortions to market allocations.

  • So they're almost like an extreme form off taxation on male.

  • Work in these occupations is like taxi may work.

  • Male work at 100% are only making this jobs available to women.

  • So our this kind of distortions ah, sort of valuable do they achieve the impact that we would like?

  • It really depends what is the underlying Maria to the enter every many certain professions.

  • If the entry women is on the labor demand side, for example, you to social norms or discrimination, then probably this kind of affirmative action policies help women entering life financially rewarding profession.

  • And by doing that, they may also help women.

  • The enter women in this profession change on sort of evolved social norms.

  • If instead, the constraints come from the labor supply size, there is not a big enough pool a well qualified women for that particular sort of protected job.

  • Then quotas may actually backfire, because by selecting only from one Pool, 1 may attract a sort of lower quality pool of hires on, therefore, reinforcing the sort of stereotypes that women are not good enough for certain professions.

  • Another important question about having gender quarters in start off highly important occupations occupations, for example, in politics and in managerial jobs is really to understand how the formacion off teams with the different gender presents has an impact on decisions percolating down, for example, for a company policies or or or decisions made in politics.

  • So, of course, there is, for example, that can be remembered as the recent evidence at the moment on the fact that gender boards in which there is a higher presence of women they may actually make actually different decision about, for example, human resource practices about hiring or firing practices.

  • And there is also some completely different evidence coming from Italian academia that shows that the higher presence of women in committees in academic committees for for promotion actually lowers the chances of women being promoted to associate or tofu professional.

  • So the research in this kind of various off quarters on dhe on positive discrimination is very much divided at the moment is it's still not clear.

  • Okay, I will talk next about work, life, balance, motives and again we have seen before that we're looking at the data.

  • There were strong converges in female and male role, both in the household and in the market.

  • But this kind of work life balance motive is still there because those kind of trends in the house or have not converged.

  • So we may remain the primary provider of child care, elderly care and other household rules.

  • And this thing's kind of role of women inevitably has some labor market effects won't very simple way to see the women being the primary providers off childcare also bear some kind of burden in their labor market prospects is to observe a very simple piece of evidence.

  • The childless women are very similar to man in many countries.

  • Many scenarios childless women are extremely similar to man, so typically the wage gap between when and women between men and women either starts altogether or expands enormously at the time off first childbirth.

  • So this is results from a recent paper by Harry Cleveland and coffers that takes Danish administrative data and follows couples from the time from before the time you wish to have their first child for about 10 years after first birth.

  • So as you can see before before birth, this red line here represents birth.

  • The trend in total earnings of men and women are completely flat, so there is no a symmetry in the in the trends off female and male earns.

  • But after birth, there is a very strong gap, building up almost immediately after birth and staying there persistently and almost constant for about 10 years.

  • And actually the paper stands it further to 20 years.

  • So, as you can see, the arrival of a child implies a gap of about 20% which never goes away in the earnings off men and women.

  • How does that happen?

  • The happens across all possible margins in the labor market, so women are less likely to participate altogether after birth.

  • If they participate, they're working fewer hours, and if they work the urine or wages.

  • So the fact that this huge gap builds up very strongly after childbirth properly put some doubts, probably put some sort off burden off proof on those explanations about innate psychological differences because then why didn't the gap shop very strongly before that?

  • So unless this kind of psychological differences turns on the moment a woman has a child, then, of course, is a lot more difficult to explain differences in labor market with innate differences between General, uh, what I've shown you before was data from Denmark, which are all the more surprising because when we think that Scandinavian countries, and especially Denmark, has in place some relatively gender neutral family policies on the relatively equal approach to labor markets, they refer to the average worker.

  • So these are really data that represent the whole population.

  • And this is the beauty off this kind off administrative data set.

  • What I'm going to show you next is something completely different.

  • That cost from the very, very top off the distribution off males and females earning A refers to a very small and selected sample off graduates from a top business school in the U.

  • S.

  • So the kind off work, life palace consideration that we have observed for the average worker in Denmark.

  • Do they still hold for people at the very top off the waste distribution on bye bye, Emphasizing this fact, the father these people are in the sort off top earnings nationals off the distribution.

  • I want to emphasize this.

  • The father for these people is extremely easy toe outsource to the market.

  • Any aspect of child care and from production they want is not an issue of logical straight.

  • So how are these guys behaving towards work?

  • Life balance considerations.

  • So this study here, as I said before it, first with top business school in the U.

  • S.

  • And the reason to look at this particular types of graduate is first of all to remove any kind of budget constraint out of child care cleaning, cooking, gardening us on.

  • But also to look at the impact of work, life, balance, consideration in careers in which the long hours culture and the continues sort of work attachment the continues involvement and the competitiveness may be particularly detrimental to men and women who want to have a sort off solid presence in the house.

  • So what The Wheeler from this study.

  • This body has a relatively small sample, so we're not talking about Danish registered eight.

  • Of course, we're talking a small sample of graduates, but we have extremely good information on this sample, extremely precise information on exactly what they've done before graduating from the M.

  • P A.

  • On for the 10 years after graduation.

  • So the moment when these guys graduate, if you look at main and female mean earnings.

  • So this to solid line here the Akan graduation year, zero men or women are almost identical.

  • There's only a very small difference in their earnings that is total explained by the fact that during their NBA's, they might choose slightly different tracks.

  • So men take more courses, for example, in finals.

  • And we meant take more courses in, say, human resource Match.

  • But the gap here is extremely small.

  • 10 years into graduation, there is a gap of about 50% in the earnings of men and women.

  • So how do these guys go from being identical to be 50% difference 10 years old?

  • And if you look at the very high flyer, so people in the 90th percentile off this already very strongly selected sample at the 90th percentile.

  • Men after 10 years earn about three times as much as women at the 90% time.

  • Okay, so what's going wrong during those 10 years?

  • What are these men and wome

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馬克斯-韋伯講座,Barbara Petrongolo(倫敦瑪麗皇后大學),2017年1月18日。 (Max Weber Lecture by Barbara Petrongolo (Queen Mary University London), 18 January 2017)

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    林宜悉 發佈於 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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