That's the theory of our next guest, Harvard professor and political philosopher Michael Sandel.

這就是下一位嘉賓，哈佛大學教授、政治哲學家邁克爾-桑德爾的理論。

He joins Walter Isaacson to discuss how polarization fueled Trump's campaign.

他與沃爾特-艾薩克森（Walter Isaacson）一起討論了兩極分化如何助長了特朗普的競選活動。

Thank you, Beanna and Michael Sandel.

謝謝你們，貝安娜和邁克爾-桑德爾。

Welcome back to the show.

歡迎回到節目。

Good to be with you, Walter.

很高興和你在一起，沃爾特

You know, when the election results came in, I was rereading your book, Democracy's Discontents, the new version of it.

你知道嗎，選舉結果出來的時候，我正在重讀你的書《民主的不滿》（Democracy's Discontents）的新版本。

And I said, this is the best explanation of what just happened.

我說，這是對剛剛發生的事情最好的解釋。

Explain to me how democracy's discontents that you write about will manifest in the election.

請向我解釋一下你所寫的民主的不滿情緒將如何在選舉中體現出來。

In two ways, Walter.

從兩個方面來說，沃爾特。

First, people feel that they don't have a meaningful say in how they are governed.

首先，人們覺得自己對如何治理自己沒有發言權。

It's really a crisis of self-government.

這其實是一場自治危機。

People feel overwhelmingly that their voice doesn't matter.

人們普遍感到自己的聲音無關緊要。

That's one.

這是一個。

And secondly, people have felt for some time that the moral fabric of community has been unraveling from family, to community, to the nation.

其次，一段時間以來，人們已經感覺到，從家庭、社區到國家，社會的道德結構正在解體。

People hunger for a sense of belonging, a sense of pride, a sense of solidarity.

人們渴望歸屬感、自豪感和團結感。

And people feel unmoored.

人們感到無所適從。

And so I think these are two deep sources of the discontent that this election was about, that Donald Trump managed to tap into, connected also with the grievances of working people, those without university degrees, who felt that elites looked down on them.

是以，我認為這是這次選舉中唐納德-特朗普設法利用的不滿情緒的兩個深層來源，同時也與那些沒有大學學歷的勞動人民的不滿情緒有關，他們認為精英們看不起他們。

You talk about those grievances, and you actually call them legitimate grievances.

你說的這些冤屈，其實就是合法的冤屈。

Explain why.

請解釋原因。

Yes.

是的。

For decades, the divide between winners and losers has been deepening, poisoning our politics and setting us apart.

幾十年來，贏家和輸家之間的鴻溝不斷加深，毒化了我們的政治，使我們分道揚鑣。

It came to a head in 2016, when Donald Trump was first elected, by speaking to those grievances.

2016 年，當唐納德-特朗普首次當選時，這些不滿一吐為快。

And I think the way they arose, Walter, is that for decades, Democrats and Republicans alike had carried out a kind of neoliberal, market-friendly globalization project that delivered enormous rewards to those at the top, but left the bottom half of the country, basically, with stagnant wages and outsourced jobs.

沃爾特，我認為它們產生的原因在於，幾十年來，民主黨和共和黨都在推行一種新自由主義的、有利於市場的全球化項目，該項目為那些處於頂層的人帶來了巨大的回報，但卻基本上讓該國的下半部分人的工資停滯不前，工作外包。

So there was widening inequality of income and wealth.

是以，收入和財富的不平等日益擴大。

But not only that.

不僅如此。

The governing elites, Democrats and Republicans, had told working people, if you want to compete and win in the global economy, go to college.

民主黨和共和黨的執政精英告訴勞動人民，如果你想在全球經濟中競爭並獲勝，就去上大學。

What you earn will depend on what you learn.

你的收入取決於你學到了什麼。

You can make it if you try.

只要你努力，你就能做到。

What they missed was the insult implicit in that bracing advice.

他們忽略了的是，這個令人振奮的建議中暗含的侮辱。

If you're struggling in the new economy, and you didn't get a degree, your failure is your fault.

如果你在新經濟中掙扎，而你沒有獲得學位，那麼你的失敗就是你的錯。

That's the implication.

這就是暗示。

So it's no wonder that many working people felt not only dispossessed and economically squeezed by the new economy, but also insulted, looked down upon by governing elites.

是以，難怪許多勞動人民不僅感到一無所有，在經濟上受到新經濟的擠壓，而且還受到執政精英的侮辱和輕視。

Hey, but the Democratic Party used to be in favor of the average working person.

嘿，但民主黨過去是支持普通勞動者的。

Why do you think they got tagged as the party of what you call the meritocratic elites that down on others?

你認為他們為什麼會被貼上你所說的功利精英黨的標籤？

It's really an important question, Walter, because you're right, there has been a reversal.

這確實是一個重要的問題，沃爾特，因為你是對的，情況發生了逆轉。

Traditionally, the Democratic Party, going back to the New Deal, was the party of the people against the powerful, the party of working people.

從新政開始，民主黨歷來是人民反對強權的政黨，是勞動人民的政黨。

And affluent folks tended to vote Republican.

而富裕的人傾向於投共和黨的票。

Those with college degrees tended to vote Republican.

擁有大學學位的人傾向於投共和黨票。

Those without college degrees and working people tended to vote Democratic.

沒有大學學歷的人和上班族傾向於投民主黨的票。

By 2016, this had flipped.

到 2016 年，這種情況發生了翻天覆地的變化。

Donald Trump did very well among those voters without college degrees.

唐納德-特朗普在沒有大學學歷的選民中表現非常出色。

And those of us who spend our time in the company of the credential can easily forget the fact that most of our fellow citizens don't have four-year degrees.

而我們這些與證書為伴的人很容易忘記一個事實，那就是我們的大多數同胞都沒有四年制學位。

Nearly two-thirds do not.

近三分之二的人不這樣認為。

But with the Democratic Party, the way it evolved during the age of globalization, there was a kind of market triumphalism, but also a kind of meritocratic triumphalism.

但民主黨在全球化時代的發展方式，既有一種市場勝利論，也有一種功利勝利論。

Though there was such emphasis on getting a college degree as the avenue to success, and also to respect, then by 2016, the Democratic Party had become more attuned to the values and the interests and the outlook of credentialed elites and professional classes than to the blue-collar voters who once constituted their primary base of support.

雖然人們強調獲得大學學位是通往成功的途徑，也是獲得尊重的途徑，但到了2016年，民主黨已經變得更加適應有文憑的精英和專業階層的價值觀、利益觀和人生觀，而不是曾經構成其主要支持基礎的藍領選民。

Why has social mobility stalled, and how does that fit into this?

社會流動性為何停滯不前？

We have long consoled ourselves in America that we don't have to worry so much about inequality as those old European countries, because in America it's possible to rise.

長期以來，我們一直安慰自己，在美國，我們不必像那些古老的歐洲國家那樣擔心不平等問題，因為在美國，我們有可能崛起。

No one is consigned to the fate of his or her birth.

沒有人註定要與生俱來。

But what's striking is that the rates of intergenerational upward mobility are higher in the more egalitarian European countries than they are in the United States.

但令人震驚的是，在更加平等的歐洲國家，代際向上流動率要高於美國。

And that's because having a strong welfare state, strong public education, and housing, and health care, provide the kind of stability and strength that actually enables people to rise.

這是因為，擁有一個強大的福利國家、強大的公共教育、住房和醫療保健，能夠提供穩定和力量，使人們真正能夠崛起。

And so what we found is that we have widening inequality, but also stalled mobility.

是以，我們發現，我們的不平等在擴大，但流動性也停滯不前。

And yet the story we tell about ourselves, that in America you can make it if you try, is demoralizing under conditions where many people found over the last few decades that no matter how hard they worked, they couldn't get ahead.

然而，在過去幾十年裡，許多人發現，無論他們如何努力，都無法出人頭地，在這種情況下，我們所講述的關於我們自己的故事--在美國，只要你努力，你就能成功--卻令人士氣低落。

So not only was there economic inequality, and job loss, and wage stagnation, but there was also a demoralizing message pronounced especially by credentialed elites who said, if only you work hard, you can make it.

是以，不僅出現了經濟不平等、失業和工資停滯，而且還出現了士氣低落的資訊，尤其是那些有資歷的精英們說，只要你努力工作，你就能成功。

If only you get a degree, but it's on you, you can make it.

只要你能拿到學位，你就能成功。

And that in a way prevented, I think, progressives, and the Democratic Party in particular, from stepping back and asking a fundamental question.

我認為，這在某種程度上阻礙了進步人士，特別是民主黨，後退一步，提出一個根本性的問題。

If Donald Trump is as unfit and as serious a threat to democracy as we say he is, why is it that half the country, now more than half the country, prefers him to what we've been offering?

如果唐納德-特朗普真像我們說的那樣不合適，對民主構成了嚴重威脅，那麼為什麼有一半的國家，現在已經超過一半的國家，更喜歡他而不是我們提供的人選呢？

That's a sobering question that Democrats need to ask themselves, looking in the mirror and asking, how do we need to rejuvenate the mission and purpose of progressive politics or the Democratic Party if we're to address these sources of grievance and discontent, Walter?

這是一個令人警醒的問題，民主黨人需要捫心自問，照照鏡子，問一問，如果我們要解決這些怨憤和不滿的根源，我們需要如何重振進步政治或民主黨的使命和宗旨，沃爾特？

When you talk about Trump and why he appealed to things, break down the reasons for me.

當你談到特朗普以及他吸引人的原因時，請為我分析一下原因。

To what extent was it economic?

它在多大程度上是經濟性的？

To what extent was it cultural, social issues?

在多大程度上與文化、社會問題有關？

To what extent was it a condescension amongst the elite?

這在多大程度上是精英階層的居高臨下？

I think it was all of those things.

我想這就是所有的原因。

The election itself, I think, boiled down to one fundamental question, which candidate would be able to present themselves as the candidate of change, because people wanted change.

我認為，選舉本身歸結為一個基本問題，即哪位候選人能夠以變革候選人的形象示人，因為人們希望變革。

They were not happy with the way things were going.

他們對事情的發展並不滿意。

Donald Trump won that argument.

唐納德-特朗普贏得了這場爭論。

Kamala Harris was not able, for various reasons, successfully to present herself as the agent of change.

由於種種原因，卡馬拉-哈里斯沒能成功地將自己塑造成變革的推動者。

But beyond that, we have debates in the postmortems.

但除此之外，我們還在事後進行辯論。

Was it economic grievance, or was it cultural anxiety and anger and grievance?

是經濟上的不滿，還是文化上的焦慮、憤怒和不滿？

Or was it elites looking down?

還是精英們在窺視？

It was all of those things.

就是這些東西。

And I think we make a mistake, both as analysts trying to figure out and comment on the election, but also I think the political parties make a mistake, by distinguishing too sharply between economic issues, things like inflation, jobs, economic growth, distribution of income, on the one hand, and cultural grievances.

我認為我們犯了一個錯誤，作為分析家，我們試圖弄清並評論這場選舉，但我也認為各政黨犯了一個錯誤，那就是把經濟問題（如通貨膨脹、就業、經濟增長、收入分配等）和文化不滿區分得過於明顯。

They're closely connected because the economy, of course, it matters how well the economy does in producing jobs and keeping prices down, and so on.

當然，經濟在創造就業機會、平抑物價等方面的表現如何也很重要。

But it matters above all as a system for allocating social recognition and esteem.

但最重要的是，它是一個分配社會認可和尊重的系統。

And this connects to the cultural question.

這與文化問題有關。

Part of what's turned working people against the Democratic Party in recent years is not only that they've been left behind economically, and the Democrats participated in deregulating the financial industry and promoting market-driven globalization.

近年來，讓勞動人民反對民主黨的部分原因不僅在於他們在經濟上被拋在後面，而且民主黨參與了放鬆對金融業的管制和推動市場驅動的全球化。

That all mattered.

這一切都很重要。

But Democrats didn't focus on the dignity of work, didn't focus on honor, respect, social esteem, and recognition.

但民主黨人並不注重工作的尊嚴，不注重榮譽、尊重、社會尊重和認可。

And the emphasis on telling people that the solution to their troubles was to get a college degree contributed to that, to a kind of credentialist condescension.

而強調告訴人們解決煩惱的辦法就是獲得大學學位，則助長了這一點，助長了一種文憑主義的居高臨下。

So people not only felt left behind economically, but they also felt that they were being looked down upon.

是以，人們不僅感到在經濟上被拋在後面，還感到自己被人瞧不起。

And this is a volatile brew of economic and cultural grievance that I think Donald Trump very successfully tapped into, and the Democrats haven't quite come to terms with it.

我認為唐納德-特朗普非常成功地利用了這一點，而民主黨還沒有完全接受這一點。

One of the philosophical concepts that goes through all of your books, and I think the course in justice that you teach at Harvard, is the notion of the commons.

貫穿你所有著作的哲學概念之一，我想你在哈佛教授的正義課程，就是公地的概念。

And at a time when there's rising inequality, as we said, and also a little bit less social mobility, at least there's this concept that there's certain things we have in common.

正如我們所說，在不平等現象日益加劇、社會流動性略有下降的時候，至少有這樣一個概念，即我們有某些共同點。

We all form a line at the Department of Motor Vehicles.

我們在機動車輛管理局排成一隊。

We all get to use the same parks.

我們都可以使用同一個公園。

We all go to the stadium together.

我們一起去體育場。

And yet, I've seen you write about this sorting, sort of a skybox phenomenon, where no longer are we all sitting together in the same common spaces.

然而，我看到你寫到過這種排序，有點像天空盒現象，我們不再坐在同一個公共空間裡。

Yes.

是的。

And I think this is at the heart of what people long for when they feel that they're unmoored, and we don't have a sense of community that holds us together.

我認為，當人們覺得自己失去了歸屬感，沒有一種將我們凝聚在一起的社區意識時，這就是他們所渴望的核心所在。

You mentioned, my name for it is the skyboxification of American life, because in the 90s and early 2000s, sports stadia, which once served as class mixing occasions and places, increasingly even sports stadia, were separated.

你提到過，我給它起的名字是美國生活的天空盒子化，因為在上世紀 90 年代和本世紀初，體育場館曾經是階級混合的場合和場所，甚至越來越多的體育場館被分離出來。

Those who could occupy the luxury corporate boxes, and those fans, common folk in the stands below.

那些可以佔據豪華企業包廂的人，以及下面看臺上的普通球迷。

And what really has unfolded during the last several decades is that the most corrosive effect of the widening inequalities has been on the erosion of those public places and common spaces that gather us together as citizens in the ordinary course of our lives.

而在過去幾十年中，不平等現象不斷擴大所造成的最嚴重的腐蝕性影響，就是侵蝕了那些在日常生活中將我們作為公民聚集在一起的公共場所和公共空間。

Increasingly, those who are affluent, and those of modest means, live separate lives.

越來越多的富裕人群和經濟條件一般的人群過著兩地分居的生活。

We send our kids to different schools.

我們把孩子送到不同的學校。

We live and work and shop and play in different places.

我們在不同的地方生活、工作、購物和娛樂。

This isn't good for democracy, because democracy is about more than just voting on election day.

這對民主不利，因為民主不僅僅是在選舉日投票。

It's about sharing a common life that reminds us that we are all in this together.

這是為了分享共同的生活，提醒我們大家都在一起。

And increasingly, the way our civil society has unraveled, the way there is less and less encounter among people from different walks of life in the ordinary course of our lives, that erodes the sense of commonality that democracy requires.

而且，我們的公民社會已經解體，來自不同階層的人們在日常生活中的接觸越來越少，這日益削弱了民主所要求的共同意識。

And here's another thing that Democrats and progressives have missed.

民主黨人和進步人士還忽略了另一件事。

Even those who have seen the importance of alleviating the inequality, and even those who have called for some populist economic programs to take seriously the dignity of work, need to connect that economic rejuvenation with a sense of community, and that includes to claim a kind of monopoly on national pride.

即使是那些看到了緩解不平等的重要性的人，即使是那些呼籲一些民粹主義經濟計劃認真對待工作尊嚴的人，也需要將經濟復興與社區意識聯繫起來，這包括要求一種對民族自豪感的壟斷。

Make America great again?

讓美國再次偉大？

Well, there are a lot of problems with that.

這樣做有很多問題。

But it suggests, it speaks to the aspiration for national pride.

但它表明，它訴說著對民族自豪感的渴望。

There's a tendency, understandably, to say, well, that's the MAGA project, a kind of hyper-nationalism that is ungenerous to immigrants, and to outsiders, and to inclusiveness.

可以理解的是，人們傾向於說，這就是MAGA項目，一種對移民、外來者和包容性都不慷慨的超民族主義。

But the answer to that is not to cast a kind of suspicion on all things patriotic, but to articulate a progressive vision of what patriotism, and national pride, and a sense of community can mean.

但是，要解決這個問題，並不是要對所有愛國主義的東西持一種懷疑的態度，而是要對愛國主義、民族自豪感和社區意識的含義提出一種進步的看法。

Tell me what that vision is.

告訴我你的願景是什麼？

Part of it is to launch a serious project to renew civil society, to strengthen public places and common spaces of shared democratic citizenship.

其中之一就是啟動一個嚴肅的項目，以更新公民社會，加強公共場所和共同的民主公民空間。

And that means investing, often at the local, state and local level, in everything from municipal parks, and public that bring people together, and especially, and above all, I should say, the public schools, to bring people from different classes into a shared democratic encounter.

這就意味著投資，通常是在地方、州和地方層面，投資於從市政公園到將人們聚集在一起的公共設施，尤其是，我應該說，最重要的是，投資於公立學校，將來自不同階層的人們聚集在一起，共同分享民主。

So that's one.

所以這是一個。

But in speaking about the economy, I think we can bring patriotic themes to bear there, too.

但在談論經濟時，我認為我們也可以把愛國主義的主題融入其中。

Part of what the age of globalization did was to say, to imply, and to teach national borders and national identity, they don't matter so much.

全球化時代所做的部分工作就是說、暗示和教導國界和民族身份並不那麼重要。

We don't really need to depend on those folks who live nearby, or for that matter, in our country, either for production or for consumption.

無論是生產還是消費，我們其實都不需要依賴那些住在附近的人，或者是我們國家的人。

We can collaborate and produce with people anywhere in the world.

我們可以與世界上任何地方的人合作和製作。

And this underlay the outsourcing.

而這正是外包的基礎。

But it also conveyed a certain attitude of less and less dependence on those with whom we share a country.

但這也傳達了一種態度，即我們越來越不依賴那些與我們同屬一個國家的人。

And so I think this, too, is part of unraveling of a sense of national community.

是以，我認為這也是民族共同體意識瓦解的一部分。

I think it has fueled the anger that those who have broken away with enormous wealth seem to feel less need to rely on fellow citizens closer to home.

我認為，這加劇了人們的憤怒，因為那些擁有鉅額財富的人似乎覺得不太需要依賴離家較近的同胞。

So an economic patriotism, we've seen at the beginning of it, with friendshoring, or bringing supply chains closer to home, with making public investments to manufacture key goods, to support key industries domestically, that can all be articulated in terms of a kind of rejuvenated patriotism that is connected to the dignity of work, and our mutual dependence, and our mutual obligations on one another, for one another, as fellow citizens.

是以，經濟愛國主義，我們已經看到了它的開端，如友商，或使供應鏈更貼近本土，進行公共投資以生產關鍵產品，支持國內的關鍵產業，這些都可以用一種重新煥發活力的愛國主義來表述，這種愛國主義與工作的尊嚴、我們的相互依賴以及我們作為同胞相互之間的相互義務聯繫在一起。

Michael Sandel, thank you so much for joining us.

邁克爾-桑德爾，非常感謝您接受我們的採訪。

Thank you, Walter.

謝謝你，沃爾特。