It's being called the ultimate election year, when countries with half the world's population can vote for their leaders.

今年被稱為終極選舉年，屆時擁有世界一半人口的國家可以投票選舉自己的領導人。

This is a big test of democracy that requires millions of polling places and billions of ballots.

這是一場民主大考，需要數百萬個投票站和數十億張選票。

But voting's not always easy.

但投票並不總是那麼容易。

In some places, people need to travel long distances or wait in long lines.

在一些地方，人們需要長途跋涉或排長隊等候。

In the United States, we vote on a Tuesday, so sometimes people need to take off from work.

在美國，我們在星期二投票，所以有時人們需要請假。

I'm very excited to go vote.

我很想去投票。

And I'm wondering, wouldn't it be easier if I could just...

我在想，如果我能...

Why can't I vote online?

為什麼不能在線投票？

Over the past few months, I've been talking to voting and security experts to try to answer that question.

在過去的幾個月裡，我一直在與投票專家和安全專家交談，試圖回答這個問題。

And it turns out that the answer is more controversial, complicated, and high-stakes than I could have ever imagined.

而事實證明，答案的爭議性、複雜性和高風險超出了我的想象。

Online voting.

在線投票。

Online voting.

在線投票。

Online ballots.

在線投票。

Online voting system.

在線投票系統。

Our adversaries are extremely talented.

我們的對手才華橫溢。

Vulnerable to cyber attacks.

易受網絡攻擊。

It's simply not secure enough.

這根本不夠安全。

They have unbounded amounts of hackers, computers, and cash.

他們擁有不計其數的黑客、電腦和現金。

Faster and easier.

更快、更簡單

More convenient and boost voter turnout.

更方便，提高投票率。

Total security for your vote.

全面保障您的投票安全。

Might be the future of elections.

這可能就是選舉的未來。

One of the surprising origins of online voting is actually space.

網絡投票令人驚訝的起源之一其實是太空。

In 1997, the U.S. state of Texas added an option for online voting to let this astronaut vote from the Mir space station.

1997 年，美國得克薩斯州增加了在線投票選項，讓這位太空人在和平號空間站上投票。

We fill out this application, the ballot is encrypted to us, we send it back down, and they record the vote.

我們填寫申請表，選票加密後發給我們，我們再把選票發回去，他們就會記錄投票。

This tradition of allowing astronauts to vote from space is still happening.

這種允許太空人在太空投票的傳統仍在延續。

The two American astronauts that are trapped on the ISS right now are planning to vote this way.

目前被困在國際空間站上的兩名美國太空人正計劃這樣投票。

And now, all of these states allow options for online voting for military and overseas citizens.

現在，所有這些州都允許軍人和海外公民選擇在線投票。

All in, about 300,000 Americans voted online in 2020.

總之，2020 年約有 30 萬美國人在網上投票。

Around the world, this map isn't exhaustive, but all of these countries have options for people to vote online to varying degrees.

在世界各地，這張地圖並不詳盡，但所有這些國家都在不同程度上為人們提供了在線投票的選擇。

But again, it's mostly available to people with special circumstances, it's not available to everybody.

但還是那句話，這主要是提供給有特殊情況的人，並不是每個人都能享受到。

In most of the world, voting looks like this.

在世界上大多數國家，投票是這樣進行的。

In India, for example, the world's largest democracy, people go to polling stations and then vote using electronic machines like this.

例如，在世界上最大的民主國家印度，人們前往投票站，然後使用這樣的電子投票機投票。

And then election officials paint their fingers with ink that lasts around two weeks.

然後，選舉官員在他們的手指上塗上墨水，這種墨水可以持續兩週左右。

This helps prevent fraud.

這有助於防止欺詐行為。

Or in Gambia, for example, people place marbles into colored drums like this.

例如，在甘比亞，人們會把彈珠放到這樣的彩色鼓裡。

Or in the United States, here's me voting for the first time when I was 19.

或者在美國，這是我 19 歲時第一次投票。

I love that picture because I got all dressed up.

我喜歡這張照片，因為我打扮得漂漂亮亮的。

When I go this year, I'll mark a paper ballot, put it into the machine like this, and my vote will likely be counted using an optical scan ballot counter, which records the vote by reading the ballot like one of those Scantron tests you might have taken at school.

今年投票時，我會在紙質選票上做記號，然後像這樣把選票放進投票機，然後可能會使用光學掃描計票機來計算我的選票，這種計票機通過讀取選票來記錄選票，就像你在學校參加的 Scantron 考試一樣。

Importantly, the physical paper ballot is kept as a backup in case of an audit or a recount.

重要的是，實物紙質選票將作為備份保存，以備審計或重新計票時使用。

Many countries do something similar to this process.

許多國家的做法與此類似。

The totals then get sent to a central office, which reports unofficial results.

然後，這些總數被送到中央辦公室，由其報告非官方結果。

That's what we see on TV on election night.

這就是我們在選舉之夜從電視上看到的。

So this is the map right now.

這就是現在的地圖。

Too close to call.

太接近了，很難說。

We can now project the winner of the presidential race.

我們現在可以預測總統競選的勝者了。

The official results can sometimes come weeks later after election officials have had a But only about two-thirds of eligible U.S. citizens usually vote.

官方結果有時會在幾周後，在選舉官員對投票結果進行分析後才會公佈，但通常只有約三分之二的合格美國公民參加投票。

Compared to other countries, that's not great.

與其他國家相比，這並不算好。

The biggest dream North Star of online voting is to help increase the number of people who vote.

網絡投票最大的夢想北極星是幫助增加投票人數。

We don't know that it'll do that.

我們不知道它會不會這樣做。

But it would be enough, in my mind, if it just made it easier for people to participate in their own democracies.

但在我看來，只要能讓人們更容易地參與自己的民主政治，這就足夠了。

If and only if we can do it safely.

如果而且只有在我們能夠安全地做到這一點的情況下。

The biggest thing to remember here about online voting is that the stakes couldn't be higher.

關於網絡投票，最重要的一點是，其利害關係不可謂不大。

We're talking about the most important, well-armed countries in the world choosing who runs them and trying to affect who runs their enemies.

我們談論的是世界上最重要、武器最精良的國家選擇誰來管理他們，並試圖影響誰來管理他們的敵人。

This is cybersecurity on a whole other level.

這是另一個層面上的網絡安全。

If you're one of the select people voting online in the U.S. now, you often have to email or fax your ballot.

如果您是美國現在網上投票的特定人群之一，您通常需要通過電子郵件或傳真來發送選票。

And the cybersecurity experts that I spoke to were very clear.

與我交談過的網絡安全專家都非常清楚。

That is not a system that you want a whole country using.

你不希望整個國家都使用這種系統。

But this is huge if true.

但是，如果這是真的，那就不得了了。

So let's imagine.

讓我們想象一下

What would good online voting actually take?

良好的網絡投票究竟需要什麼？

This is Dr. Joe Connery and Dr. Josh Benalow, who are both cybersecurity experts with over 20 years' experience working on online voting.

這位是喬-康納利博士（Dr. Joe Connery）和喬什-貝納洛博士（Dr. Josh Benalow），他們都是網絡安全專家，在網絡投票方面擁有 20 多年的工作經驗。

They're going to be our guides to understand why this problem is so hard and how we might be able to solve it.

他們將成為我們的嚮導，幫助我們理解為什麼這個問題如此棘手，以及我們如何才能解決這個問題。

How hard is this problem, really?

這個問題到底有多難？

It is a difficult problem.

這是一個難題。

We don't have all of the problems solved or well enough solved.

我們並沒有解決所有問題，也沒有解決得足夠好。

I usually will list four basic challenges to voting online.

我通常會列出網絡投票的四個基本挑戰。

And the first is credentials.

首先是證書。

If you're voting online, you have to have credentials of some sort, digital credentials.

如果你在網上投票，你必須有某種憑證，數字憑證。

There are places that have this.

有些地方也有這種情況。

In Estonia, every citizen gets an electronic ID card, which they use for healthcare, taxes, and since the early 2000s, online voting.

在愛沙尼亞，每個公民都有一張電子身份證，他們可以用這張身份證進行醫療保健、納稅，從 2000 年代初開始，還可以進行在線投票。

When an Estonian goes to vote, they use their ID card to validate their identity and then cast their vote.

愛沙尼亞人去投票時，先用身份證驗證身份，然後再投票。

In Europe, national ID cards are a thing and they've been around forever.

在歐洲，國家身份證是個東西，而且一直存在。

But in the U.S.?

但在美國呢？

In America, there has always been an extreme resistance to the rollout of a national ID system.

在美國，推行全國身份證系統一直受到極大的阻力。

Social security numbers?

社會保險號碼？

You have a number.

你有一個號碼。

That is true.

沒錯。

And that number sort of represents the foundation of what could be, you know, the first step of 1,000 to get to a national ID card from a technical standpoint.

從技術角度看，這個數字可以說是實現國民身份證的第一步。

But from a political standpoint, it's simply a no-go.

但從政治角度來看，這根本不可能。

This isn't just technical challenges.

這不僅僅是技術上的挑戰。

It's political ones, too.

這也是政治性的。

The second challenge is both technical and political.

第二個挑戰既是技術性的，也是政治性的。

Coercion.

脅迫。

If I'm using a phone to vote and I log into the phone, like with my facial ID, I can just then hand that to someone else and they can vote.

如果我用手機投票，並用面部 ID 登錄手機，我就可以把手機交給其他人，讓他們投票。

Though you can't do that in a polling place.

不過在投票站可做不到這一點。

Imagine your boss says that they'll give you $500 to vote for a particular candidate.

想象一下，你的老闆說給你 500 美元，讓你投給某位候選人。

It's crucial that your vote is a secret.

您的投票是保密的，這一點至關重要。

And not just that you vote in secret, but also that you don't have a receipt that you could then take back to your boss and say, ka-ching.

不僅是祕密投票，還因為你沒有收據，無法拿回去對老闆說 "咔嚓"。

When we didn't have secret ballot, we had lots of vote selling and vote buying and, you know, manipulation of voters.

在沒有無記名投票的時候，我們有很多賣票和買票的行為，你知道，還有操縱選民的行為。

Estonia deals with this by allowing voters to recast their vote as many times as they want online, with the last recorded vote being counted.

愛沙尼亞在處理這一問題時，允許選民在網上不限次數地重新投票，最後一次記錄的投票將被計算在內。

So if someone forced you to vote a certain way, you could re-vote later.

是以，如果有人強迫你以某種方式投票，你可以稍後再投。

We think of other things like online banking as being secret.

我們認為網上銀行等其他東西都是祕密的。

But by this standard, they're not at all.

但按照這個標準，他們根本不是。

In banking, you must not be secret.

在銀行業，你絕不能保密。

You're logging into a website and every transaction you make has to be part of your public ledger shared with the bank.

你登錄一個網站，你所做的每一筆交易都必須成為與銀行共享的公共分類賬的一部分。

You can see all of your transactions afterward and your bank can see them too.

之後，您可以查看您的所有交易，您的銀行也可以看到這些交易。

Online voting is not like online banking.

網上投票與網上銀行不同。

That brings us to the third problem with online voting.

這就是網絡投票的第三個問題。

Client malware.

客戶惡意軟件。

Hackers.

黑客

Data breach.

數據洩露

Major data breach.

重大數據洩露事件。

Stole private information.

竊取私人資訊

Paralyzed by ransomware attacks.

因勒索軟件攻擊而癱瘓。

But first I gotta tell you about another piece of technology.

不過，我得先告訴你另一項技術。

This.

這。

I love the backstory of this company.

我喜歡這家公司的背景故事。

They were originally an aerospace company and they made parts for a Mars rover and the International Space Station.

他們最初是一家航空航天公司，為火星探測器和國際空間站製造零部件。

And then in 2020, they took all of that engineering expertise and they brought it to this razor.

到了 2020 年，他們將所有的工程專業知識都運用到了這款刮鬚刀上。

This is the Henson AL-13.

這是 Henson AL-13。

It also feels like a piece of engineering.

它還讓人感覺像是一項工程。

Like this does make me feel cool.

這確實讓我感覺很酷。

One of the problems with razors is that they're typically not supported well enough.

刮鬚刀的一個問題是，它們通常沒有足夠的支撐。

So the blade actually moves a little bit along your skin.

是以，刀片實際上是沿著皮膚一點點移動的。

And that's one of the reasons that people get razor burned.

這也是人們被刮鬚刀灼傷的原因之一。

The blade only extends past the shave plane a tiny little bit.

刀片只超出刮鬚刀平面一點點。

It's .0013 inches, which is actually less than the thickness of a human hair.

它是 0.0013 英寸，實際上還不到人的頭髮絲粗細。

That also helps the razor hold the blade at the ideal 30 degree angle.

這也有助於刮鬚刀將刀片保持在理想的 30 度角。

It's also completely plastic free.

它還完全不含塑膠。

And not just the razor, but the packaging too.

不僅是刮鬚刀，包裝也是如此。

And I found it cool that this company is doing a bunch of research to help understand what makes people get the best shave.

這家公司正在進行大量研究，以幫助瞭解是什麼讓人們獲得最佳剃鬚效果，我覺得這很酷。

So like here, for example, the camera detects blood flow in the skin.

比如在這裡，攝像頭可以檢測到皮膚中的血流。

So red means more irritation and green means less.

是以，紅色表示刺激性較強，綠色表示刺激性較弱。

If you're looking for a new razor and you love good engineering, you might enjoy it.

如果你正在尋找一款新的刮鬚刀，並且喜歡出色的工程設計，你可能會喜歡它。

Click the link in my description.

點擊我描述中的鏈接。

Now, back to client malware.

現在，回到客戶端惡意軟件上來。

As soon as you go to internet voting, that means every voter's device in the entire election is part of the election's infrastructure.

一旦使用網絡投票，就意味著整個選舉中每個選民的設備都是選舉基礎設施的一部分。

For a hacker, that's a lot of doors to get through.

對於黑客來說，要通過的門可真不少。

And so your attack surface is what we call it in cybersecurity, has grown many orders of magnitude larger.

是以，我們在網絡安全領域所說的攻擊面，已經擴大了許多數量級。

And suddenly you have to worry about the bad guys getting into any of those doors.

突然間，你不得不擔心壞人會進入任何一扇門。

Yikes.

呀

The thing most people are worried about here is vote flipping.

在這裡，大多數人擔心的是翻票。

I try to vote for A, there's malware on my phone.

我想投 A 票，但手機上有惡意軟件。

It casts a vote for B without my knowing it.

它讓我在不知不覺中投了 B 一票。

And you know, there's a vote for B.

你知道，有一票投給了 B。

But I use my phone to do all kinds of secure things, right?

但我用手機做各種安全的事情，不是嗎？

Like why can't we just build an unhackable system?

比如，我們為什麼不能建立一個無法破解的系統？

I bank online, I send encrypted messages.

我在網上銀行，我發送加密資訊。

I don't understand yet how voting is different from what I already do.

我還不明白投票與我已經在做的事情有什麼不同。

The principal difference is the ability to confirm that things have been done properly.

主要區別在於能否確認事情已經妥善處理。

And that confirmation is hard because of the secret ballot.

由於無記名投票的原因，這種確認很難。

Right, so the thing that protects us from one problem, coercion, causes another problem, which is confirming your vote is correct.

沒錯，所以保護我們免受脅迫這個問題的東西，會導致另一個問題，那就是確認你的投票是否正確。

But some cybersecurity experts are excited about a way to solve that.

但一些網絡安全專家對解決這一問題的方法感到興奮。

It's called the Benelow Challenge, named after my friend Josh Benelow, who invented it.

它叫貝內洛挑戰賽，以我的朋友喬希-貝內洛（Josh Benelow）的名字命名，是他發明的。

Yeah, this Josh Benelow.

是的，這個喬希-班尼洛

Yeah, I can do a demonstration for you of how that works.

是的，我可以給你演示一下如何操作。

I would love that.

我很樂意。

Yes, please.

好的，謝謝。

I have my trusty deck of cards here.

我有一副值得信賴的撲克牌。

First I get to choose to vote red or black.

首先，我可以選擇投紅票還是黑票。

So I vote red.

所以我投紅色票。

So I am going to show you this and I claim for you that this is an encryption of a red vote.

所以，我要給你們看這個，並聲稱這是紅票的加密。

Now I can submit my vote.

現在我可以提交我的投票了。

Or you can say, you want to check?

或者你可以說，你想檢查一下嗎？

I want to check.

我想檢查一下。

Okay, there it is.

好吧，就這樣。

And I can repeat this process as much as I want.

我可以盡情地重複這個過程。

Black.

黑色

Would you like to keep it or would you like to check it?

您想保留它還是想檢查它？

I'd like to check it.

我想檢查一下。

Okay.

好的

Red.

紅色

Okay.

好的

Challenge.

挑戰。

Thank you.

謝謝。

Black.

黑色

Okay.

好的

Challenge it.

挑戰它。

Okay.

好的

Thank you.

謝謝。

Black.

黑色

Red.

紅色

Black.

黑色

I could do this all day.

我可以這樣做一整天。

I promise you will get bored soon.

我保證你很快就會厭倦的。

What we're doing is testing the system, making sure that if there was a bug or a hack that was flipping votes, I'd notice.

我們正在做的是測試系統，確保如果出現漏洞或黑客攻擊，導致選票翻轉，我會注意到。

And when I've done it enough times...

當我做了足夠多的次數...

Keep it or challenge it?

保留還是挑戰？

You know, I trust you now.

你知道，我現在信任你了。

I can submit my final encrypted vote.

我可以提交最後的加密投票了。

This doesn't just make people feel like the system is working.

這不僅讓人們感覺到系統在運行。

It mathematically proves that it is.

從數學角度證明了這一點。

Statistics are very, very much on our side.

統計數據對我們非常非常有利。

You can imagine a large election, 100 million voters.

你可以想象一個大型選舉，一億選民。

If 1% of voters actually do a check, as much as 100 votes being flipped across the entire election would likely be caught somewhere.

如果有 1%的選民真的進行了核對，那麼整個選舉中就可能有多達 100 張選票被翻轉。

In practice, my encrypted vote is a sequence of numbers.

實際上，我的加密投票是一串數字。

And at the end of an election, all of those numbers would be recorded.

選舉結束時，所有這些數字都將被記錄在案。

So I can see my number.

這樣我就能看到我的號碼了。

Not how I voted, but the fact that the vote I submitted went through.

不是我如何投票，而是我投的票通過了。

Great, so we solved it, right?

很好，我們解決了，對嗎？

Absolutely not.

絕對不行。

Because if you do find a problem, what then?

因為如果你真的發現了問題，那該怎麼辦？

If finding a problem on your phone calls an election into question, unfortunately, a lot of people would do that deliberately.

如果在手機上發現問題會讓選舉受到質疑，不幸的是，很多人都會故意這樣做。

If the fact that I have malware on my phone causes an election to be overturned or upset, then there are going to be a lot of people who intentionally put malware on their phones.

如果我在手機上安裝惡意軟件會導致選舉被推翻或破壞，那麼就會有很多人故意在手機上安裝惡意軟件。

But here's the craziest part to me about all of this.

但對我來說，這一切最瘋狂的地方就在這裡。

Actually flipping a vote isn't even necessarily the biggest cybersecurity risk.

實際上，翻轉選票甚至不一定是最大的網絡安全風險。

Imagine an enemy just makes it a little bit more annoying for certain groups to vote.

想象一個敵人只是讓某些群體投票時更煩人一點。

That brings us to the fourth and maybe highest stakes challenge with online voting, which is called a denial-of-service attack.

這就引出了網絡投票的第四個挑戰，也可能是風險最大的一個挑戰，即所謂的拒絕服務攻擊。

The goal of this type of attack is to overload a system with fake traffic, causing a website to crash or not load properly, or causing an internet outage in certain areas.