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Today, we turn
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to the question of distributive justice.
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How should income and wealth and power
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and opportunities be distributed?
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According to what principles?
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John Rawls offers a detailed answer to that question.
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And we're going to examine and assess his answer to that question today.
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We put ourselves in a position to do so last time.
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By trying to make sense of why he thinks. That principles of justice
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are best derived from a hypothetical contract.
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And what matters is that the hypothetical contract be carried out in an original position of equality
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behind, what Rawls calls, the veil of ignorance.
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So that much is clear?
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Alright, then let's turn to the principles
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that Rawls says would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.
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First, he considered some of the major alternatives.
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What about utilitarianism?
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Would the people in the original position choose to govern their collective lives
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utilitarian principles, the greatest good for the greatest number
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No, they wouldn't, Rawls says.
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And the reason is,
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that behind the veil of ignorance, everyone knows
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that once the veil goes up, and real life begins,
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we will each want to be respected with dignity.
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Even if we turn out to be a member of a minority.
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We don't want to be oppressed.
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And so we would agree
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to reject utilitarianism, and instead to adopt
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as our first principle, equal basic liberties.
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Fundamental rights to freedom of speech,
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freedom of assembly, religious liberty,
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freedom of conscience and the like.
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We wouldn't want to take the chance that we would wind up
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as members of an oppressed or a despised minority
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with the majority tyrannizing over us.
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And so Rawls says utilitarianism would be rejected.
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"Utilitarianism makes the mistake", Rawls writes,
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"of forgetting, or at least not taking seriously,the distinction between persons."
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And in the original position behind the veil of ignorance, we would recognize that and reject utilitarianism.
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We wouldn't trade off our fundamental rights and liberties for any economic advantages.
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That's the first principle.
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Second principle has to do with social and economic inequalities.
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What would we agree to?
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Remember, we don't know whether we're going to wind up rich or poor.
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Healthy or unhealthy.
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We don't know what kind of family we're going to come from.
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Whether we're going to inherit millions
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or whether we will come from an impoverished family.
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So we might, at first thought,
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say, "Well let's require an equal distribution of income and wealth."
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Just to be on the safe side.
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But then we would realize,
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that we could do better than that.
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Even if we're unlucky and wind up at the bottom.
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We could do better if we agree to a qualified principle of equality.
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Rawls calls it "the Difference Principle".
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A principle that says, only those social and economic
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inequalities will be permitted that work to the benefit of the least well off.
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So we wouldn't reject all inequality of income and wealth.
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We would allow some.
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But the test would be,
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do they work to the benefit of everyone including those,
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or as he specifies, the principle,
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especially those at the bottom.
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Only those inequalities would be accepted behind the veil of ignorance.
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And so Rawls argues, only those inequalities that work to the benefit
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of the least well off, are just.
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We talked about the examples of
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Michael Jordan making 31 million dollars a year.
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Of Bill Gates having a fortune in the tens of billions.
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Would those inequalities be permitted under the difference principle?
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Only if they were part of a system, those wage differentials,
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that actually work to the advantage of least well off.
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Well, what would that system be?
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Maybe it turns out that as a practical matter
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you have to provide incentives
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to attract the right people to certain jobs.
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And when you do, having those people in those jobs
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will actually help those at the bottom.
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Strictly speaking, Rawls's argument for the difference principle
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is that it would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.
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Let me hear what you think about
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Rawls's claim that these two principles would be chosen
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behind the veil of ignorance.
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Is there anyone who disagrees that they would be chosen?
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Alright, let's start up in the balcony, if that's alright.
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Go ahead.
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OK, your argument depends upon us believing that
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we would argue in said policy, or justice from a bottom.
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For the disadvantaged.
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And I just don't see from a proof standpoint,
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where we've proven that.
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Why not the top?
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Right, and what's your name? - Mike.
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Mike, alright, good question.
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Put yourself behind the veil of ignorance.
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Enter into the thought experiment.
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What principles would you choose?
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How would you think it through?
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Well, I would say things like, even Harvard's existence
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is an example of preaching toward the top.
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Because Harvard takes the top academics.
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And I didn't know when I was born how smart I would be.
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But I worked my life to get to a place of this caliber.
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Now, if you had said Harvard's going to randomly take 1600 people
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of absolutely no qualification, we'd all be saying,
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"There's not much to work for."
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And so what principle would you choose?
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In that situation I would say a merit based one.
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One where I don't necessarily know, but I would rather have a system that
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rewards me based on my efforts.
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So you, Mike, behind the veil of ignorance,
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would choose a merit-based system,
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where people are rewarded according to their efforts?
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Alright, fair enough. What would you say?
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Go ahead.
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My question is, if the merit-based argument is based on
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when everyone is at a level of equality?
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Where from that position, you're rewarded to where you get,
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or is it regardless of what advantages you may have
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when you began your education to get where you are here?
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I think what the question you're asking is saying that
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if we want to look at, whatever, utilitarianism, policy,
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do you want to maximize world wealth.
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And I think a system that rewards merit
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is the one that we've pretty much all established,
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is what is best for all of us.
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Despite the fact that some of us may be in the second percentile
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and some may be in the 98th percentile.
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At the end of the day it lifts that lowest based level,
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a community that rewards effort as opposed to an differences.
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But, I don't understand how you're rewards someone's efforts
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who clearly has had, not you, but maybe myself,
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advantages throughout, to get where I am here.
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I mean, I can't say that somebody else
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who maybe worked as hard as I did
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would have had the same opportunity to come
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to a school like this.
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Alright, let's look at that point. What's your name?
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Kate. -Kate, you suspect that the ability
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to get into top schools may largely depend
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on coming from an affluent family.
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Having a favorable family background,
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social, cultural, economic advantages and so on?
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I mean, economic, but yes, social, cultural.
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All of those advantages, for sure.
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Someone did a study, of the 146 selective
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colleges and universities in the United States.
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And they looked at the students
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in those colleges and universities
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to try to find out what their background was, their economic background.
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What percentage do you think, come from the bottom quarter
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of the income scale?
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You know what the figure is?
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Only three percent of students, at the most selective colleges and universities
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come from poor backgrounds.
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Over 70 percent come from affluent families.
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Let's go one step further then, and try to address Mike's challenge.
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Rawls actually has two arguments, not one,
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in favor of his principles of justice.
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And in particular, of the difference principle.
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One argument is the official argument,
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what would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.
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Some people challenge that argument, saying,
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"Maybe people would want to take their chances.
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Maybe people would be gamblers behind the veil of ignorance.
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Hoping that they would wind up on top."
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That's one challenge that has been put to Rawls.
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But backing up the argument from the original position
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is the second argument.
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And that is the straightforwardly moral argument.
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And it goes like this,
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it says,
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the distribution of income and wealth and opportunities
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should not be based on factors
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for which people can claim no credit.
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It shouldn't be based on factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of view.
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Rawls illustrates this by considering several rival theories of justice.
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He begins with the theory of justice
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that most everyone these days would reject.
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A feudal aristocracy.
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What's wrong with the allocation of life prospects in a feudal aristocracy?
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Rawls says, well the thing that's obviously wrong about it is
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that people's life prospects are determined
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by the accident of birth.
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Are you born to a noble family or to a family of peasants and serfs?
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And that's it. You can't rise.
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It's not your doing where you wind up
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or what opportunities you have.
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But that's arbitrary from a moral point of view.
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And so that objection to feudal aristocracy
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leads, and historically has lead, people to say,
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careers should be open to talents.
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There should be formal equality of opportunity
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regardless of the accident of birth.
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Every person should be free to strive, to work,
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to apply for any job in the society.
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And then, if you open up jobs, and you allow people to apply,
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and to work as hard as they can, then the results are just.
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So it's more or less the libertarian system that we've discussed
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in earlier weeks.
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What does Rawls think about this?
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He says it's an improvement.
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It's an improvement because it doesn't take as fixed
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the accident of birth.
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But even with formal equality of opportunity
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the libertarian conception doesn't extend that,
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doesn't extend its insight far enough.
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Because if you let everybody run the race,
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everybody can enter the race, but some people start
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at different starting points, that race isn't going to be fair.
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Intuitively, he says, the most obvious injustice of this system
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is that it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced
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by factors arbitrary from a moral point of view.
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Such as, whether you got a good education or not.
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Whether you grew up in a family that support you
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and developed in you a work ethic
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and gave you the opportunities.
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So that suggests moving to a system of fair
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equality of opportunity.
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And that's really the system that Mike was advocating earlier on.
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What we might call a merit-based system.
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A meritocratic system.
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In a fair meritocracy the society sets up institutions
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to bring everyone to the same starting point
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before the race begins.
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Equal educational opportunities.
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Head start programs, for example.
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Support for schools in impoverished neighborhoods.
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So that everyone, regardless of their family background,
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has a genuinely fair opportunity.
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Everyone starts from the same starting line.
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Well, what does Rawls think about the meritocratic system?
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Even that, he says, doesn't go far enough
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in remedying, or addressing,
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the moral arbitrariness
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of the natural lottery.
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Because if you bring everyone to the same starting point
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and begin the race, who's going to win the race?
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Who would win?
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To use the runners example.
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The fastest runners would win.
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But is it their doing
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that they happen to be blessed with athletic powers to run fast?
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So Rawls says, "Even the principle of meritocracy,
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where you bring everyone to the same starting point,
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may eliminate the influence of social contingencies and upbringing,
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...but it still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined
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by the natural distribution of abilities and talents."
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And so he thinks that the principle of eliminating
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morally arbitrary influences in the distribution of income and wealth
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requires going beyond
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what Mike favors, the meritocratic system.
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Now, how do you go beyond?
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Do you bring everyone to the same starting point
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and you're still bothered by the fact that
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some are fast runners and some are not fast runners,
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what can you do?
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Well, some critics of a more egalitarian conception
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say the only thing you can do is handicap the fast runners.
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Make them wear lead shoes.
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But who wants to do that?
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That would defeat the whole point of running the race.
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But Rawls says, you don't have to have
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a kind of leveling equality, if you want to go
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beyond a meritocratic conception.
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You permit, you even encourage,
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those who may be gifted, to exercise their talents.
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But what you do, is you change the terms
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on which people are entitled to the fruits of
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the exercise of those talents.
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And that really is what the difference principle is.
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You establish a principle that says,
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people may benefit from their good fortune,
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from their luck in the genetic lottery,
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but only on terms that work to the advantage of the least well off.
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And so, for example,
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Michael Jordan can make 31 million dollars but,
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only under a system that taxes away a chunk of that
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to help those who lack the basketball skills that he's blessed with.
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Likewise, Bill Gates.
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He can make his billions.
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But he can't think that he somehow morally deserves
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those billions.
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"Those who have been favored by nature,
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may gain from their good fortune but only on terms that improve
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the situation of those who have lost out."
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That's the difference principle.
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And it's an argument from moral arbitrarianists.
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Rawls claims, that if you're bothered by basing distributive shares
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on factors arbitrary from a moral point of view,
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you don't just reject a feudal aristocracy for a free market.
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You don't even rest content with a meritocratic system
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that brings everyone to the same starting point.
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You set up a system, where everyone, including those at the bottom,
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benefit from the exercise of the talents held by those
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who happen to be lucky.
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What do you think? Is that persuasive?
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Who finds that argument unpersuasive?
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The argument for moral arbitrarianists.
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Yes.
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I think that in the egalitarian proposition
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the more talented people,
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I think it's very optimistic to think that they
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would still work really hard, even if they knew that
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part of what they made would be given away.
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So I think that the only way for the more talented people to
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exercise their talents to the best of their ability
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is in the meritocracy.
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And in a meritocracy, what's your name?
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Kate.
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Kate, does it bother you, and Mike, does it bother you,
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that in a meritocratic system, that even with fair equality of opportunity,
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people get ahead, people get rewards that they don't deserve
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simply because they happen to be naturally gifted.
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What about that?
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I think that it is arbitrary.
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Obviously it's arbitrary.
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But I think that correcting for it would be detrimental.
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Because it would reduce incentives, is that why?
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It would reduce incentives, yeah.
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Mike, what do you say?
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We're all sitting in this room and we have undeserved,
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we have undeserved glory of some sort.
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So you should not be satisfied with the process of your life.
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Because you have not created any of this.
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And I think, from a standpoint of, not just this room, us being upset,
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but from a societal standpoint we should have some kind of
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a gut reaction to that feeling.
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The guy who runs the race, he doesn't...
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He actually harms us as opposed to maybe makes me run that last
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ten yards faster.
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And that makes the guy behind me run ten yards faster
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and the guy behind him ten yards faster.
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Alright, so Mike, let me ask you.
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You talked about effort before. Effort.
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Do you think when people work hard to get ahead, and succeed,
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that they deserve the rewards that go with effort?
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Isn't that the idea behind your defense?
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I mean, of course, bring Michael Jordan here,
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I'm sure you can get him, and have him come
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and defend himself about he makes 31 million dollars.
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And I think what you're going to realize is
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his life was a very, very tough one to get to the top.
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And that we are basically being the majority oppressing the minority in a different light.
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It's very easy to pick on him. Very easy.
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Alright, effort.
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You've got...
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I've got a few. I've got a few. But that's about it.
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Effort, you know what Rawls's answer to that is?
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Even the effort that some people expend,
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conscientious driving, the work ethic,
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even effort depends a lot on fortunate family circumstances.
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For which you, we, can claim no credit.
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Let's do the test. Let's do a test here.
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Never mind economic class, those differences are very significant.
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Put those aside.
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Psychologists say that birth order makes a lot of difference
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in work ethic, striving, effort.
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How many here, raise your hand,
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those of you here, who are first in birth order.
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I am too by the way.
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Mike, I noticed you raised your hand.
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If the case for the meritocratic conception
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is that effort should be rewarded,
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doesn't Rawls have a point that even effort
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striving, work ethic is largely shaped even by birth order?
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Is it your doing?
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Mike, is it your doing that you were first in birth order?
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Then why, Rawls says, of course not.
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So why should income and wealth and opportunities in life
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be based on factors arbitrary from a moral point of view?
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That's the challenge that he puts
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to market societies, but also
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to those of us at places like this.
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A question to think about for next time.
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A justice of the United States Supreme Court,
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what do they make?
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It's just under $200,000.
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But there's another judge who makes a lot more than Sandra Day O'Connor.
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Do you know who it is? - Judge Judy?
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Judge Judy. How did you know that?
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Judge Judy, you know how much she makes?
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$25 million.
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Now, is that just? Is it fair?
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We ended last time with that remarkable poll, do you remember?
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The poll about birth order.
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What percentage of people
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in this room raised their hands,
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was it, to say that they were the first born?
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75, 80 percent?
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And what was the significance of that?
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If you're thinking about these theories of distributive justice.
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Remember, we were discussing
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three different theories of distributive justice.
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Three different ways of answering the question,
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"How should income and wealth and opportunities
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and the good things in life, be distributed?"
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And so far we've looked at the libertarian answer.
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That says, the just system of distribution
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is a system of free exchange, a free market economy.
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Against a background of formal equality.
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Which simply means, that jobs and careers are open to anyone.
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Rawls says that this represents an improvement
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over aristocratic and caste systems,
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because everyone can compete for every job.
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Careers open to talents.
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And beyond that, the just distribution is the one
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that results from free exchange.
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Voluntary transactions.
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No more, no less.
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Then Rawls argues, if all you have is formal equality,
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jobs open to everyone,
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the result is not going to be fair.
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It will be biased in favor of those who happen to be born
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to affluent families,
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who happen to have the benefit of good educational opportunities.
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And that accident of birth
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is not a just basis for distributing life chances.
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And so, many people who notice this unfairness,
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Rawls argues, are lead to embrace a system of fair equality of opportunity.
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That leads to the meritocratic system.
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Fair equality of opportunity.
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But Rawls says, even if you bring everyone
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to the same starting point in the race,
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what's going to happen? Who's going to win?
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The fastest runners.
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So once you're troubled by basing distributive shares
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on morally arbitrary contingencies,
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you should, if you reason it through,
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be carried all the way to what Rawls calls, "the democratic conception".
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A more egalitarian conception of distributive justice
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that he defines by the difference principle.
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Now, he doesn't say that the only way to remedy
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or to compensate for differences in natural talents and abilities
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is to have a kind of, leveling equality.
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A guaranteed equality of outcome.
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But he does say
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there's another way to deal with these contingencies.
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People may gain, may benefit from their good fortune,
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but only on terms that work to the advantage of the least well off.
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And so, we can test how this theory actually works
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by thinking about some paid differentials that arise
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in our society.
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What does the average school teacher make
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in the United States, do you suppose?
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Roughly. -$35,000.
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It's a little more, 40, $42,000.
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What about David Letterman?
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How much do you think David Letterman makes?
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More than a school teacher?
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$31 million. David Letterman.
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Is that fair?
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That David Letterman makes that much more than a school teacher?
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Well, Rawls's answer would be,
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it depends whether the basic structure of society is designed in such a way
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that Letterman's $31 million is subject to taxation
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so that some of those earnings are taken
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to work for the advantage of the least well off.
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One other example of a paid differential.
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A justice of the United States Supreme Court.
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What do they make?
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It's just under $200,000.
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Here's Sandra Day O'Connor, for example. There she is.
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But there's another judge who makes a lot more
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than Sandra Day O'Connor.
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Do you know who it is? - Judge Judy.
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Judge Judy. How did you know that?
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You watch?
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You're right.
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Judge Judy, you know how much she makes?
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There she is.
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$25 million.
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Now, is that just? Is it fair?
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Well, the answer is, it depends on whether
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this is against a background system
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in line with the difference principle.
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Where those who come out on top, in terms of
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income and wealth are taxed in a way
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that benefits the least well off members of society.
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Now, we're going to come back
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to these wage differentials, pay differentials,
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between a real judge and a TV judge.
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The one Marcus watches all the time.
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What I want to do now, is return to these theories
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and to examine the objections to
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Rawls's more egalitarian theory.
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The difference principle.
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There are at least three objections
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to Rawls's difference principle.
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One of them came up last time in the discussion
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and a number of you raised this worry.
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What about incentives?
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Isn't there the risk, if taxes reach 70, 80, 90 percent marginal rate
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that Michael Jordan won't play basketball?
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That David Letterman won't do late night comedy?
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Or that CEOs will go into some other line of work?
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Now, who among those who are defenders of Rawls
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who has an answer to this objection about
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the need for incentives?
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Yes. Go ahead, stand up.
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Rawls's idea is that there should only be so much difference
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that it helps the least well off the most.
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So if there's too much equality, then the least well off
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might not be able to watch late night TV,
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or might not have a job because their CEO doesn't want to work.
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So you need to find the correct balance where
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taxation still leaves enough incentive to least well off to benefit
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from the talents. - Good.
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And what's your name? - Tim.
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Tim. Alright, so Tim is saying, in effect,
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that Rawls is taking count of incentives.
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And could allow for pay differentials and
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for some adjustment in the tax rate
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to take account of incentives.
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But, Tim points out,
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the standpoint from which the question of incentives needs to be considered
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is not the effect on the total size of the economic pie.
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But instead from the standpoint of the effect
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of incentives, or disincentives,
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on the well-being of those on the bottom.
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Right?
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Good. Thank you.
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I think that is what Rawls would say.
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In fact, if you look in section 17,
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where he describes the difference principle,
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he allows for incentives.
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"The naturally advantaged are not gain
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merely because they are more gifted,
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but only to cover the costs of training and education
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and for using their endowments in ways that help less fortunate as well."
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So you can have incentives. You can adjust the tax rate.
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If taking too much from David Letterman
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or from Michael Jordan, or from Bill Gates,
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winds up actually hurting those at the bottom.
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That's the test.
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So incentives, that's not a decisive objections against
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Rawls's difference principle.
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But there are two weightier, more difficult objections.
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One of them
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comes from defenders of a meritocratic conception.
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The argument that says, what about effort?
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What about people working hard
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having a right to what they earn
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because they've deserved it.
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They've worked hard for it.
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That's the objection from effort and moral desert.
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Then there's another objection.
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That comes from libertarians.
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And this objection has to do with reasserting the idea
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of self-ownership.
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Doesn't the difference principle, by treating
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our natural talents and endowments as common assets,
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doesn't that violate the idea that we own ourselves?
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Now, let me deal first,
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with the objection that comes from the libertarian direction.
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Milton Friedman writes, in his book, "Free to Choose,"
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"Life is not fair.
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And it's tempting to believe that government can rectify
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what nature has spawned."
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But his answer is,
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"The only way to try to rectify that is to have
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a leveling equality of outcome."
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Everyone finishing the race at the same point.
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And that would be a disaster.
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This is an easy argument to answer.
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And Rawls addresses it.
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In one of the most powerful passages, I think,
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of the theory of justice.
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It's in Section 17.
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"The natural distribution", and here he's talking about
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the natural distribution talents and endowments.
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"...is neither just nor unjust.
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"Nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position.
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These are simply natural facts.
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What is just and unjust is the way that institutions
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deal with these facts."
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That's his answer to libertarian laissez faire economists
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like Milton Friedman who say, "Life is unfair but get over it."
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Get over it and let's see if we can, at least,
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maximize the benefits that flow from it.
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But the more powerful libertarian objection to Rawls
-
is not libertarian from the libertarian economists like Milton Friedman.
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It's from the argument about self-ownership.
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Developed as we saw, in Nozick.
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And from that point of view,
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yes, it might be a good thing,
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to create head start programs and public schools
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so that everyone can go to a decent school
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and start the race at the same starting line.
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That might be good.
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But if you tax people to create public schools,
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if you tax people against their will,
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you coerce them.
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It's a form of theft.
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If you take some of Letterman's $31 million,
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tax it away to support public schools, against his will,
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the state is really doing no better than stealing from him.
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It's coercion.
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And the reason is, we have to think of ourselves
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as owning our talents and endowments.
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Because otherwise we're back to just using people and coercing people.
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That's the libertarian reply.
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What's Rawls's answer to that objection?
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He doesn't address the idea of self-ownership directly.
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But the effect, the moral weight of his argument
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for the difference principle is,
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maybe we don't own ourselves in that thoroughgoing sense after all.
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Now, he says, this doesn't mean that the state
-
is an owner in me, in the sense that it can simply
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commandeer my life.
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Because remember, the first principle
-
we would agree to behind the veil of ignorance,
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is the principle of equal basic liberties.
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Freedom of speech, religious liberty,
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freedom of conscience and the like.
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So the only respect
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in which the idea of self-ownership must give way,
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comes when we're thinking about whether
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I own myself in the sense that
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I have a privileged claim
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on the benefits that come from the exercise of my talents
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in a market economy.
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And Rawls says, on reflection, we don't.
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We can defend rights.
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We can respect the individual.
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We can uphold human dignity.
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Without embracing the idea of self-possession.
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That, in effect, is his reply to the libertarian.
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I want to turn now, to his reply to
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the defender of a meritocratic conception.
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Who invokes effort as the basis of moral desert.
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People who work hard to develop their talents
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deserve the benefits that come from the exercise of their talents.
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Well, we've already seen the beginning of Rawls's answer
-
to that question.
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And it goes back to that poll we took about birth order.
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His first answer is
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even the work ethic, even the willingness to strive conscientiously,
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depends on all sorts of family circumstances and
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social and cultural contingencies for which we can claim no credit.
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You can't claim credit for the fact that you,
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most of you, most of us, happen to be first in birth order.
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And that for some complex psychological and social reasons
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that seems to be associated with striving,
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with achieving, with effort.
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That's one answer.
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There's a second answer.
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Those of you who invoke effort,
-
you don't really believe that moral desert attaches to effort.
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Take two construction workers.
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One is strong and can raise four walls in an hour
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without even breaking a sweat.
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And another construction worker is small and scrawny.
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And has to spend three days
-
to do the same amount of work.
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No defender of meritocracy is going to look at the effort
-
of that weak an scrawny construction worker and say
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"Therefore he deserves to make more".
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So it isn't really effort.
-
This is the second reply
-
to the meritocratic claim.
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It isn't really effort
-
that the defender of meritocracy believes is the moral basis
-
of distributive shares.
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It's contribution.
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How much do you contribute?
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But contribution takes us right back to
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our natural talents and abilities. Not just effort.
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And it's not our doing, how we came into the possession
-
of those talents in the first place.
-
Alright, suppose you accepted these arguments,
-
that effort isn't everything, that contribution matters,
-
from the standpoint of the meritocratic conception.
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That effort, even, isn't our own doing.
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Does that mean, the objection continues,
-
does that mean that according to Rawls,
-
moral desert has nothing to do with distributive justice?
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Well, yes.
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Distributive justice is not about moral desert.
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Now, here, Rawls introduces an important
-
and a tricky distinction.
-
It's between moral desert, on the one hand,
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and entitlements to legitimate expectations, on the other.
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What is the difference between moral deserts and entitlements?
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Consider two different games.
-
A game of chance and a game of skill.
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Take a game of pure chance.
-
Say, I play the Massachusetts state lottery.
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And my number comes up.
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I'm entitled to my winnings.
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But even though I'm entitled to my winnings,
-
there's no sense in which, because it's just a game of luck,
-
no sense in which, I morally deserve to win in the first place.
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That's an entitlement.
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Now contrast the lottery with a different kind of game.
-
A game of skill.
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Now, imagine the Boston Red Sox winning the World Series.
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When they win, they're entitled to the trophy.
-
But it can be always asked of a game of skill
-
did they deserve to win?
-
It's always possible, in principle,
-
to distinguish what someone's entitled to,
-
under the rules,
-
and whether they deserve to win in the first place.
-
That's an antecedent standard. Moral desert.
-
Now, Rawls says distributive justice is not a matter of
-
moral desert though it is a matter of
-
entitlements to legitimate expectations.
-
Here's where he explains it.
-
"A just scheme answers to what men are entitles to.
-
It satisfies their legitimate expectations as founded upon
-
social institutions.
-
But what they are entitled to is not proportional to
-
nor dependent upon their intrinsic worth."
-
"The principles of justice that regulate the basic structure
-
do not mention moral desert and there is no tendency
-
for distributive shares to correspond to it."
-
Why does Rawls make this distinction?
-
What, morally, is at stake?
-
One thing morally at stake is the whole question of effort
-
that we've already discussed.
-
But there's a second contingency, a second source of
-
moral arbitrariness that goes beyond
-
the question of whether it's to my credit
-
that I have the talents that enable me to get ahead.
-
And that has to do with the contingency
-
that I live in an society that happens to prize
-
my talents.
-
The fact that David Letterman
-
lives in a society that puts a great premium,
-
puts a great value, on a certain type of smirky joke,
-
that's not his doing.
-
He's lucky that he happens to live in such a society.
-
But this is a second contingency.
-
This isn't something that we can claim credit for.
-
Even if I had sole, unproblematic, claim
-
to my talents and to my effort.
-
It would still be the case, that the benefits I get
-
from exercising those talents,
-
depend on factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of view.
-
What my talents will reap in a market economy.
-
What does that depend on?
-
What other people happen to want or like in this society.
-
It depends on the law of supply and demand.
-
That's not my doing.
-
It's certainly not the basis for moral desert.
-
What counts as contributing
-
depends on the qualities that this or that society happens to prize.
-
Most of us are fortunate to possess, in large measure,
-
for whatever reason,
-
the qualities that our society happens to prize.
-
The qualities that enable us to provide
-
what society wants.
-
In a capitalist society it helps to have entrepreneurial drive.
-
In bureaucratic society it helps to get on easily and smoothly
-
with superiors.
-
In a mass democratic society
-
it helps to look good on television
-
and to speak in short, superficial sound bites.
-
In a litigious society,
-
it helps to go to law school and have the talents to do well on LSATs.
-
But none of this is our doing.
-
Suppose that we, with our talents,
-
inhabited not our society, technologically advanced,
-
highly litigious, but a hunting society,
-
or a warrior society.
-
What would become of our talents then?
-
They wouldn't get us very far.
-
No doubt some of us would develop others.
-
But would we be less worthy?
-
Would we be less virtuous?
-
Would we be less meritorious if we lived in that kind of society
-
rather than in ours.
-
Rawls's answer is, no.
-
We might make less money and properly so.
-
But while we would be entitled to less,
-
we would be no less worthy.
-
No less deserving than we are now.
-
And here's the point.
-
The same could be said of those in our society
-
who happen to hold less prestigious positions,
-
who happen to have fewer of the talents that our society
-
happens to reward.
-
So here's the moral import of the distinction between
-
moral desert and entitlements to legitimate expectations.
-
We are entitled to the benefits
-
that the rules of the game promise
-
for the exercise of our talents.
-
But it's a mistake and a conceit to suppose
-
that we deserve, in the first place,
-
a society that values the qualities we happen to have in abundance.
-
Now we've been talking here about income and wealth,
-
what about opportunities and honors?
-
What about the distribution of access of seats in elite colleges and universities?
-
It's true,
-
all of you
-
most of you first born, worked hard, strived,
-
developed your talents, to get here.
-
But Rawls asks, in effect,
-
what is the moral status of your claim
-
to the benefits that attach
-
to the opportunities that you have?
-
Are seats in colleges and universities
-
a matter, a kind of reward, an honor
-
for those who deserve them,
-
because they've worked so hard?
-
Or, are those seats, those opportunities and honors
-
entitlements to legitimate expectations
-
that depend for their justification
-
on those of us who enjoy them
-
doing so in a way that works to the benefit
-
of those at the bottom of society?
-
That's the question that Rawls's difference principle poses.
-
It's a question that can be asked
-
of the earnings of Michael Jordan and David Letterman
-
and Judge Judy.
-
But it's also a question that can be asked
-
of opportunities to go to
-
the top colleges and universities.
-
And that's a debate that comes out
-
when we turn to the question of affirmative action next time.
