Donald Trump's first presidency gave Washington a playbook of hard-line tactics for preventing China from overtaking the U.S.

唐納德-特朗普（Donald Trump）的首任總統任期為華盛頓提供了一本防止中國超越美國的強硬策略手冊。

as the world's dominant economic and technological power.

成為世界經濟和技術的主導力量。

Trump introduced punitive tariffs on China, as well as trying to rebalance the trade deficit, to try and contain China's economic rise, as well as trying to contain its military might.

特朗普對中國徵收懲罰性關稅，並試圖重新平衡貿易逆差，試圖遏制中國的經濟崛起，同時也試圖遏制中國的軍事實力。

To me, the most beautiful word in the dictionary is tariff.

對我來說，字典裡最美的詞就是關稅。

Trump has focused on raising tariffs to prevent China from shipping many of their goods into the United States that perhaps are subsidized by the government.

特朗普的重點是提高關稅，以阻止中國將許多可能得到政府補貼的商品運入美國。

And his campaign for re-election left no doubt that his ambition for American supremacy was still his North Star.

而他競選連任的活動也毫無疑問地表明，他對美國霸主地位的野心仍然是他的北極星。

We will hire American, buy American, build American, grow American, and show the whole world that the American dream is back.

我們將僱用美國人、購買美國貨、建造美國建築、發展美國經濟，並向全世界展示美國夢又回來了。

But after four years out of the Oval Office,

但在離開橢圓形辦公室四年之後

Trump is returning to face an emboldened, savvier China, and one the U.S. may already be losing its battle to contain.

特朗普回來後將面對一個更加大膽、更加精明的中國，而美國可能已經在遏制中國的鬥爭中敗下陣來。

Tackling that is likely to be one of Trump's primary plot lines in the sequel to his first four-year showdown with China.

在特朗普與中國長達四年的首次對決的續集中，解決這一問題很可能是他的主要計劃之一。

Let's rewind for a second.

讓我們倒帶一下。

When China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, it marked a new era in global economics.

2001 年中國加入世界貿易組織，標誌著全球經濟進入了一個新時代。

Lower trade barriers allowed China to ship cheap toys,

貿易壁壘的降低使中國得以運輸廉價玩具、

T-shirts, and TVs around the globe and an export bonanza that helped lift hundreds of millions of Chinese into the middle class.

在中國，T恤衫和電視機銷往全球各地，出口紅利幫助數億中國人步入中產階級行列。

Then around here, two pivotal events occurred.

後來，在這裡發生了兩件關鍵性事件。

I am officially running for president of the United States.

我將正式競選美國總統。

I am officially running for president of the United States.

我將正式競選美國總統。

And that same year, China officially revealed a 10-year plan to upgrade its thriving export economy with cutting-edge innovations.

同年，中國正式公佈了一項十年計劃，以尖端創新提升其蓬勃發展的出口經濟。

Made in China 2025 is essentially President Xi Jinping's vision to secure China's place in the world as a preeminent global technological leader.

中國製造 2025》實質上是習近平主席的願景，即確保中國作為全球卓越技術領導者的世界地位。

At its heart, it's really about ensuring that China's national security goals are at the heart of its policymaking.

其核心是確保中國的國家安全目標成為其決策的核心。

It's the kind of grand ambition that would galvanize successive U.S. presidents into taking action.

這種宏大抱負將激勵美國曆屆總統採取行動。

This is number one, but this is the first of many.

這是第一個，但也是許多箇中的第一個。

The U.S. efforts to contain China's growth began with tariffs and some of the trade policies in the Trump administration.

美國遏制中國經濟增長的努力始於關稅和特朗普政府的一些貿易政策。

Basically, they sought to make it more expensive for Chinese companies to sell to the U.S. and consequently redress a massive trade deficit, the imbalance that occurs when a nation imports more from a country than it exports to it.

從根本上說，他們試圖提高中國公司向美國銷售產品的成本，從而彌補鉅額貿易逆差，即當一個國家從另一個國家進口的產品多於向該國出口的產品時出現的不平衡。

President Biden is holding back on a decision to scrap any Trump-era tariffs on China imports.

拜登總統暫不決定取消特朗普時代對中國進口商品徵收的任何關稅。

You can see this has had an impact.

可以看出，這已經產生了影響。

In 2023, the deficit shrank to the smallest total since 2010, reflecting a decline in imports shipped from China.

2023 年，赤字總額降至 2010 年以來的最小值，反映出從中國進口的貨物減少。

But globally, China's productive prowess is at historic heights.

但在全球範圍內，中國的生產實力達到了歷史最高水準。

Its manufactured goods trade surplus is the largest relative to global GDP of any country since the U.S. right after World War II.

其製成品貿易順差相對於全球 GDP 的比例是自二戰後美國以來最大的。

Trump also introduced policies to control high-tech exports from U.S. manufacturers, as well as those of some allied economies, which were tightened by the Biden administration.

特朗普還出臺了控制美國以及一些盟國經濟體制造商高科技出口的政策，拜登政府曾收緊了這些政策。

So that essentially makes it impossible or much harder to transfer

是以，從根本上說，轉讓是不可能的，或者說難上加難

U.S. goods or U.S. technologies into China.

美國商品或美國技術進入中國。

The U.S. government stopped Huawei from being able to sell much of its telecom equipment into the United States.

美國政府阻止華為向美國銷售其大部分電信設備。

And then it went even a step further.

然後又更進一步。

It went to many of its allies around the world and tried to persuade them also to not let Huawei sell its equipment into their countries.

它去找世界各地的許多盟國，試圖說服它們也不要讓華為向其國家出售設備。

That caused all sorts of problems for them.

這給他們帶來了各種問題。

In 2022, they constrained China's ability to get the most advanced semiconductors out there, including AI chips that would be used to train models like CHAT-GPT.

2022 年，它們限制了中國獲得最先進半導體的能力，包括用於訓練 CHAT-GPT 等模型的人工智能芯片。

They also constrained the country's ability to get chipmaking equipment, including the machines that make the most advanced chips that drive smartphones and also AI and quantum computing.

它們還限制了該國獲得芯片製造設備的能力，包括製造驅動智能手機以及人工智能和量子計算的最先進芯片的機器。

Massive appliances like these extreme ultraviolet lithography machines, developed by Dutch company ASML.

像這些由荷蘭 ASML 公司開發的極紫外線光刻機這樣的大型設備。

The constraints are also intended to hinder China's tech giants from developing anything that could threaten America's military superiority, a concern long intertwined with Washington's economic strategy.

這些限制措施還旨在阻止中國的科技巨頭開發任何可能威脅美國軍事優勢的產品，而這一問題長期以來一直與華盛頓的經濟戰略交織在一起。

In terms of semiconductors and these really sensitive technologies,

就半導體和這些真正敏感的技術而言、

China is still lagging behind the U.S.

中國仍落後於美國

So we have seen some efficacy there.

是以，我們在這方面看到了一些成效。

But the data shows U.S.-led export controls had an unintended side effect.

但數據顯示，美國主導的出口管制產生了意想不到的副作用。

They forced China to become more self-reliant and invest in its own scientists and researchers.

它們迫使中國更加自力更生，並投資於自己的科學家和研究人員。

They've been very aggressive in applying for patents that they think are going to help them develop domestic industries that are critical to their future.

他們非常積極地申請專利，認為這將有助於他們發展對未來至關重要的國內產業。

When President Xi Jinping makes something a priority in China, he can point to banks to provide cheap financing.

當習近平主席將某件事列為中國的優先事項時，他可以指著銀行提供廉價融資。

He can point to state-owned enterprises to throw their full weight behind backing that certain sector or industry.

他可以指出國有企業全力以赴支持某個部門或行業。

For instance, backers of companies like Shanghai Microelectronics Equipment considered China's best bet for competing with ASML's advanced lithography machines.

例如，上海微電子設備有限公司等公司的支持者認為，中國是與 ASML 先進光刻機競爭的最佳選擇。

At this point, I think everybody believes that they're many years away from being able to match ASML at the pinnacle of the industry.

在這一點上，我想每個人都相信，他們要想在行業巔峰上與 ASML 匹敵，還有很多年的路要走。

But they're pouring billions and billions of dollars into this effort and they're very determined to be able to close the gap as much as they possibly can.

但是，他們在這項工作中投入了數十億美元，下定決心要儘可能縮小差距。

Evidence that China's semiconductor ecosystem was expanding emerged in 2023 when Huawei released the Mate 60, or more precisely when Bloomberg News commissioned a research firm to take one apart.

2023 年，當華為發佈 Mate 60 時，或者更準確地說，當彭博新聞社委託一家研究公司拆解華為 Mate 60 時，中國半導體生態系統正在擴大的證據就出現了。

Inside that phone was a semiconductor that was much more powerful than anybody thought China could make on its own.

那部手機中的半導體比任何人想象的都要強大得多。

It suggested instead of being eight or ten years behind the U.S., actually China was four to five years behind the U.S.

這表明，與其說中國比美國落後八到十年，不如說中國比美國落後四到五年。

But the cross-application is what really worries D.C.

但交叉應用才是華盛頓特區真正擔心的問題。

If we can do this with a consumer product like a phone, it's just as easy to do this with much more sensitive technology that's used for military applications.

如果我們能在手機這樣的消費品上做到這一點，那麼在用於軍事應用的更為敏感的技術上做到這一點也同樣容易。

In other areas, China really has charged ahead to take a lead.

在其他領域，中國確實衝鋒在前，一馬當先。

Take a look at this chart.

看看這張圖表。

You can see China's market share of many high-tech exports growing, particularly EVs, despite U.S. tariffs and restrictions on access to technology.

你可以看到，儘管美國對中國徵收關稅並限制技術准入，但中國在許多高科技出口產品中的市場份額仍在增長，尤其是電動汽車。

Ultimately, there is this idea that trade always gets through and that's sort of what we see when we think about the EV industry in China.

歸根結底，有一種觀點認為，貿易總能獲得成功，而這正是我們在思考中國電動車行業時所看到的。

So, for example, a big EV automaker like BYD is already getting around some of these potential restrictions by building factories in places like Thailand, in Hungary, in Brazil.

例如，像比亞迪這樣的大型電動汽車製造商已經通過在泰國、匈牙利、巴西等地建廠來規避一些潛在的限制。

Trump wants to further limit imports of Chinese EVs and batteries and in his second term may try to fulfill a popular campaign pledge to protect U.S. carmakers.

特朗普希望進一步限制中國電動汽車和電池的進口，並可能在第二任期內努力兌現保護美國汽車製造商的競選承諾。

I will impose whatever tariffs are required, 100 percent, 200 percent, 1,000 percent.

我會徵收任何必要的關稅，100%、200%、1000%。

They're not going to sell one car into the United States.

他們不會向美國出售一輛汽車。

The concern in Washington is that the electric vehicles and some of the software behind them would be able to collect personal information and perhaps share it with the Chinese government or at least with the companies that are involved in making those vehicles.

華盛頓的擔憂是，電動汽車及其背後的一些軟件將能夠收集個人信息，並可能與中國政府或至少與參與制造這些汽車的公司共享。

It's the kind of rhetoric Beijing has vehemently rejected.

中國政府堅決反對這種言論。

We support China's legitimate and legitimate rights.

我們支持中國的合法正當權利。

We also support China's legitimate and legitimate rights.

我們也支持中國的合法正當權利。

So have two U.S. administrations hindered China in ways Trump initially intended?

那麼，兩屆美國政府是否以特朗普最初希望的方式阻礙了中國的發展？

It doesn't appear so.

看來並非如此。

The vast majority have made it in China 2025 targets that Bloomberg tracks actually have been achieved or are on track to be achieved.

彭博社跟蹤的中國 2025 年目標絕大多數已經實現或有望實現。

Tariffs have helped cut America's trade deficit with its rival.

關稅有助於削減美國與其競爭對手之間的貿易逆差。

But as we saw earlier, they haven't prevented China from boosting exports elsewhere.

但正如我們之前所看到的，它們並沒有阻止中國在其他地方增加出口。

And while the U.S. may have slowed Beijing's progress in some areas, like advanced chip making, overall, Xi Jinping's industrial policies are successfully advancing

雖然美國可能會延緩北京在某些領域（如先進芯片製造）的進展，但總體而言，習近平的產業政策正在成功推進

China's technological capabilities.

中國的技術能力。

But even if the U.S. hasn't managed to trip China yet, nobody expects a second Trump administration to stop trying.

不過，即使美國尚未成功絆倒中國，也沒人指望特朗普第二任政府會停止努力。

If you look at the geopolitical landscape,

縱觀地緣政治格局、

I think it's clear that the United States will continue to apply pressure on their ally for more restriction.

我認為，很明顯，美國將繼續向其盟友施壓，施加更多限制。

How this sequel to Trump's first confrontation with China will play out is yet to be written.

特朗普與中國首次對抗的續集將如何上演，還沒有定論。

But if you listen to Trump, it's clear that keeping America on top is his ultimate goal.

但如果你聽特朗普的話，很明顯，保持美國的領先地位才是他的終極目標。

We can do things that nobody else can do.

我們可以做到別人做不到的事情。

China doesn't have what we have.

中國沒有我們所擁有的。

Nobody has what we have.

沒有人擁有我們所擁有的一切。