Lai Ching-tei, also known as William Lai, was sworn in on 20th May amid strong threats from China and pro-independence statements. "...

賴清德，又名威廉-賴，於 5 月 20 日在中國的強烈威脅和支持獨立的聲明中宣誓就職。"...

I hope that China will face the reality of Taiwan's existence, respect the choices of the people of Taiwan and, in good faith, choose dialogue over confrontation." So of course, the presidential inauguration has been anything but smooth for Lai.

我希望中國能夠正視臺灣存在的現實，尊重臺灣人民的選擇，真誠地選擇對話而不是對抗"。當然，賴清德的總統就職典禮並不順利。

The Beijing regime responded to the arrival of the new president by nothing less than carrying out new massive invasion drills on Taiwan.

北京政權對新總統上臺的反應不外乎是對臺灣進行新的大規模入侵演習。

It was Beijing's unusual welcome and a clear warning to what they consider a president very much inclined to secession.

這是北京不尋常的歡迎儀式，也是對他們認為非常傾向於分裂的總統的明確警告。

China says military drills encircling Taiwan designed to test its ability to seize power.

中國稱包圍臺灣的軍事演習旨在測試其奪權能力。

What you see right now on screen are the two biggest invasion drills Beijing has conducted in the last two years, this one from 24th May and one from August 2022.

您現在在螢幕上看到的是北京在過去兩年中進行的兩次最大規模的入侵演習，一次是 5 月 24 日的演習，另一次是 2022 年 8 月的演習。

With these exercises, the Chinese regime has encircled Taiwan by sea and air in what can be interpreted as terrible psychological warfare to threaten the Taiwanese and tell them that, if you take one step out of line, in a few hours you will become part of the People's Republic of China.

通過這些演習，中國政權從海上和空中包圍了臺灣，這可以被解釋為可怕的心理戰，威脅臺灣人並告訴他們，如果你越雷池一步，幾個小時後你將成為中華人民共和國的一部分。

In other words, we are facing an action of subjugation.

換句話說，我們面臨的是征服行動。

What Xi Jinping's regime is doing is telling the Taiwanese that everything they have, democracy, autonomy, freedom of expression, security, is because Beijing lets them have it until they get tired of it and take it away from them.

習近平政權正在做的就是告訴臺灣人，他們所擁有的一切，民主、自治、言論自由、安全，都是因為北京讓他們擁有，直到他們厭倦並奪走為止。

And of course, with the Hong Kong precedent and news items like this, the outlook is not reassuring.

當然，有了香港的先例和這樣的新聞，前景並不令人放心。

China drops peaceful reunification reference to Taiwan Now, with all these threats, which the Taiwanese have been putting up with for decades, you would think that the island, a fairly wealthy country with a GDP per capita, similar to that of South Korea, would put a veritable fortune into its military budget.

中國放棄和平統一臺灣的提法 現在，面對臺灣人幾十年來一直忍受的所有這些威脅，你會認為這個人均 GDP 與韓國相近、相當富裕的島國會在軍事預算上投入一筆名副其實的鉅款。

Don't you agree?

你同意嗎？

But what if I told you that this is not the case at all?

但如果我告訴你事實並非如此呢？

Take a look at this statistic.

看看這個統計數據。

South Korea, a country also under great threat, in its case from its northern neighbor, invests around 3% of its GDP in defense, while Taiwan barely exceeds 2%.

韓國也面臨著來自北方鄰國的巨大威脅，其國防投資約佔國內生產總值的 3%，而臺灣僅勉強超過 2%。

What's more, that 2% is only thanks to the increase in recent years.

更重要的是，這 2% 只是由於近年來的增長。

And what can I say?

我能說什麼呢？

Given the current situation, it seems much more likely that China will try to do something serious in Taiwan than that North Korea will try to do something serious to its maximum tension.

從目前的形勢來看，中國試圖在臺灣動真格的可能性似乎要比北韓試圖在其最大緊張局勢下動真格的可能性大得多。

I don't know, doesn't seem like a huge effort.

我也不知道，看起來不是很費勁。

As a comparison, many of the Eastern European countries bordering Russia and Belarus are already spending more than 3% on defense.

相比之下，與俄羅斯和白俄羅斯接壤的許多東歐國家的國防開支已經超過了 3%。

This has led the VisualPolitik team to ask ourselves a very clear question.

這促使 VisualPolitik 團隊向自己提出了一個非常明確的問題。

Why on earth does Taiwan spend so little on defense?

臺灣的國防開支為何如此之少？

Are they not concerned about the Chinese threat?

他們不擔心中國的威脅嗎？

What is the explanation for this apparent incongruity?

如何解釋這種明顯的不協調？

Well, we've done our homework, and now in this video we're going to tell you all about it in order to get started.

好了，我們已經做足了功課，現在在這段視頻中，我們將告訴你有關它的一切，以便開始行動。

It's always been the great obsession of Chinese leaders.

這一直是中國領導人的一大心病。

Since Mao Zedong triumphed with his communist revolution in 1949, this has always been a priority objective, to recover the only communist party, Taiwan, the island where the leaders of the Republic of China and the Kuomintang took refuge.

自 1949 年毛澤東取得共產主義革命勝利以來，這一直是一個優先目標，即收復唯一的共產黨--臺灣，中華民國和國民黨領導人避難的島嶼。

We've already talked about it many times on VisualPolitik.

我們已經在 VisualPolitik 上討論過很多次了。

Now, the slowdown of the Chinese economy, domestic problems and the trade war with the United States have further fueled the nationalist discourse.

現在，中國經濟放緩、國內問題以及與美國的貿易戰進一步助長了民族主義言論。

And of course, if there is one thing that fuels Chinese nationalism above anything else, it is precisely the Taiwan issue.

當然，如果說有什麼東西能讓中國的民族主義火上澆油，那就是臺灣問題。

Which is also one of the reasons why China is modernizing its armed forces by leaps and bounds.

這也是中國軍隊現代化突飛猛進的原因之一。

Now, as I said before, with this growing threat, it would be reasonable to think that Taiwan is increasing its military spending, wouldn't it?

現在，正如我之前所說的，隨著威脅的不斷增加，我們有理由認為臺灣正在增加軍費開支，不是嗎？

After all, we're talking about the fact that its very existence may be in danger.

畢竟，我們談論的是它的生存可能面臨危險的事實。

Well, look at this graph.

請看這張圖。

As you can see, and despite a small recent rebound, the trend in Taiwan over recent decades has been to make a smaller and smaller economic effort in defense.

如您所見，儘管最近略有反彈，但近幾十年來，臺灣在國防方面的經濟努力一直呈下降趨勢。

If we look at the data of the last decade, we might well think that defense has been far from being a priority in Taipei.

如果我們看一下過去十年的數據，我們很可能會認為國防在臺北遠非優先事項。

The result is that between 1996 and 2019, the percentage of GDP devoted to defense was cut in half.

結果是，從 1996 年到 2019 年，國防開支佔國內生產總值的比例減少了一半。

Which, trust me, is easier said than done.

相信我，說起來容易做起來難。

And things don't seem to be changing much either.

情況似乎也沒有什麼變化。

Increases in military spending have been announced, but not with much sign of change.

增加軍費的消息已經宣佈，但並沒有什麼變化的跡象。

And this alone is something to make our heads explode.

光是這一點，就足以讓我們頭皮發麻。

Taiwan is threatened by China.

臺灣受到中國的威脅。

In recent years, this island has become a key strategic enclave for global industry thanks to its famous microchips.

近年來，這座島嶼因其著名的微型芯片而成為全球工業的重要戰略飛地。

And yet Taiwan does not seem to take defense particularly seriously.

然而，臺灣似乎並不特別重視國防。

Most military analyses of the state of its armed forces are clear.

對其武裝部隊狀況的軍事分析大多是明確的。

Taiwan does not spend enough.

臺灣的開支不足。

But to illustrate this further, let's take a closer look at the defense effort they are actually making.

不過，為了進一步說明這一點，讓我們仔細看看他們實際做出的防禦努力。

Taiwan currently is spending $709 per capita on defense, an amount similar to countries without imminent geopolitical risks such as the Netherlands or New Zealand.

臺灣目前的人均國防開支為 709 美元，與荷蘭或紐西蘭等沒有緊迫地緣政治風險的國家相近。

By comparison, Singapore spends about $2,200 per capita, and Israel almost $3,000.

相比之下，新加坡的人均支出約為 2,200 美元，以色列接近 3,000 美元。

So you see, with the data in hand, it seems that Washington is more concerned about the security of the island than the Taiwanese government.

所以你看，有了這些數據，華盛頓似乎比臺灣政府更關心島內的安全。

Strange, don't you think?

你不覺得奇怪嗎？

And remember, we're not the only ones to have noticed.

請記住，我們不是唯一注意到這一點的人。

The United States has been urging them for years to redouble their efforts in order to be able to face a Chinese invasion when the time comes, a scenario that seems less and less unlikely.

多年來，美國一直敦促他們加倍努力，以便在時機成熟時能夠面對中國的入侵，而這種情況似乎越來越不可能發生。

And do you know something even stranger?

你知道更奇怪的事情嗎？

Contrary to many other countries, public opinion in Taiwan is mostly in favor of increasing military spending.

與許多其他國家相反，臺灣的民意大多支持增加軍費。

To reach this 3% of GDP in defense in 2023, $6.6 billion more would have had to be spent than was actually spent.

要在 2023 年達到國防開支佔國內生產總值 3%的目標，就必須比實際開支多支出 66 億美元。

But then, if the threat exists, and Taiwanese society supports it, why does the defense budget of this island seem to be so low?

但是，既然威脅存在，臺灣社會也支持這種威脅，為什麼這個島國的國防預算似乎如此之低？

Well, let's find out.

那就讓我們一探究竟吧。

False sense of security?

虛假的安全感？

One question, have you ever considered what the US would do if China were to attack Taiwan?

有一個問題，你有沒有想過如果中國進攻臺灣，美國會怎麼做？

Well, those of you who think that Uncle Sam would definitely defend Taipei, congratulations!

那麼，那些認為山姆大叔一定會保衛臺北的人，恭喜你們！

You think the same as the Taiwanese government.

你的想法和臺灣政府一樣。

This is no joke.

這可不是鬧著玩的。

It's a sentiment that may be a long way toward explaining why Taiwan's defense spending is not higher.

這種情緒或許可以很好地解釋為什麼臺灣的國防開支沒有增加。

But what if I told you that there is a huge grey area in that interpretation?

但如果我告訴你，這種解釋存在著巨大的灰色地帶呢？

To begin with, in terms of defense, Taiwan-US relations are built through so-called strategic ambiguity.

首先，在防務方面，臺美關係是通過所謂的戰略模糊來建立的。

In other words, the Americans neither confirm nor deny that they would go out to protect the Taiwanese in the event of a Chinese invasion.

換句話說，美國人既不確認也不否認他們會在中國入侵時出兵保護臺灣人。

There is no protection agreement and there is no defensive umbrella or anything of the sort.

沒有保護協議，也沒有保護傘之類的東西。

This is a totally different situation from what is happening in South Korea, for example.

這與韓國的情況完全不同。

The only thing the Taiwanese have today, beyond the support of Joe Biden, who has said several times that he would defend Taiwan, is perhaps an unpublished communication of intent.

喬-拜登曾多次表示他將保衛臺灣，除了他的支持，臺灣人今天唯一擁有的也許就是一份未公開的意向書。

If Biden does not remain in the White House and another, less committed president arrives in the future, Taipei would have virtually nothing.

如果拜登不繼續留在白宮，而未來另一位不那麼堅定的總統上臺，臺北將幾乎一無所有。

And you may ask, how is it possible that what is probably one of America's most threatened allies is not under any umbrella of protection?

你可能會問，美國可能是最受威脅的盟國之一，怎麼可能不受任何保護？

Well, I'm guessing you can already imagine where this is going, China.

好吧，我猜你已經能想象出這是怎麼回事了，中國。

To begin with, Taiwan is not recognized as a state by Washington, which recognizes only one China and since 1979 that is the People's Republic of China.

首先，華盛頓不承認臺灣是一個國家，它只承認一箇中國，自 1979 年以來就是中華人民共和國。

Remember that Taiwan has never proclaimed its independence.

請記住，臺灣從未宣佈獨立。

That alone greatly limits Washington's options to begin with.

僅這一點就大大限制了華盛頓的選擇。

That's far from the only reason.

這遠遠不是唯一的原因。

As you know, over the years China has been gaining more and more ground economically to become an export powerhouse on which the supply chains of almost the entire world depend.

眾所周知，多年來，中國的經濟實力不斷增強，已成為出口大國，幾乎全世界的供應鏈都依賴於中國。

This in itself is Beijing's greatest source of protection and also its main bargaining chip.

這本身就是中國政府最大的保護傘，也是其討價還價的主要籌碼。

If the US goes too far with Taiwan, then China could hit the US economy very hard.

如果美國在臺灣問題上走得太遠，那麼中國可能會對美國經濟造成沉重打擊。

And don't even ask me what would happen to the European Union and other allies of the West in Asia that are heavily dependent on trade with Beijing.

不要問我歐盟和其他嚴重依賴與北京貿易的西方國家在亞洲的盟友會發生什麼。

The catastrophe would be gigantic.

災難將是巨大的。

Now, of course, this is no secret.

當然，這已經不是什麼祕密了。

What's more, there are already precedents of Washington making decisions contrary to Taipei's interests so as to not upset China.

更何況，華盛頓為了不惹惱中國，做出違背臺北利益的決定已有先例。

Do you want an example?

你想舉個例子嗎？

Let's go back to 2001.

讓我們回到 2001 年。

That year, as you all know, the 9-11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York took place, and George Bush then began to build an alliance to fight global terrorism, the famous War on Terror.

眾所周知，那一年發生了針對紐約雙子塔的 "9-11 "襲擊事件，喬治-布什隨後開始建立一個打擊全球恐怖主義的聯盟，這就是著名的反恐戰爭。

At that time, Taiwan was on the verge of closing a deal to buy American F-16 fighters.

當時，臺灣即將完成購買美國 F-16 戰鬥機的交易。

And you know what happened?

你知道發生了什麼嗎？

Bush had to delay the sale of these fighters to facilitate China collaborating in the anti-jihadist alliance, for example, with intelligence information.

布什不得不延後出售這些戰鬥機，以方便中國與反聖戰聯盟合作，例如提供情報信息。

So off to a great start.

所以有了一個好的開始。

When it comes down to it, the United States puts its own interests before those of Taiwan's defense.

歸根結底，美國將自身利益置於臺灣防務利益之上。

At least that is what some past events show us.

至少過去的一些事件告訴我們，情況就是這樣。

And it doesn't end there.

而且還不止於此。

Added to this are the constant delays by the United States in delivering artillery, sea defense systems or missiles to Taiwan.

此外，美國還不斷拖延向臺灣運送火炮、海防系統或飛彈。

To give you an idea, the upgrade of the F-16 and delivery of AGM-154 air-to-ground missiles was delayed by more than a decade.

舉個例子，F-16 的升級和 AGM-154 空對地飛彈的交付就延後了十多年。

In fact, the backlog in arms deliveries is so large that, according to estimates, there is already about $19 billion in equipment awaiting delivery, an amount greater even than Taiwan's entire military budget in 2023.

事實上，武器交付的積壓量非常大，據估計，已有約 190 億美元的裝備等待交付，這一數額甚至超過了臺灣 2023 年的全部軍事預算。

And if we focus only on the expenditure items aimed at buying equipment, we are talking about quite a few years of military spending.

如果我們只關注用於購買裝備的支出項目，那麼我們談論的將是相當多年的軍費開支。

As you can imagine, this discourages the Taiwanese government from buying more weapons from the United States.

可以想象，這使臺灣政府不願意從美國購買更多武器。

So instead of spending on contracts that pile up gathering dust in some bottom drawer, that money could be spent on other things.

是以，與其把錢花在堆積在抽屜底層的合同上，不如花在其他事情上。

Or saved, don't you agree?

或者說是得救了，你說呢？

And of course, many of you will think, well, if the United States has a bottleneck, or any other problem delivering weapons to Taipei, then they should just buy them from another country, right?

當然，你們中的許多人會認為，如果美國在向臺北運送武器方面遇到瓶頸或其他任何問題，那麼他們就應該從其他國家購買武器，對嗎？

In the end, there are many other countries that would be happy to feed their defense industry.

歸根結底，還有許多其他國家樂意為其國防工業提供養料。

The United Kingdom, France, Israel, South Korea.

英國、法國、以色列、韓國。

In fact, some, like France, occasionally sign a contract here and there, and in the early 1990s, even sold Mirage fighters to Taiwan.

事實上，有些國家，如法國，偶爾會在這裡或那裡簽訂一份合同，在 20 世紀 90 年代初，甚至向臺灣出售幻影戰鬥機。

In other words, Washington has not been, and should not be the exclusive supplier, and perhaps not even the main one.

換句話說，華盛頓不是，也不應該是唯一的供應國，甚至可能不是主要的供應國。

And if you think so, you are not wrong.

如果你是這麼想的，那你就沒有錯。

That would be ideal under normal circumstances.

這在正常情況下是最理想的。

The problem is that the circumstances are not normal.

問題是，情況並不正常。

Remember that we are talking about a country that is not recognized as a state by almost anyone and whose weapons, if used, would surely be used in a hypothetical conflict with China.

請記住，我們談論的是一個幾乎不被任何人承認為國家的國家，其武器如果被使用，肯定會在與中國的假設衝突中被使用。

So you can imagine what would happen if suddenly the Europeans or the South Koreans started selling arms to Taiwan left and right.

是以，你可以想象，如果歐洲人或韓國人突然開始向臺灣出售武器，會發生什麼。

China would be furious and take action.

中國會勃然大怒並採取行動。

And don't forget that we're talking about a superpower that has more and more political, military and, above all, economic influence.

別忘了，我們談論的是一個在政治、軍事，尤其是經濟方面擁有越來越大影響力的超級大國。

And if many of the delays in US arms deliveries are already due to avoiding confrontation with China, despite the US's status, imagine what would happen with a country like South Korea.

如果說美國武器交付的許多延誤已經是為了避免與中國對抗，儘管美國的地位如此，那麼試想一下像韓國這樣的國家會發生什麼。

For example, Seoul exports almost a quarter of everything it produces to the Asian giant.

例如，首爾向這個亞洲巨人出口了近四分之一的產品。

So let me tell you, they wouldn't dream of undertaking such an adventure.

所以讓我告訴你，他們做夢也不會想到要進行這樣的冒險。

What's more, the US military industry would not be amused if Taiwan suddenly turned its millions to other manufacturers.

更重要的是，如果臺灣突然將數百萬美元轉向其他製造商，美國軍工企業也不會感到高興。

And of course, if there is one thing Taipei does not want, it's to lose sway in Washington.

當然，如果說有什麼是臺北不希望看到的，那就是失去在華盛頓的影響力。

Well, with this in mind, and with the majority in Taiwan believing that in the end the United States would rush to save them in the event of invasion, you have the answer.

那麼，考慮到這一點，再加上臺灣大多數人都認為美國最終會在入侵時趕來拯救他們，答案就出來了。

Why should I put money into arms?

我為什麼要把錢投入武器？

And why should I look for new suppliers?

我為什麼要尋找新的供應商？

Now, hold on a minute, because it doesn't end there.

現在，請稍等一下，因為事情還沒有結束。

The United States and the countries that wary of selling arms to Taiwan are not the only ones responsible for Taipei's low defense spending.

造成臺北國防開支低的原因不僅僅是美國和那些對向臺灣出售武器持謹慎態度的國家。

Evidently, they themselves are also at fault for much of the blame.

顯然，他們自己也有很大的過錯。

And that is exactly what we're going to talk about to you now.

這正是我們現在要跟大家討論的。

Stay tuned.

敬請期待。

THE GAME OF POLITICS Typically, parties that advocate increased military spending tend to have a more right-leaning ideological tendency, and those that are less supportive tend to be more left-leaning.

政治遊戲 通常情況下，主張增加軍費開支的政黨在意識形態上傾向於右傾，而不太支持的政黨則傾向於左傾。

That's how it works, at least in most of the world.

至少在世界上的大部分地區是這樣的。

But what if I told you that in Taiwan, it's just the other way around?

但如果我告訴你，在臺灣，情況恰恰相反呢？

You see, in Taiwan, the traditional Kuomintang and the People's Party, both more right-wing, tend to be reluctant to increase defense investment, while the center-left Democratic Progressive Party, which is the one in power, wants to increase it.

要知道，在臺灣，傳統的國民黨和人民黨都是比較右翼的政黨，往往不願意增加國防投入，而中左翼的民進黨，也就是現在的執政黨，則希望增加國防投入。

Now, why am I telling you all this?

我為什麼要告訴你們這些？

Well, because Taiwanese politics is a mess, and that's not exactly conducive to creating long-term defense plans that would help reform the military and better equip it.

因為臺灣的政治一團糟，這不利於制定長期的國防計劃，而長期的國防計劃將有助於軍隊改革和更好地裝備軍隊。

Do you want an example?

你想舉個例子嗎？

In Taiwan, we have to differentiate between the defense baseline budget that appears in the general budget and other items that are considered extraordinary and have to be approved separately in parliament.

在臺灣，我們必須區分出現在一般預算中的國防基線預算和其他被視為非常項目、必須在議會單獨準許的項目。

For example, let's talk about military equipment purchases.

例如，我們來談談軍事裝備採購。

For instance, $16.6 billion was spent in 2023, but only about $13 billion was budgeted.

例如，2023 年花費了 166 億美元，但預算只編列了約 130 億美元。

As you can see, these are not minor adjustments, but more than a fifth of military spending.

可以看出，這些調整幅度不小，超過了軍費開支的五分之一。

And, of course, the problem is that approving each item becomes a huge political challenge.

當然，問題是準許每一個項目都是一個巨大的政治挑戰。

Because, as we have already told you, not all parties are willing to arm themselves to the teeth.

因為，正如我們已經告訴大家的那樣，並非所有各方都願意把自己武裝到牙齒。

On the one hand, we have the Kuomintang, which deep down still believes in the idea of one China and seeks to try to get along with Beijing.

一方面，我們有國民黨，它在內心深處仍然相信一箇中國的理念，並試圖與北京和睦相處。

Their strategy is to build bridges, so to speak.

可以說，他們的戰略就是架設橋樑。

And how can you build bridges if you are arming yourself to the teeth?

如果你把自己武裝到牙齒，又怎麼能架起橋樑呢？

Well, as you can understand, these are two things that are difficult to reconcile.

你們可以理解，這兩件事很難調和。

On the other hand, there is the Popular Party, of a socioliberal nature, which considers that it's more important to increase spending on other social items rather than on defense.

另一方面，社會自由主義性質的人民黨認為，增加其他社會項目的開支比增加國防開支更重要。

And not surprisingly, since the government is in the minority, these two parties do not miss an opportunity to try to control as much as possible what it does and what it spends.

毫不奇怪，由於政府是少數派，這兩個政黨會不失時機地儘可能控制政府的行為和支出。

So passing a small military budget, and then passing additional packages bit by bit, is one way to do that.

是以，通過少量的軍事預算，然後一點一點地通過額外的一攬子計劃，是實現這一目標的方法之一。

Given all this, it's not surprising that many analysts have pointed out that the way the Taiwanese parliament functions is as a brake on maintaining stable and, above all, reliable defense spending.

有鑑於此，許多分析家指出，臺灣議會的運作方式是維持穩定、尤其是可靠的國防開支的掣肘，也就不足為奇了。

The problem is that, without a large regular budget, it is very difficult to carry out military reforms or modernization of the equipment.

問題是，如果沒有龐大的經常預算，就很難進行軍事改革或裝備現代化。

What if this year you have the money, but next year you don't get approved for more than the baseline budget?