Name: 對沖基金如何讓華爾街崩潰的瘋狂故事 | 長期資本管理公司（LTCM） (The INSANE Story of How a Hedge Fund Collapsed the Wall Street | Long Term Capital Management (LTCM))
Uploaded: 2024-10-02T13:56:30.000Z
Duration: 11 min 41 s

Have you heard about the story of Icarus?

基礎被動語態

He was given a pair of wings that allowed him to fly and he took full advantage.

他獲得了一雙可以飛翔的翅膀，並充分利用了這雙翅膀。

情態副詞

Unfortunately for him, he got a little carried away.

Despite warnings not to, he tried to fly as high as he could, so high that the sun started to melt the wax that held his wings together.

儘管有人警告他不要飛，但他還是拼命往高處飛，以至於太陽開始融化固定他翅膀的蠟。

Within seconds, his wings fell apart and he plunged to his death.

幾秒鐘之內，他的翅膀就散架了，墜落而死。

This famous fable of the dangers of hubris can be easily applied to the story of long-term capital management, a huge hedge fund which dominated the financial market in the 1990s.

這則關於自大危險的著名寓言可以很容易地應用到長期資本管理公司的故事中，這是一家在 20 世紀 90 年代稱霸金融市場的大型對沖基金。

Like Icarus, they found themselves riding high, with profits through the roof, and eventually they went too far and plunged to their collapse.

就像伊卡洛斯一樣，他們發現自己一路高歌猛進，利潤突破了屋頂，最終他們走得太遠，陷入了崩潰。

In this video, we will go through the amazing story of long-term capital management and discover the incredible lessons we can learn from the rise and fall of this former Wall

在這段視頻中，我們將回顧長期資本管理的神奇故事，並發現我們可以從這位前華爾街大亨的興衰中汲取的令人難以置信的經驗教訓。

Long-term capital management, or the LTCM, was a hedge fund founded in 1994 by trader

長期資本管理公司（LTCM）是一家對沖基金，於 1994 年由交易員

Hedge funds manage the pooled investments of small groups of mostly wealth investors.

對沖基金管理的是主要由財富投資者組成的小團體的集合投資。

Unlike mutual funds, hedge funds are subject to very little regulation, meaning that there are virtually no limits to the size of the fund or where it can be invested.

與共同基金不同，對沖基金幾乎不受監管，這意味著對基金規模或投資地點幾乎沒有限制。

This lack of regulation makes hedge funds a ripe environment for investment in risk care financial products, such as derivatives.

由於缺乏監管，對沖基金成為投資風險金融產品（如衍生產品）的成熟環境。

Like all other hedge funds, LTCM managed their investments with a strategy called arbitrage.

與所有其他對沖基金一樣，LTCM 採用一種名為套利的策略管理投資。

To demonstrate this, imagine that one company sells different stocks in two markets.

為了說明這一點，設想一家公司在兩個市場銷售不同的股票。

As both stocks represent the same company, you'd expect them to be the same price.

由於這兩隻股票代表的是同一家公司，是以價格應該相同。

However, sometimes the price of the stock in one market may dip below the other, due to market overreaction.

不過，有時由於市場反應過度，一個市場的股票價格可能會低於另一個市場。

When this occurs, you have an opportunity to quickly buy the stock before the prices reach equilibrium again, after which, you can sell that stock at a profit.

當出現這種情況時，您就有機會在價格再次達到平衡之前迅速買入股票，之後就可以賣出股票獲利。

Although it's a common strategy, LTCM took it to another whole new level.

雖然這是一種常見的策略，但 LTCM 將其提升到了另一個全新的高度。

They used economic calculations and predictions, as well as the latest computer software to recognize the opportunities and exploit them quickly.

他們利用經濟計算和預測以及最新的計算機軟件來識別機會並迅速加以利用。

Using this strategy, LTCM became the largest hedge fund ever.

利用這一策略，LTCM 成為有史以來最大的對沖基金。

Hedge funds bet on tiny discrepancies between the present and the future, which means that they need large position size to make significant profits.

對沖基金將賭注押在現在與未來之間的微小差異上，這意味著他們需要大量頭寸才能獲得可觀的利潤。

Despite the huge amount of funds LTCM received from their investors, it wasn't enough to earn the greatest profits.

儘管 LTCM 從投資者那裡獲得了鉅額資金，但這並不足以賺取最大的利潤。

So LTCM borrowed heavily and encouraged investors to make even larger investments.

於是，LTCM 大量借貸，並鼓勵投資者進行更大規模的投資。

Many banks were more than happy to lend huge amounts of loans to LTCM, because they have a pretty good track record and arbitrary strategy seems to carry little risk.

許多銀行非常樂意向 LTCM 提供鉅額貸款，因為他們的業績相當不錯，而且任意的策略似乎風險很小。

To give you just a small example of how much LTCM could borrow through leveraging, consider that with only 1 billion dollars as the investment capital, they could leverage up to 30 billion dollars to trade.

僅舉一個小例子，就能說明 LTCM 通過槓桿可以借到多少錢，想想看，如果只有 10 億美元的投資資本，他們可以利用高達 300 億美元的槓桿進行交易。

Institutions like investment banks were glad to issue big loans, because they thought profits were almost guaranteed.

投資銀行等機構樂於發放大額貸款，因為他們認為利潤幾乎可以保證。

As history tells over and over again, banks made such investments because their greed are bigger than the underlying risk.

歷史一再證明，銀行之所以進行這樣的投資，是因為它們的貪婪大於潛在的風險。

As more and more banks were rushing in to issue loans, LTCM's leverage rate skyrocketed, leaving the company at enormous risk if things started to go wrong.

隨著越來越多的銀行急於發放貸款，LTCM 的槓桿率急劇上升，一旦出現問題，公司將面臨巨大風險。

Many people believe there is a gap between the knowledge of high-minded academics and the conditions of the real world.

許多人認為，高高在上的學術知識與現實世界的條件之間存在差距。

Their plan was to apply the expert knowledge and theories of mathematicians and economists to the real Wall Street.

他們的計劃是將數學家和經濟學家的專業知識和理論應用於真實的華爾街。

So they recruited some of the biggest names in economics and trading, hiring people like

是以，他們招募了一些經濟學和貿易領域的重量級人物，聘用的人員包括

Nobel Prize winner Myron Scholes and Robert Merton to sit on their board of directors.

諾貝爾獎得主邁倫-斯科爾斯（Myron Scholes）和羅伯特-默頓（Robert Merton）加入其董事會。

More and more investors were enticed into investing in LTCM.

越來越多的投資者被誘惑投資於 LTCM。

Even universities were persuaded to invest in the fund.

甚至大學也被說服投資於該基金。

One of the main reasons people were so interested in investing in LTCM was because the rocks are mathematicians and economists in LTCM believe they had eliminated all the risk altogether and investing with LTCM is virtually risk-free.

人們對投資 LTCM 如此感興趣的一個主要原因是，LTCM 的數學家和經濟學家認為他們已經完全消除了所有風險，投資 LTCM 幾乎沒有風險。

Their arrogance was filled by incredibly complex mathematical formulas based on careful historical analysis of the market.

他們的傲慢被基於對市場的細緻歷史分析而得出的極其複雜的數學公式所充斥。

By scrutinizing how the market had reacted to events in the past, they hoped to predict how it would react in the future.

通過仔細研究市場過去對事件的反應，他們希望預測市場未來的反應。

This gave them the ability to recognize and circumnavigate risks and crises before they even occurred.

這使他們有能力在風險和危機發生之前就識別和規避它們。

This academic approach was a major lure for investors and contributed to LTCM's enormous success at the early stage.

這種學術方法是吸引投資者的主要因素，也是 LTCM 早期取得巨大成功的原因之一。

In the 1990s, it was a fashionable thing on Wall Street to invest in hedge funds.

20 世紀 90 年代，在華爾街投資對沖基金是一種時尚。

Investors saw them as new, exciting, and most importantly, incredibly profitable financial products.

在投資者眼中，它們是新穎、令人興奮的金融產品，最重要的是，它們利潤豐厚。

But even in this love affair with hedge funds fever, LTCM stood out, both in terms of popularity and leveraging.

但即便是在這場對沖基金熱潮中，LTCM 也在知名度和槓桿率方面脫穎而出。

During the mid-1990s, LTCM was four times larger than its closest hedge fund rival.

20 世紀 90 年代中期，LTCM 的規模是其最接近的對沖基金競爭對手的四倍。

They also controlled more assets than huge investment banks like Lehman Brothers and

它們控制的資產也超過了雷曼兄弟和螞蟻金服等大型投資銀行。

Banks around the world were practically fighting to lend to LTCM for their trading leverages.

全世界的銀行幾乎都在爭相貸款給 LTCM，以獲取交易槓桿。

Everyone wanted to get a piece of their pie, so they all fought to offer leverage packages with ridiculously low interest rates, only for LTCM.

每個人都想分一杯羹，於是大家都爭相推出槓桿套餐，利率低得離譜，只有 LTCM 獨享。

Even with such special low interest rates to borrow, LTCM was still paying $200 million a year just as the interest payment.

即使以如此特別的低利率借款，LTCM 每年仍需支付 2 億美元的利息。

For all the love LTCM was getting on Wall Street, it appears much healthier than it actually was.

儘管華爾街對 LTCM 頗有好感，但它似乎比實際情況要健康得多。

這其中有一部分是簡單的欺騙。

Although they reported their assets and liabilities quarterly, these reports weren't always transparent and often provided only generalized summaries and hid important key points.

雖然他們每季度都會報告資產和負債情況，但這些報告並不總是透明的，而且往往只提供概括性的摘要，隱藏了重要的關鍵點。

LTCM's success could not last forever, and soon, the signs of danger become unmistakable.

LTCM 的成功不可能一勞永逸，很快，危險的徵兆就顯露無遺。

Despite the popularity of academic models used by LTCM, they had one fatal flaw, human errors.

儘管 LTCM 使用的學術模型很受歡迎，但它們有一個致命的缺陷，那就是人為錯誤。

The models assumed the financial system was a rational, predictable entity, directed by rational, predictable people.

這些模型假定金融體系是一個理性、可預測的實體，由理性、可預測的人指揮。

Due to their poor nature, humans are irrational and panic easily, a fact which caused enormous problems for LTCM.

由於人類的劣根性，他們缺乏理性，容易產生恐慌，這給 LTCM 帶來了巨大的麻煩。

These problems began in the 1997 Asian financial crisis, as the booming tiger economies like

這些問題始於 1997 年的亞洲金融危機，當時蓬勃發展的老虎經濟體如

Taiwan and South Korea took a big downturn.

In times of uncertainty, the normal thing to do would be to invest in bonds.

在不確定時期，通常的做法是投資債券。

Their models were telling them to increase their share of riskier assets like equities.

他們的模型告訴他們要增加股票等風險較高資產的份額。

So instead of buying more safety hedges, they started adding more risky stocks.

是以，他們沒有購買更多的安全對沖股票，而是開始增加風險更大的股票。

They had already seen a slight dip in profits once the crisis hit in the summer of 1997, but they continued to follow their models.

1997 年夏天危機爆發後，這些公司的利潤已經略有下降，但它們仍繼續沿用自己的模式。

LTCM never had a losing year since it was founded.

LTCM 自成立以來從未出現過虧損。

But now, they didn't even know they were not far from the brink of collapse.

但現在，他們甚至不知道自己離崩潰的邊緣已經不遠了。

The models that the mathematicians and economists at LTCM developed were based on one single principle.

LTCM 的數學家和經濟學家們所開發的模型都基於一個原則。

If disrupted, markets will always revert to their mean or the natural position.

如果受到干擾，市場總會恢復到其平均值或自然位置。

This was the reason that LTCM chose risky strategies during the Asian financial crisis.

這也是 LTCM 在亞洲金融危機期間選擇高風險策略的原因。

They saw the downturn as a small blip in the market which would always eventually stabilize and earn them a whole lot of money in the process.

在他們看來，經濟下滑只是市場中的一個小插曲，最終總會穩定下來，並在這一過程中為他們賺取一大筆錢。

However, this didn't happen as models suggested.

然而，這種情況並沒有像模型顯示的那樣發生。

The market didn't return to normal and instead, most people continued to act irrationally, selling more stocks and buying more bonds.

市場並沒有恢復正常，相反，大多數人繼續採取非理性行為，賣出更多股票，買入更多債券。

But LTCM's models told them to continue taking risks.

但 LTCM 的模型告訴他們要繼續冒險。

LTCM suffered several months worth of losses for the first time in its history.

LTCM 歷史上首次出現連續數月的虧損。

As problems and losses started to mount up, the ridiculously high leverage rate of LTCM became a milestone.

隨著問題和損失開始增加，LTCM 高得離譜的槓桿率成為了一個里程碑。

They had to follow the models and take even more risks in hope of earning enough just to pay back their mounting fees and debts.

他們不得不效仿這些模式，冒更大的風險，希望賺到足夠的錢來償還不斷增加的費用和債務。

Because of their high leverage, reversing course was no longer an option.

由於他們的槓桿率很高，扭轉乾坤已不再是一種選擇。

Eventually, the models failed completely.

According to LTCM's models, the probability of losing everything in a single year was only 1 in septillion, or 10 to the power of 24.

根據 LTCM 的模型，在一年內傾家蕩產的概率僅為七億分之一，即 10 的 24 次方。

In other words, it was virtually impossible.

換句話說，這幾乎是不可能的。

And yet, in August 1998, the impossible has happened.

然而，1998 年 8 月，不可能的事情發生了。

The Russian government defaulted on its debts and devalued its currency.

俄羅斯政府拖欠債務，貨幣貶值。

It wasn't just that the Russian economy was tanking, but no one, not even the IMF, had stepped in to help them.

不僅僅是俄羅斯經濟下滑，而且沒有任何人，甚至是國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）介入幫助他們。

This incident caused a massive sell-off in the global financial markets, especially the stock market.

這一事件引發了全球金融市場，尤其是股票市場的大規模拋售。

This was catastrophic news for LTCM because their models heavily invested in global equity markets.

這對 LTCM 來說是個災難性的消息，因為他們的模型大量投資於全球股票市場。

In one single day on August 17, 1998, LTCM lost $533 million.

1998 年 8 月 17 日一天之內，LTCM 就損失了 5.33 億美元。

Due to their huge debts and lack of capital, LTCM needed to sell quickly to stay solvent.

由於債臺高築、資金短缺，LTCM 需要迅速出售資產以保持償付能力。

But no one wanted what they had to offer.

但沒有人想要他們提供的東西。

The fewer buyers there are in the market, the more severe the losses for the seller.

市場上的買家越少，賣家的損失就越嚴重。

By the end of August, LTCM had lost 45% of its capital.

截至 8 月底，LTCM 已損失了 45% 的資本。

On top of that, they had reached a leverage rate of 55 times more than the original capital and stuck with $125 billion in assets, which they couldn't sell.

此外，他們的槓桿率達到了原始資本的 55 倍，而且還揹負著 1 250 億美元的資產，無法出售。

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對沖基金如何讓華爾街崩潰的瘋狂故事 | 長期資本管理公司（LTCM） (The INSANE Story of How a Hedge Fund Collapsed the Wall Street | Long Term Capital Management (LTCM))

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