I think that when you remember the manifest causes of conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, which have bedeviled us for 20 years and which are by no means in any conventional sense solved, when you remember the ideological ferocity that animated the post-war communists that we see now in the Chinese unmuted form, you think of the anti-communist ferocity with which we met this, the notion that there is a telephone communication between the White House and the Kremlin to make sure that there are no misunderstandings is a damn new pattern of behavior. I think it's something that, almost without precedent, in wars and conflicts which have such a total character as that between the communists and the free world has tended to have, I think the notion that the United States should be fixing up its power to fight limited engagements on the ground and in the air with old-fashioned weapons that we hope are a little better than they used to be, not as a step in conquering the world, but as a step in giving a chance to think, to pause, to argue and to persuade before a holocaust, that's a pattern that I believe is not familiar either. When you think that for years the intellectuals of Russia were interested in France, the United Kingdom, the United States, have gotten together to talk to each other about the problems of armament and the problems of the application of science and the problems of maintaining the peace, this also is not quite something that is familiar.
我認為,當你回憶起蘇聯和美國之間衝突的明顯原因(這些原因困擾了我們 20 年,而且從任何傳統意義上講都沒有得到解決),當你回憶起戰後共產黨人在意識形態上的凶殘(我們現在看到的是中國的無聲形式),當你回憶起我們遇到這種情況時反共的凶殘,白宮和克里姆林宮之間通過電話溝通以確保沒有誤解的概念是一種該死的新行為模式。我認為,在共產主義和自由世界之間的戰爭和衝突中,美國應該加強力量,在地面和空中使用我們希望比過去更好一點的老式武器進行有限的交戰,這幾乎是沒有先例的、不是作為征服世界的一步,而是作為在大屠殺之前給人們