I'm about to tell you some unconventional wisdom, alright?

我'要告訴你一些非常規的智慧，好嗎？

I called my talk today "The real truth about the 2008 financial crisis."

我把我今天的演講稱為 "2008年金融危機的真正真相"。

So, I guess what I ask you to do this morning

所以，我想今天早上我要求你做的是：

is to think about what you believe

是思考你所相信的

what the conventional wisdom is about 2008,

關於2008年的傳統智慧是什麼。

and I'm going to put some words in your mind or describe it this way,

而我'要把一些話放在你的腦海裡，或者這樣描述。

and that is most people believe

那是大多數人都相信的

that the free-market capitalist system, especially bankers, are greedy,

自由市場的資本主義制度，特別是銀行家，是貪婪的。

they go through periods of excess speculation,

他們會經歷過度投機的時期。

and then the world collapses

天崩地裂

and the government has to come in and save us.

而政府必須進來拯救我們。

By the way, this is the story that was told about the Great Depression,

對了，這是關於大蕭條的故事。

and it is also the story that is told about the 2008 financial crisis.

而這也是2008年金融危機的故事。

Now, before I get into the meat of my presentation,

現在，在我進入演講的正題之前。

I want you to think about something else,

我想讓你想想別的事情。

and that is that the Federal Reserve

那就是美聯儲

controls the level of short-term interest rates in our economy.

控制著我國經濟中的短期利率水準。

Everybody knows that today,

今天大家都知道了。

they're holding those interest rates at 0%,

他們'將這些利率保持在0%。

trying to get the economy moving again.

試圖讓經濟重新運轉起來。

What lots of people don't remember is that back in 2001, 2002 and 2003

很多人不記得的是，早在2001年、2002年和2003年的時候。

the Federal Reserve dropped interest rates to 1%.

美聯儲將利率降至1%。

I want you to think about this.

我想讓你考慮一下

Because when you make a decision to take out a loan,

因為當你做出貸款的決定時。

when you make a decision to buy a house,

當你做出買房的決定時。

what is the most important ingredient of that decision?

這個決定中最重要的因素是什麼？

I mean, obviously, whether you have income,

我的意思是，很明顯，你是否有收入。

whether you like the house,

無論你是否喜歡這個房子。

but one of the most important ingredients of that

但其中最重要的成分之一

is the level of interest rates.

是利率水準。

Alan Greenspan pushed interest rates

格林斯潘推高利率

down to 1% in 2003 and 2004.

2003年和2004年下降到1%。

In fact, interest rates were below inflation

事實上，利率低於通貨膨脹率

for almost three years - below the rate of inflation.

近三年來----低於通貨膨脹率。

Now, how do you think about this?

現在，你是怎麼想的？

So, when you're looking at a house - can I afford this house, the payment?

所以，當你'看房子的時候--我付得起這個房子、這個款項嗎？

Obviously,

很明顯

those payment streams are determined by the level of interest rates,

這些付款流是由利率水準決定的。

and when interest rates are low,

和低利率時。

you're going to buy a bigger house,

你'要買一個更大的房子。

you're going to buy in a better neighborhood,

你'要買在一個更好的社區。

buy cherry cabinets and granite counter tops

購買櫻桃木櫥櫃和花崗岩檯面。

because you can afford it.

因為你能負擔得起。

So, let me put this into a story that I know you can understand.

所以，讓我把這個放到一個故事裡，我知道你能理解。

And that is, when you come to a green light in your car -

就是說，當你的車遇到綠燈的時候--。

you're driving along, there's a green light -

你開著車，有一個綠色的光 -

how many people in here actually have ever stopped at a green light?

有多少人在這裡實際上已經停止 在綠燈？

I'm not talking about senior moments.

我'不是在說高級時刻。

(Laughter)

(笑聲)

I'm talking about stopping at a green light,

我'說的是在綠燈時停車。

getting out of your car and walking around to the other side,

下車，走到另一邊。

just to make sure the other one really is red

只是為了確定對方真的是紅色的。

Because, obviously, if it was green too,

因為，很明顯，如果它也是綠色的。

it'd be dangerous to go through that intersection.

穿過那個十字路口會很危險。

So what happens when Alan Greenspan or the Federal Reserve

那麼，當艾倫-格林斯潘或美聯儲時，會發生什麼？

holds interest rates all the way down at 1%?

將利率一直維持在1%的水準？

You get a green light.

你得到一個綠燈。

You get a green light to make a purchase

你得到了一個綠燈，進行購買

that's bigger than probably you should,

那'比可能你應該大。

and by the way, the financial system is no different than you.

順便說一句，金融系統和你沒有什麼不同。

Bankers, they're no different than individuals.

銀行家，他們和個人沒有什麼不同。

They would say, "Hey, with interest rates so low,

他們會說："嘿，利率這麼低，。

leverage, borrowing doesn't matter as much, it's cheap.

槓桿，借貸並沒有那麼重要，它便宜。

So, why don't we lever up a little bit more?

那麼，我們為什麼不多加一點槓桿呢？

After all, it's Alan Greenspan, the smartest man in the world,

畢竟，這是艾倫-格林斯潘，世界上最聰明的人。

that tells us interest rates are 1%;

這告訴我們利率是1%。

in other words, all the lights are green."

換句話說，所有的燈都是綠色的。"

And, so what happens when you hold interest rates down like this?

那麼，如果你這樣把利率壓低會怎麼樣呢？

You cause people to make decisions that they wouldn't otherwise make.

你讓人們做出了他們不會做出的決定'。

Now, let me put this in a different perspective.

現在，讓我從另一個角度來看待這個問題。

House prices went up 8% in 2001.

2001年的房價上漲了8%。

By 2004, 2005

到2004年、2005年

they went up 14% in 2004, 15% in 2005.

他們在2004年上升了14%，2005年上升了15%。

So you could borrow at 1%, especially with those teaser loans,

所以你可以以1%的利率借貸，尤其是那些預告貸款。

and you could have a house that was appreciating at 14%:

而你可以有一個房子，升值14%。

what a great deal!

好東西

And, so what happened is we encouraged more people to buy homes,

所以，所以發生的事情是我們鼓勵更多的人買房。

bigger homes than they should have at the time.

比他們當時應該有更大的房子。

We also encouraged bankers to take on more leverage,

我們也鼓勵銀行家多加槓桿。

and make more risky bets than they would have

並做出比他們更冒險的賭注。

if interest rates were higher.

如果利率較高。

In fact, if interest rates would have been 4 or 5%,

事實上，如果利率會是4、5%。

I don't believe we would have had the housing bubble at all.

我不'相信我們根本不會有房地產保麗龍。

Now, let's go back in time just a little bit,

現在，讓我們回到過去，只是一點點。

because this has happened before.

因為這種情況以前也發生過。

The last time the Federal Reserve really held interest rates too low for too long

上一次美聯儲真的把利率壓得太低，時間太長了。

was back in the 1970s.

是在上世紀70年代。

In the 1970s, farmers bought too much land,

在上世紀70年代，農民買了太多的土地。

we drilled too many oil wells,

我們鑽了太多的油井。

we were betting on oil prices going up forever,

我們在賭油價會永遠上漲。

and in the 1980s, when farmland prices collapsed and oil collapsed,

而在上世紀80年代，農田價格崩盤，石油崩盤。

banks collapsed too.

銀行也倒閉了。

By the way, the entire savings and loan industry

順便說一下，整個儲蓄和貸款行業。

also collapsed in the 1980s

上世紀八十年代也倒閉了

because of the same reason:

因為同樣的原因。

they made too many loans when interest rates were low,

他們在低利率時做了太多的貸款。

and then, when interest rates went up, they collapsed.

然後，當利率上升時，他們就崩潰了。

At the same time,

同時。

we made big banks make huge loans to the Latin and South America.

我們讓大銀行向拉丁美洲和南美洲提供了大量貸款。

And so, if you go back and look at the 1970s, banks expanded,

所以，如果你回過頭來看看20世紀70年代，銀行擴張。

they made loans to farming, housing, oil, Latin and South America,

他們向農業、住房、石油、拉丁美洲和南美洲提供貸款。

and all of those parts of the economy collapsed

所有這些經濟部分都崩潰了。

in the late of 70s, early 80s,

在70年代末、80年代初。

and the banking system was in monster trouble.

和銀行系統陷入怪物的麻煩。

In fact, the eight biggest banks in America in 1983 had no capital -

事實上，1983年美國最大的八家銀行沒有資本----------。

zero capital -

零資本

because they had lent too much to Latin and South American countries

因為他們向拉丁美洲和南美洲國家提供了太多的貸款。

that all collapsed.

那都是崩潰的。

And here's my point of going back to that.

而我的觀點是'回到這裡。

That is if you go back and look at the 1980s,

那是如果你回過頭來看看80年代的情況。

the problems of the 1980s - the banking problems -

八十年代的問題----銀行問題-----------------。

did not take down the entire economy.

並沒有把整個經濟搞垮。

This time, they did.

這一次，他們做到了。

And so, the question is why,

所以，問題是為什麼。

and we're going to deal with that in just a minute.

而我們'要處理的是，在短短一分鐘。

And so one of the things that I want to do

所以我想做的一件事就是

is tell you something I just did, right?

是告訴你一些我剛剛做的事，對嗎？

This is the picture of the S&P 500 -

這是標普500指數的圖片------。

the 500 largest companies in the US stock market.

美國股市中最大的500家公司。

It's a picture from 2008 all the way through the first half of 2009.

這'是從2008年一直到2009年上半年的畫面。

What I just recently did is I went back,

我最近剛做的就是我回去了。

and I read the verbatim transcripts

我讀了逐字記錄本。

of all the Federal Reserve meetings during 2008.

2008年期間美聯儲所有會議中。

Now, the reason I just did this

現在，我之所以這樣做

is because they only come out with a five-year lag.

是因為他們只出了五年的滯後期。

The Fed they released little statements,

美聯儲他們發佈的聲明很少。

and then minutes,

然後分。

and then five years later,

然後五年後。

they give us the full transcripts of what they've talked about, right?

他們給我們完整的副本 他們已經談論，對不對？

All of those red dots, there's 14 of them, are a Fed meeting.

所有這些紅點，有'的14個，都是美聯儲會議。

Normally, the Fed has six or seven meetings,

通常情況下，美聯儲有六到七次會議。

but that was a crisis year, right?

但那是個危機年，對嗎？

And so the Fed had 14 meetings that year.

所以美聯儲當年有14次會議。

Just to put this in perspective,

只是為了讓大家明白這一點。

it's 18 or 20 people sitting around a table,

它'是18或20人坐在桌子周圍。

and the verbatim transcripts are each of them talking

和逐字記錄是他們每個人都在說話

for three or four minutes

三四分鐘

if they go around and they vote and they go around again; they vote.

如果他們轉了一圈又投了一圈，他們又投了一圈。

These transcripts were 1,865 pages long,

這些筆錄長達1 865頁。

559,000 words.

五十五萬九千字。

Now, I read these for you, just so you know.

現在，我為你讀這些，只是讓你知道。

(Laughter)

(笑聲)

And some people have a hard time, like, what is 559,000 words?

而有些人很難受，比如，55.9萬字是什麼？

Well, the Old Testament is 593,000 words.

嗯，《舊約》是59.3萬字。

I mean think about that,

我的意思是考慮一下。

we've built the universe,

我們已經建立了宇宙。

wandered around the desert for 40 years, 50 years,

在沙漠裡徘徊了40年，50年。

built an ark ...

造方舟

There is a lot of stuff that happened in the Old Testament.

舊約中發生了很多事情。

(Laughter)

(笑聲)

The Fed used that many words

美聯儲用了那麼多詞

for one year of US economic history.

為美國經濟史上的一年。

Now, I could head down this road -

現在，我可以沿著這條路走下去

maybe that's another TED talk - because that's one of our problems.

也許那'是另一個TED演講--因為那是我們的問題之一。

Nonetheless, one of the things I want to point to

儘管如此，我想指出的是

is this huge decline in the market

是這種巨大的市場跌幅

that happened in September and October of 2008.

發生在2008年9月和10月的。

You know what happened in September and October of 2008?

你知道2008年9月和10月發生了什麼嗎？

Well, first of all, the bloody weekend, September 13th, 14th, I think it was,

好吧，首先，血腥的週末，9月13日，14日，我想這是。

when Lehman Brothers failed, AIG, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac,

雷曼兄弟倒閉時，AIG、房利美和房地美。

and all of those things happened,

而所有這些事情都發生了。

and the Federal Reserve started a program called quantitative easing;

和美聯儲開始了一項名為量化寬鬆的計劃。

that's where they started to buy bonds and inject cash into the economy

這就是他們開始購買債券，並注入現金的經濟

in an attempt to save us.

試圖拯救我們。

At the same time, in fact, just a few weeks later,

同時，事實上，就在幾個星期後。

on October 8th of 2008, Hank Paulson, the Treasury secretary,

2008年10月8日，財政部長漢克-保爾森。

President Bush, the Bush White House, Congress passed TARP:

布什總統、布什白宮、國會通過TARP。

the Troubled Asset Relief Plan,

問題資產救助計劃。

and it was 700 billion dollars of government spending

而這是7000億美元的政府開支

to save our banking system, okay?

拯救我們的銀行系統，好嗎？

I want you to take a look at this chart a little more closely.

我想讓你再仔細看看這張圖。

Quantitative easing started right here, TARP was passed right there.

量化寬鬆就在這裡開始，TARP就在那裡通過。

Did it help?

有幫助嗎？

In fact, the worst part of the crisis was after TARP was passed.

事實上，危機最嚴重的部分是在TARP通過後。

The stock market fell 40%;

股市下跌40%。

financial-company stocks fell 80% after TARP was passed.

TARP通過後，金融公司股票下跌80%。

In fact, if I look at this chart and kind of squint at it,

其實，如果我看這張圖，有點眯著眼睛看。

look at all those red dots,

看那些紅點。

I would say the more the Fed met, the more the Fed did, the worse it got.

我想說的是，美聯儲越開會，美聯儲越做越差。

So, something else must have been going on, right?

所以，一定是發生了別的事情，對嗎？

In my opinion,

在我看來。

the government did not save us,

政府並沒有拯救我們。

and in fact, this is one of the problems that people have

而事實上，這也是人們所存在的問題之一

when they're trying to understand the economy.

當他們'試圖瞭解經濟。

You see, there's an interesting fact about our world, and that is

你看，有一個有趣的事實，我們的世界，這是

the free market - capitalism -

自由市場 - 資本主義 -

does not have a press agent;

沒有新聞代理人。

the government does.

政府的做法。

The Federal Reserve does.

美聯儲確實。

In fact, there are about 2,000 books about the financial crisis,

事實上，關於金融危機的書籍大約有2000本。

but there are three main ones that have just come out.

但剛出來的主要有三個。

One is by Timothy Geithner,

一個是蒂莫西-蓋特納的。

former Secretary of the Treasury under President Obama.

奧巴馬總統時期的前財政部長。

He was the head of the New York Federal Reserve Bank during 2008.

2008年期間，他是紐約聯邦儲備銀行的負責人。

He'd written a book about the crisis;

他'寫了一本關於危機的書。

who do you think he says

你以為他說誰

saved the world?

拯救了世界？

(Laughter)

(笑聲)

Timothy Geithner, of course.

當然，蒂莫西-蓋特納。

Ben Bernanke.

本-伯南克。

He doesn't have a book out - he has a book of speeches out -

他沒有出書--他出了一本演講書--。

who do you think he says

你以為他說誰

saved the world?

拯救了世界？

Ben Bernanke.

本-伯南克。

Hank Paulson has a book out,

漢克-保爾森出了一本書

and who do you think he says saved the world?

你覺得他說誰拯救了世界？

Hank Paulson.

Hank Paulson

In fact, it's not really that they take credit themselves,

其實，這'並不是他們自己真正的功勞。

but they credit TARP

但他們卻把TARP的功勞記在心裡

and quantitative easing and stress tests;

以及量化寬鬆和壓力測試。

that's what Timothy Geithner takes credit for:

這'就是蒂莫西-蓋特納的功勞。

stress testing banks, so that everybody can trust them, right?

對銀行進行壓力測試，這樣大家就可以相信他們了，對吧？

This is where I want to shift gears, just a little bit,

這是我想換擋的地方，就差一點點。

because what I want to tell you is why - or explain -

因為我想告訴你的是，為什麼--或者說是解釋--的原因

is why I believe this banking crisis

所以我認為這次銀行危機

turned into a true overall economic crisis,

變成了真正的整體經濟危機。

while if you look back in the early 1980s,

而如果你回頭看看80年代初。

where banks had more losses than they did in 2008,

其中銀行的損失比2008年更多。

the economy did not collapse,

經濟並沒有崩潰。

and in fact started to accelerate without TARP,

而事實上在沒有TARP的情況下開始加速。

without quantitative easing.

在沒有量化寬鬆政策的情況下。

In fact, Paul Volcker was raising interest rates in the early 1980s,

事實上，保羅-沃爾克在上世紀80年代初就在加息。

and the economy recovered.

和經濟復甦。

Here we cut interest rates to zero,

在這裡，我們把利率降到零。

and the economy has grown relatively slowly.

而經濟增長相對緩慢。

So, what caused this problem?

那麼，是什麼原因導致了這個問題呢？

By the way, in those transcripts that I said that I read,

對了，在我說的那些記錄本裡，我讀到了。

Ben Bernanke asks his staff to go out and find out how big the problem is,

伯南克要求他的員工出去看看問題有多大。

how many subprime loans were made,

有多少次貸。

how many losses could we face,

我們能面臨多少損失。

and he has a staff of about 200 Ph.D. economists,

並且他擁有約200名博士經濟學家。

and they came back with a number of 228 billion dollars.