Proponents insist that God is the source of all morality, so if he commands something, it must be good. Interestingly, while this defence has significant sway among theologians, it has nearly none at all among philosophers. The reason for this is that it essentially boils down to might makes right – the idea that power alone determines morality, which carries extremely troubling implications. The most prominent of these is that it renders morality arbitrary. If God could command anything, and, by virtue of him commanding it, that act is definitionally good, then morality has no objective basis beyond God's whim. If, for instance, he commands a rape victim to marry her violator, as he does in Deuteronomy 22, 28, and 29, then this order is morally good. In fact, the distraught victim has an objective moral duty to marry the monster who so egregiously abused her. This might makes right position not only contradicts the laws God provides in other passages, it grossly violates our moral intuition that apparently God has given us – an intuition that, in other contexts, proponents steadfastly rely upon with the mantra, right and wrong is written on our heart. So let's take a closer look at the verses in question. The command, do not leave alive anything that breathes, evokes utter disgust, and yet, somehow, we're to believe that this carnage is maximally loving.
支持者堅持認為,上帝是一切道德的源泉,是以如果他命令做什麼,那就一定是好的。有趣的是,雖然這種辯護在神學家中具有很大的影響力,但在哲學家中卻幾乎沒有任何影響力。究其原因,這主要是因為它歸結為 "強權即公理"--認為只有權力才能決定道德,這就帶來了極其令人不安的影響。其中最突出的一點是,它使道德變得武斷。如果上帝可以下達任何命令,而且由於他下達了命令,該行為在定義上就是好的,那麼道德就沒有了上帝心血來潮之外的客觀基礎。舉例來說,如果上帝命令強姦受害者與施暴者結婚,就像申命記第 22、28 和 29 章所做的