We all know it dominates the shoe market.

我們都知道，它主導著鞋類市場。

The company owns 38 percent of the total market share and it's outpaced competitors for years.

該公司擁有 38% 的市場份額，多年來一直領先於競爭對手。

But with sales falling in Q1 this year, Nike is facing its worst performance since the late 1990s.

但隨著今年第一季度銷售額的下滑，耐克正面臨著自 20 世紀 90 年代末以來最糟糕的業績。

And this past February, Nike announced that it will lay off 2 percent of its workforce as part of its plan to cut $2 billion in costs.

今年 2 月，耐克宣佈將裁員 2%，作為削減 20 億美元成本計劃的一部分。

So many challenges that Nike has to face right now.

耐克現在要面對的挑戰太多了。

Today there, in my opinion, has never been a better time to be a small brand.

在我看來，今天是做小品牌的最好時機。

While newer brands have been gaining ground and longtime rivals have seen their sales soar, Nike's shoes are continuing to stack up on clearance racks.

在新品牌不斷崛起、老對手銷量飆升的同時，耐克鞋卻在清倉貨架上不斷堆積。

The pressure's on and Nike is trying to recover from the crucial missteps it took in recent years and pick back up in the areas it used to own in.

壓力重重，耐克正試圖從近幾年的重大失誤中恢復過來，並在其曾經擁有的領域重振雄風。

Now that the company is shifting priorities, Nike might be getting the boost it needs.

現在，耐克公司正在轉變工作重點，這可能會給耐克帶來所需的推動力。

Let's first take a step back and identify one of the biggest factors that led to Nike's current state.

讓我們先回過頭來，找出導致耐克目前狀況的最大因素之一。

During a management shakeup in early 2020, Nike bid adieu to veteran CEO Mark Parker, who started at Nike as a footwear designer in 1979.

在 2020 年初的一次管理層調整中，耐克告別了資深首席執行官馬克-帕克。

Under his 16-year leadership, Parker led the company through some of its biggest wins.

在他 16 年的上司下，帕克帶領公司取得了一些最大的成功。

But when Nike announced John Donahoe would replace him as the company's fourth-ever CEO, the company entered a new era.

但當耐克宣佈約翰-多納霍將接替他成為公司有史以來第四任首席執行官時，公司進入了一個新時代。

Donahoe's background was quite different from Parker's.

多納霍的背景與帕克截然不同。

A lot of his experience came from leading tech companies.

他的很多經驗都來自於上司科技公司。

He and other new management members played a big part in advancing Nike's consumer direct acceleration strategy in 2017.

2017 年，他和其他新的管理層成員在推進耐克消費者直接加速戰略方面發揮了重要作用。

This prompted Nike to drastically shift focus in its business model, including a big emphasis on direct-to-consumer channels.

這促使耐克大幅調整業務模式，包括大力發展直接面向消費者的管道。

You see, back in 2019, Nike saw a lot of growth in e-commerce.

你看，早在 2019 年，耐克就看到了電子商務的大幅增長。

By the end of that fiscal year, its Sneakers app doubled its number of monthly active users, and sales on the app accounted for roughly 20 percent of Nike's digital business.

到該財年末，其 Sneakers 應用程序的月活躍用戶數量翻了一番，該應用程序的銷售額約佔耐克數字業務的 20%。

Which put Nike in a good strategic position when the pandemic hit, and e-commerce became key for many companies' survival.

這使耐克在大流行病襲來時處於有利的戰略地位，電子商務成為許多公司生存的關鍵。

At this point, Donahoe doubled down on the company's ongoing initiatives.

此時，多納霍加倍努力地推進公司正在實施的各項舉措。

And in one earnings call, Donahoe said, The consumer today is digitally grounded and simply will not revert back.

在一次財報電話會議上，多納霍說："今天的消費者以數字為基礎，根本不會倒退。

But if this year has taught us anything, it's that betting on yourself might not always be the right move.

但是，如果說今年讓我們學到了什麼，那就是賭上自己並不總是正確的選擇。

Nike invested heavily in developing its digital presence, including global store concepts and four mobile apps, all in hopes for customers to move to Nike's DTC channels.

耐克投入巨資發展數字業務，包括全球商店概念和四個移動應用程序，都是希望顧客轉向耐克的 DTC 管道。

The shoes are much, much more margin rich at selling via DTC.

通過 DTC 銷售的鞋子利潤要豐厚得多。

This shift away from retail was an aggressive move.

這種從零售業的轉變是一種積極的舉措。

For context, Wholesale brought in revenue of $25 billion for Nike in 2019.

批發業在 2019 年為耐克帶來了 250 億美元的收入。

So this was a huge decision.

是以，這是一個重大的決定。

But ultimately, Nike severed a third of its relationships with sales partners and cut back on the amount of merchandise it sold to remaining clients.

但最終，耐克斷絕了三分之一與銷售夥伴的合作關係，並削減了向其餘客戶出售的商品數量。

At least at the start, things were looking good.

至少在開始的時候，情況看起來還不錯。

Membership to Nike's digital platforms grew to 160 million users.

耐克數字平臺的用戶數增至 1.6 億。

And by May 2020, digital channels accounted for 30 percent of Nike's sales, which was about three years ahead of schedule.

到 2020 年 5 月，數字管道的銷售額佔耐克銷售額的 30%，比計劃提前了約三年。

But that's as far as it got.

但也僅此而已。

Nike never reached that 50 percent goal that Donahoe initially anticipated.

耐克從未達到多納霍最初預期的 50%的目標。

Once lockdowns lifted, consumers started to go back to brick-and-mortar stores.

封鎖解除後，消費者開始重返實體店。

And that's when Nike's direct sales started to see a change in course.

就在那時，耐克的直銷業務開始出現轉機。

To add to the matter, Nike was one of the many companies that faced significant supply chain headwinds during the pandemic.

更重要的是，耐克是在大流行病期間面臨嚴重供應鏈困難的眾多公司之一。

Come the latter half of 2022, several seasons worth of products finally arrived at Nike's warehouses.

2022 年下半年，幾季的產品終於運抵耐克倉庫。

And the company was suddenly hit by an inventory tsunami amounting to nearly $9.7 billion.

該公司突然遭遇了近 97 億美元的庫存海嘯。

This marked the company's highest inventory level in history and resulted in a 14 percent drop in share price.

這標誌著公司歷史上最高的庫存水準，導致股價下跌了 14%。

It became more and more evident that Nike overshot its DTC potential and needed to re-strategize.

越來越明顯的是，耐克的 DTC 潛力已經過剩，需要重新制定戰略。

They pushed way too hard and fast on trying to grow their own DTC business at the expense of their wholesale partners.

他們過於急功近利地發展自己的 DTC 業務，而犧牲了批發合作伙伴的利益。

Stuck managing its own inventory, Nike attempted to protect its brand value by selling many of its products through widespread discounting, but not just on their own.

耐克公司受困於自己的庫存管理，試圖通過大範圍打折銷售許多產品來保護自己的品牌價值，但這並不僅僅侷限於產品本身。

At the time, there was a strong demand for Nike products from wholesale channels.

當時，批發管道對耐克產品的需求十分旺盛。

I think they've come to a realization that they need those partners to bring products to consumers where they can't reach them otherwise.

我認為，他們已經意識到，他們需要這些合作伙伴將產品帶給消費者，否則他們就無法接觸到消費者。

So Nike, like the Sorry X, came crawling back to some of its wholesale partners.

於是，耐克就像 "對不起 X "一樣，爬回了一些批發合作伙伴那裡。

And while these companies welcomed Nike back with open arms, this rekindling of sorts wasn't a fix-all solution.

雖然這些公司張開雙臂歡迎耐克的迴歸，但這種重燃戰火的做法並非一勞永逸。

Nike definitely deprioritized some of their opening price point footwear during the pandemic and during this push to DTC.

耐克公司在大流行病期間，以及在向 DTC 轉型的過程中，肯定會優先考慮一些開價鞋類產品。

It's starting to come back.

它開始回來了。

I would not tell you that they're back anywhere close to where they had been.

我不會告訴你它們已經恢復到了原來的水準。

Still, Nike generally has strong pricing power, which is largely due to how much thought the company puts into managing the marketplace.

儘管如此，耐克的定價能力一般都很強，這主要歸功於該公司在管理市場方面花費了很多心思。

I think most brands use a much more channel segmentation, which is a much more blunt instrument.

我認為，大多數品牌使用的管道細分方法更為直截了當。

Nike, I think, takes a much more detailed approach and says all the way down to the doorfront, this is where we're going to put the product for this particular release.

我認為，耐克的做法要詳細得多，他們會一直說到店門口，這就是我們這次發佈的產品的擺放位置。

To hit revenue goals, Nike decided to churn out some of its top selling products.

為了實現收入目標，耐克決定淘汰一些最暢銷的產品。

Like these, the Pegasus and the Air Force Ones, but not quickly enough because fashion is a fickle industry.

就像這些飛馬和空軍一號，但還不夠快，因為時尚是一個善變的行業。

And sales are weakening due to fluctuations in consumer demand and competitive pressure.

而由於消費者需求的波動和競爭壓力，銷售正在減弱。

In fact, retailers are continuing to slash prices on Nike sneakers at a rate that's nearly double the amount two years ago.

事實上，零售商對耐克運動鞋的降價幅度幾乎是兩年前的兩倍。

Nike looks really tired at retail.

耐克在零售方面看起來非常疲憊。

Living on a new colorway of an old established shoe is not a formula for success.

靠一款老款鞋的新配色過日子並不是成功之道。

Matt goes on to say that the turnover rate for fashion shoes is shorter than five years.

Matt 接著說，時裝鞋的更替率短於 5 年。

But brands can extend the time span of a product line through scarcity, the lure of a product, if you will.

但是，品牌可以通過產品的稀缺性和誘惑力來延長產品線的時間跨度。

The Jordan line, for instance, is a multi-billion dollar brand that was built on this model.

例如，喬丹系列就是基於這種模式建立起來的一個價值數十億美元的品牌。

Nike releases often sold out within seconds.

耐克發佈的新產品往往在幾秒鐘內就被搶購一空。

For example, in 2021, demand on the sneakers app grew by 70 percent compared to the year before.

例如，2021 年，運動鞋應用程序的需求量比前一年增長了 70%。

Nike only met 7 percent of that demand, meaning it was leaving profit on the table.

耐克只滿足了其中 7% 的需求，這意味著它把利潤留在了桌面上。

So the company tried to meet more of the demand.

是以，公司試圖滿足更多的需求。

But this turned out to be a double edged sword.

但事實證明，這是一把雙刃劍。

In making the product more widely available, the hype behind its product simmered.

隨著產品的普及，其產品背後的炒作也逐漸升溫。

And now Nike announced that it, too, will go back to its OG approach and pull back on some of its big franchises.

現在，耐克公司宣佈，它也將回歸其一貫的做法，撤出一些大的特許經營項目。

But really, these limited supply shoes are coveted by sneaker heads, and they only make up a small portion of Nike's total consumers.

但實際上，這些限量供應的鞋款都是球鞋愛好者夢寐以求的，他們只佔耐克消費者總數的一小部分。

I think Nike's greatest emphasis right now is on the innovation side.

我認為耐克目前最重視的是創新方面。

The company's brand identity is so connected to its innovative culture, especially in one of Nike's legacy categories, performance running.

耐克公司的品牌形象與其創新文化息息相關，尤其是在耐克的傳統品類之一--高性能跑步方面。

Think of Phil Knight, the co-founder of Nike, who sold these shoes out of the trunk of his car.

想想耐克公司的聯合創始人菲爾-奈特吧，他曾在自己的汽車後備箱裡賣過這種鞋。

Nike's origin story was rooted in running shoes.

耐克起源於跑鞋。

When Nike dropped the ball on this front, it provided space for competitors to start eating at its market share.

耐克在這方面的失誤，為競爭對手開始蠶食其市場份額提供了空間。

So while they have some innovation at the very top end of the market, that sort of real sweet spot of $100 to $150, where Hoka, On, Brooks, A6 are all winning.

是以，雖然他們在高端市場有一些創新，但在 100 美元到 150 美元這個真正的甜蜜點上，Hoka、On、Brooks 和 A6 都勝出了。

Many consumers shifted their interest to newer brands that boast unique, techie designs, like those thick foamy insoles from Hoka or On Running's patented cushioning system.

許多消費者將興趣轉移到那些擁有獨特技術設計的新品牌上，比如 Hoka 厚厚的保麗龍鞋墊或 On Running 的專利緩衝系統。

I do not see Nike's No. 1 share position in jeopardy.

我認為耐克的第一份額地位不會受到威脅。

Where companies can currently tap into Nike's vulnerability is in the sports lifestyle section.

目前，企業可以利用耐克弱點的領域是運動生活方式部分。

Think of the New Balance 990s or Adidas, Sambas or Gazelles that everyone seems to have these days.

想想如今似乎人人都有的 New Balance 990 或 Adidas、Sambas 或 Gazelles。

That's where I would expect Adidas to have its greatest impact on Nike if they are able to grab some share from them.

如果阿迪達斯能從耐克手中搶到一些份額，我希望他們能在這方面對耐克產生最大的影響。

And Nike recognizes that.

耐克也意識到了這一點。

Back in September, Donahoe reiterated that the company is focused and mobilized to address areas where we need to raise our game.

早在 9 月份，多納霍就曾重申，公司正集中精力，全力以赴，解決我們需要改進的地方。

Remember, this is the company that has created some of the most cutting edge pieces of shoe technology.

請記住，正是這家公司創造了一些最前沿的製鞋技術。

The Air Max Bubble, Nike Flyknit and even those shoes that could tie themselves.

Air Max Bubble、Nike Flyknit，甚至那些能自己打結的鞋子。

The big issue, though, is that this product takes months and months and months to bring to market.

但最大的問題是，這種產品需要幾個月的時間才能推向市場。

So while it's absolutely the right thing to do, it's not a quick fix.

是以，雖然這樣做是絕對正確的，但卻不是一蹴而就的。

In a recent statement, Nike announced a new lineup of footwear and apparel products to kick off a multi-year innovation cycle.

在最近的一份聲明中，耐克宣佈將推出一系列新的鞋類和服裝產品，以啟動一個多年的創新週期。

It's got to come season after season after season.

它必須一季又一季地到來。

It's not just one product or one platform.

這不僅僅是一種產品或一個平臺。

It's going to be continuous.

這將是持續性的。

Products that, according to them, will bring the innovation, performance, style and comfort consumers will be excited about for years to come.

他們認為，這些產品將帶來創新、性能、風格和舒適，讓消費者在未來的歲月裡為之興奮。

Even though Nike expects revenue to grow just 1 percent for fiscal 2024, the company is still unmatched within the footwear industry.

儘管耐克公司預計 2024 財年的收入增長率僅為 1%，但該公司在鞋類行業中的地位依然無可匹敵。

During Donahoe's time at the helm, sales have grown.

在多納霍掌舵期間，銷售額不斷增長。

Just between 2021 and 2023, Nike saw revenue growth of about 15 percent.

就在 2021 年至 2023 年期間，耐克的收入增長了約 15%。

Nike is massively dominant, four times the size of Adidas.

耐克佔據著絕對優勢，其規模是阿迪達斯的四倍。

Meaning Nike can make big swings without taking too much damage.

這意味著耐克可以在不受到太大傷害的情況下進行大揮杆。

Nike is so big today, they can do whatever they want.

耐克公司如今如此強大，他們可以為所欲為。

Just take a look at how it's recently handled its endorsement deals.

看看它最近是如何處理代言交易的就知道了。

After losing Tiger Woods, a partnership that lasted for more than 27 years, Nike didn't just sit idly by.

在失去了與泰格-伍茲長達 27 年的合作之後，耐克並沒有坐以待斃。

It went hard, outbidding competitors and landing a deal with Caitlyn Clark.

它出價很高，擊敗了競爭對手，與凱特琳-克拉克（Caitlyn Clark）達成了協議。

Nike also signed the German national soccer team to a kit partnership that ended a 70-year run with Adidas.

耐克還與德國國家足球隊簽訂了裝備合作協議，結束了與阿迪達斯長達 70 年的合作。

The Olympics also is a potential catalyst for Nike, although it generally hasn't been a visceral driver in footwear.

奧運會也是耐克的一個潛在催化劑，儘管它通常不是鞋類產品的主要驅動力。

Where the Olympics have been important over the years is when brands have new products to introduce free advertising, if you will.

多年來，奧運會的重要意義在於，當品牌推出新產品時，可以免費做廣告。

And while it hasn't been Nike's year, or years really, many experts still aren't betting against them.

雖然耐克今年的表現不盡如人意，但許多專家仍不看好耐克。

For more UN videos visit www.un.org

欲瞭解更多聯合國視頻，請訪問 www.un.org