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  • semiconductors, or chips, power everything from smartphones and laptops to critical defence systems and advanced artificial intelligence.

    從智能手機和筆記本電腦到關鍵的國防系統和先進的人工智能,半導體或芯片為一切提供動力。

  • They are at the heart of the global economy and vital to technological advancement.

    它們是全球經濟的核心,對技術進步至關重要。

  • The US government recently implemented tight controls on chip exports to China in an effort to maintain its technological edge and curb China's rise as a tech powerhouse.

    美國政府最近對向中國出口芯片實施了嚴格控制,以保持其技術優勢,遏制中國作為科技強國的崛起。

  • However, this approach may carry substantial risks not only to US businesses but to the rest of the world.

    然而,這種做法不僅會給美國企業,也會給世界其他國家帶來巨大風險。

  • To understand the consequences of these export controls, let us first understand where the US is coming from.

    要了解這些出口管制的後果,我們首先要了解美國的出發點。

  • These all started back in 2019.

    這些都要追溯到 2019 年。

  • The US government has steadily been tightening controls on chip exports to Asia's largest economy.

    美國政府不斷加強對亞洲最大經濟體芯片出口的控制。

  • Initially, restrictions targeted Huawei, China's telecom giant, on fears of national security threats.

    最初,限制措施針對的是中國電信巨頭華為,原因是擔心國家安全受到威脅。

  • By cutting Huawei off from critical semiconductor components, the US aimed to weaken its capabilities in 5G, AI and cloud technology.

    通過切斷華為與關鍵半導體組件的聯繫,美國旨在削弱華為在 5G、人工智能和雲技術方面的能力。

  • However, these measures soon extended to a range of Chinese companies across various sectors.

    然而,這些措施很快就擴展到各行各業的一系列中國公司。

  • In 2022, new regulations were introduced that limited China's access to critical chip-making equipment.

    2022 年,中國出臺了新規定,限制中國獲得關鍵芯片製造設備。

  • These controls specifically blocked access to tools like those from ASML, which builds the high-tech machines essential for producing advanced semiconductors.

    這些管制措施特別禁止使用 ASML 等公司生產的工具,該公司製造生產先進半導體所必需的高科技機器。

  • The intent was to stymie China's ability to manufacture its own high-performance chips, crucial for AI applications and military technology.

    這樣做的目的是要遏制中國製造自己的高性能芯片的能力,而這對人工智能應用和軍事技術至關重要。

  • This action has since ignited a tech arms race, with China now pursuing a fast-track path to self-sufficiency in semiconductor manufacturing.

    此後,這一行動引發了一場技術軍備競賽,中國目前正在快速實現半導體制造的自給自足。

  • In July of 2023, the US had also escalated its restrictions on exporting advanced AI chips to China, impacting companies like Nvidia, AMD and Intel, all of which produce high-performance chips used in deep learning and artificial intelligence.

    2023 年 7 月,美國還升級了對中國出口先進人工智能芯片的限制,對 Nvidia、AMD 和英特爾等公司造成了影響,這些公司都生產用於深度學習和人工智能的高性能芯片。

  • The US government now requires licenses for American firms to export chips with advanced processing capabilities, particularly those crucial for AI and machine learning tasks, which could give China a military or intelligence advantage.

    美國政府現在要求美國公司出口具有先進處理能力的芯片必須獲得許可證,尤其是那些對人工智能和機器學習任務至關重要的芯片,這可能會給中國帶來軍事或情報優勢。

  • Now let's talk about why all of these might backfire to the US.

    現在讓我們來談談為什麼所有這些都可能對美國產生反作用。

  • The first reason is simple.

    第一個原因很簡單。

  • China is a major consumer market for US technology firms, especially for companies that produce high-end semiconductors.

    中國是美國科技公司的主要消費市場,尤其是生產高端半導體的公司。

  • Restricting access to this market could lead to revenue losses for American companies like Nvidia, Qualcomm and Intel, all of which count China as a significant part of their sales.

    限制進入這一市場可能導致英偉達(Nvidia)、高通(Qualcomm)和英特爾(Intel)等美國公司的收入損失,這些公司都將中國視為其銷售額的重要組成部分。

  • For instance, Nvidia's advanced AI chips, such as the A100 and H100, are in high demand across China for applications in AI development, data processing and machine learning.

    例如,Nvidia 的先進 AI 芯片(如 A100 和 H100)在中國的 AI 開發、數據處理和機器學習應用中需求量很大。

  • Losing this market could hamper these companies' ability to reinvest in research and development, affecting their competitiveness on a global scale.

    失去這一市場可能會阻礙這些公司重新投資研發的能力,影響其在全球範圍內的競爭力。

  • This situation not only threatens revenue streams but may also impede innovation.

    這種情況不僅威脅到收入來源,還可能阻礙創新。

  • US companies allocate a portion of their revenue toward research, enabling them to stay ahead in the technology sector.

    美國公司將收入的一部分用於研究,使其在技術領域保持領先地位。

  • However, as China is one of the largest consumers of AI chips and other advanced tech, US firms risk a weakened financial base without this demand.

    然而,由於中國是人工智能芯片和其他先進技術的最大消費國之一,如果沒有這種需求,美國公司將面臨資金基礎被削弱的風險。

  • This could cause them to lose ground to global competitors who retain access to the Chinese market or develop alternative revenue sources.

    這可能會導致它們被那些保留中國市場準入權或開發其他收入來源的全球競爭對手甩開。

  • Then there is also global trade and the pressure on allied nations.

    此外,還有全球貿易和盟國面臨的壓力。

  • The US, as we mentioned, was reported to have extended its chip export controls by encouraging allies like Japan, South Korea and the European Union to adopt similar restrictions.

    正如我們所提到的,據報道,美國已經擴大了芯片出口管制,鼓勵日本、韓國和歐盟等盟國採取類似的限制措施。

  • This approach has put these nations in a difficult position.

    這種做法使這些國家陷入困境。

  • For instance, the European Union, which exports semiconductor materials to China, may face economic pressure if forced to comply.

    例如,向中國出口半導體材料的歐盟如果被迫遵守,可能會面臨經濟壓力。

  • Such pressures could strain diplomatic ties, particularly if European countries perceive the US as overreaching or disregarding their economic interests.

    這種壓力可能會使外交關係變得緊張,特別是如果歐洲國家認為美國過於強勢或無視其經濟利益的話。

  • Moreover, countries like Japan and South Korea, both crucial players in the semiconductor supply chain, may feel conflicted about enforcing restrictions that could damage their trade relations with China.

    此外,日本和韓國等國家都是半導體供應鏈中的重要參與者,它們可能會對實施可能損害與中國貿易關係的限制措施感到矛盾。

  • South Korea's semiconductor companies, like Samsung and SK have invested heavily in China and compliance with US restrictions could strain their operations.

    三星和 SK 等韓國半導體公司在中國進行了大量投資,遵守美國的限制措施可能會給它們的營運帶來壓力。

  • Thus, the US's efforts to rally allied support may backfire if these nations prioritise their economic ties with China over alignment with US policies.

    是以,如果這些國家優先考慮與中國的經濟關係,而不是與美國政策保持一致,那麼美國爭取盟國支持的努力可能會適得其反。

  • Another risk is that restrictions may drive China to accelerate its domestic semiconductor production capabilities.

    另一個風險是,限制措施可能促使中國加快國內半導體生產能力。

  • China has responded to sanctions by investing heavily in development aimed at creating indigenous technologies.

    為應對制裁,中國投入巨資開發本土技術。

  • Companies such as Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation have made impressive strides, producing chips at 7nm, while some news reports even say that they are close to shipping 5nm chips.

    中芯國際集成電路製造有限公司等公司已經取得了令人矚目的進展,生產出了 7 納米的芯片,而一些新聞報道甚至稱,他們已經接近出貨 5 納米芯片。

  • To top it off, both Huawei and Xiaomi, which are China's largest consumer electronics producer, have been designing state-of-the-art chips.

    更重要的是,作為中國最大的消費電子產品生產商,華為和小米都一直在設計最先進的芯片。

  • Huawei, for instance, has been reported to have a patent that covers both 3nm and 5nm process technologies.

    例如,據報道華為擁有一項專利,涵蓋 3 納米和 5 納米制程技術。

  • Xiaomi, too, has been reported by SCMP to have taped out the country's first 3nm-grade mobile chip.

    據《南華早報》報道,小米公司也已推出國內首款 3 納米級移動芯片。

  • These are all notable achievements, especially for Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, which lacks access to ASML's EUV lithography tools.

    這些都是引人注目的成就,尤其是對於無法使用 ASML 的 EUV 光刻工具的中芯國際集成電路製造有限公司而言。

  • In case you're not aware of these, ASML, which is a company from the Netherlands, is the world's leading supplier of photolithography machines used in semiconductor manufacturing.

    ASML是一家來自荷蘭的公司,是世界領先的半導體制造光刻機供應商。

  • ASML's machines are essential for producing advanced chips at the smallest nodes, specifically the EUV Extreme Ultraviolet lithography tools required for manufacturing chips below 7nm.

    ASML 的設備對於生產最小節點的先進芯片至關重要,特別是生產 7 納米以下芯片所需的 EUV 極紫外光刻工具。

  • EUV lithography enables extremely fine patterns on silicon wafers, which are necessary for creating the high-performance, low-power chips used in modern devices and critical applications.

    超紫外光刻技術可在硅晶片上形成極其精細的圖案,而這正是製造現代設備和關鍵應用中使用的高性能、低功耗芯片所必需的。

  • While ASML is the world's supplier, there are also reports that China's Shanghai Microelectronics Equipment, the country's leading lithography equipment producer, applied for a patent covering an EUV lithography machine, according to the South China Morning Post.

    雖然 ASML 是全球供應商,但據《南華早報》報道,中國領先的光刻設備生產商--上海微電子設備有限公司也申請了一項關於 EUV 光刻機的專利。

  • The patent, filed by SMEE in March 2023, focuses on Extreme Ultraviolet Radiation Generators and lithography equipment.

    該專利由 SMEE 於 2023 年 3 月提交,主要涉及極紫外輻射發生器和光刻設備。

  • This includes a laser-produced plasma EUV source, which involves using a CO2 laser to target tiny tin droplets in a specialised chamber, creating a high-energy plasma.

    這包括脈衝光產生的等離子體極紫外光源,其中包括使用二氧化碳脈衝光瞄準專用腔室中的微小錫滴,產生高能等離子體。

  • This plasma emits EUV light at 13.5nm, which is collected and reflected using a mirror coated with molybdenum and silicon layers, key elements of an EUV lithography tool.

    這種等離子體發出 13.5 納米的超紫外光,通過一面塗有鉬和硅層的鏡子收集和反射這些光,這是超紫外光刻工具的關鍵要素。

  • Currently, SMEE's most advanced lithography tool, the SSX600, supports chips with 90nm, 110nm and 280nm process technologies.

    目前,SMEE 最先進的光刻工具 SSX600 支持 90 納米、110 納米和 280 納米工藝技術的芯片。

  • In 2023, SMEE announced its plan to debut a 28nm-capable system, though it's unclear if this has entered mass production.

    2023 年,SMEE 宣佈計劃首次推出 28 納米系統,但目前尚不清楚該系統是否已進入量產階段。

  • For more advanced nodes, such as 7nm or below, EUV is crucial.

    對於更先進的節點,如 7 納米或以下,EUV 至關重要。

  • In the meantime, SMIC relies on multi-patent DUV Deep Ultraviolet for 7nm-class chips, which, while feasible, is time-consuming and impacts yield efficiency.

    與此同時,中芯國際依靠擁有多項專利的 DUV 深紫外技術生產 7nm 級芯片,這種方法雖然可行,但耗時長,而且影響成品率。

  • China's push for self-reliance has not been limited to semiconductors.

    中國推動的自力更生不僅限於半導體。

  • Recently, China has been prioritising the development of chips based on the open-source RISC-V architecture, which has gained popularity due to its cost-effectiveness and flexibility.

    最近,中國一直在優先開發基於開源 RISC-V 架構的芯片,該架構因其成本效益和靈活性而廣受歡迎。

  • Unlike traditional chip architectures like ARM and x86, which are patented and controlled by US-based companies, RESC-V is free to use and modify, making it a strategic choice for China as it seeks to minimise dependence on US technology.

    與 ARM 和 x86 等傳統芯片架構不同,RESC-V 可自由使用和修改,這使其成為中國尋求最大限度減少對美國技術依賴的戰略選擇。

  • Chinese companies, with government support, are increasingly incorporating RISC-V architecture into their design processes for AI chips, aiming to reduce their vulnerability to future US sanctions.

    在政府的支持下,中國公司正越來越多地將 RISC-V 架構納入其人工智能芯片的設計流程,目的是減少未來受美國製裁影響的可能性。

  • As RISC-V gains traction in China, it could lead to a parallel ecosystem of AI chips that competes with American designs, allowing Chinese firms to innovate more freely and cater to a growing demand for non-US-controlled technology.

    隨著 RISC-V 在中國的發展,可能會形成一個與美國設計競爭的人工智能芯片平行生態系統,使中國公司能夠更自由地進行創新,滿足對非美國控制技術日益增長的需求。

  • Chinese tech companies are also pursuing alternative technologies to offset the limitations imposed by US sanctions.

    中國科技公司也在尋求替代技術,以抵消美國製裁帶來的限制。

  • One example is the shift toward silicon photonics, a promising technology aimed at improving data transmission speeds without relying on conventional semiconductor processes.

    其中一個例子是向硅光子學的轉變,這是一種前景廣闊的技術,旨在提高數據傳輸速度,而無需依賴傳統的半導體工藝。

  • If successful, silicon photonics could enable China to leapfrog traditional semiconductor manufacturing methods, providing a unique competitive advantage in emerging technologies.

    如果取得成功,硅光子技術將使中國超越傳統的半導體制造方法,在新興技術領域提供獨特的競爭優勢。

  • But anyway, do let us know what you think.

    無論如何,請告訴我們您的想法。

  • Thanks for watching.

    感謝觀看。

semiconductors, or chips, power everything from smartphones and laptops to critical defence systems and advanced artificial intelligence.

從智能手機和筆記本電腦到關鍵的國防系統和先進的人工智能,半導體或芯片為一切提供動力。

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