Placeholder Image

字幕列表 影片播放

  • Funding for this program provided by

  • Additional funding provided by

  • last time we argued about

  • the case of the Queen verses Dudley and Stephens

  • the lifeboat case, the case of cannibalism at sea

  • and with the arguments about

  • the lifeboat

  • in mind the arguments for and against what Dudley and Stephens did in mind,

  • let's turn back to the

  • philosophy

  • the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham

  • Bentham was born in England in 1748, at the age of twelve

  • he went to Oxford, at fifteen he went to law school

  • he was admitted to the bar at age nineteen but he never practiced law,

  • instead he devoted his life

  • to jurisprudence and moral

  • philosophy.

  • last time we began to consider Bentham's version of utilitarianism

  • the main idea

  • is simply stated and it's this,

  • the highest principle of morality

  • whether personal or political morality

  • is

  • to maximize

  • the general welfare

  • or the collective happiness

  • or the overall balance of pleasure over pain

  • in a phrase

  • maximize

  • utility

  • Bentham arrives at this principle by the following line of reasoning

  • we're all governed by pain and pleasure

  • they are our sovereign masters and so any moral system has to take account of them.

  • How best to take account?

  • By maximizing

  • and this leads to the principle

  • of the greatest good for the greatest number

  • what exactly should we maximize?

  • Bentham tells us

  • happiness

  • or more precisely

  • utility.

  • Maximizing utility is a principal not only for individuals but also for communities and

  • for legislators

  • what after all is a community

  • Bentham asks,

  • it's the sum of the individuals who comprise it

  • and that's why

  • in deciding the best policy, in deciding what the law should be, in deciding what's just,

  • citizens and legislators should ask themselves the question if we add up,

  • all of the benefits of this policy

  • and subtract

  • all of the costs,

  • the right thing to do

  • is the one

  • that maximizes

  • the balance

  • of happiness

  • over suffering.

  • that's what it means to maximize utility

  • now, today

  • I want to see

  • whether you agree or disagree with it,

  • and it often goes, this utilitarian logic, under the name of cost-benefit analysis

  • which is used by companies

  • and by

  • governments

  • all the time

  • and what it involves

  • is placing a value usually a dollar value to stand for utility

  • on the costs and the benefits

  • of various proposals.

  • recently in the Czech Republic

  • there was a proposal to increases the excise tax on smoking

  • Philip Morris,

  • the tobacco company,

  • does huge business

  • in the Czech Republic. They commissioned

  • a study of cost-benefit analysis

  • of smoking

  • in the Czech Republic

  • and what their cost benefit

  • analysis found

  • was

  • the government gains

  • by

  • having Czech citizens smoke.

  • Now, how do they gain?

  • It's true that there are negative effects

  • to the public finance of the Czech government

  • because there are increased health care costs for people who develop smoking-related

  • diseases

  • on the other hand there were positive effects

  • and those were

  • added up

  • on the other side of the ledger

  • the positive effects included, for the most part, various tax revenues that the government

  • derives from the sale of cigarette products but it also included health care savings to

  • the government when people die early

  • pensions savings, you don't have to pay pensions for as long,

  • and also savings

  • in housing costs for the elderly

  • and when all of the costs and benefits were added up

  • the Philip Morris

  • study found

  • that there is a net public finance gain in the Czech Republic

  • of a hundred and forty seven million dollars

  • and given the savings

  • in housing and health care and pension costs

  • the government enjoys the saving of savings of over twelve hundred dollars

  • for each person who dies prematurely due to smoking.

  • cost-benefit analysis

  • now, those among you who are defenders utilitarianism may think that this is a unfair

  • test

  • Philip Morris was pilloried in the press and they issued an apology for this heartless

  • calculation

  • you may say

  • that what's missing here is something that the utilitarian can be easily incorporate

  • mainly

  • the value to the person and to the families of those who die

  • from lung cancer.

  • what about the value of life?

  • Some cost-benefit analyses incorporate

  • a measure

  • for the value of life.

  • One of the most famous of these involved the Ford Pinto case

  • did any of you read about that? this was back in the 1970's, you remember that

  • the Ford Pinto was, a kind of car?

  • anybody?

  • it was a small car, subcompact car, very popular

  • but it had one

  • problem which is the fuel tank was at the back of the car

  • and in rear collisions the fuel tank exploded

  • and some people were killed

  • and some severely injured.

  • victims of these injuries took Ford to court to sue

  • and in the court case it turned out

  • that Ford had long

  • since known

  • about the vulnerable fuel tank

  • and had done a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether it would be worth it

  • to put in a special shield

  • that would protect the fuel tank and prevent it from exploding.

  • They did a cost benefit analysis

  • the cost per part

  • to increase the safety

  • of the Pinto,

  • they calculated at eleven dollars per part

  • and here's,

  • this was the cost benefit analysis that emerged

  • in the trial,

  • eleven dollars per part

  • at 12.5 million cars and trucks

  • came to a total cost of

  • 137 million dollars to improve the safety

  • but then they calculated

  • the benefits

  • of spending all this money on a safer car

  • and they counted 180 deaths

  • and they assigned a dollar value

  • 200 thousand dollars

  • per death

  • 180 injuries

  • 67 thousand

  • and then the cost to repair

  • the replacement cost for two thousand vehicles that would be destroyed without the

  • safety device

  • 700 dollars per vehicle,

  • so the benefits

  • turned out to be only 49.5 million,

  • and so they

  • didn't install

  • the device

  • needless to say

  • when this memo

  • of the Ford Motor Company's cost-benefit analysis came out in the trial

  • it appalled the jurors

  • who awarded a huge settlement

  • is this a counter example to the utilitarian idea of calculating

  • because Ford included a

  • measure of the value life.

  • Now who here wants to defend

  • cost-benefit analysis from

  • this apparent counter example

  • who has a defense?

  • or do you think it's completely destroys

  • the whole utilitarian calculus?

  • I think that

  • once again they've made the same mistake the previous case did that they've assigned a dollar value

  • to human life and once again they failed to take into account things like

  • suffering and emotional losses of families, I mean families lost earnings

  • but they also lost a loved one and that

  • is more value than 200 thousand dollars.

  • Good, and wait wait wait, what's you're name?

  • Julie Roto.

  • so if two hundred thousand, Julie, is too

  • too low a figure because it doesn't include the loss of a loved one,

  • and the loss of those years of life,

  • what would be, what do you think

  • would be a more accurate number?

  • I don't believe I could give a number I think that this sort of analysis shouldn't be applied to

  • issues of human life.

  • I think it can't be used monetarily

  • so they didn't just put to low a number,

  • Julie says, they were wrong to try to put any number at all.

  • all right let's hear someone who

  • you have to adjust for inflation

  • all right

  • fair enough

  • so what would the number of being now?

  • this is was thirty five years ago

  • two million dollars

  • you would put two million

  • and what's your name

  • Voicheck

  • Voicheck says we have to allow for inflation

  • we should be more generous

  • then would you be satisfied that this is the right way of thinking about the question?

  • I guess unfortunately

  • it is for

  • there's needs to be of number put somewhere

  • I'm not sure what number would be but I do agree that there could possibly

  • be a number put

  • on a human life.

  • all right so

  • Voicheck says

  • and here he disagrees with

  • Julie

  • Julie says we can't put a number of human life

  • for the purpose of a cost-benefit analysis, Voicheck says we have to

  • because we have to make decisions somehow

  • what do other people think about this? Is there anyone prepared to defend cost-benefit

  • analysis here

  • as accurate, as desirable?

  • I think that if ford and other car companies didn't use cost-benefit analysis they'd eventually go out

  • of business because they wouldn't be able to be profitable

  • and millions of people wouldn't be able to use their cars to get to jobs, to put food on the table

  • to feed their children so I think that if cost-benefit analysis isn't employed

  • the greater good

  • is sacrificed

  • in this case. Alright let me ask, what's your name?

  • Raul. Raul.

  • there was recently a study done about cell phone use by drivers, when people are driving

  • a car,

  • and there's a debate about whether that should be banned

  • and

  • the figure was that some

  • two thousand people die

  • as a result of accidents

  • each year

  • using cell phones

  • and yet the cost benefit analysis which was done by the center for risk analysis at Harvard

  • found that if you look at the benefits

  • of the cell phone use

  • and you put some

  • value on the life, it comes out about the same

  • because of the enormous economic benefit of enabling people to take advantage

  • of their time, not waste time, be able to make deals and talk to friends and so on

  • while they're driving

  • doesn't that suggest that

  • it's a mistake to try to put monetary figures on questions

  • of human life?

  • well I think that if

  • the great majority of people

  • tried to derive maximum utility out of a service like using cell phones and the convenience that cell phones

  • provide

  • that sacrifice is necessary

  • for

  • satisfaction to occur.

  • You're an outright utilitarian. In, yes okay.

  • all right then, one last question Raul

  • and I put this to Voicheck,

  • what dollar figure should be put

  • on human life to decide whether to ban the use of cell phones

  • well I don't want to

  • arbitrarily

  • calculate a figure, I mean right now

  • I think that

  • you want to take it under advisement.

  • yeah I'll take it under advisement.

  • but what roughly speaking would it be? you've got 23 hundred deaths

  • you've got to assign a dollar value to know whether you want to prevent those deaths by

  • banning the use of cell phones in cars

  • so what would you're hunch be?

  • how much?

  • million

  • two million

  • two million was Voitech's figure

  • is that about right? maybe a million.

  • a million.?!

  • Alright that's good, thank you

  • So these are some of the controversies that arise these days from cost-benefit analysis especially

  • those that involve

  • placing a dollar value on everything to be added up.

  • well now I want to turn

  • to your objections, to your objections not necessarily to cost benefit analysis specifically,

  • because that's just one version of the

  • utilitarian logic in practice today,

  • but to the theory as a whole, to the idea

  • that the right thing to do,

  • the just basis for policy and law,

  • is to maximize

  • utility.

  • How many disagree

  • with the utilitarian

  • approach

  • to law

  • and to the common good?

  • How many bring with it?

  • so more agree than disagree.

  • so let's hear from the critics

  • my main issue with it is that I feel like

  • you can't say that just because someone's in the minority

  • what they want and need is less valuable than someone who's in the majority

  • so I guess I have an issue with the idea that

  • the greatest good for the greatest number

  • is okay because

  • there is still what about people who are in

  • the lesser number, like it's not fair to them they didn't have a say in where they wanted

  • to be.

  • alright now that's an interesting objection, you're worried about

  • the effect on minority. yes.

  • what's your name by the way. Anna.

  • alright who has an answer to Anna's worry about the effect on the minority

  • What do you say to Anna?

  • she said that

  • the minorities value less, I don't think that's the case because individually the minorities

  • value is just the same as the individual in the majority it's just that

  • the numbers outweigh the

  • minority

  • and I mean at a certain point you have to make a decision

  • and I'm sorry for the minority but

  • sometimes

  • it's for the general

  • for the greater good. For the greater good, Anna what do you say? what's your name? Youngda.

  • What do you say to Youngda?

  • Youngda says you just have to add up people's preferences

  • and those in the minority do have their preferences weighed.

  • can you give an example of the kind of thing you're worried about when you say you're worried

  • about utilitarianism violating

  • the concern or respect due the minority?

  • can you give an example.

  • so well with any of the cases that we've talked about, like with the shipwreck one,

  • I think that

  • the boy who was eaten

  • still had

  • just as much of a right to live as the other people and

  • just because

  • he was the

  • minority in that case the one who

  • maybe had less of a chance to keep living

  • that doesn't mean

  • that the others automatically have a right to eat him

  • just because

  • it would give a greater amount of people

  • the chance to live.

  • so there may be a certain rights

  • that the minority

  • members have that the individual has that shouldn't be traded off

  • for the sake of

  • utility?

  • yes Anna?

  • Now this would be a test for you,

  • back in ancient Rome

  • they threw Christians to the lions in the coliseum for sport

  • if you think how the utilitarian calculus would go

  • yes, the Christian thrown to the lion suffers enormous excruciating pain,

  • but look at the collective ecstasy of the Romans.

  • Youngda. Well

  • in that time

  • I don't think

  • in the modern-day of time to value the, um, to given a number to the happiness given to the people watching

  • I don't think

  • any

  • policy maker would say

  • the pain of one person, the suffering of one person is much much,

  • in comparison to the happiness gained

  • no but you have to admit that if there were enough Romans delirious with happiness,

  • it would outweigh even the most excruciating pain of a handful of

  • Christians thrown to the lion.

  • so we really have here two different objections to utilitarianism

  • one has to do

  • with whether utilitarianism

  • adequately respects

  • individual rights

  • or minority rights

  • and the other has to do

  • with the whole idea

  • of aggregating

  • utility

  • for preferences

  • or values

  • is it possible to aggregate all values

  • to translate them

  • into dollar terms?

  • there was

  • in the 1930's

  • a psychologist

  • who tried

  • to address

  • the second question. He tried to prove

  • what utilitarianism assumes,

  • that it is possible

  • to translate

  • all goods, all values, all human concerns

  • into a single uniform measure

  • and he did this

  • by conducting a survey

  • of the young recipients of relief, this was in the 1930's

  • and he asked them, he gave them a list of unpleasant experiences

  • and he asked them how much would you have to be paid to undergo

  • the following experiences and he kept track

  • for example

  • how much would you have to be paid to have one upper front tooth pulled out

  • or how much would you have to be paid to have one little one tow cut off?

  • or eat a live earth worm, six inches long

  • or to live the rest of your life on a farm in Kansas

  • or to choke a stray cat to death with your bare hands

  • now what do you suppose

  • what do you suppose was the most expensive item on that list

  • Kansas?

  • You're right it was Kansas

  • for a Kansas

  • people said they'd have to pay them

  • they have to be paid three hundred thousand dollars

  • what do you think

  • what do you think was the next most expensive?

  • not the cat

  • not the tooth

  • not the toe

  • the worm!

  • people said you'd have to pay them a hundred thousand dollars

  • to eat the worm

  • what do you think was the least expensive item?

  • not the cat

  • the tooth

  • during the depression people were willing to have their tooth pulled

  • for only forty five hundred dollars

  • now

  • here's what Thorndike

  • concluded from his study

  • any want or satisfaction which exists, exists

  • in some amount and is therefore measurable

  • the life of a dog

  • or a cat

  • or a chicken consists

  • of appetites

  • cravings

  • desires and their gratifications

  • so does the life

  • of human beings

  • though the appetites and desires

  • are more complicated

  • but what about

  • Thorndike's study?

  • does it support

  • Bentham's idea

  • that all

  • goods all values can be captured according to a single uniform measure of value

  • or does the preposterous character of those different items on the list

  • suggest the opposite conclusion

  • that may be whether we're talking about life

  • or Kansas

  • or the worm

  • maybe

  • the things we value

  • and cherish

  • can't be captured

  • according to a single uniform measure of value

  • and if they can't

  • what are the consequences

  • for the utilitarian theory

  • of morality

  • that's a question we'll continue with next time

  • alright now let's take the other

  • part of the poll

  • which is the

  • the highest

  • experience or pleasure?

  • how many say

  • Shakespeare

  • how many say fear Factor

  • no you can't be serious

  • really?

  • last time

  • last time we began to consider some objections

  • to Jeremy Bentham's version

  • of utilitarianism

  • people raised two objections in the discussion

  • we had

  • the first

  • was the objection, the claim

  • that utilitarianism,

  • by concerning itself

  • with the greatest good for the greatest number

  • fails adequately to respect

  • individual rights.

  • today we have debates

  • about torture

  • and terrorism

  • suppose

  • a suspected terrorists was apprehended on September tenth

  • and you had reason to believe

  • that the suspect

  • had crucial information about an impending terrorist attack that would kill over three thousand

  • people

  • and you couldn't extract the information

  • would it be just

  • to torture

  • the suspect

  • to get the information

  • or

  • do you say no

  • there is a categorical moral duty of respect for individual rights

  • in a way we're back to the questions we started with t

  • about trolley cars and organ transplants so that's the first issue

  • and you remember we considered some examples of cost-benefit analysis

  • but a lot of people were unhappy with cost-benefit analysis

  • when it came to placing a dollar value on human life

  • and so that led us to the

  • second objection,

  • it questioned whether it's possible to translate all values

  • into a single uniform measure of value

  • it asks in other words whether all values are commensurable

  • let me give you one other

  • example

  • of an experience, this actually is a true story, it comes from personal experience

  • that raises a question at least about whether all values can be translated without

  • loss

  • into utilitarian terms

  • some years ago

  • when I was a graduate student I was at Oxford in England and they had men’s and women's

  • colleges they weren't yet mixed

  • and the women's colleges had rules

  • against

  • overnight male guests

  • by the nineteen seventies these

  • rules were rarely enforced and easily violated,

  • or so I was told,

  • by the late nineteen seventies when I was there, pressure grew to relax these rules and it became

  • the subject of debate among the faculty at St. Anne's College

  • which was one of these all women colleges

  • the older women on the faculty

  • we're traditionalists they were opposed to change

  • on conventional moral grounds

  • but times had changed

  • and they were embarrassed

  • to give the true grounds of their objection

  • and so the translated their arguments

  • into utilitarian terms

  • if men stay overnight,

  • they argued, the costs to the college will increase.

  • how you might wonder

  • well they'll want to take baths, and that will use up hot water they said

  • furthermore they argued

  • we'll have to replace the mattresses more often

  • the reformers

  • met these arguments by adopting the following compromise

  • each woman

  • could have a maximum of three overnight male guest each week

  • they didn't say whether it had to be the same one, or three different

  • provided

  • and this is the compromise provided

  • the guest

  • paid fifty pence to defray the cost to the college

  • the next day

  • the national headline in the national newspaper read St. Anne's girls, fifty pence a night

  • another

  • illustration

  • of the difficulty of translating

  • all values

  • in this case a certain idea of virtue

  • into utilitarian terms

  • so that's all to illustrate

  • the second objection

  • to utilitarianism, at least the part of that objection

  • that questions rather

  • the utilitarianism

  • is right to assume

  • that we can

  • assume the uniformity of

  • value, the commensurability of values and translate all moral considerations

  • into

  • dollars

  • or money.

  • But there is a second

  • aspect to this worry about aggregating values and preferences

  • why should we

  • weigh

  • all preferences

  • that people have

  • without assessing whether they're good preferences or bad preferences

  • shouldn't we distinguish

  • between

  • higher

  • pleasures

  • and lower pleasures.

  • Now, part of the appeal of

  • not making any qualitative distinctions about the worth of people's preferences, part of the

  • appeal

  • is that it is non-judgmental and egalitarian

  • the Benthamite utilitarian says

  • everybody's preferences count

  • and they count regardless of what people want

  • regardless of what makes it different people

  • happy. For Bentham,

  • all that matters

  • you'll remember

  • are the intensity and the duration

  • of a pleasure or pain

  • the so-called higher pleasures or nobler virtues are simply those, according to Bentham

  • that produce

  • stronger,

  • longer, pleasure

  • yet a famous phrase to express this idea

  • the quantity of pleasure being equal

  • pushpin

  • is as good as poetry.

  • What was pushpin?

  • It was some kind of a child's game like to tidily winks pushpin is as good as poetry

  • Bentham said

  • and lying behind this idea

  • I think

  • is the claim

  • the intuition

  • that it's a presumption

  • to judge

  • whose pleasures

  • are intrinsically higher

  • or worthier or better

  • and there is something attractive in this

  • refusal to judge, after all some people like

  • Mozart, others

  • Madonna

  • some people like ballet

  • others

  • bowling,

  • who's to say

  • a Benthamite might argue, who's to say which of these pleasures

  • whose pleasures

  • are higher

  • worthier

  • nobler

  • than others?

  • But, is that right?

  • this refusal to make qualitative distinctions

  • can we

  • altogether dispense with the idea

  • that certain things we take pleasure in are

  • better or worthier

  • than others

  • think back to the case of the Romans in the coliseum, one thing that troubled people about that

  • practice

  • is that it seemed to violate the rights

  • of the Christian

  • another way of objecting to what's going on there

  • is that the pleasure that the Romans take

  • in this bloody spectacle

  • should that pleasure

  • which is a base,

  • kind of corrupt

  • degrading pleasure, should that even

  • be valorized or weighed in deciding what the

  • the general welfare is?

  • so here are the objections to Bentham's utilitarianism

  • and now we turn to someone who tried to

  • respond to those objections,

  • a later day utilitarian

  • John Stuart Mill

  • so what we need to

  • examine now

  • is whether John Stuart Mill had a convincing reply

  • to these objections to utilitarianism.

  • John Stuart Mill

  • was born in 1806

  • his father James Mill

  • was a disciple of Bentham’s

  • and James Mills set about giving his son

  • John Stuart Mill a model education

  • he was a child prodigy

  • John Stuart Mill

  • the knew Latin, sorry, Greek at the age of three, Latin at eight

  • and at age ten

  • he wrote a history of Roman law.

  • At age twenty

  • he had a nervous breakdown

  • this left him in a depression for five years

  • but at age twenty five what helped lift him out of this depression

  • is that he met Harriet Taylor

  • she in no doubt married him, they lived happily ever after

  • and it was under her

  • influence

  • the John Stuart Mill try to humanize

  • utilitarianism

  • what Mill tried to do was to see

  • whether the utilitarian calculus could be

  • enlarged

  • and modified

  • to accommodate

  • humanitarian concerns

  • like the concern to respect individual rights

  • and also to address the distinction between higher and lower

  • pleasures.

  • In 1859 Mill wrote a famous book on liberty

  • the main point of which was the importance of defending individual rights and minority

  • rights

  • and in 1861

  • toward the end of his life

  • he wrote the book we read is part of this course

  • Utilitarianism.

  • It makes it clear

  • that utility is the only standard of morality

  • in his view

  • so he's not challenging

  • Bentham's premise,

  • he's affirming it.

  • he says very explicitly the sole evidence,

  • it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people actually do

  • desire it.

  • so he stays with the idea that our de facto actual empirical desires are the only

  • basis

  • for moral judgment.

  • but then

  • page eight

  • also in chapter two, he argues that it is possible for a utilitarian to distinguish

  • higher from lower

  • pleasures.

  • now, those of you who've read

  • Mill already

  • how

  • according to him is it possible to draw that distinction?

  • How can a utilitarian

  • distinguish qualitatively higher pleasures

  • from

  • lesser ones, base ones, unworthy ones?

  • If you tried both of them

  • and you'll prefer the higher one naturally always

  • that's great, that's right. What's your name? John.

  • so as John points out

  • Mill says here's the test,

  • since we can't step outside

  • actual desires, actual preferences

  • that would

  • violate utilitarian premises,

  • the only test

  • of whether

  • a pleasure is higher

  • or lower is whether someone who has experienced both

  • would prefer it.

  • And here,

  • in chapter two

  • we see the passage

  • where Mill makes the point that John just described

  • of two pleasures, if there be one to which all are almost all who have experience

  • of both give a decided preference,

  • irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, in other words no outside, no independent

  • standard,

  • then that is the more desirable pleasure.

  • what do people think about that argument.

  • does that

  • does it succeeded?

  • how many think that it does succeed?

  • of arguing within utilitarian terms for a distinction between higher and lower pleasures.

  • how many

  • think it doesn't succeed?

  • I want to hear your reasons.

  • but before

  • we give the reasons

  • let's do an experiment

  • of Mills'

  • claim.

  • In order to do this experiment

  • we're going to look that three

  • short excerpts

  • of popular entertainment

  • the first one is a Hamlet soliloquy

  • it'll be followed by two other

  • experiences

  • see what you think.

  • 'what a piece of work is a man

  • how noble in reason

  • how infinite in faculties

  • in form and moving, how express and admirable

  • in action how like an angel. In apprehension, how like a god

  • the beauty of the world

  • the paragon of animals

  • and yet, to me

  • what is this quintessence of dust?

  • man delights not me.

  • Imagine a world where your greatest fears become reality

  • each show, six contestants from around the country battle each other in three

  • extreme stunts. these stunts are designed to challenge these contestants both physically and mentally

  • six contestants, three stunts, one winner.

  • Fear factor.

  • The Simpsons. Well hi diddly-o peddle to the metal o-philes! Flanders- since when do you like anything cool.

  • well, I don't care for the speed, but I can't get enough of that safety gear

  • helmets, roll bars, caution flags. I like the fresh air

  • and looking at the poor people in the infield.

  • Dang Cletus, why you got to park by my parents.

  • Now hunny, it's my parents too.

  • I don't even have to ask which one you like most

  • the Simpsons? How many like the Simpson's most?

  • How many Shakespeare?

  • What about fear factor?

  • how many preferred fear factor?

  • really?

  • people overwhelmingly

  • like the Simpsons

  • better

  • than Shakespeare. alright, now let's take the other

  • part of the poll

  • which is the

  • highest

  • experience or pleasure?

  • how many say

  • Shakespeare?

  • how many say

  • fear factor?

  • no you can't be serious

  • really?

  • alright go ahead you can say it.

  • I found that one

  • the most entertaining

  • I know but which do you think was the worthiest, the noblest experience, I know you find it

  • the most anything

  • if something is good just because it is pleasurable what is the matter if you have some kind of

  • abstract

  • idea of whether it is good by someone else's sense or not.

  • Alright so you come down on the straight Benthamite's side

  • whose to judge

  • and why should we judge

  • apart from just registering and aggregating de facto preferences, alright fair enough.

  • what's your name?

  • Nate? okay fair enough

  • Alright so

  • how many think that the Simpson's is actually

  • apart from liking is actually the higher experience

  • higher than Shakespeare.

  • Alright let's see the vote for Shakespeare again

  • how many think Shakespeare is higher?

  • alright so

  • why is it

  • ideally I'd like to hear from someone is there someone

  • think Shakespeare is highest

  • but who preferred

  • watching

  • the Simpsons

  • Like I guess just sitting and watching the Simpsons, it's entertaining because the make jokes, they make us laugh but

  • someone has to tell us that Shakespeare was this great writer we had to be taught how to read him, how to

  • understand him, we had to be taught how to

  • take in Rembrandt, how to analyze a painting.

  • well how do, what's your name? Aneesha.

  • Aneesha, when you say someone

  • told you that Shakespeare's better

  • are you accepting it on blind faith you voted that Shakespeare's higher only because the culture

  • tells you that our teachers tell you that or do you

  • actually agree with that yourself

  • well in the sense that Shakespeare, no, but earlier you made

  • an example of Rembrandt

  • I feel like I would enjoy a reading a comic book more than I would enjoy a kind of analyzing

  • Rembrandt because someone told me it was great, you know. Right so of some this seems

  • to be, you're suggesting a kind of

  • cultural convention and pressure. We're told

  • what books, what works of art are great. who else?

  • although I enjoyed watching the Simpsons more in this particular moment in Justice,

  • if I were to spend the rest of my life considering

  • the three different

  • video clips shown

  • I would not want to spend

  • that remainder of my life considering

  • the latter two clips.

  • I think I would derive more pleasure

  • from being able to

  • branch out in my own mind

  • sort of

  • considering more deep pleasures, more deep thoughts.

  • and tell me your name

  • Joe.

  • Joe, so if you had to spend the rest of your life on

  • on a farm in Kansas with only

  • with only Shakespeare

  • or the collected episodes of the Simpsons

  • you would prefer

  • Shakespeare

  • what do you conclude from that

  • about John Stuart Mill's test

  • but the test of a higher pleasure

  • is whether

  • people who have experienced

  • both prefer it.

  • can I cite another example briefly?

  • in biology

  • in neuro biology last year we were told of a rat who was tested

  • a particular center in the brain

  • where the rat was able to stimulate its brain and cause itself intense pleasure repeatedly

  • the rat did not eat or drink until it died

  • so the rat was clearly experiencing intense pleasure

  • now if you asked me right now if I'd rather experience intense pleasure

  • or have

  • a full lifetime of higher pleasure, I would consider intense pleasure to be lower pleasure, right

  • now enjoy intense pleasure

  • yes I would

  • but over a lifetime I think

  • I would think

  • almost a complete majority here would agree

  • that they would rather be a human with higher pleasure that rat

  • with intense pleasure

  • for a momentary period of time

  • so now

  • in answer to your question, right, I think

  • this proves that, or I won't say proves

  • I think the conclusion

  • is that Mill's theory that when a majority people are asked

  • what they would rather do,

  • they will answer

  • that they would rather

  • engage in a higher pleasure. So you think that this supports Mills, that Mills was on to something here

  • I do.

  • all right is there anyone

  • who disagrees with Joe who thinks that our experiment

  • disproves

  • Mills'

  • test

  • shows that that's not an adequate way

  • that you can't distinguish higher pleasures within the utilitarian

  • framework.

  • If whatever is good is truly just whatever people prefer it's truly relative and there's

  • no objective definition then

  • there will be some society where people prefer Simpsons

  • more

  • anyone can appreciate the Simpsons, but I think it does take education to appreciate Shakespeare

  • Alright, you're saying it takes education to appreciate higher

  • true thing

  • Mill's point is

  • that the higher pleasures do require

  • cultivation and appreciation and education

  • he doesn't dispute that

  • but

  • once having been cultivated

  • and educated

  • people will see

  • not only see the difference between higher lower

  • pleasures

  • but will it actually

  • prefer

  • the higher

  • to the lower.

  • you find this famous passage from John Stuart Mill-

  • it is better

  • to be a human being dissatisfied

  • then a pig satisfied.

  • Better to the Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied

  • and if the fool

  • or the pig

  • are of a different opinion

  • it is because they only know

  • their side of the question.

  • so here you have

  • an attempt

  • to distinguish

  • higher from lower

  • pleasures

  • so going to an art museum or being a couch potato, swilling beer watching television

  • at home

  • sometimes Mill agrees we might succumb

  • to the temptation

  • to do the latter,

  • to be couch potatoes,

  • but even when we do that

  • out of indolence

  • and sloth,

  • we know

  • that the pleasure we get

  • gazing at Rembrandts

  • in the museum

  • is actually higher,

  • because we've experienced both.

  • And is a higher pressure

  • gazing at Rembrandts

  • because of engages our higher human faculties

  • what about Mill's attempt

  • to reply to the objection about individual rights?

  • In a way he uses the same

  • kind of argument

  • and this comes out in chapter five

  • he says while I dispute the pretensions of any theory which sets up an imaginary standard

  • of justice

  • not grounded on utility,

  • but still

  • he considers

  • justice

  • grounded on utility to be what he calls the chief part

  • and incomparably the most sacred and binding part

  • of all morality.

  • so justice is higher

  • individual rights are privileged

  • but not for

  • reasons that depart from utilitarian assumptions.

  • Justice is a name

  • for certain moral requirements

  • which, regarded collectively

  • stand higher in the scale of social utility

  • and are therefore

  • of more

  • paramount obligation

  • than any others

  • so justice is sacred, it's prior, it's privileged, it isn't something that can easily be traded

  • off against lesser things

  • but the reason

  • is ultimately

  • Mills Claims

  • a utilitarian reason

  • once you consider

  • the long run interests

  • of humankind,

  • of all of us,

  • as progressive

  • beings.

  • If we do justice and if we respect rights

  • society as a whole

  • will be better off in the long run.

  • Well is that convincing?

  • Or

  • is Mill actually, without admitting it, stepping outside

  • utilitarian considerations

  • in arguing

  • for qualitatively higher

  • pleasures

  • and for sacred

  • or specially important

  • individual rights?

  • we haven't fully answered that question

  • because to answer that question

  • in the case of rights and justice

  • will require that we explore

  • other ways,

  • non utilitarian ways

  • of accounting for the basis

  • or rights

  • and then asking

  • whether they succeed

  • as for Jeremy Bentham,

  • who launched

  • utilitarianism

  • as a doctrine

  • in moral and legal philosophy

  • Bentham died in 1832 at the age of eighty five

  • but if you go to London you can visit him today

  • literally.

  • he provided in his will

  • that his body be preserved,

  • embalmed and displayed

  • in the university of London

  • where he still presides in a glass case

  • with a wax head

  • dressed in his actual clothing.

  • you see before he died,

  • Bentham addressed himself to a question consistent with his philosophy,

  • of what use

  • could a dead man be to the living

  • one use, he said, would be to make one's corpse available

  • for the study of anatomy

  • in the case of great philosophers, however,

  • better yet

  • to preserve one's physical presence in order to inspire future generations of thinkers.

  • You want to see what Bentham looks like stuffed?

  • Here's what he looks like

  • There he is

  • now, if you look closely

  • you'll notice

  • that

  • the embalming up his actual had was not a success so they substituted a waxed head

  • and at the bottom for verisimilitude

  • you can actually see his actual had

  • on a plate

  • you see it?

  • right there

  • so, what's the moral of the story?

  • the moral of the story

  • by the way they bring him out during meetings of the board at university college London

  • and the minutes record him as present but not voting.

  • here is a philosopher

  • in life and in death

  • who adhered

  • to the principles

  • of his philosophy. we'll continue with rights next time.

  • Don't miss the chance to interact online with other viewers of Justice

  • join the conversation, take a pop quiz,

  • watch lectures you've missed, and a lot more. Visit Justiceharvard.org

  • It's the right thing to do.

  • funding for this program is provided by

  • additional funding provided by

Funding for this program provided by

字幕與單字

單字即點即查 點擊單字可以查詢單字解釋

B1 中級 美國腔

【哈佛名課─正義】生命值多少錢?Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 02: "PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE"

  • 1247 210
    VoiceTube 發佈於 2013 年 03 月 04 日
影片單字