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  • It's very nice to be here tonight.

    今晚能來到 TED 實在太棒了!

  • So I've been working on the history of income

    我一直在研究有關

  • and wealth distribution for the past 15 years,

    所得和財富分配的歷史,已經 15 年了,

  • and one of the interesting lessons

    從這些過往的證據裡

  • coming from this historical evidence

    可以發現一個很有意思的道理,

  • is indeed that, in the long run,

    那就是長期來說

  • there is a tendency for the rate of return of capital

    資本報酬率有高於 經濟成長率的趨勢,

  • to exceed the economy's growth rate,

    這種趨勢容易造成財富高度集中,

  • and this tends to lead to high concentration of wealth.

    雖然並不是無止境的財富集中,

  • Not infinite concentration of wealth,

    但是資本報酬率 (r) 與經濟成長率 (g) 差距越大,

  • but the higher the gap between r and g,

    財富不均的程度就會越嚴重,

  • the higher the level of inequality of wealth

    社會裡的不平等也會越嚴重。

  • towards which society tends to converge.

    這就是我今天要談的主要因素,

  • So this is a key force that I'm going to talk about today,

    不過讓我先說明,

  • but let me say right away

    這並不是所得和財富分配變動的

  • that this is not the only important force

    唯一重要因素,

  • in the dynamics of income and wealth distribution,

    還有許多其他因素

  • and there are many other forces that play

    在所得和財富分配的長期變動上

  • an important role in the long-run dynamics

    扮演著重要的角色。

  • of income and wealth distribution.

    而且還有許多資料有待蒐集。

  • Also there is a lot of data

    今天我們比以前懂多一些,

  • that still needs to be collected.

    不過懂的還是太少了,

  • We know a little bit more today

    而且一定還有許多不同的演變過程,

  • than we used to know, but we still know too little,

    像是經濟、社會、政治,

  • and certainly there are many different processes

    需要再多做研究。

  • economic, social, political

    而我今天會鎖定在這個單一因素,

  • that need to be studied more.

    但這並不是說就沒有 其他重要因素了。

  • And so I'm going to focus today on this simple force,

    我接下來要呈現的資料

  • but that doesn't mean that other important forces

    大部分來自可上網取得的資料庫:

  • do not exist.

    「全球高所得資料庫」。

  • So most of the data I'm going to present

    這是現存最大的

  • comes from this database

    所得不均歷史資料庫,

  • that's available online:

    得力於數十個國家

  • the World Top Incomes Database.

    超過三十位學者的貢獻。

  • So this is the largest existing

    就讓我來帶大家看一些

  • historical database on inequality,

    從資料庫裡得出的事實,

  • and this comes from the effort

    然後我們再回來談 r 大於 g。

  • of over 30 scholars from several dozen countries.

    事實一,

  • So let me show you a couple of facts

    美國和歐洲所得不均的排行

  • coming from this database,

    在上個世紀發生了大逆轉。

  • and then we'll return to r bigger than g.

    時間拉回到 1900 年、1910 年,

  • So fact number one is that there has been

    歐洲所得不均的排名確實高於美國,

  • a big reversal in the ordering of income inequality

    而今天美國排名卻遠高於歐洲。

  • between the United States and Europe

    我先聲明,

  • over the past century.

    這裡主要的原因並不是 r 大於 g,

  • So back in 1900, 1910, income inequality was actually

    而是與以往不同的人才供需、

  • much higher in Europe than in the United States,

    教育跟科技間的競賽、

  • whereas today, it is a lot higher in the United States.

    全球化有關,

  • So let me be very clear:

    也許和美國不平等的 技能學習管道大有關係。

  • The main explanation for this is not r bigger than g.

    美國有非常好、頂尖的大學,

  • It has more to do with changing supply and demand

    但基礎教育卻沒有很好。

  • for skill, the race between education and technology,

    因此不平等的技能學習管道

  • globalization, probably more unequal access

    再加上美國高階主管的薪資福利

  • to skills in the U.S.,

    史無前例的大幅提升,

  • where you have very good, very top universities

    很難以教育為基礎來解釋這個問題。

  • but where the bottom part of the educational system

    因此這之中還有許多因素,

  • is not as good,

    但我今天不打算在這上面講太多,

  • so very unequal access to skills,

    因為我要聚焦在財富不均。

  • and also an unprecedented rise

    請看這項

  • of top managerial compensation of the United States,

    關於所得不均的簡易指標。

  • which is difficult to account for just on the basis of education.

    這是所得前 10% 者的所得

  • So there is more going on here,

    佔總所得的比重,

  • but I'm not going to talk too much about this today,

    所以你可以看到在一個世紀以前,

  • because I want to focus on wealth inequality.

    歐洲的比例是在 45% 至 50% 之間,

  • So let me just show you a very simple indicator

    美國稍微高過 40%,

  • about the income inequality part.

    所以歐洲的所得較不平均。

  • So this is the share of total income

    到了二十世紀上半葉,

  • going to the top 10 percent.

    比重大大下滑,

  • So you can see that one century ago,

    接著近數十年來,

  • it was between 45 and 50 percent in Europe

    你可以發現美國所得不均的現象 變得比歐洲更嚴重,

  • and a little bit above 40 percent in the U.S.,

    這正是我剛說的第一個事實。

  • so there was more inequality in Europe.

    第二項事實跟財富不均更有關係,

  • Then there was a sharp decline

    核心的事實就是

  • during the first half of the 20th century,

    財富不均一直遠高於所得不均。

  • and in the recent decade, you can see that

    雖然近幾十年來財富不均日益嚴重,

  • the U.S. has become more unequal than Europe,

    但是比起上一個世紀,

  • and this is the first fact I just talked about.

    現在已經沒那麼極端了。

  • Now, the second fact is more about wealth inequality,

    然而現在與所得有關的財富總量

  • and here the central fact is that wealth inequality

    已從一次世界大戰、大蕭條、

  • is always a lot higher than income inequality,

    第二次世界大戰的重創中

  • and also that wealth inequality,

    恢復正常了。

  • although it has also increased in recent decades,

    請各位看這兩張圖表,

  • is still less extreme today

    解釋了事實二和事實三。

  • than what it was a century ago,

    首先,如果你注意看財富不均的程度,

  • although the total quantity of wealth

    這是財富前 10% 者持有財富

  • relative to income has now recovered

    佔總財富的比重,

  • from the very large shocks

    你可以發現

  • caused by World War I, the Great Depression,

    美國與歐洲之間有相同的逆轉,

  • World War II.

    就跟過去所得不均的逆轉一樣。

  • So let me show you two graphs

    所以百年前歐洲財富集中的情形

  • illustrating fact number two and fact number three.

    高過於美國,

  • So first, if you look at the level of wealth inequality,

    現在就顛倒過來了。

  • this is the share of total wealth

    另外你也可以看出兩件事情,

  • going to the top 10 percent of wealth holders,

    第一、財富不均的程度

  • so you can see the same kind of reversal

    普遍高於所得不均。

  • between the U.S. and Europe that we had before

    記得所得不均的情況,

  • for income inequality.

    前 10% 者擁有的所得

  • So wealth concentration was higher

    是總所得的 30% 至 50%,

  • in Europe than in the U.S. a century ago,

    然而他們擁有的財富比例

  • and now it is the opposite.

    卻一直在 60% 至 90% 之間。

  • But you can also show two things:

    這就是事實一,

  • First, the general level of wealth inequality

    對之後要說的很重要。

  • is always higher than income inequality.

    財富一直都

  • So remember, for income inequality,

    遠比所得更為集中。

  • the share going to the top 10 percent

    事實二、

  • was between 30 and 50 percent of total income,

    近幾十年來財富不均惡化的情況

  • whereas for wealth, the share is always

    還不致於像 1910 年那樣嚴重。

  • between 60 and 90 percent.

    與過去不同的是,

  • Okay, so that's fact number one,

    現在的貧富差距依然很大,

  • and that's very important for what follows.

    前10% 的富人擁有 60% 至 70% 的總財富,

  • Wealth concentration is always

    但好消息是

  • a lot higher than income concentration.

    情況的確已經比上個世紀好多了,

  • Fact number two is that the rise

    當時 90% 的總財富 落入了前 10% 富人的口袋裡。

  • in wealth inequality in recent decades

    那麼今天你們看到的是

  • is still not enough to get us back to 1910.

    我稱為中間 40% 的人,

  • So the big difference today,

    不是前 10 %,

  • wealth inequality is still very large,

    也不是墊底的 50%,

  • with 60, 70 percent of total wealth for the top 10,

    他們可以說是財富的中產階級,

  • but the good news is that it's actually

    擁有總財富、國家財富的 20% 至 30%;

  • better than one century ago,

    然而上個世紀他們卻是窮人,

  • where you had 90 percent in Europe going to the top 10.

    因為那時候基本上沒有 財富的中產階級。

  • So today what you have

    所以這是很重大的改變,

  • is what I call the middle 40 percent,

    而且看到財富不均沒有完全恢復到

  • the people who are not in the top 10

    第一次世界大戰之前的程度也很有趣,

  • and who are not in the bottom 50,

    即便財富總量已經是恢復了。

  • and what you can view as the wealth middle class

    沒問題吧?

  • that owns 20 to 30 percent

    這是相較於所得的財富總值,

  • of total wealth, national wealth,

    你可以看到特別是歐洲,

  • whereas they used to be poor, a century ago,

    我們幾乎是回到了 第一次世界大戰之前的程度。

  • when there was basically no wealth middle class.

    這件事其實有兩個不一樣的面向,

  • So this is an important change,

    一個是關於我們累積的財富總量,

  • and it's interesting to see that wealth inequality

    當然累積一大堆財富

  • has not fully recovered to pre-World War I levels,

    這件事本身沒有不好,

  • although the total quantity of wealth has recovered.

    特別是假如財富更分散,

  • Okay? So this is the total value

    又比較不那麼集中的時候。

  • of wealth relative to income,

    那麼我們真正關心的是什麼?

  • and you can see that in particular in Europe,

    是財富不均的長期演變,

  • we are almost back to the pre-World War I level.

    還有未來會發生什麼事。

  • So there are really two

    我們要如何解釋 第一次世界大戰以前,

  • different parts of the story here.

    財富差距如此大,

  • One has to do with

    而且是大到前所未有的程度,

  • the total quantity of wealth that we accumulate,

    那麼我們該如何看待未來呢?

  • and there is nothing bad per se, of course,

    那麼讓我來做一些說明,

  • in accumulating a lot of wealth,

    以及預測未來。

  • and in particular if it is more diffuse

    我先聲明,

  • and less concentrated.

    解釋財富為什麼比所得

  • So what we really want to focus on

    還要更集中的最佳經濟模型

  • is the long-run evolution of wealth inequality,

    大概是一種動態、世代的經濟模型,

  • and what's going to happen in the future.

    其中每個人都長期

  • How can we account for the fact that

    為了各種理由來累積財富。

  • until World War I, wealth inequality was so high

    假使人們累積財富

  • and, if anything, was rising to even higher levels,

    只是為了因應生命週期,

  • and how can we think about the future?

    為了在他們老的時候

  • So let me come to some of the explanations

    還有能力花錢消費,

  • and speculations about the future.

    那麼財富不均的情形

  • Let me first say that

    應該和所得不均的情形

  • probably the best model to explain

    相差不遠。

  • why wealth is so much

    可是你很難說明

  • more concentrated than income

    為什麼財富不均要比所得不均更嚴重,

  • is a dynamic, dynastic model

    只憑生命週期理論,

  • where individuals have a long horizon

    所以你需要一個情境,

  • and accumulate wealth for all sorts of reasons.

    在其中的人們會為了 其他理由累積財富。

  • If people were accumulating wealth

    一般來說,他們想把財富

  • only for life cycle reasons,

    交給下一代、他們的小孩,

  • you know, to be able to consume

    或者有時候他們累積財富

  • when they are old,

    是為了特權──伴隨財富而來的權力。

  • then the level of wealth inequality

    所以累積財富一定有除了

  • should be more or less in line

    生命週期以外的理由,

  • with the level of income inequality.

    來解釋我們在資料裡發現的情況。

  • But it will be very difficult to explain

    在這種累積財富

  • why you have so much more wealth inequality

    是為了累積世代財富的變動模式之中,

  • than income inequality

    會有各種毫無規則且加倍的衝擊。

  • with a pure life cycle model,

    舉例來說:

  • so you need a story

    有些家庭有非常多的小孩,

  • where people also care

    因此財富就會分散,

  • about wealth accumulation for other reasons.

    有些家庭的小孩則較少。

  • So typically, they want to transmit

    你也會對資產報酬率感到吃驚,

  • wealth to the next generation, to their children,

    有的家庭有大筆資本利得,

  • or sometimes they want to accumulate wealth

    有的卻投資失利。

  • because of the prestige, the power that goes with wealth.

    因此財富累積的過程

  • So there must be other reasons

    總是會有一些流動,

  • for accumulating wealth than just life cycle

    有些人會往上升、 有些人則會往下掉。

  • to explain what we see in the data.

    重點是任何在這種模型下,

  • Now, in a large class of dynamic models

    有這種特定的變動衝擊,

  • of wealth accumulation

    財富不均的水平

  • with such dynastic motive for accumulating wealth,

    會成為急遽升高的 r 減 g 函數。

  • you will have all sorts of random,

    財富報酬率與經濟成長率之間的差異

  • multiplicative shocks.

    為什麼重要,

  • So for instance, some families

    想當然是因為只要 r 減 g 的數值越大,

  • have a very large number of children,

    最初財富不均的情況就會被擴大得更快。

  • so the wealth will be divided.

    舉個簡單的例子:

  • Some families have fewer children.

    假設 r 是 5% 而 g 是 1%,

  • You also have shocks to rates of return.

    財富持有人只需要再投資

  • Some families make huge capital gains.

    資本所得的五分之一,

  • Some made bad investments.

    他們財富增加的速度

  • So you will always have some mobility

    就會跟經濟成長一樣快。

  • in the wealth process.

    因此創造和保有大筆財富就更容易,

  • Some people will move up, some people will move down.

    因為你可以消費五分之四,

  • The important point is that,

    假設零稅率,

  • in any such model,

    你就可以再投資五分之一。

  • for a given variance of such shocks,

    當然有些家庭會消費多一些、

  • the equilibrium level of wealth inequality

    有的則消費較少,

  • will be a steeply rising function of r minus g.

    分配上就會有一些變動,

  • And intuitively, the reason why the difference

    但是總的來看, 他們只要再投資五分之一,

  • between the rate of return to wealth

    這樣就能維持財富高度不均。

  • and the growth rate is important

    現在你應該不會驚訝於

  • is that initial wealth inequalities

    r 永遠可以大於 g 這句話了,

  • will be amplified at a faster pace

    因為事實上,

  • with a bigger r minus g.

    這種情況在人類史上很常見。

  • So take a simple example,

    這種情況大家都能看得一清二楚,

  • with r equals five percent and g equals one percent,

    理由很簡單,

  • wealth holders only need to reinvest

    因為史上大多數時候 經濟成長率幾乎是 0%。

  • one fifth of their capital income to ensure

    經濟成長率也許是 0.1%、0.2% 或 0.3%,

  • that their wealth rises as fast

    但人口和人均產出的成長率非常慢,

  • as the size of the economy.

    那時候資本報酬率

  • So this makes it easier

    當然不會是 0%。

  • to build and perpetuate large fortunes

    以土地來說,

  • because you can consume four fifths,

    在工業化以前的社會,

  • assuming zero tax,

    土地是典型的資產,

  • and you can just reinvest one fifth.

    報酬率通常是 5%。

  • So of course some families will consume more than that,

    任何讀過珍奧斯汀作品的人都知道。

  • some will consume less, so there will be

    假如你想要得到一千英磅的年所得,

  • some mobility in the distribution,

    你應該要有價值兩萬英鎊的資本,

  • but on average, they only need to reinvest one fifth,

    兩萬的 5% 就是一千。

  • so this allows high wealth inequalities to be sustained.

    這就是以前社會的基礎,

  • Now, you should not be surprised

    因為 r 大於 g

  • by the statement that r can be bigger than g forever,

    就會讓財富以及資產的持有者可以

  • because, in fact, this is what happened

    靠著資本所得過生活,

  • during most of the history of mankind.

    還能在生活中做些別的事,

  • And this was in a way very obvious to everybody

    而不是只關心能不能填飽肚子。

  • for a simple reason, which is that growth

    我的歷史研究

  • was close to zero percent

    有一個重要的結論是

  • during most of the history of mankind.

    現代工業的發展並未如我們期待

  • Growth was maybe 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 percent,

    改變這個簡單的事實太多。

  • but very slow growth of population

    當然經濟成長率

  • and output per capita,

    隨著工業革命後增加,

  • whereas the rate of return on capital

    通常是多出零到 1% 或 2%,

  • of course was not zero percent.

    不過同一時間

  • It was, for land assets, which was

    資本報酬率也增加了,

  • the traditional form

    所以貧富差距沒多少改變。

  • of assets in preindustrial societies,

    二十世紀

  • it was typically five percent.

    是由許多事件交織成的特殊時代。

  • Any reader of Jane Austen would know that.

    首先是非常低的報酬率,

  • If you want an annual income of 1,000 pounds,

    肇因於 1914 年和 1945 年 戰爭造成的衝擊、

  • you should have a capital value

    財富破壞、通貨膨脹、

  • of 20,000 pounds so that

    以及大蕭條期間的破產,

  • five percent of 20,000 is 1,000.

    以上原因讓個人的財富報酬率

  • And in a way, this was

    在 1914 到 1945 年時

  • the very foundation of society,

    下降到異常低的程度。

  • because r bigger than g

    接著在戰後期間

  • was what allowed holders of wealth and assets

    出現異常高的經濟成長率,

  • to live off their capital income

    部分歸功於重建。

  • and to do something else in life

    在德國、法國和日本,

  • than just to care about their own survival.

    在 1950 到 1980 年之間,

  • Now, one important conclusion

    出現過 5% 的經濟成長率,

  • of my historical research is that

    大部分歸功於重建,

  • modern industrial growth did not change

    也歸功於大量的人口成長,

  • this basic fact as much as one might have expected.

    也就是嬰兒潮世代。

  • Of course, the growth rate

    顯然那無法持續太久,

  • following the Industrial Revolution

    或者至少未來

  • rose, typically from zero to one to two percent,

    人口成長應該會下降,

  • but at the same time, the rate of return

    我們有的最佳預測是

  • to capital also rose

    長期經濟成長率

  • so that the gap between the two

    將會是 1% 至 2%,

  • did not really change.

    而不是 4% 至 5%。

  • So during the 20th century,

    如果你看到這邊,

  • you had a very unique combination of events.

    這是全球國內生產毛額、

  • First, a very low rate of return

    資本報酬率、

  • due to the 1914 and 1945 war shocks,

    也就是平均資產報酬率的最佳預測。

  • destruction of wealth, inflation,

    你能看到人類史上

  • bankruptcy during the Great Depression,

    大多數時間的

  • and all of this reduced

    經濟成長率非常低,

  • the private rate of return to wealth

    遠低於資本報酬率,

  • to unusually low levels

    後來在 20 世紀期間,

  • between 1914 and 1945.

    真的就是人口成長,

  • And then, in the postwar period,

    戰後的人口成長率非常高,

  • you had unusually high growth rate,

    而重建的過程

  • partly due to the reconstruction.

    讓經濟成長率

  • You know, in Germany, in France, in Japan,

    與資產報酬率間的差距縮小了。

  • you had five percent growth rate

    我用的是聯合國的未來人口預測,

  • between 1950 and 1980

    當然這些數字還不確定。

  • largely due to reconstruction,

    也許是我們開始準備

  • and also due to very large demographic growth,

    要在未來生很多的小孩,

  • the Baby Boom Cohort effect.

    而經濟成長率就會更高一些,

  • Now, apparently that's not going to last for very long,

    但是從現在開始,

  • or at least the population growth

    這些就是我們現有的最佳預測,

  • is supposed to decline in the future,

    這將使得全球的經濟成長下滑、

  • and the best projections we have is that

    還有與資產報酬率之間的

  • the long-run growth is going to be closer

    差距將會擴大。

  • to one to two percent

    另一件 20 世紀發生的特殊事件,

  • rather than four to five percent.

    如同我剛才提到的,

  • So if you look at this,

    就是財產破壞、資本稅,

  • these are the best estimates we have

    這邊是稅前的報酬率;

  • of world GDP growth

    而這是稅後、財產破壞後的報酬率,

  • and rate of return on capital,

    這是課稅後、財產破壞後的平均報酬率,

  • average rates of return on capital,

    就是稅金和財產破壞

  • so you can see that during most

    讓平均報酬率 長時間低於經濟成長率。

  • of the history of mankind,

    但是如果沒有財產破壞和資本稅,

  • the growth rate was very small,

    這些就不可能發生。

  • much lower than the rate of return,

    所以讓我這麼說吧,

  • and then during the 20th century,

    資本報酬率以及經濟成長率之間的平衡

  • it is really the population growth,

    取決於許多難以預料的各種因素,

  • very high in the postwar period,

    像是科技和資本密集技術的發展。

  • and the reconstruction process

    在目前的經濟裡,

  • that brought growth

    資本最密集的行業是

  • to a smaller gap with the rate of return.

    地產業、房屋業、能源業,

  • Here I use the United Nations population projections,

    不過未來有可能

  • so of course they are uncertain.

    在部分部門中 我們會用上一大堆機器人,

  • It could be that we all start

    這些行業就會佔有

  • having a lot of children in the future,

    比今天更高的總資本量比例。

  • and the growth rates are going to be higher,

    但那還遙不可及,

  • but from now on,

    從現在來說不動產業、能源業

  • these are the best projections we have,

    發生的變化,

  • and this will make global growth

    對資本總量還有所佔比例

  • decline and the gap between

    更加重要。

  • the rate of return go up.

    另一個重要的課題是

  • Now, the other unusual event

    投資組合管理的規模效果,

  • during the 20th century

    結合金融的複雜性

  • was, as I said,

    與財政法令鬆綁,

  • destruction, taxation of capital,

    使得大型的投資組合

  • so this is the pre-tax rate of return.

    更容易得到較高的報酬率,

  • This is the after-tax rate of return,

    這對億萬富翁、大型資本捐贈來說

  • and after destruction,

    似乎格外有效。

  • and this is what brought

    給你看個例子,

  • the average rate of return

    這是富比士的億萬富翁排名,

  • after tax, after destruction,

    1987 年到 2013 年期間的資料,

  • below the growth rate during a long time period.

    你可以看到財富最多的那群人

  • But without the destruction,

    財富實質上每年都比 通貨膨脹高 6% 至 7%,

  • without the taxation, this would not have happened.

    但是世界上的平均所得、平均財富

  • So let me say that the balance between

    每年卻只增加 2%。

  • returns on capital and growth

    你也會看到同樣的情形

  • depends on many different factors

    出現在大學的大型捐贈,

  • that are very difficult to predict:

    起始的捐贈基金規模越大,

  • technology and the development

    報酬率就越高。

  • of capital-intensive techniques.

    我們可以做什麼呢?

  • So right now, the most capital-intensive sectors

    第一件事我認為我們需要

  • in the economy are the real estate sector, housing,

    財務更加透明。

  • the energy sector, but it could be in the future

    我們對全球的財富流動所知不多,

  • that we have a lot more robots in a number of sectors

    因此我們需要銀行資訊在國際間傳遞,

  • and that this would be a bigger share

    我們需要全球性的金融資產登記制度,

  • of the total capital stock that it is today.

    並且在財富稅上做更多協調,

  • Well, we are very far from this,

    縱使財富稅用較低的稅率,

  • and from now, what's going on

    仍會是提供資訊的方式,

  • in the real estate sector, the energy sector,

    如此一來我們就能

  • is much more important for the total capital stock

    依據發現的問題來調整政策。

  • and capital share.

    在某個程度來說,

  • The other important issue

    對抗避稅天堂、

  • is that there are scale effects in portfolio management,

    自動傳遞資訊

  • together with financial complexity,

    都促使我們朝這個方向前進。

  • financial deregulation,

    現在有其他重新分配財富的方法

  • that make it easier to get higher rates of return

    讓人非常想要採用,

  • for a large portfolio,

    像是通貨膨脹,

  • and this seems to be particularly strong

    比起擬定稅務規則, 印鈔票是簡單多了,

  • for billionaires, large capital endowments.

    所以那非常誘人,

  • Just to give you one example,

    可是有時候你不清楚要怎麼處理錢,

  • this comes from the Forbes billionaire rankings

    這就是問題了。

  • over the 1987-2013 period,

    充公是非常吸引人的方式,

  • and you can see the very top wealth holders

    只要你認為有些人太富有了,

  • have been going up at six, seven percent per year

    你就讓他們的財產充公。

  • in real terms above inflation,

    但是制定讓財富流動的法令

  • whereas average income in the world,

    並不是非常有效的辦法;

  • average wealth in the world,

    而戰爭更是無效的辦法,

  • have increased at only two percent per year.

    所以我比較偏好累進式稅制,

  • And you find the same

    當然了,歷史…(笑聲)

  • for large university endowments

    歷史會找到當下的最佳方法,

  • the bigger the initial endowments,

    那可能會是所有方法的匯總。

  • the bigger the rate of return.

    謝謝!

  • Now, what could be done?

    (掌聲)

  • The first thing is that I think we need

    布魯諾.吉桑尼: 托瑪.皮凱提,謝謝你。

  • more financial transparency.

    托瑪,我想請教你兩、三個問題,

  • We know too little about global wealth dynamics,

    因為你運用資料的方式 讓人印象深刻,這是當然的了,

  • so we need international transmission

    不過基本上你指出的是

  • of bank information.

    財富集中的增長算是

  • We need a global registry of financial assets,

    資本主義的自然趨勢,

  • more coordination on wealth taxation,

    如果我們放任它不管,

  • and even wealth tax with a small tax rate

    也許它會傷害到 資本主義本身的系統,

  • will be a way to produce information

    所以你認為我們需要採取

  • so that then we can adapt our policies

    落實財富重分配的政策,

  • to whatever we observe.

    包含我們剛剛看到的

  • And to some extent, the fight

    累進稅制…等等。

  • against tax havens

    在當前的政治環境裡,

  • and automatic transmission of information

    那些方法的可能性有多高呢?

  • is pushing us in this direction.

    你又認為這些方法

  • Now, there are other ways to redistribute wealth,

    有多少可能性會被採用?

  • which it can be tempting to use.

    托瑪.皮凱提:好的,我認為

  • Inflation:

    如果你回頭看,

  • it's much easier to print money

    所得、財富還有稅制的歷史

  • than to write a tax code, so that's very tempting,

    總令人意外,

  • but sometimes you don't know what you do with the money.

    所以我對那些事先知道

  • This is a problem.

    將來會或不會發生什麼事的人

  • Expropriation is very tempting.

    並沒有留下太深刻的印象。

  • Just when you feel some people get too wealthy,

    我想一個世紀前,

  • you just expropriate them.

    許多人會說,

  • But this is not a very efficient way

    累進式所得稅不可行,

  • to organize a regulation of wealth dynamics.

    但後來卻實現了。

  • So war is an even less efficient way,

    甚至是在五年前,

  • so I tend to prefer progressive taxation,

    很多人會說瑞士的銀行保密

  • but of course, history — (Laughter) —

    會永遠罩著我們,

  • history will invent its own best ways,

    因為瑞士對其他國家來說太強勢了。

  • and it will probably involve

    後來突然間美國對瑞士 提出一些制裁,---

  • a combination of all of these.

    要求大幅改變,

  • Thank you.

    現在我們的財務會漸漸變得更透明。

  • (Applause)

    所以我認為要在政治上

  • Bruno Giussani: Thomas Piketty. Thank you.

    做更多協調不是太難的事。

  • Thomas, I want to ask you two or three questions,

    不久後會有一項協定

  • because it's impressive how you're in command of your data, of course,

    由全球半數 GDP 的國家共同協議,

  • but basically what you suggest is

    包含美國和歐盟,

  • growing wealth concentration is kind of

    如果佔全球半數 GDP 的國家

  • a natural tendency of capitalism,

    還不足以改善財務透明、

  • and if we leave it to its own devices,

    對跨國公司的獲利課點稅,

  • it may threaten the system itself,

    那需要多少才夠呢?

  • so you're suggesting that we need to act

    所以我認為並沒有技術上的困難,

  • to implement policies that redistribute wealth,

    我認為我們可以改善,

  • including the ones we just saw:

    只要我們有更務實的方法 來解決這些問題,

  • progressive taxation, etc.

    並且有恰當的制裁手段

  • In the current political context,

    對付因為財務不透明而獲利的人。

  • how realistic are those?

    吉桑尼:有一項爭議

  • How likely do you think that it is

    和你的觀點相左,

  • that they will be implemented?

    那就是經濟不平等

  • Thomas Piketty: Well, you know, I think

    不只是資本主義的特色, 更是經濟的引擎之一,

  • if you look back through time,

    因此我們採取手段減少不平等現象,

  • the history of income, wealth and taxation

    但同時我們也不經意減少了經濟成長,

  • is full of surprise.

    你怎麼回應這點呢?

  • So I am not terribly impressed

    皮凱提:我認為

  • by those who know in advance

    不平等本身並不是個問題,

  • what will or will not happen.

    我認為不平等某種程度

  • I think one century ago,

    對創新跟成長確實能有幫助,

  • many people would have said

    問題是到什麼程度。

  • that progressive income taxation would never happen

    當不平等變得太嚴重,

  • and then it happened.

    對經濟成長就會沒有幫助,

  • And even five years ago,

    而且它還可能有害,

  • many people would have said that bank secrecy

    因為它會導致永久的高度不平等,

  • will be with us forever in Switzerland,

    以及低流動性。

  • that Switzerland was too powerful

    舉例來說十九世紀,

  • for the rest of the world,

    甚至一直到第一次世界大戰以前

  • and then suddenly it took a few U.S. sanctions

    發生在歐洲各國的那種財富集中,

  • against Swiss banks for a big change to happen,

    我認為對成長是沒有幫助的。

  • and now we are moving toward

    財富集中被悲劇事件和政策改變----

  • more financial transparency.

    一同摧毀了,

  • So I think it's not that difficult

    卻未阻擋經濟成長。

  • to better coordinate politically.

    而且極度不平均可能

  • We are going to have a treaty

    對我們的民主體制有害,

  • with half of the world GDP around the table

    如果它造成取得政治發言權的不平等,

  • with the U.S. and the European Union,

    還有在美國政治裡

  • so if half of the world GDP is not enough

    私人財富的影響力,

  • to make progress on financial transparency

    我認為那是現在該擔心的事了。

  • and minimal tax for multinational corporate profits,

    我們不想要回到那種極端,

  • what does it take?

    像第一次世界大戰前那樣的不均。

  • So I think these are not technical difficulties.

    讓中產階級享有適當比例的國家財富---

  • I think we can make progress

    對經濟成長不是壞事,

  • if we have a more pragmatic approach to these questions

    其實還有助於

  • and we have the proper sanctions

    公平與效率原則。

  • on those who benefit from financial opacity.

    吉桑尼:開頭時我曾說

  • BG: One of the arguments

    你的書不斷被人批評,

  • against your point of view

    有一些是批評你的資料,

  • is that economic inequality

    有些是批評你對資料集的選擇,

  • is not only a feature of capitalism but is actually one of its engines.

    你被指控只篩選某些資料做案例,---

  • So we take measures to lower inequality,

    你要怎麼來回答這個問題呢?

  • and at the same time we lower growth, potentially.

    皮凱提:我想說我真的很高興

  • What do you answer to that?

    這本書引起討論,

  • TP: Yeah, I think inequality

    因為那也是這本書的目的之一。

  • is not a problem per se.

    我將全部的資料放上網路,

  • I think inequality up to a point

    包括計算的細節,

  • can actually be useful for innovation and growth.

    是因為這樣一來我們可以

  • The problem is, it's a question of degree.

    公開和透明的辯論。

  • When inequality gets too extreme,

    所以我已經一一回應

  • then it becomes useless for growth

    每一個疑慮,

  • and it can even become bad

    讓我這麼說吧, 假使我今天要重寫這本書,

  • because it tends to lead to high perpetuation

    我一定會斷言

  • of inequality over time

    財富不均日益嚴重的情形,

  • and low mobility.

    特別是在美國,

  • And for instance, the kind of wealth concentrations

    已經超過當初我在書中所述。

  • that we had in the 19th century

    最近賽茲和祖克曼在一項研究中

  • and pretty much until World War I

    採用的新資料

  • in every European country

    就是我出書時還沒有的,

  • was, I think, not useful for growth.

    研究顯示美國的財富已更加集中,

  • This was destroyed by a combination

    甚至高過於我所寫的。

  • of tragic events and policy changes,

    未來還會有其他的資料,

  • and this did not prevent growth from happening.

    某部分會有不同的走向,

  • And also, extreme inequality can be bad

    你看,我們幾乎是每週 把資料放上網路,

  • for our democratic institutions

    將更新的歷程放上全球高所得資料庫,

  • if it creates very unequal access to political voice,

    而且我們未來也會繼續這樣做,

  • and the influence of private money

    特別是在新興國家,

  • in U.S. politics, I think,

    而我也歡迎所有想要

  • is a matter of concern right now.

    協助收集資料的人。

  • So we don't want to return to that kind of extreme,

    事實上我絕對同意

  • pre-World War I inequality.

    財富變動不夠透明,---

  • Having a decent share of the national wealth

    取得較佳資料的好方法

  • for the middle class is not bad for growth.

    就是要有財富稅,

  • It is actually useful

    一開始採取低稅率,

  • both for equity and efficiency reasons.

    這樣我們都能認同

  • BG: I said at the beginning

    這項重要改革,

  • that your book has been criticized.

    還有從我們觀察到的來調整政策。

  • Some of your data has been criticized.

    所以稅收是重要的資訊來源,

  • Some of your choice of data sets has been criticized.

    而那正是我們現在最需要的。

  • You have been accused of cherry-picking data

    吉桑尼:托瑪.皮凱提, 非常感謝(法語)!謝謝你!

  • to make your case. What do you answer to that?

    皮凱提:謝謝大家!(掌聲)

  • TP: Well, I answer that I am very happy

  • that this book is stimulating debate.

  • This is part of what it is intended for.

  • Look, the reason why I put all the data online

  • with all of the detailed computation

  • is so that we can have an open and transparent

  • debate about this.

  • So I have responded point by point

  • to every concern.

  • Let me say that if I was to rewrite the book today,

  • I would actually conclude

  • that the rise in wealth inequality,

  • particularly in the United States,

  • has been actually higher than what I report in my book.

  • There is a recent study by Saez and Zucman

  • showing, with new data

  • which I didn't have at the time of the book,

  • that wealth concentration in the U.S. has risen

  • even more than what I report.

  • And there will be other data in the future.

  • Some of it will go in different directions.

  • Look, we put online almost every week

  • new, updated series on the World Top Income Database

  • and we will keep doing so in the future,

  • in particular in emerging countries,

  • and I welcome all of those who want to contribute

  • to this data collection process.

  • In fact, I certainly agree

  • that there is not enough

  • transparency about wealth dynamics,

  • and a good way to have better data

  • would be to have a wealth tax

  • with a small tax rate to begin with

  • so that we can all agree

  • about this important evolution

  • and adapt our policies to whatever we observe.

  • So taxation is a source of knowledge,

  • and that's what we need the most right now.

  • BG: Thomas Piketty, merci beaucoup.

  • Thank you. TP: Thank you. (Applause)

It's very nice to be here tonight.

今晚能來到 TED 實在太棒了!

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【TED】托馬斯-皮凱蒂:托馬斯-皮凱蒂:二十一世紀資本的新思維》讀後感(一) (【TED】Thomas Piketty: New thoughts on capital in the twenty-first century (Thomas Piketty: New thoughts on capital in the twenty-first century))

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    王惟惟 發佈於 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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