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  • our way through Kant's moral theory.

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  • Now, fully to make sense of Kant moral theory in the groundwork

    公正:該如何做是好?

  • requires that we be able to answer three questions.

    謊言的教訓

  • How can duty and autonomy go together?

    上一次我們... 對康德的道德論

  • What's the great dignity in answering to duty?

    進行了有益的探討

  • It would seem that these two ideas are opposed duty and autonomy.

    現在 為了從根本上理解康德的道德論

  • What's Kant's answer to that?

    我們必須回答三個問題

  • Need someone here to speak up on Kant's behalf.

    義務和自律如何統一?

  • Does he have an answer?

    什麼是履行義務的偉大尊嚴?

  • Yes, go ahead, stand up.

    從表面看來 義務和自律無法共存

  • Kant believes you the only act autonomously when you are pursuing

    對於這一點 康德的回答是什麼呢?

  • something only the name of duty and not because of your own circumstances

    這裡需要有人代表康德來講幾句

  • such as... like you're only doing something good and moral

    他給出回答了嗎?

  • if you're doing it because of duty and not because something

    好的 你說吧 站起來

  • of your own personal gain.

    康德認為當一個人是出於義務而不是由於出於對自身的考慮

  • Now why is that acting... what's your name?

    來做一件事時 這種行為才是自主的

  • My name is Matt.

    例如... 當你做有益的 符合道德觀的事

  • Matt, why is that acting on a freedom? I hear what you're saying about duty?

    只是出於一種義務

  • Because you choose to accept those moral laws in yourself

    並非為了個人利益

  • and not brought on from outside upon onto you.

    為什麼這種行為... 你叫什麼名字?

  • Okay, good. Because acting out of duty

    我叫Matt

  • - Yeah. - is following a moral law

    Matt 為什麼這種行為是自主決定的? 我聽你說是因為義務?

  • That you impose on yourself.

    因為你自已選擇了接受這些道德律

  • that you impose on yourself. That's what makes duty

    而非外界對你施壓 使你逼迫接受

  • - compatible with freedom. - Yeah.

    好的 很好 因為這種出於義務的行為

  • Okay, that's good Matt. That is Kant's answer. That's great.

    - 是的 - 是你遵從自已選擇的

  • Thank you. So, Kant's answer is it is not in so far as I am subject

    道德律的表現

  • to the law that I have dignity but rather in so far as with regard

    是你施加給自己的 這個論據證明義務與自由

  • to that very same law, I'm the author and I am subordinated

    - 可以並存 - 是的

  • to that law on that ground that I took it as much as at I took it upon myself.

    好的 很好 Matt 這就是康德的回答 很好

  • I willed that law. So that's why for Kant acting according

    謝謝 所以 康德的回答是 我們並非只有受限於法律時

  • to duty and acting freely in the sense of autonomously are one and the same.

    才能享有尊嚴 而是針對同一項法律

  • But that raises the question, how many moral laws are there?

    我說了算 我遵守這項法律

  • Because if dignity consists and be governed by a law that I give myself,

    但前提是我們主動接受這一規則

  • what's to guarantee that my conscience will be

    我們願意遵循法律 因此康德表明出於義務的行為

  • the same as your conscience? Who has Kant's answer to that? Yes?

    和自主決定的行為本質上是統一的

  • Because a moral law trend is not contingent upon seductive conditions.

    但這又提出了一個問題 有多少道德律存在呢?

  • It would transcend all particular differences between people

    因為如果尊嚴是由一種 我們給予自身的法律組成的

  • and so would be a universal law and in this respect there'd only be

    那麼如何能保證我們的是非觀是一致的呢?

  • one moral law because it would be supreme.

    誰知道康德的回答是什麼? 你說?

  • Right. That's exactly right. What's your name?

    因為道德律不受主觀條件所左右

  • Kelly.

    它超越了所有人與人之間的具體區別

  • Kelly. So Kelly, Kant believes that if we choose freely

    因此它是一項通用法律 從這方面來說

  • out of our own consciences, the moral law we're guarantee

    只會存在一項道德律 因為它是至高無上的

  • - to come up with one and the same moral law. - Yes.

    對 非常對 你叫什麼名字?

  • And that's because when I choose it's not me, Michael Sandel choosing.

    我叫Kelly

  • It's not you, Kelly choosing for yourself.

    Kelly 那麼Kelly 康德認為如果我們用自已的是非觀

  • What is it exactly? Who is doing the choosing?

    來自主選擇 道德律 我們一定會

  • Who's the subject? Who is the agent? Who is doing the choosing?

    - 選擇同一項道德律 - 是的

  • - Reason? - Well reason... - Pure reason.

    那是因為我們選擇的時候 不是我 Michael Sandel在選擇

  • Pure reason and what you mean by pure reason is what exactly?

    也不是你 Kelly在選擇

  • Well pure reason is like we were saying before not subject to any

    那到底是什麼呢? 誰在做抉擇呢?

  • external conditions that may be imposed on that side.

    這一主體是誰? 誰是媒介? 誰在做決定?

  • Good that's' great. So, the reason that does the willing,

    - 理性? - 理性... - 純粹的理性

  • the reason that governs my will when I will the moral law

    純粹的理性 你具體是指什麼?

  • is the same reason that operates when you choose the moral law

    嗯 純粹的理性就是我們在不受任何外部條件

  • for yourself and that's why it's possible to act autonomously

    左右的情況下所持有的想法

  • to choose for myself, for each of us to choose for ourselves

    很好 很好 那麼 讓一種意願得以實現的理性

  • as autonomous beings and for all of us to wind up willing the same moral law,

    也就是在我們履行道德律時支配我們意願的理性

  • the categorical imperative.

    也同樣是在我們為自已選擇道德律時起作用的理性

  • But then there is one big and very difficult question left even

    因此我們每一個人才有可能自主選擇

  • if you accept everything that Matt and Kelly had said so far.

    每個人作為個體為自己做選擇

  • How is a categorical imperative possible?

    這樣我們最終都會遵循同一個道德律

  • How is morality possible? To answer that question,

    這就是定言命令

  • Kant said we need to make a distinction.

    但是即使你接受Matt和Kelly所說的一切觀點

  • We need to make a distinction between two standpoints,

    仍然存在一個重要而難以回答的問題

  • two standpoints from which we can make sense of our experience.

    定言命令有存在的可能嗎?

  • Let me try to explain what he means by these two standpoints.

    道德有存在的可能嗎? 想要回答這個問題

  • As an object of experience, I belong to the sensible world.

    康德說我們需要作一個區分

  • There my actions are determined by the laws of nature

    我們需要區別兩種觀點

  • and by the regularities of cause and effect.

    從這兩種觀點中 我們可以理解自身經歷

  • But as a subject of experience, I inhabit an intelligible world here

    我來解釋一下他所說的這兩種觀點的內涵

  • being independent of the laws of nature I am capable of autonomy,

    作為人生經歷的客體 我們屬於感知世界

  • capable of acting according to a law I give myself.

    在這一世界中我們的行為由自然定律

  • Now Kant says that, "Only from this second standpoint can I regard myself

    以及因果關係所決定

  • as free for to be independent of determination by causes

    但作為人生經歷的主體 我們存在於智思世界中

  • in the sensible world is to be free."

    我們可以獨立於自然定律之外 主宰自已

  • If I were holy and empirical being as the utilitarian assume,

    我們可以根據自已認定的法律主宰我們的行為

  • if I were a being holy and only subject to the deliverances of my senses,

    康德說只有基於第二個觀點我們才能認為

  • the pain and pleasure and hunger and thirst and appetite,

    在感知世界中 決策不受定律支配的自由

  • if that's all there were to humanity, we wouldn't be capable of freedom,

    才是真正的自由

  • Kant reasons because in that case every exercise of will would be

    如果像功利論者所說的 我是一個聖尊 一個經驗主義者

  • conditioned by the desire for some object.

    如果我是一個聖尊 而且只受自身感覺支配

  • In that case all choice would be heteronomous choice governed

    像是疼痛 快樂 飢渴 食慾

  • by the pursued of some external end. "When we think of ourselves as free,"

    如果人性只有這些 我們將無法獲得自由

  • Kant writes, "we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members

    康德說 因為在那種情況下 任何一種意願的執行

  • and recognize the autonomy of the will." That's the idea of the two standpoints.

    都將會受到對某一事物慾望的支配

  • So how are categorical imperatives possible? Only because the idea

    那樣的話 所有選擇都會成為他律性選擇

  • of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world?

    為涉及某種外在目的的對象所支配當我們認為自已是自由人的時候

  • Now Kant admits we aren't only rational beings.

    康德寫道我們將自已看成智思世界中的一員

  • We don't only inhabit the intelligible world, the realm of freedom.

    並且認可意志自律這就是兩種觀點

  • If we did... if we did, then all of our actions

    那麼定言命令怎麼可能存在呢? 只是由於自由觀

  • would invariably accord with the autonomy of the will.

    使我們成為智思世界中的一員嗎?

  • But precisely because we inhabit simultaneously the two standpoints,

    康德承認我們不只是理性的個體

  • the two realms, the realm of freedom and the realm of necessity

    我們不只存在於智思世界這個自由王國裡

  • precisely because we inhabit both realms there is always potentially a gap

    如果我們只存在於這個世界... 那麼我們所有的行為

  • between what we do and what we ought to do between is and ought.

    就一定會符合意志自律的規則

  • Another way of putting this point and this is the point with which

    但正是因為我們腦中同時存在兩種觀念

  • Kant concludes the groundwork, morality is not empirical.

    存在兩個王國之中 即自由王國和必然王國

  • Whatever you see in the world, whatever you discover through science

    正是因為我們同時存在於兩種王國 所以在我們所做之事和應做之事之間

  • can't decide moral questions.

    總有一個潛在的差距是和應該是之間的差距

  • Morality stands at a certain distance from the world,

    還有一種解釋這一觀點的方法 康德利用這一觀點

  • from the empirical world.

    來總結他的依據 那就是 道德並非經驗主義

  • And that's why no science could deliver moral truth.

    在這個世上無論你看到了什麼 無論你通過科學發現了什麼

  • Now I want to test Kant's moral theory with the hardest possible case,

    都無法用來判定道德問題

  • a case that he raises, the case of the murderer at the door.

    道德是屹立於世界以外的

  • Kant says that lying is wrong. We all know that.

    在經驗世界之外

  • We've discussed why. Lying is at odds with the categorical imperative.

    因此科學無法闡釋道德真理

  • A French Philosopher, Benjamin Constant wrote an article responding

    現在我想用一個最不可能發生的例子來檢驗康德的道德論

  • to the groundwork where he said, "This absolute probation online is wrong. It can't be right."

    這個例子由他自已提出來 是一個關於在門口的殺手的例子

  • What if a murderer came to your door looking for your friend

    康德說撒謊是不對的 這點我們都知道

  • who was hiding in your house?

    原因我們已經討論過 撒謊是不符合定言命令的

  • And the murderer asked you point blank, "Is your friend in your house?"

    一位名叫本傑明·康斯坦特的法國哲學家在一篇針對這一論點

  • Constant says, "It would be crazy to say that the moral thing to do

    的文章裡寫道這種絕對化的檢驗是錯的 不可能對

  • in that case is to tell the truth."

    如果一個殺手敲你的門 想找你的朋友

  • Constant says the murderer certainly doesn't deserve the truth

    而你的朋友藏在你家裡 你會怎麼辦?

  • and Kant wrote to reply.

    這個殺手直截了當地問你,你的朋友在你房裡嗎?

  • And Kant stuck by his principle that lying even to the murderer

    康斯坦特說如果有人說在這個例子中說出真相才是道德的

  • at the door is wrong.

    那他簡直是瘋了

  • And the reason it's wrong, he said is once you start taking

    康斯坦特說這個殺手很顯然不配知道真相

  • consequences into account to carve out exceptions to the categorical imperative,

    而康德也寫信回復了

  • you've given up the whole moral framework.

    但康德堅持他自已的原則 說哪怕對門口的殺手說謊

  • You've become a consequentialist or maybe a rule utilitarian.

    也是不對的

  • But most of you and most to our Kant's readers think there's something odd

    他說不對的理由是 一旦你開始考慮後果

  • and impossible about this answer.

    你這種做法已給定言命令開創了先例

  • I would like to try to defend Kant on this point

    你已經脫離了整個道德架構

  • and then I want to see whether you think that my defense is plausible,

    你就變成了一個後果論者 或者一個規則功利主義者

  • and I would want to defend him within the spirit of his own account of morality.

    但是你們大多數人 大多數康德理論的讀者都認為

  • Imagine that someone comes to your door.

    這個答案有些怪異並且不大可能

  • You were asked that question by this murder.

    這點上我想嘗試為康德辯護

  • You are hiding your friend.

    之後再聽聽看你們認為我的辯護是否有理

  • Is there a way that you could avoid telling a lie

    我想以他的道德論給他辯護

  • without selling out your friend?

    想像一下有人敲你的門

  • Does anyone have an idea of how you might be able to do that?

    然後這個殺手問你那個問題

  • Yes? Stand up.

    你當時想要將你朋友藏起來

  • I was just going to say if I were to let my friend in my house

    有沒有一種方法可以讓你不必說謊

  • to hide in the first place, I'd probably make a plan with them

    但也不會出賣你朋友?

  • so I'd be like, "Hey I'll tell the murderer you're here,

    有人想到辦法沒有?

  • but escape," and that's one of the options mentioned.

    你說? 站起來

  • But I'm not sure that's a Kantian option. You're still lying though.

    我會說 如果一開始我就讓我朋友躲在我家裡

  • No because he's in the house but he won't be.

    我可能會和我朋友制定一項計劃

  • Oh I see. All right, good enough. One more try.

    然後我會說嘿,我會告訴殺手你在這裡

  • If you just say you don't know where he is because he might not

    但是你逃走了,這是常見的一種選擇

  • be locked in the closet.

    但我認為這不屬於康德提倡的做法 你仍然在撒謊

  • He might have left the closet. You have no clue where he could be.

    不 因為他現在在屋子裡 可之後就不在了

  • So you would say, I don't know which wouldn't actually be a lie

    噢 我知道了 好的 很好 聽一下其他人的意見

  • because you weren't at that very moment looking in the closet.

    如果你只是說你不知道他在哪兒 是因為

  • - Exactly. -So it would be strictly speaking true.

    他可能並沒有被鎖在衣櫃裡

  • Yes.

    他可能已經從衣櫃裡出來了 你根本不知道他在哪

  • - And yet possibly deceiving, misleading. -But still true.

    所以你可以說 我不知道 這其實並不算撒謊

  • - What's your name? -John.

    因為那一刻你並沒有檢查衣櫃

  • John. All right, John has... now John may be on to something.

    - 是的 - 所以嚴格上說你說的是真話

  • John you're really offering us the option of a clever evasion

    是的

  • that is strictly speaking true.

    - 但是可能是欺騙性的 誤導性的 - 但仍然是事實

  • This raises the question whether there is a moral difference between

    - 你叫什麼名字? - John

  • an outright lie and a misleading truth.

    John 好的 John... John的想法很貼近了

  • From Kant's point of view there actually is a world of difference between a lie

    John 你的確想到了一種方法 可以在講真話的同時

  • and a misleading truth.

    聰明地逃避問題

  • Why is that even though both might have the same consequences?

    這提出了一個問題 就是徹頭徹尾的謊言

  • But then remember Kant doesn't base morality on consequences.

    和誤導性的事實之間有無道德上的區別

  • He bases it on formal adherence to the moral law.

    依康德看來 謊言和誤導性的事實

  • Now, sometimes in ordinary life we make exceptions for the general rule against

    之間是有許多區別的

  • lying with the white lie. What is a white lie?

    為什麼就算兩者都會導致同樣的結果 二者還是有區別的?

  • It's a lie to make... you're well to avoid hurting someone's feelings for example.

    但請記住康德沒有將道德建立於結果基礎之上

  • It's a lie that we think of as justified by the consequences.

    他將道德建立在嚴格遵循道德准律的基礎上

  • Now Kant could not endorse a white lie but perhaps he could endorse

    平時我們儘管不說謊言 可也偶爾破個例

  • a misleading truth.

    說一些善意的謊言 什麼是善意的謊言?

  • Supposed someone gives you a tie, as a gift, and you open the box

    這種謊言可以... 比如說可以幫你避免傷害別人的感情

  • and it's just awful. What do you say? Thank you?

    從後果的角度來說 我們認為撒這種謊是情有可原的

  • You could say thank you.

    康德可能不支持善意的謊言 但有可能支持

  • But they're waiting to see what you think of it or they ask you

    誤導性的事實

  • what do you think of it?

    假設有人將一個領帶送給你作為禮物 你打開禮物盒

  • You could tell a white lie and say it's beautiful.

    發現領帶很差勁 你怎麼說? 謝謝?

  • But that wouldn't be permissible from Kant's point of view.

    你可以說謝謝

  • Could you say not a white lie but a misleading truth,

    但是那個人想知道你覺得禮物怎麼樣 或者他會問你

  • you open the box and you say, "I've never seen a tie like that before.

    你覺得怎麼樣?

  • Thank you." You shouldn't have.

    你可以說一個善意的謊言 說它很漂亮

  • That's good.

    但從康德的角度來說 這是不容許的

  • Can you think of a contemporary political leader who engaged... you can?

    你可以避免說善意的謊言 而講一個誤導性的事實嗎

  • Who are you thinking of?

    你打開盒子 說道我以前從來沒見過這樣的領帶

  • You remember the whole carefully worded denials in the

    謝謝,你可別

  • Monica Lewinsky affair of Bill Clinton.

    說得好

  • Now, those denials actually became the subject of very explicit debate

    你們能想到一個當代的政治領袖做例子嗎... 可以?

  • in argument during the impeachment hearings.

    你們想到的是誰?

  • Take a look at the following excerpts from Bill Clinton.

    你們記得比爾·克林頓利用巧辯否認

  • Is there something do you think morally at stake in the distinction between a lie

    與Monica Lewinsky的關係吧

  • and a misleading carefully couched truth?

    他否認的言辭實際上成為了彈劾聽證會上

  • I want to say one thing to the American people.

    公開爭論的對象

  • I want you to listen to me. I'm going to say this again.

    我們看一下比爾·克林頓講話的片段

  • I did not have sexual relations with that woman Miss Lewinsky.

    你們認為在區分謊言和措辭謹慎的 有誤導性的事實上

  • I never told anybody to lie not a single time, never. These allegations are false.

    存在道德關鍵點嗎?

  • Did he lie to the American people when he said I never had sex with that woman?

    我想對美國人民說一件事

  • You know, he doesn't believe he did and because of the...

    你們聽我說 我再重複一遍

  • Well he didn't explain it.

    我和那位Lewinsky小姐沒有發生過性關係

  • He did explain that, explain congressman.

    我從沒讓任何人撒謊 一次都沒有 從來沒有 這些指控是錯誤的

  • What he said was to the American people that he did not have sexual relations

    當他說他從沒和那個女人發生性關係時 他對美國人民撒謊了嗎?

  • and I understand you're not going to like this congressman

    他不認為他做了 因為...

  • because you will see it as a hair-splitting evasive answer.

    他並沒有給出解釋

  • But in his own mind his definition was not...

    他解釋過了 議員 他解釋了

  • - Okay, I understand that argument. - Okay.

    他對美國人民所說的是 他沒有發生過性關係

  • All right, so there you have the exchange.

    我知道你們可能不喜歡這個國會議員

  • Now at the time, you may have thought this was just a

    因為你們會認為這個回答只是滿口托辭的含糊回答

  • legalistic hair-splitting exchange between a Republican who wanted to

    但在他看來 他的定義不是...

  • impeach Clinton and a lawyer who is trying to defend him.

    - 好的 我明白你的意思了 - 好的

  • But now in the light of Kant, do you think there is something

    好了 你們已經看了這段對話了

  • morally at stake in the distinction between a lie and an evasion,

    你們現在可能覺得這只是一次

  • a true but misleading statement? I'd like to hear from defenders of Kant.

    吹毛求疵的條文主義的爭辯 一方是想要彈劾克林頓的共和黨

  • People who think there is a distinction. Are you ready to defend Kant?

    另一方是想要為他辯護的律師

  • Well I think when you try to say that lying and misleading truths are the same thing;

    但是依照康德的理論 你們認為在危急時刻區分謊言

  • you're basing it on consequentialist argument which is that they achieve the same thing.

    和一個真實但有誤導性的托辭上

  • But the fact to the fact to the matter is you told the truth

    存在道德關鍵點嗎? 我想聽聽康德的辯護者的看法

  • and you intended that people would believe what you are saying

    那些認為有明顯區別的人 你們打算為康德辯護嗎?

  • which was the truth which means it is not morally the same

    我覺得當你說說謊和誤導性的事實是同一個概念時

  • as telling a lie and intending that they believe it is the truth

    你是以結果論判定 其導致的結果是一樣的

  • even though it is not true.

    但是實際上當你給別人說了實話

  • - Good. What's your name? - Diana.

    並且希望別人相信你所說的話是真話

  • So Diana says that Kant has a point here and it's a point that might even come

    在道德層面上 這和你說假話

  • to the aid of Bill Clinton and that is... well what about that?

    並且打算以此來欺騙別人

  • There's someone over here.

    是完全不同的

  • For Kant motivation is key, so if you give to someone

    - 很好 你叫什麼名字? - Diana

  • because primarily you want to feel good about yourself

    Diana認為康德有個觀點 此觀點可能還能為

  • Kant would say that has no moral worth. Well with this, the motivation is the same.

    比爾.克林頓做辯護... 其他人是怎麼想的?

  • It's to sort of mislead someone, it's to lie, it's to sort of throw them

    那邊有人有話說了

  • off the track and the motivation is the same. So there should be no difference.

    對康德而言 動機是關鍵的因素

  • Okay, good. So here isn't the motive the same, Diana?

    如果你的行為是為了使自己更好受

  • What do you say to this argument that, well, the motive is the same in both cases

    康德會認為這不存在道德價值 這裡的動機也一樣

  • there is the attempt or at least the hope that one's pursuer will be misled?

    不管是故意誤導還是謊言欺騙

  • Well that, you could look it that way but I think that the fact is

    動機都是一樣的 沒有任何區別

  • that your immediate motive is that they should believe you.

    很好 那麼Diana 難道這二者動機不一樣嗎?

  • The ultimate consequence of that is that they might be deceived

    這兩案例中的動機是一樣的 即當事人企圖或至少希望聽者被誤導

  • and not find out what was going on.

    對此你怎麼看?

  • But that your immediate motive is that they should believe you

    呃 你可以這樣看待 但是我還是覺得

  • because you're telling the truth.

    你行為的直接動機都是希望他們相信你

  • - May I help a little? - Sure.

    最終的結果是他們可能被騙了

  • You and Kant. Why don't you say... and what's your name, I'm sorry?

    而且還不知道發生了什麼

  • Wesley.

    但是你的直接動機還是要他們相信你

  • Why don't you say to Wesley it's not exactly the case

    因為你說的是實話

  • that the motive in both cases is to mislead?

    - 我可以幫點忙嗎? - 當然

  • They're hoping, they're hoping that the person will be misled

    你和康德 你為何不說... 你叫什麼名字? 不好意思我忘了問

  • by the statement "I don't know where they are" or "I never had sexual relations."

    我叫Wesley

  • You're hoping that they will be misled but in the case

    你為何不對Wesley說明

  • where you're telling the truth, you're motive is to mislead

    這兩個案例裡的動機不是為了誤導別人?

  • while at the same time telling the truth and honoring the moral law

    他們希望 他們希望相對人會被這樣的言論所誤導

  • and staying within the bounds of the categorical imperative.

    例如我不知道他們在哪兒或者我沒有任何的性行為

  • - I think Kant's answer would be Diana, yes? - Yes.

    你希望他們會被誤導 可在此案例中當你說真話之時

  • - You like that? - I do.

    你的動機還是要誤導別人

  • Okay. So I think Kant's answer would be unlike a falsehood,

    即便你是說的實話 而且遵守了道德律

  • unlike a lie, a misleading truth pays a certain homage to duty.

    而且未逾越定言命令範圍

  • And the homage it pays to duty is what justifies that the work of

    - 我覺得康德的答案會是 Diana 懂了嗎? - 是的

  • even the work of the evasion. Diana, yes? you like? Okay.

    - 喜歡這樣的解釋嗎? - 是的

  • And so there is something, some element of respect for the dignity

    很好 我覺得康德的答案會是

  • of the moral law in the careful evasion because Clinton could have told an

    與謊言不同的是 誤導性的真相強調一種義務

  • outright lie but he didn't.

    而這種對義務的強調可證明

  • And so I think Kant's insight here is in the carefully couched but true evasion.

    含糊回答的合理性 Diana 懂了麼? 好的

  • There is a kind of homage to the dignity of the moral law that is not present

    所以當克林頓沒有說出赤裸的謊言

  • in the outright lie and that, Wesley, is part of the motive.

    而是說出精心編製的托詞時

  • It's part of the motive. Yes, I hope he will be misled.

    他體現了對道德律的尊重

  • I hope the murderer will run down the road or go to the mall looking

    因此我認為康德洞悉了雖措辭嚴謹但卻不擇不扣的托詞

  • for my friend instead at the closet. I hope that will be the effect.

    有種對道德律的尊重也不是

  • I can't control that. I can't control the consequences.

    表現在說謊與否 Wesley啊 這就是動機的一部分

  • But what I can control is standing by and honoring however I pursue the ends,

    是動機的作一部分 是的 是我希望他受誤導

  • I hope will unfold to do so in a way that is consistent with respect for the moral law.

    我希望兇手會跑到路上 或者去超市找我朋友

  • Wesley, I don't think, is entirely persuaded but at least this brings out,

    而不是在衣櫥裡 我希望這是最終的結果

  • this discussion brings out some of what it's at stake,

    我當然不能控制 我不能掌控結果

  • what's morally at stake in Kant's notion of the categorical imperative.

    但我能控制的是 在場時 不論是否說謊

  • As long as any effort this involved I would say that the contract is valid then.

    我希望自己的話語與道德律相符

  • It should take effect.

    Wesley 我認為你並沒有完全被我說服 但是至少

  • But why? What was... what morally can you point to?

    這個探討使得我們明白了一個關鍵點

  • For example two people agreed to be married and one suddenly

    康德定言命令的觀點中的關鍵點

  • called the other in two minutes say I changed my mind.

    接下來您將看到

  • Does the contract have obligation on both sides?

    既然花了精力 我就認為契約是有效的

  • Well I am tempted to say no.

    就該生效

  • Fine.

    但是為何? 但是你有什麼道德依據呢?

  • Last time we talked about Kant's categorical imperative

    例如兩個人打算結婚了 但是其中一人

  • and we considered the way he applied the idea of the categorical imperative

    在婚前兩分鐘反悔了

  • to the case of lying.

    雙方是否還該對他們的婚姻負責呢?

  • I want to turn briefly to one other application of Kant's moral theory

    額 我傾向於說不

  • and that's his political theory.

    很好

  • Now Kant says that just laws arise from a certain kind of social contract.

    協議就是協議

  • But this contract he tells us is of an exceptional nature.

    上次我們說到了康德的定言命令理論

  • What makes the contract exceptional is that it is not an actual contract

    我們也將他的該理論應用到

  • that happens when people come together and try to figure out

    說謊的案例中的

  • what the constitution should be.

    我現在要簡單的說一下康德的另一個道德理論

  • Kant points out that the contract that generates justice

    而且是他的政治理論

  • is what he calls an idea of reason.

    康德認為公正的法律是從某種社會契約中得來的

  • It's not an actual contract among actual men and women gathered

    但是他說的那種契約太特殊了

  • in a constitutional convention. Why not?

    特殊的原因就是該契約比較罕見

  • I think Kant's reason is that actual men and women gathered in real

    是人們聚在一起

  • constitutional convention would have different interests, values, aims,

    共同制定憲法的契約

  • and it would also be differences of bargaining power

    康德將產生公正的契約

  • and differences of knowledge among them.

    稱為理性之觀

  • And so the laws that would result from their deliberations wouldn't necessarily be just,

    但是並不是真實的男女聚在一起

  • wouldn't necessarily conform to principles of right

    按照合法的程序制定的 為何不是呢?

  • but would simply reflect the differences a bargaining power,

    我想康德認為 真正的男女聚在一起時

  • the special interests the fact that some might know more than others

    他們有不同的利益訴求 價值取向 目標指引

  • about law or about politics.

    同時他們的力量對比

  • So Kant says, "A contract that generates principles of right is merely an idea

    以及知識體系也會不同

  • of reason but it has undoubted practical reality because it can oblige

    那麼如此一來 他們深思熟慮的法律就不一定是公正的了

  • every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been

    不一定遵循了公平原則

  • produced by the united will of the whole nation."

    僅僅反映了不同力量的角力

  • So Kant is a contractarian, but he doesn't trace the origin

    在一些特殊利益上不同 有人在法律和政治上

  • or the rightness of law to any actual social contract.

    知道的比別人多

  • This contrives to an obvious question.

    由此康德認為產生公正原則的契約僅僅是理性之觀

  • What is the moral force of a hypothetical contract,

    但其卻反映了事實 因為其

  • a contract that never happened?

    要求立法者修訂法律使其符合

  • That's the question we take up today but in order to investigate it,

    全體社會的利益訴求

  • we need to turn to a modern philosopher, John Rawls, who worked out in his book,

    所以康德是一個契約論者 但是他從未把法律的起源和公正

  • A Theory of Justice, in great detail and account of a hypothetical agreement

    追溯到任何實際社會契約中

  • as the basis for justice.

    這引出了一個明顯的問題

  • Rawls' theory of justice in broad outline is parallel to Kant's

    假定契約 作為一個從未發生過的契約

  • in two important respects.

    其道德效力是什麼??

  • Like Kant, Rawls was a critic of utilitarianism.

    這就是我們今天要講的問題 但是為了深入研究

  • "Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice,"

    我們首先要說說一個當代的哲學家 約翰·羅爾斯

  • Rawls' writes, "that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.

    他在他的著作《正義論》裡面 對假定契約的研究頗為深入

  • The rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining

    這是他研究正義的基礎

  • or to the calculus social interests."

    羅爾斯的正義論廣義上講 在兩個重要的方面上

  • The second respect in which Rawls' theory follows Kant's is on the idea that

    與康德的理論是一致的

  • principles of justice properly understood can be derived from a hypothetical

    正如康德一樣 羅爾斯對功利主義持批判態度

  • social contract. Not an actual one.

    每個人都有源自於正義的不可侵犯的權利

  • And Rawls works this out in fascinating detail with the device

    羅爾斯寫到即便是全社會都來反對也不可褻瀆

  • of what he calls the "veil of ignorance".

    源自於正義的權利不能作為政治的籌碼

  • The way to arrive at the rights... the basic rights that we must respect,

    或者成為社會利益的犧牲品

  • the basic framework of rights and duties is to imagine that we were

    羅爾斯觀點的第二個方面符合的康德的觀點 即

  • gathered together trying to choose the principles to govern our collective lives

    對公正原則的解讀可源自於假定契約

  • without knowing certain important particular fact about ourselves.

    而非實際契約

  • That's the idea of the veil of ignorance.

    羅爾斯研究出了很多成就

  • Now what would happen if we gather together just as we are here

    使用的是他所說的無知的面紗這一理論

  • and try to come up with principles of justice to govern our collective life?

    此方法可得到我們必須尊重的基本權利

  • There would be a cacophony of proposals of suggestions reflecting people's

    權利義務的基本框架要假定我們

  • different interests, some are strong, some are weak,

    要選出一些基本法則來管理我們的集體生活

  • some are rich, some are poor.

    哪怕我們不知道我們每個人的具體情況

  • So Rawls says, imagine instead that we are gathered in an original position

    這就是無知的面紗了

  • of equality and what assures the equality is the veil of ignorance.

    那麼 如果我們聚在一起

  • Imagine that we are all behind a veil of ignorance which temporarily abstracts

    想出一些原則來管理我們的生命 結果會怎樣呢?

  • from or brackets, hides from us who in particular we are.

    這會產生很多不和諧的聲音

  • Our race, our class, our place in society, our strengths, our weaknesses,

    這些聲音源自於不同的利益訴求 有的強烈 有的虛弱

  • whether we're healthy or unhealthy, then and only then Rawls says,

    有的富裕 有的貧窮

  • the principles we would agree to would be principles of justice.

    由此羅爾斯認為 假使我們處在一個最初的平等的位置

  • That's how the hypothetical contract works.

    這種平等 受無知的面紗之擔保

  • What is the moral force of this kind of hypothetical agreement?

    假使我們目前都處在這個抽像的無知的面紗之後

  • Is it stronger or weaker than a real agreement, an actual social contract?

    使我們暫時遠離現實的自我

  • In order to answer that question, we have to look hard at the moral force

    我們的種族 班級 社會地位 我們的優點缺點

  • of actual contracts. There are really two questions here.

    健康與否都拋開 只有這樣 羅爾斯認為

  • One of them is how do actual contracts bind me or obligate me?

    我們所達成的原則才是公平正義的

  • Question number one.

    這就是假定契約的工作原理

  • And question number two, how do actual real life contracts

    那麼其中的道德效力是什麼呢?

  • justify the terms that they produce?

    其與事實契約相比 其效力是更強還是相反?

  • If you think about it and this is in line with Rawls and Kant,

    要回答這個問題 我們要好好的研究下

  • the answer to the second question, how do actual contracts justify

    實際契約的道德效力 目前有兩個問題

  • the terms that they produce, the answer is they don't.

    首先 事實契約是如何束縛我或賦予我義務的?

  • At least not on their own.

    這是第一個問題

  • Actual contracts are not self-sufficient moral instruments

    第二個問題 現實中的實際契約

  • of any actual contract or agreement.

    要如何證明其條款的合理性?

  • It can always be asked, is it fair what they agreed to?

    如果你這樣想了 你就和羅爾斯與康德的想法一致了

  • The fact of the agreement never guarantees the fairness of the agreement

    第二個問題的答案 實際契約如何證明其條款的真實性

  • and we know this by looking at our own constitutional convention.

    答案是 它們不用證明

  • It produced a constitution that permitted slavery to persist.

    至少不是它們自己來證明

  • It was agreed to. It was an actual contract

    實際契約對任何實際的契約或約定而言

  • but that doesn't establish that the laws agreed to all of them were just.

    不是自給自足的道德工具

  • Well then what is the moral force of actual contracts?

    人們常常會質問 那些契約公平嗎?

  • To the extent that they bind us, they obligate in two ways.

    實際上契約從不保證公平

  • Suppose, maybe here it would help to take an example.

    我們從我們的制憲會議就可以看出

  • We make an agreement, a commercial agreement.

    早期的時候我們的憲法還允許奴隸制存在

  • I promise to pay you $100 if you will go harvest

    它可是大家同意簽署的 而且還是實際契約

  • and bring to me 100 lobsters. We make a deal.

    但是這並不是說他們共同制定的法律就絕對公正

  • You go out and harvest them and bring them to me.

    那麼 到底實際契約的道德效力是什麼?

  • I eat the lobsters, served them to my friends, and then I don't pay.

    就其約束我們 賦予我們義務而言 表現於兩個方面

  • And you say, "But you're obligated."

    假設 我舉個例子

  • And I say, "Why?" What do you say? "Well we had a deal."

    我們定個合同 一個商業合同

  • And you benefited. You ate all those lobsters.

    你給我抓100只龍蝦來

  • Well that's a pretty strong argument.

    我就給你100美元 成交了

  • It's an argument that depends though and the fact that I benefited from your labor

    你辛辛苦苦的抓了龍蝦給我

  • So, contracts sometimes bind us in so far as they are instruments of mutual benefit.

    我連吃帶送 但就是不給錢

  • I ate the lobsters. I owe you the $100 for having gathered them.

    你就說你有給錢的義務

  • But suppose, now take a second case. We make this deal,

    我會說為啥啊?你會怎麼說呢?我們達成交易了啊

  • I'll pay you $100 for 100 lobsters and two minutes later,

    你從中受益了 你吃了龍蝦

  • before you've gone to any work I call you back and say

    這就是一個極強的論據

  • I've changed my mind. Now, there's no benefit.

    這個論據建立在我從你的勞力中受益的事實

  • There's no work on your part so there's no element of reciprocal exchange.

    由此 契約有時候以互惠原則束縛著我們

  • What about in that case, do I still owe you merely in virtue

    我吃了龍蝦 因你抓來了龍蝦 我欠你100美元

  • of the fact that we had an agreement?

    但是假設 第二個例子來了 我們成交了

  • Who says those of you who say, yes, I still owe you? Why? Okay, stand up.

    你抓100只龍蝦我給你100美元 但是兩分鐘後

  • Why do I owe you? I called you back after two minutes.

    在你動手前我就反悔了

  • You haven't done any work.

    我改主意了 現在沒有受益了

  • I think I spent the time and effort in drafting this contract with you

    你也沒有作出任何勞力 就沒有了互惠交換

  • and also have emotional expectation that I go through the work.

    這個案例中 我是否僅僅是因為我們曾達成交易

  • So you took time to draft the contract but we did it very quickly.

    還欠你100美元?

  • We just chatted on the phone.

    你們誰說是的? 誰? 起來說

  • That wouldn't be a formal form of contract though.

    我怎麼還欠你錢? 兩分鐘後我叫你回來了

  • Well I faxed at you. It only took a minute.

    你還沒有採取行動

  • As long as any effort is involved, I would say that the contract is valid then.

    我認為我花了時間和精力來起草與你的契約

  • It should take effect.

    並且有了去工作的期望

  • But why? What was... what morally can you point to that obligates me?

    哦 你花了時間和精力來起草契約 可我們起草得很快

  • I admit that I agreed but you didn't go to any work. I didn't enjoy any benefit.

    我們是在電話裡說定的

  • Because one might mentally go through all the work of harvesting the lobsters.

    那就稱不上是一個正式的契約

  • You mentally went through the work of harvesting the lobsters.

    額 那麼我是傳真給你的 只花了一分鐘

  • That's nothing is it? It's not much.

    既然花了精力 我就認為契約是有效的

  • Is it worth $100 that you were imagining yourself going and collecting lobsters?

    該生效

  • It may not worth $100, but it may worth something to some people.

    但是為何? 你能指出我的任何道德義務嗎?

  • All right, I'll give you a buck for that. But what I... so you're still pointing...

    我承認我當初同意了 但是你沒有付出任何勞力 我沒有受益啊

  • what's interesting you're still pointing to the reciprocal dimension of contracts.

    因為人能在腦海裡進行捕蝦的過程

  • You did or imagined that you did or looked forward to doing something that might be had.

    你在腦海裡捕蝦

  • For example two people agreed to be married and one suddenly calls the other

    但是還是等於零 不是嗎?

  • in two minutes say, I've changed my mind,

    你在腦海裡捕蝦值得100美元?

  • does the contract have obligation on both sides?

    也許不值那麼多 但是對有些人而言值一些東西

  • Nobody has done any work or nobody has benefited yet.

    我會為此給你一美元 但我... 你仍然認為...

  • Well I'm tempted to say no.

    有趣的是你仍堅持契約中的互惠觀點

  • Fine.

    你做了或者是想像了一些你希望要做的事情

  • - All, right. What's your name? -Julian.

    例如兩個人要結婚了

  • Thank you Julian. All right, that was good.

    但是一個人在婚前兩分鐘反悔了

  • Now is there anyone who has who agrees with Julian that I still owe the money?

    雙方是否還該對他們的婚姻負責呢?

  • For any other reason now I have... go ahead, stand up.

    沒人有任何實質的行為也沒人受益

  • I think if you back out it sort of cheapens the institution of contracts.

    額 我傾向於說不

  • Good but why? Why does it?

    很好

  • Well I think is kind of Kantian, but there's in almost there's a certain intrinsic value

    - 很好 你的名字? - Julian

  • in being able to make contracts and having, you know, knowing

    謝謝你 你說得很好

  • people will expect that you'll go through with that.

    是否還有人同意Julian 我還是欠他的錢呢?

  • Good, there is some... it would cheapen the whole idea

    出於其他的原因我... 起來說吧

  • of contracts which has to do with taking in obligation on myself. Is that the idea?

    我覺得如果你違約了 你就貶低了契約的價值

  • Yeah, I think so.

    很好 為何?

  • - What's your name? - Adam.

    這應該是康德的理論 但是如果訂立了契約

  • So Adam points instead not to any reciprocal benefit or mutual exchange

    人們會希望你遵守契約

  • but to the mere fact of the agreement itself.

    這裡面是有內在價值的

  • We see here there are really two different ways in which

    很好 這會... 這會貶低

  • actual contracts generate obligations.

    契約這個概念 而契約本身就意味著我應該承擔我這一方的責任 你是這個意思吧?

  • One has to do with the active consent as a voluntary act and it points...

    嗯 是這樣的

  • Adam said this was a Kantian idea and I think he is right

    - 你的名字是? - Adam

  • because it points to the ideal of autonomy.

    Adam的論點不在於契約帶來的互惠利益交換

  • When I make a contract, the obligation is one that is self-imposed

    而在與協議本身

  • and that carries a certain moral weight, independent of other considerations.

    我們可以看到 實際的契約是通過兩種方式

  • And then there's a second element of the moral force of contract arguments

    產生約束力的

  • which has to do with the sense in which actual contracts are instruments

    一種是個人出於自願同意契約 而這個契約...

  • of mutual benefit and this points toward the ideal of reciprocity

    Adam說這是一種康德的哲學觀點 我覺得是這樣

  • that obligation can arise, I can have an obligation to you in so far

    因為這種契約實質上是自律論的體現

  • as you do something for me.

    簽署契約時 我施加給自身的義務

  • Now, when investigating the moral force and also the moral limits of actual contracts

    帶有一定道德約束力 並不受制於其他因素

  • and here I would like to advance an argument about the moral limits

    然後還有一個論點 是關於契約產生約束力的另一種方式

  • of actual contracts now that we know what moral ingredients do the work

    認為實際的契約就要求

  • when people come together and say, "I will do this if you do that."

    契約雙方要互惠互利 即要遵循互惠主義

  • I would like to argue first that the fact that two people agreed

    由此產生的責任 一方對另一方的責任

  • to some exchange does not mean that the terms of their agreement are fair.

    是以惠及對方為前提的

  • When my two sons were young they collected baseball cards and traded them.

    為了研究道德在實際契約中的約束力和局限性

  • And one was... there was a two-year aged... there is a two-year aged difference

    讓我進一步推進有關道德約束力在實際契約中的局限性的論點

  • between them and so I had to institute a rule about the trades that no trade was complete

    鑒於大家都已經清楚如果一群人在一起

  • until I had approved it and the reason is obvious.

    有人說:如果你做什麼什麼 我就會做什麼什麼 這句話就已經存在道德約束力

  • The older one knew more about the value of these cards

    我的論點是 兩個人同意進行

  • and so would take advantage of the younger one.

    某種交換並不意味著他們的契約就是公平的

  • So that's why I had to review it to make sure that the agreements were fair.

    我的兩個兒子小時候喜歡收集棒球卡片 然後彼此做交易

  • Now you may say, "Well this is paternalism."

    其中一個... 有一個要年長兩歲... 他們倆相差兩歲

  • Of course it was. That's what paternalism is for that kind of thing.

    所以我就制定了一個貿易規則 未經我本人許可

  • So what does this show?

    貿易無效 原因顯而易見

  • What is the baseball cards example show?

    年紀大一點的更瞭解那些卡片的價值

  • The fact of an agreement is not sufficient to establish the fairness of the terms.

    可能就會借此佔他弟弟的便宜

  • I read some years ago of a case in Chicago there was an elderly widow,

    所以我必須要介入審核 確保契約的公平性

  • an 84-year-old widow named Rose who had a problem in her apartment

    你可能會說這不是家長式作風嘛

  • with a leaky toilet and she signed a contract with an unscrupulous contractor,

    必然是了 家長作風就是為此而存在的

  • who offered to repair her leaky toilet in exchange for $50,000.

    這說明什麼?

  • But she had agreed she was of sound mind,

    棒球卡片交易這個例子說明什麼呢?

  • maybe terribly naive and unfamiliar with the price of plumbing,

    簽訂協議並不能證明其本身的公正與否

  • she had made this agreement.

    幾年前在芝加哥有這樣一件事 有一位上了年級的寡婦

  • Luckily, it was discovered.

    84歲高齡 名字叫Rose 她的公寓有一點毛病

  • She went to the bank and asked to withdraw $25,000.

    馬桶漏水 然後她就跟一個寡廉鮮恥的承包人簽署契約

  • And the teller said, "Why do you need all of that money for?"

    承包人負責修好馬桶 老太太支付他5萬美元

  • And she said, "Well, I have a leaky toilet."

    老太太同意了 她當時頭腦很清醒

  • And the teller called authorities and they discovered this unscrupulous contractor.

    或許是不諳世事 對這個行業的報價不瞭解

  • Now, I suspect that even the most ardent contract carryings in the room will agree

    她同意了這項契約

  • that the fact of this woman's agreement is not a sufficient condition

    幸好這件事被發現了

  • of the agreement being fair.

    老太太到銀行櫃檯提款 兩萬五千美元

  • Is there anyone who will dispute that? No one. Am I missing anyone?

    銀行出納問您提這麼大筆錢幹嘛?

  • Alex, where are you?

    她回答說支付修馬桶的費用啊

  • Where are you?

    出納把這事告訴了領導 就這樣 恬不知恥的承包商計劃敗露了

  • So, maybe there's no dispute then to my first claim that an actual agreement

    在做的哪怕是最熱誠的契約支持者也該認為

  • is not necessary to their.. is not a sufficient condition

    老太太簽署這項契約並不是證明

  • of there being an obligation.

    這個協議公平性的充分條件

  • I want to now make us stronger, maybe more controversial claim about

    有人反對嗎? 沒人 一個都沒有嗎?

  • the moral limits of actual contracts that a contract or an active consent is

    Alex到哪兒去了?

  • not only not sufficient but it's not even a necessary condition

    你在哪兒?

  • of there being an obligation.

    呃 那麼大家對我提出的第一個觀點沒有異議 都同意實際契約

  • And the idea here is that if there is reciprocity,

    並不能成為證明義務因契約而產生的

  • if there is an exchange, then a receipt of benefits,

    充分條件

  • there can be an obligation even without an act of consent.

    現在我要讓我的觀點更有力一些 這可能更具爭議性

  • One great example of this involves the 18th century philosopher,

    道德約束力在實際契約中的局限性或積極同意契約並不是

  • the Scottish moral philosopher David Hume.

    證明義務由此產生的充分條件

  • When he was young, Hume wrote a book arguing against

    更不是必要條件

  • Locke's idea of an original social contract.

    我的觀點是 如果已經存在互惠

  • Hume heaps scorn on his contractarian idea.

    雙方做了交換 並且其中一方從中受益

  • He said it was a philosophical fiction.

    那麼即便沒有簽署協議 責任也已存在

  • One of the most mysterious and incomprehensible operations

    舉個非常貼切的例子 這個例子中的主人公是18世紀蘇格蘭

  • that can possibly be imagined this idea of the social contract.

    道德哲學家大衛·休謨

  • Many years later when he was 62 years old, Hume had an experience

    休謨年輕時曾寫過一本書反駁

  • that put to the test his rejection of consent as the basis of obligation.

    洛克的原初社會契約論

  • Hume had a house in Edinboro.

    休謨對他的契約論觀點嗤之以鼻

  • He rented to his friend James Boswell who in turn sublet it to a subtenant.

    他認為那僅是一個哲學虛構

  • The subtenant decided that the house needed some repairs and a paint job.

    並且極其神秘費解

  • He hired a contractor to do the work.

    令人難以想像其為社會契約

  • The painter did the work and sent the bill to Hume.

    許多年後 休謨62歲時的一次經歷

  • Hume refused to pay on the grounds that he hadn't consented.

    使他否定契約是產生義務的基礎這一觀點得到了檢驗

  • He hadn't hired the painter. The case went to court.

    休謨在Edinboro有棟房子

  • The contractor said, "It's true, Hume didn't agree

    他把房子租給了朋友James Boswell 朋友又將其轉租出去

  • but the house needed the painting and I gave it a very good one."

    那位租客認為這棟房子需要修整粉刷一下

  • Hume thought this was a bad argument.

    然後租客僱人做了維修

  • The only argument this painter makes is that the work was necessary to be done

    油漆匠工作完成後就把發票寄給休謨

  • but this is no good answer because by the same rule,

    休謨拒絕支付費用 理由是維修工作事先未徵得他的同意

  • this painter may go through every house in Edinboro and do what he thinks proper

    他沒有僱傭油漆匠 事情鬧上了法庭

  • to be done without the landlord's consent and give the same reason

    油漆匠說:休謨確實沒有同意

  • that the work was necessary and that the house was the better for it.

    但是房子需要粉刷了 而且我刷得很好

  • So Hume didn't like the theory that there could be obligation to repay a benefit

    休謨覺得這不算理由

  • without consent. But the defense failed and he had to pay.

    油漆匠唯一的論點就是房子需要粉刷了

  • Let met give you one other example of the distinction

    但這不算什麼正當理由 因為這麼一來

  • between the consent-based aspect of obligations and the benefit-based aspect

    只要油漆匠覺得Edinboro鎮上的哪間房子需要粉刷

  • and how they're sometimes run together.

    他就可以未經業主同意進行粉刷 因為按照油漆匠的理論

  • This is based on a personal experience.

    房子需要維修 這樣做是為了房子著想

  • Some years ago, I was driving across the country

    因此 休謨不認同剛才的那個理論即 即便事先未經同意 受益人也有責任

  • with some friends and we found ourselves in the middle of nowhere

    回報另一方 但他最終敗訴 不得不自己掏腰包

  • in Hammond, Indiana.

    我再給大家舉個例子 以便區分

  • We stopped in a rest stop and got out of the car

    以契約為基礎產生的義務和以利益為基礎產生的義務

  • and when we came back our car wouldn't start.

    也讓大家知道 有時它們是不分彼此的

  • None of us knew much about cars.

    這純屬個人經歷

  • We didn't really know what to do until we noticed that in the parking lot

    幾年前 我和幾個朋友

  • driving up next to us was a van and on the side it said,

    一起自駕游 可是我們迷路了

  • "Sam's mobile repair van." And out of the van came a man,

    在印第安納州Hammond市某個地方

  • presumably Sam and he came up to us and he said, "Can I help you?

    我們在一個休息停車點下車休息

  • Here's how I work. I work by the hour for $50 an hour.

    等到我們回來時 車子啟動不了了

  • If I fix your car in five minutes, you owe me the $50

    我們幾個沒人對汽車在行

  • and if I work on your car for an hour and can't fix it,

    幾個人一籌莫展 就在那時我們突然發現

  • you'll still owe me the $50."

    停在我們旁邊的那輛車的車身上寫著

  • So I said, "But what is the likelihood that you'll be able to fix the car"

    Sam的移動電汽維修車,一個人從車上下來

  • and he didn't answer.

    估計就是Sam Sam走到我們跟前說可以為您效勞嗎?

  • But he did start looking under the poking around the steering column.

    我的收費標準是50美元一小時

  • Short time passed, he emerged from under the steering column and said,

    如果我在5分鐘之內修好車 你給我50塊

  • "There's nothing wrong with the ignition system

    如果一個小時之後我還是沒修好車

  • but you still have 45 minutes left. Should I look under the hood?"

    你也得給我50塊

  • I said, "Wait a minute. I haven't hired you. We haven't made any agreement."

    然後我就問:那你修好車的可能性有多大?

  • And then he became very angry and he said, "Do you mean to say that

    他沒回答我

  • if I had fixed your car while I was working under the steering column

    卻爬到車底開始檢修駕駛桿

  • that you wouldn't have paid me?" And I said, "That's a different question."

    沒過多久 他從車底出來對我說

  • I didn't go into the distinction between consent based and benefit based applications.

    點火系統沒出什麼問題

  • But I think he had the intuition that if he had fixed it

    可別著急 還有45分鐘呢 我能打開引擎蓋檢查一下嗎?

  • while he was poking around that I would have owed him the $50.

    我說等一下 我沒說要雇你 咱們還沒達成任何協議呢?

  • I shared that intuition. I would have. But he inferred from that.

    他相當生氣說你的意思是

  • This was the fallacy and the reasoning that I think lay behind his anger.

    我認為這是他憤怒背後的謬論和推斷。

  • He inferred from that fact that therefore implicitly we had an agreement.

    你也不會付錢給我?我說那就另當別論了

  • But that it seems to me as a mistake.

    我沒有告訴他如何區分以契約為基礎的義務和以受益為基礎的義務

  • It's a mistake that fails to recognize the distinction between

    但我想他有種直覺 覺得如果他把車修好

  • these two different aspects of contract arguments.

    我是會付給他50美元的

  • Yes, I agree. I would have owed him $50 if he had repaired my car during that time

    他的直覺是對的 我會付的 但他正是由此推論

  • not because we had made any agreement. We hadn't.

    錯誤就出在這 這大概也是他惱怒的原因

  • But simply because if he had fixed my car, he would have conferred on me a benefit

    憑此他推斷我們已經暗中達成協議

  • for which I would have owed him in the name of reciprocity and fairness.

    但是 他理解錯了

  • So here's another example of the distinction between these two different

    他沒能理解剛才提及的兩種契約

  • kinds of arguments, these two different aspects of the morality of contract.

    之間的區別

  • Now I want to hear how many think I was in the right in that case?

    我承認 如果他在規定時間內修好車 我會支付他50美元 但不是因為我們之間

  • That's reassuring. Is there anyone who thinks I was in the wrong?

    有什麼協議 那根本就不存在

  • Anyone? You do? Why? Go ahead.

    而是因為他修好了我的車 他令我受益

  • Isn't the problem with this is that any benefit is inherently subjectively defined?

    根據互惠和公平原則 我才支付他的

  • I mean what if you wanted your car broken and he had fixed it? I mean...

    還有一個例子可以闡述剛剛提及的兩種契約

  • No, I didn't want it broken.

    這道德契約的兩個方面之間的區別

  • Yeah in this case. I mean...

    先告訴我 有多少人認為修車那件事中我做對了?

  • But who would? Who would?

    我可安心了 有人覺得我做錯了嗎?

  • I don't know, someone.

    有嗎? 你? 為什麼? 請說

  • I mean what if Hume, you know, what if the painter

    你不覺得獲益與否是由人主觀決定的?

  • that painted his house blue but he hated the color blue,

    如果你就想讓車壞掉 Sam就卻給修好了呢? 呃...

  • I mean you have to sort of define what your benefit is before the person does it.

    不 我當然不希望車壞掉

  • Well all right, so what would you conclude for that though

    是 那是在這個例子裡 額...

  • for the larger issue here, would you conclude that

    那誰願意? 誰會願意呢?

  • therefore consent is a necessary condition of their being an obligation?

    不知道 有人會

  • - Absolutely. - You would. What's your name?

    那在Hume的例子裡 假如油漆匠

  • Nate.

    把Hume的房子刷成藍色 而Hume討厭藍色

  • Because otherwise how can we know, Nate says, whether there has been

    我的意思是受益人應當在另一方採取行動前 講清楚自己想從中獲何收益

  • an exchange of equivalent or fair benefits unless we have the subjective evaluation

    好吧 那你對剛才那個問題的態度

  • which may vary one person to the next of the situation.

    是什麼 你是否認為

  • All right, that's a fair challenge.

    契約是證明義務存在的必要條件?

  • Let me put to you one other example in order to test the relation between

    - 當然 - 這樣 你叫什麼名字?

  • these two aspects of the morality of contract.

    叫Nate

  • Suppose I get married and suppose I discover that after 20 years

    Nate認為 如果事先不對契約做主觀評估

  • of faithfulness on my part, every year on our trip across the country

    很難確保交易秉持互惠公正原則

  • my wife has been seeing another man, a man with a van on the Indiana toll road.

    因為每個人會做出不同的評估

  • This part is completely made up by the way.

    嗯 觀點很不錯

  • Wouldn't I have two different reasons for moral outrage?

    我再給大家舉個例子 以此驗證一下道德契約的兩個方面

  • One reason could be we had an agreement.

    之間的關係

  • She broke her promise referring to the fact of her consent.

    假設我結婚了 而結婚20年後我發現

  • But I would also have a second ground for moral outrage having nothing to do

    雖然我一直忠貞不渝 但是每年我的妻子都會在自駕游時

  • with the contract as such but I've been so faithful for my part.

    幽會另一個人 印第安納州收費公路上一個駕貨車的男人

  • Surely I deserve better than this.

    情節純屬虛構

  • Is this what I'm doing in return and so on?

    道德上看 我是不是有兩個理由勃然大怒?

  • So that would point to the element of reciprocity.

    原因一 我們之間有了契約

  • Each reason has an independent moral force.

    她沒有履行諾言

  • That's the general point and you can see this if you imagine

    我生氣還有第二個原因 這個原因跟契約

  • a slight variation on the marriage case.

    毫無關係 原因二是我一直如此忠貞

  • Suppose we haven't been married for 20 years.

    而她卻如此對我

  • Suppose we were just married and that the betrayal occurred

    這是我該得的回報嗎?

  • on the way to our honeymoon in Hammond, Indiana.

    這就關係到上文提到的互惠原則

  • After the contract has been made, but before there is any history

    每個原因都有各自的道德力在內

  • of performance on my part, performance of the contract I mean,

    這是一個普遍論點 如果把上述案例稍作修改

  • I would still with Julian, I'd be able to say

    也是一樣

  • but you promised, you promised.

    假設我們不是結婚已經20年的夫婦

  • That would isolate the pure element of consent,

    假定我們剛剛結婚 而妻子的背叛發生在

  • right where there were no benefit, never mind. You get the idea.

    我們前往蜜月旅行的路上 還是在印第安納

  • Here's the main idea, actual contracts have their moral force

    在契約定下之後 我沒有採取任何行動之前

  • in virtue of two distinguishable ideals: autonomy and reciprocity,

    我是指關於契約的行動

  • but in real life every actual contract may fall short, may fail to realize

    我還是同意Julian的觀點的 我只能說

  • the ideals that give contracts their moral force in the first place.

    你已經承諾了 你許下諾言了

  • The ideal of autonomy may not be realized because there may be

    這就跟是否同意這一要素無關了

  • a difference in the bargaining power of the parties.

    因為那時夫妻雙方都還沒有獲利 不說了 你們明白就行

  • The ideal of reciprocity may not be realized because there may be

    主要意思就是 實際的契約是通過兩種不同的

  • a difference of knowledge between the parties and so they may misidentify

    理念實現其道德約束力的: 自律論和互惠主義

  • what really counts as having equivalent value.

    但在實際生活當中 實際的契約可能並不能實現

  • Now suppose you were to imagine a contract where the ideals

    自律和互惠主義這兩個使其產生約束力的因素

  • of autonomy and of reciprocity were not subject to contingency

    自律的設想可能無法實現是因為

  • but were guaranteed to be realized, what kind of contract would that have to be?

    雙方之間交涉能力不同

  • Imagine a contract among parties who were equal in power and knowledge

    互惠主義可能無法實現是因為

  • rather than unequal who are identically situated rather than differently situated?

    雙方之間知識水平存在差異 因而可能導致他們不知道

  • That is the idea behind Rawls' claim that the way to think about justice

    交易怎樣才算公平

  • is from the standpoint of a hypothetical contract,

    現在假設有這樣一份契約

  • behind a veil of ignorance that creates the condition of equality by ruling out

    其中的自律論和互惠主義不受意外因素干擾

  • or enabling us to forget for the moment the differences in power and knowledge

    可以雙雙實現 那將會是一種什麼樣的契約?

  • that could even in principle lead to unfair results.

    假設簽署契約的雙方並不存在任何差異

  • This is why for Kant and for Rawls a hypothetical contract among equals

    權力和知識水平相當 那這個契約是什麼樣的?

  • is the only way to think about principles of justice.

    這就是Rawls的觀點 他認為應該從假設性契約的角度

  • What will those principles be? That's the question we'll turn to next time.

    考慮公正

  • Don't miss the chance to interact online with other viewers of Justice.

    無知的面紗,通過排除或者使人們忘記各自之間的

  • Join the conversation.

    可能會導致交易結果不公平的差異 從而創造出了平等的環境

  • Take a pop quiz, watch lectures you've missed and learn a lot more.

    這些差異即人們在權力和知識水平等方面存在的差異

  • This is at justiceharvard.org. It's the right thing to do.

    因此康德和Rawls都認為在人人平等的前提下 假設性契約

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