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  • "Iran is Israel's best friend,

    譯者: lin piao 審譯者: Zhiting Chen

  • and we do not intend to change our position

    「伊朗是以色列最好的朋友,

  • in relation to Tehran."

    我們並不打算因德黑蘭

  • Believe it or not, this is a quote

    而改變態度。」

  • from an Israeli prime minister,

    你們相信嗎

  • but it's not Ben-Gurion or Golda Meir

    這句話出自一位以色列的總理

  • from the era of the Shah.

    但並不是本-古里安或戈尔迪·梅厄

  • It's actually from Yitzhak Rabin.

    在伊朗沙王治國時期的那些總理

  • The year is 1987.

    而是伊札克·拉賓

  • Ayatollah Khomeini is still alive,

    西元1987年

  • and much like Ahmadinejad today,

    伊朗最高領袖何梅尼還在世

  • he's using the worst rhetoric against Israel.

    而他就像現任總統艾馬丹加一樣

  • Yet, Rabin referred to Iran

    針對以色列發表很糟的言論

  • as a geostrategic friend.

    但拉賓還是將伊朗

  • Today, when we hear the threats of war

    稱為地理上的戰略夥伴

  • and the high rhetoric,

    今天當我們聽到那些

  • we're oftentimes led to believe

    戰爭威脅以及情緒激昂的言論時

  • that this is yet another one of those unsolvable

    我們常常因此相信

  • Middle Eastern conflicts

    這又是另一個

  • with roots as old as the region itself.

    中東地區難解的衝突

  • Nothing could be further from the truth,

    就像當地的宗教淵源一樣古老

  • and I hope today to show you why that is.

    但是這並不是對的

  • The relations between the Iranian and the Jewish people

    我希望今天能告訴你們為何並非如此

  • throughout history has actually been quite positive,

    伊朗人和猶太人的關係

  • starting in 539 B.C.,

    從歷史上來看其實一直很正面

  • when King Cyrus the Great of Persia

    西元前539年

  • liberated the Jewish people from their Babylonian captivity.

    波斯國王賽羅斯

  • A third of the Jewish population

    將猶太人民從巴別塔中釋放出來

  • stayed in Babylonia.

    三分之一的猶太人

  • They're today's Iraqi Jews.

    定居在巴比隆尼亞

  • A third migrated to Persia.

    他們就是今天的伊拉克猶太人

  • They're today's Iranian Jews,

    另外三分之一移民到波斯

  • still 25,000 of them living in Iran,

    他們是今天的伊朗猶太人

  • making them the largest Jewish community

    有2萬5千人還住在伊朗

  • in the Middle East outside of Israel itself.

    是現今中東除了

  • And a third returned to historic Palestine,

    以色列以外最大的猶太社群

  • did the second rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem,

    最後三分之一 回到歷史淵遠的巴勒斯坦

  • financed, incidentally, by Persian tax money.

    二次重建耶路撒冷聖殿

  • But even in modern times,

    順帶一提,他們用的是波斯人的納稅錢

  • relations have been close at times.

    但即使在今天

  • Rabin's statement was a reflection

    他們的關係曾經緊密過

  • of decades of security and intelligence collaboration

    拉賓的言論重新讓我們反思

  • between the two, which in turn

    過去幾十年這兩個國家的國安協防

  • was born out of perception of common threats.

    和情報合作

  • Both states feared the Soviet Union

    其實是源於感到共同的威脅

  • and strong Arab states such as Egypt and Iraq.

    兩個國家都害怕蘇聯

  • And, in addition, the Israeli doctrine of the periphery,

    以及強大的阿拉伯國家如埃及和伊拉克

  • the idea that Israel's security was best achieved

    而且以色列的國土安全

  • by creating alliances with the non-Arab states

    是主張以色列的國家安全可以通過

  • in the periphery of the region

    與周圍的非阿拉伯國家結盟得到保障

  • in order to balance the Arab states in its vicinity.

    才能在這特殊地帶

  • Now, from the Shah's perspective, though,

    與阿拉伯國家的勢力抗衡

  • he wanted to keep this as secret as possible,

    但從伊朗沙王的角度來看

  • so when Yitzhak Rabin, for instance,

    卻希望越少人知道這件事越好

  • traveled to Iran in the '70s,

    所以舉例來說,當拉賓

  • he usually wore a wig

    他在70年代到伊朗時

  • so that no one would recognize him.

    通常會戴頂假髮

  • The Iranians built a special tarmac

    這樣就沒有人認得出他來

  • at the airport in Tehran, far away from the central terminal,

    伊朗還鋪了一道特殊的飛機跑道

  • so that no one would notice the large number

    在德黑蘭機場,離中央航廈很遠

  • of Israeli planes shuttling between Tel Aviv and Tehran.

    這樣就沒人會注意到

  • Now, did all of this end with the Islamic revolution

    在特拉維夫和德黑蘭之間 往來的以色列班機

  • in 1979?

    這些互動難道在1979年的伊斯蘭革命後

  • In spite of the very clear anti-Israeli ideology

    就結束了嗎?

  • of the new regime, the geopolitical logic

    即使新政權的反以意識很強烈

  • for their collaboration lived on,

    地緣政治上應有的合作關係

  • because they still had common threats.

    依然存在

  • And when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980,

    因為他們仍擁有相同的威脅

  • Israel feared an Iraqi victory

    當伊拉克在1980入侵伊朗

  • and actively helped Iran by selling it arms

    以色列為阻止伊拉克勝利

  • and providing it with spare parts

    還主動幫助伊朗

  • for Iran's American weaponry

    販售武器給伊朗

  • at a moment when Iran was very vulnerable

    及提供伊朗美軍武器的零件

  • because of an American arms embargo

    在伊朗軍力不足

  • that Israel was more than happy to violate.

    因為美國軍武禁運時

  • In fact, back in the 1980s,

    以色列樂得置美國於不顧

  • it was Israel that lobbied Washington

    其實在80年代

  • to talk to Iran, to sell arms to Iran,

    是以色列遊說華府與伊朗溝通

  • and not pay attention to Iran's anti-Israeli ideology.

    賣軍武給伊朗

  • And this, of course, climaxed

    不要在意伊朗的反以情結

  • in the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s.

    而當然,這是秘密行動

  • But with the end of the Cold War

    隨著80年代的伊朗門事件達到高峰

  • came also the end of the Israeli-Iranian cold peace.

    不過隨著冷戰結束

  • Suddenly, the two common threats

    以色列與伊朗之間 表面的和平也結束了

  • that had pushed them closer together throughout decades,

    兩國之間的共同威脅

  • more or less evaporated.

    曾經迫使他們互助幾十年的威脅

  • The Soviet Union collapsed,

    就這樣消失了

  • Iraq was defeated,

    蘇聯解體

  • and a new environment was created in the region

    伊拉克戰敗

  • in which both of them felt more secure,

    新的秩序在這裡重新建立

  • but they were also now left unchecked.

    他們都更有安全感

  • Without Iraq balancing Iran,

    同時也更不受控制

  • Iran could now become a threat,

    沒有伊拉克制衡伊朗

  • some in Israel argued.

    伊朗就可能成為以色列的威脅

  • In fact, the current dynamic

    有些以色列人這麼認為

  • that you see between Iran and Israel

    其實目前

  • has its roots more so

    伊朗和以色列間

  • in the geopolitical reconfiguration of the region

    關係的變動

  • after the Cold War

    是源自冷戰後

  • than in the events of 1979,

    地理戰略上的重新佈局

  • because at this point, Iran and Israel

    而不是1979年發生的一連串事件

  • emerge as two of the most powerful states in the region,

    在那時伊朗和以色列

  • and rather than viewing each other

    一躍成為中東地區最強大的兩個國家

  • as potential security partners,

    他們不將對方視為國土安全上

  • they increasingly came to view each other

    可能的合作夥伴

  • as rivals and competitors.

    反倒漸漸視對方

  • So Israel, who in the 1980s

    為敵人和競爭對象

  • lobbied for and improved U.S.-Iran relations

    所以當以色列在80年代

  • now feared a U.S.-Iran rapprochement,

    遊說並改善美國和伊朗的關係後

  • thinking that it would come

    開始擔心美伊之間的友好

  • at Israel's security interests' expense,

    認為這將

  • and instead sought to put Iran

    影響以色列的國土安全利益

  • in increased isolation.

    試著要置伊朗

  • Ironically, this was happening at a time

    於逐漸孤立的境地

  • when Iran was more interested

    諷刺的是,那時後的

  • in peacemaking with Washington

    伊朗剛好更希望與

  • than to see to Israel's destruction.

    華府和平共處

  • Iran had put itself in isolation

    而不是想要搞垮以色列

  • because of its radicalism,

    伊朗因為激進主義

  • and after having helped the United States indirectly

    使自己處於孤立狀態

  • in the war against Iraq in 1991,

    伊朗曾間接地幫助過美國

  • the Iranians were hoping

    在1991年美國和伊拉克的戰爭中

  • that they would be rewarded by being included

    伊朗人希望

  • in the post-war security architecture of the region.

    他們能因為幫忙而被納入

  • But Washington chose to ignore Iran's outreach,

    戰後該地區安全框架中

  • as it would a decade later in Afghanistan,

    但是華府選擇忽略伊朗的示好

  • and instead moved to intensify Iran's isolation,

    就像十年後對阿富汗那樣

  • and it is at this point, around 1993, '94,

    就此更顯得伊朗的孤立無援

  • that Iran begins to translate

    就在此時約1993,1994年時

  • its anti-Israeli ideology

    伊朗開始將

  • into operational policy.

    反以的意識形態

  • The Iranians believed that whatever they did,

    成為國家方針政策的一部分

  • even if they moderated their policies,

    伊朗人相信不論他們做什麼

  • the U.S. would continue to seek Iran's isolation,

    即使改變政策

  • and the only way Iran could compel Washington

    美國還是會繼續孤立他們

  • to change its position was by imposing a cost

    伊朗唯一能迫使華府

  • on the U.S. if it didn't.

    改變立場的方式

  • The easiest target was the peace process,

    就是讓美國為此付出代價 如果華府還沒有付出代價

  • and now the Iranian ideological bark

    最好的著手處就是和平進程

  • was to be accompanied by a nonconventional bite,

    現在,伊朗意識形態的狂吠

  • and Iran began supporting extensively

    不守成規地大咬了美國一口

  • Palestinian Islamist groups that it previously

    伊朗開始大規模援助 巴勒斯坦的伊斯蘭教徒

  • had shunned.

    而不像之前那樣

  • In some ways, this sounds paradoxical,

    躲避他們

  • but according to Martin Indyk

    就某方面來說,這聽起來很矛盾

  • of the Clinton administration,

    但是柯林頓執政時期的

  • the Iranians had not gotten it entirely wrong,

    駐以大使英迪克認為

  • because the more peace there would be

    伊朗這樣做並不無道理

  • between Israel and Palestine,

    因為以色列和巴勒斯坦之間的關係

  • the U.S. believed, the more Iran would get isolated.

    越和平

  • The more Iran got isolated, the more peace there would be.

    美國相信伊朗會越孤立

  • So according to Indyk, and these are his words,

    伊朗越孤立,中東情勢就會越和平

  • the Iranians had an interest to do us in

    所以根據英迪克,他是這樣說的

  • on the peace process

    伊朗想要破壞

  • in order to defeat our policy of containment.

    我們的和平計畫

  • To defeat our policy of containment,

    為了打擊我們的遏制政策

  • not about ideology.

    是為了打擊我們的遏制政策

  • But throughout even the worst times of their entanglement,

    而非意識形態

  • all sides have reached out to each other.

    即使在他們互相角力的最糟情勢

  • Netanyahu, when he got elected in 1996,

    三方都嘗試向對方示好

  • reached out to the Iranians to see

    內塔尼亞胡在1996年當選以色列總理時

  • if there were any ways that

    曾試圖與伊朗溝通

  • the doctrine of the periphery could be resurrected.

    看有沒有可能

  • Tehran was not interested.

    重建過去守護領土的協議

  • A few years later, the Iranians sent

    德黑蘭對此毫無興趣

  • a comprehensive negotiation proposal to the Bush administration,

    幾年後,伊朗向

  • a proposal that revealed that there was some potential

    布希政府送上全面的談判提議

  • of getting Iran and Israel back on terms again.

    裡面提到

  • The Bush administration did not even respond.

    伊朗和以色列再度和解的可能

  • All sides have never missed an opportunity

    但是布希政府根本不回應