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Good afternoon.
Today's speaker is Peter Thiel.
Peter, was the founder of PayPal, and
Palantir, and Founders Fund, and has invested in most of
the tech companies in Silicon Valley.
And he's going to talk about strategy and competition.
Thank you for coming, Peter. >> Awesome.
Thanks, Sam.
Thanks for inviting me.
Thanks for having me.
I sorta, I have a single a day
fixed that I'm completely obsessed with in.
On the business side which is that, if you're starting
a company, if you're the founder,
entrepreneur starting a company,
you always want to aim for
monopoly, and that you want to always avoid competition.
Hence, competition is for losers.
Something we'll be talking about today.
I'd like to start by saying something
about the basic idea of when you start one
of these companies how you go about, creating value?
And this question, what makes a business valuable?
And I wanna, suggest that there's basically,
a very simple very simple formula that
you, have a valuable company two things are true.
Number one, that it creates X dollars of value for
the world.
And number two, that you capture Y% of X.
And the critical thing that I think people always miss
in the sort of analysis is that X and y are completely
independent variables, and so X can be very big.
Y can be very small.
X can be of intermediate size.
And if Y is, is reasonably big you can still get
a very big business.
So, to create a valuable company you have to
basically, both create something of value and
capture some fraction of
the value of what you've created.
And sort of,
just to illustrate this is a contrast.
If you sorta, compare the US airline industry with
a company like Google on search.
If you sorta, measure by
the size of these industries you could, you could say
that airlines are still more important than search.
If you just measure it say by revenues.
There's 195 billion.
In domestic revenues in 2012.
Google had just north of 50 billion.
And certainly, sort of on some intuitive level,
if you said, if you were given a choice and
said well do you want to get rid of all air travel.
Or do you want to get rid of your ability to
use search engines?
The intuition would be that air travel is
something that's more important than search.
And this is, of course, just the domestic numbers.
If you had looked at this globally, airlines are much,
much bigger than search, or Google, is But
the profit margins are quite a bit less.
You know,
they were marginally profitable in 2012.
Think entire hundred year history of
the airline industry.
The cumulative profits in the U.S.
have been approximately zero.
The companies make money.
They episodically go bankrupt.
They get re-capitalized and
you sort of cycle and repeat.
And this is reflected in you know the combined market
capitalization of the airline industries maybe
something of the U.S. airline industry.
Something like a quarter that of Google.
So, you have a search engine much,
much smaller than air travel but much more valuable and
I think this reflects these very different valuations on
X and Y.
So, you know, if we look at perfect competition.
You know there are, sort of, there's some pros and
cons to the world of perfect competition.
On a high level it's always,
this is what you study in Econ One.
It's always, it's easy to model, which I think is why
Econ professors like talking about perfect competition.
It somehow is efficient, especially,
in a world where things are static because you have all
the consumer surplus gets captured by everybody.
And politically, it's what we're told is good in
our society, that you want to have competition and
this is somehow a good thing.
Of course, there are a lot of negatives.
It's generally not that good if you're.
You're involvement in anything that's
hyper-competitive because you often don't
make money off, come back to this a little bit later.
So, I think at one end of the spectrum you have
industries that are perfectly competitive.
And at the other end of the spectrum you have
things that, I would say, are monopolies.
And they're much stable, longer term businesses,
you have more capital.
And if you get a creative monopoly for
inventing something new, I think it's symptomatic of
having created something really valuable.
And so I do think this, the extreme binary view of
the world I always articulate is that
there are exactly two kinds of businesses in this world.
There are businesses that are perfectly competitive
and there are businesses that are monopolies.
And, there's shockingly little that is in between.
And this dichotomy is not understood very
well because people are constantly lying
about the nature of the businesses they're in.
And this is why,
this is in my mind, this is the most important.
It's not necessarily the most important thing in
business, but I think it's the most
important business idea that people don't understand.
That there are just these two kinds of businesses.
And so let me
say a little bit about the lies that people tell.
And so you basically, the basic, if you sort of
imagine that there was a spectrum of companies from
perfect competition to monopoly.
The apparent differences are quite small.
Because the people who have monopolies pretend not to.
They will basically say, and it's because you
don't want to get regulated by the government, you
don't want the government to come after you.
So you will never say that you have a monopoly.
So, anyone who has a monopoly will pretend that
they're in incredible competition.
And on the other end of the spectrum, if you
are incredibly competitive, and if you're in some sort
of business will you will never make any money.
You will be tempted to tell a lie that goes in
the other direction.
Where you will say that you're doing something
unique that is somehow less competitive than it looks.
Because you will want to differentiate, you
will want to track capital or something like that.
So, if the monopolists pretend not to have
a monopolies the non-monopolists pretend to
have monopolies.
The apparent difference is very small.
Where as the real difference I would submit is
actually quite big.
And so there's this distortion that happens
because of the lies people tell about their businesses.
And the lies are sort of in these opposite directions.
Let me, drill a little bit down further on the way
these lies work.
And so
the basic lie you tell as
a non-monopoly is that we're in a very small market.
The basic lie you tell as a monopoly is
that the market you're in is much bigger than it looks.
And so typically,
if you want to think this in sort of set theoretic terms.
You could say that a monopoly tells a why,
where you describe your business as the union of
these vastly different markets, and
the non-monopolies describes it as the intersection.
So, that in effect, if you're non-monopolist, you
will rhetorically describe your market as super small.
You're the only person in that market.
If you have monopoly, you'll describe it as super big,
and there's lots of competition in it.
So some examples of how this works in practice.
So I always use restaurants as the example of
a terrible business.
And there's always, sort of, ideas that,
you know, capitalism and competition are antonyms.
Capital, someone who accumulates capital.
World of perfect competition is
a world where all the capital gets competed away.
So, you're opening a restaurant business.
No one wants to invest because you just lose money.
So you have to tell some idiosyncratic narrative.
And you will say something like, well,
we're the only British food restaurant in Paolo Alto.
So, it's British, Paolo Alto.
And of course,
that's too small a market because people may be able
to drive all the way to Mountain View or even Park.
And there probably no people who eat nothing but
British food.
At least, no people are still alive.
And so that is sort of a fictitiously narrow market.
There's sort of a Hollywood version of this where.
The way movies always get pitched is, it's like
a college football star, joins an elite group of
hackers to catch the shark that killed his friends.
So, that is a movie that has not been made.
But the question is,
is that the right category or is the correct category?
It's just another movie, in which case, you know,
there are lots of those, it's super competitive,
incredibly had to make money.
No one ever makes money in Hollywood doing movies.
It's really hard.
And so you always have this question about.
Does the intersection, does,
is it real, does it make sense,
does it have value that one should ask?
And of course, there are start up versions of this.
Where you, and the sort of the really bad versions you
just take a whole series of buzz words.
Sharing, mobile, social, apps, you combine them,
and you have some kind of narrative.
And, whether or not, that's a real business or not,
is, it's generally a bad sign.
So it's, it's almost this pattern recognition when you
have this rhetoric of this
sort of intersections, it generally does not work.
The something of
somewhere is really mostly just the nothing of nowhere.
It's like the Stanford of North Dakota.
One of a kind, but it's not Stanford.
So, let's look at the opposite.
The opposite lie, is if you are, let's say,
the search, company, that's down the street from here.
And has about a happy 66% market share and, you know?
Is completely dominant in the search market.
Google has not almost never describes itself.
As a search engine, these days.
And instead, it describes itself in all these
different ways.
So, it sometimes says it's an advertising company.
So, if it was search, you'd say, well, it's, like, it
has this huge market share that's really, really crazy.
It's like a incredible monopoly.
It's much bigger than, it's much,
much more robust monopoly than Microsoft,
ever had in the 90s.
Maybe that's why it's making so much money.
But if you say it's an advertising market,
you could say,
well, there's search advertising is 17 billion.
And that's part of online advertising,
which is much bigger.
And then, all US advertising is bigger.
And then by the time you get to global advertising,
that's close to 500 billion.
And so you're talking about 3.5%.
So a tiny part of this much larger market.
Or if you don't want it to be an advertising company
you could always say that you're a technology company.
And so sorry.
Let me just see.
And so
the technology market is something like a $1 trillion
market, and the narrative that you tell is that Google
in the technology market is well we're competing with
all the car companies with our self-driving cars,
we're competing with Apple on TVs and iPhones.
We're competing with Facebook.
We're competing with Microsoft on office
products, we're competing with Amazon on cloud
services, and so, we are in this giant technology market
where there's competition in every direction you look.
And no we're
not the monopoly the government's looking for and
we should not get regulated in any way whatsoever.
And so I think one has to always be super aware that
there are these very powerful incentives
to distort the nature of these markets
one way or the other.
So, the evidence of the narrow markets in
the tech industry is if you basically just.
If you look at sort of the, some of the big
tech companies, Apple, Google, Microsoft,
Amazon, they just they've just been building up
cash for year after year and you have these incredibly
high profit margins and I would, I would say that the.
That one of the reasons the tech industry in the US.
Has been so successful financially.
Is because it's prone to creating all these monopoly
like business.
And that's and
it's reflected by these companies.
Just accumulate so much cash.
That they don't know what to do with it
beyond a certain point.
And so let me
say a few things about how to build a monopoly.
And, I think one of the sort of very counter
intuitive ideas that comes out of this monopoly thread.
Is that you want to go after small markets.
If you're a startup.
You want to get to monopoly.
You're starting a new company,
you want to get to monopoly.
Monopolies you have a large share of a market,
how do you get to a large share of a market?
You start with a really small market and
you take over that whole market, and then.
And then over time you find ways to expand that market
in concentric circles.
And the thing that's always a big mistake is going
after a giant market on day one.
Because that's typically evidence that you
somehow haven't defined the categories correctly.
And it normally means that there is going to be
too much competition.
In one way or another.
And so I think almost all the successful companies
in Silicon Valley had some model of
starting with small markets and expanding.
And if you take Amazon, you start with.
Just a bookstore.
We have all the books in the world.
So it's a better bookstore than anybody else
has in the world.
When it's starts in the 90's, it's online,
there's things you can do you can't do before.
And then you gradually expand into all sorts of
different forms of e-commerce and
other things beyond that.
You know, eBay you start with Pez dispensers.
You move on to Beanie Babies and
eventually it's all these different auctions for
all these sorts of different goods.
And what was very counter intuitive about many of
these companies is they often start with
markets that are so small that people don't think
that they're valuable at all when you get started.
The PayPal version of this was, we started with
power sellers on eBay which was about 20,000 people.
When we first saw this happening in December of 99,
January of 2000 right after we launched,
there was a sense that these were all,
it was such a small market it was terrible.
We thought these were terrible customers to have.
It's just people selling junk on the internet.
Why in the world do we want to
be going after this market?
But, you know, there was a way to get a product that
was much better for everybody in that market.
You could, and we got to something like 25, 30%,
you know, market penetration in two or three months.
And you got some walk in.
You got brand recognition and
your able to build the business from there.
So I always think these,
these very small markets are quite underrated.
The Facebook version of this I always give is that you
know if the initial market of
Facebook was 10,000 people at Harvard, it went from
zero to sixty percent market share in ten days.
That was a very auspicious start.
The way this gets analyzed in business schools is
always, that's ridiculous,
it's such a small market it can't have any value at all.
And so, I think the business school analysis of
Facebook early on, or of PayPal early on, or
of eBay early on is that the markets were perhaps, so
small as to have, almost no value.
And they, they would have had little value had
they stayed small, but it turned out they were ways to
grow them concentrically and, that's what made them,
that's what made them so valuable.
Now I think the opposite version of this,
is always where you have super big markets.
And, and I, there's so much,
so many different things that went wrong with all
the clean tech companies in the last decade.
But, but, one,
one theme that ran through almost all of them,
was that they all started with massive markets.
And every clean tech PowerPoint presentation that
one saw in the years 2005 to 2008,
which was the clean tech bubble in Silicon Valley.
Started with, we're in the energy market,
we're in a market that's measured in hundreds of
billions of trillions of dollars.
And then once you're a minnow in a vast ocean.
That's not a good place to be.
That means that you have tons of competitors and
you don't even know who all the competitors are.
And so you want to be a one of a kind company,
where it's the only one in a small ecosystem.
You don't want to
be the fourth online pet food company.
You don't want to be
the tenth thin film solar panel company.
You don't want to be the 100th restaurant in
Palo Alto.
Your restaurant industry is a trillion dollar industry,
so if you do a market size analysis you conclude
restaurants are a fantastic business to go into, and
it's often, large markets, large existing markets
typically mean that you have tons of competition, very,
very hard to differentiate.
So the first very counterintuitive into a idea
is to go after small markets, often markets that
are so small people don't even notice them.
They don't think that they make sense.
That's where you got a foothold, and
then if those markets are able to expand,
you can scale into a big monopoly business.
You know, a second sort of, the sort of several
different characteristics of these monopoly businesses,
that I like to focus on.
There's probably no sort of single formula to it.
I also ways think that that in technology there
is always a sense that you know,
the history of technology is such that every.
Every moment happens only once, so you know the next
Mark Zuckerberg won't build a social network.
The next Larry Page won't be building a search engine.
The next Bill Gates won't be
building an operating system.
And if you're copying these people,
you're not learning from them.
But it's, and so,
there is always these very unique businesses that
are doing something that's not been done before,
end up, end of having the potential to be a monopoly.
The opening line in Anna Karenina that all
happy companies, sorry, all happy families.
All happy families are alike.
All unhappy families are unhappy in
their own special way.
And the opposite is true in business,
where I think all happy companies are different
because they're doing something very unique.
All unhappy companies are alike because they fail to
escape the essential sameness that
is competition, and so
one sort of characteristic of a monopoly technology
company is some sort of proprietary technology.
My sort of crazy, somewhat arbitrary,
rule of thumb is you want to have a technology that's
an order of magnitude better than the next best thing.
So Amazon had over ten times as many books,
maybe not that high tech, but you figure out a way to
sell ten times as many books in an efficient online way.
You know, PayPal, the alternative for
PayPal was using checks to send money on eBay,
took seven to ten days to clear.
PayPal could do it more than ten times as fast.
So you wanna have some sort of very
powerful improvement in some order, maybe an order of
magnitude improvement on some key dimension.
Of course, you know,
if you actually come with something totally new it's,
it's just, it's just like an infinite improvement.
So I would say the,
the iPhone was the first smartphone that worked and
so that's, you know that's like I mean,
I mean maybe not infinite, but
it's sort of definitely order of magnitude or
more of improvement.
So I think, the, the technology is designed to
give you a massive delta over, over the next,
the next best thing.
I think, I think there often are network effects that
can kick in that, really help.
The thing that's very, and these,
these lead to monopolies over time,
the thing that's very tricky about network effects is,
they're often.
They're often very hard to get started.
So even though everyone understands how
valuable they are, there is
always this incredibly tricky question why is it
valuable to the first person who is doing something?
Economies of scale, if you have something of
a very high fixed costs, very low marginal cost.
That's typically a monopoly like business.
And then there's this thing of branding.
Which is sort of like this idea that gets lodged in
people's brains.
I never quite understand how branding works, so I never
invest in companies where it's just about branding.
But it is, I think,
a real phenomenon that creates real value.
I think one of the things, I'm gonna come back to
this a little bit, towards the end.
But one of the things that's very striking,
is that software businesses are often, are, for
some reason, very good at some of these things.
They're especially good at the economies of scale part.
Because, the marginal cost of software is zero.
And so if you get something that works in software.
It's often significantly better
than the existing solution.
And then you have these tremendous economies of
scale, and you can scale fairly quickly.
So even if the market starts small,
you can grow your business quickly enough to stay at
the same size as the growing market.
And maintain the sort of monopoly power.
Now, the critical thing about these monopolies is,
it's not enough to have a monopoly for just a moment.
The critical thing is to
have one that lasts over time.
And so in Silicon Valley there's always this idea
that you wanna be the first mover.
And I, I always think it's, it's, in some ways,
the better framing is you wanna be the last mover, or
you wanna be the last company in a category.
Those are the ones that are really valid.
Microsoft was the last operating system,
at least for many decades.
Google is the last search engine.
Facebook will be valuable if it turns out to be the last,
social networking site.
One way to think of
this last mover of value is this idea that most of
the value in these companies exists far in the future.
If you do a discounted cash flow analysis of a business.
You look at, you have sort of all these profit streams.
You have a growth rate.
The growth rate's much higher than
the discount rate.
And so most of the value exists far in the future.
I did this exercise At PayPal in March of 2001.
We'd been in business for about 27 months.
And we sort of had, the growth rate was 100% a year.
We were discounting future cashflows by about 30%.
And it turned out that about three quarters of
the value of the business, as of 2001,
came from cash flows in years 2011 and beyond.
And whenever you do the math on any of these tech
companies, you get an answer that's something like that.
So if you are trying to analyze any other
tech companies in Silicon Valley, Arabian B, Twitter.
Facebook, any emerging internet companies,
any of the ones in Y-Combinator.
The math tells you that three quarters, 80,
85% of the value is coming from cash flows in
years 2024 and beyond.
It's very, very far in the future.
And, so one of the things that we always overvalue in
Silicon Valley is growth rates, and
we undervalue durability.
Because, growth is something you can measure in the here
and now, and you can always track that very precisely.
The question of whether a company's still gonna be
around a decade from now.
That's actually what,
what dominates the value equation and
that sort of is a much more qualitative sort of a thing.
And so if we, if we went back to this idea of these
characteristics of monopoly, proprietary technology,
network effects, economies of scale, You can think
of these characteristics as ones that exist at a moment
in time when you capture a market and take it over.
But you also want to think about,
are these things going to last over time.
And, so, there's a time
dimension to all these characteristics.
So, net worth effects also have a great time element,
where as the network scales the network
effects actually get more robust, and so
if you have a network effect business that's often one
that can become a bigger and stronger monopoly over time.
Proprietary technology is always a little bit of
a tricky one, so
you want something that's order magnitude better.
Than, the state of the art in the world today.
And that's how you get people's attention.
That's how you initially break through.
But then, you don't wanna be superseded by somebody else.
And so there are all these areas of innovation where,
there was tremendous innovation, but
no one made any money.
So, you know?
Describe manufacturing in the 1980's.
You could im-,
you could do a better disk,
build a better disk drive than anybody else.
You could take over the whole world.
And two years later someone else would come along and
replace yours.
And the course of 15 years,
you got vastly improved disk drives, so
it had great benefit to consumers, but it didn't
actually help the people who started these companies.
And so there's always this question about having a huge
breakthrough in technology, but then also being able to
say, explain why, yours will be the last breakthrough, or
at least the last breakthrough for
a long time, or when you make a breakthrough.
And then you can keep improving on it
at a quick enough pace that no one can ever catch up.
So, if you have a structure of structure of
the future where there's a lot of innovation and
other people will come up with new things in
the thing you're working on.
That's great for society.
It's actually not that good for
your business, typically.
And then economies of scale, we've already talked about.
So I think this last mover thing is very critical.
I'm always, you know,
I don't wanna overdo the chess analogies, but
the first mover in chess is someone who plays white.
White is about a 1/3 of a pawn advantage, so
there's a small advantage to going first.
You wanna be the last mover, who wins the game, so
there's always the, Capablanca world champion,
Capablanca must begin by studying the end game, and
I do think that's, while I wouldn't say that's the only
thing you should study.
I think the sort of perspective of
asking these questions, why will this still be
the leading company 10, 15, 20 years from now, is a,
is a really critical one to try to think through.
Let me, let me sort of,
I want to sort of go in two slightly other directions
with this monopoly vs competition idea.
And I think so I think this is the, the central idea,
in my mind for, for business for starting business for
thinking about them and there are some, interesting
perspectives I think it gives on the whole you know,
on the whole history of innovation and
technology and science.
Because, yeah we've, we've lived through,
250, 300 years of incredible technological progress in
you know many, many different domains.
You know, steam engine to railways to
telephones, refrigeration, household appliances,
you know the computer revolution, aviation.
All sorts of different areas of
technological innovation and then there's sort of
analogous thing that one can say about science,
where we've lived through centuries of enormous
amounts of innovation in science as well.
And the thing that I think people always miss when
they think about these things is that because X and
Y are independent variables, some of these things can be
extremely valuable innovations.
But the people who invent them,
who come up with them, do not get rewarded for this.
And certainly, you can go back to, you need to
create X dollars in value, you create Y percent of X.
I would suggest that the history of science has
generally been one where Y is 0% across the board.
The scientists never make any money.
They're always deluded into thinking that they live in
a just universe that will reward them for
their work and for their inventions.
And this is probably the fundamental delusion that
scientists tend to suffer from in our society.
And even in technology, there are, sort of,
many different areas of technology,
where there were great innovations that created
tremendous value for society.
But the people did not actually capture that much
of the value.
And so I think there is a sort of whole history of.
Science and
technology that can be told from the perspective of
how much value was actually captured.
And certainly, there are entire sectors where
people didn't capture anything.
So you're the smartest Physicist of the 20th
century, you come up with special relativity,
you come up with general relativity.
You don't get to be a billionaire,
you don't even get to be a millionaire.
It somehow doesn't work that way.
The railroads, incredibly valuable.
Most of them just went bankrupt,
because there was too much competition.
Wright brothers, you fly the first plane,
you don't make any money.
And so I think there is sort of a structure to
these industries, that's very important.
And I think the thing that's actually rare,
are the success cases.
Most the, so it's actually unique when you really think
about the history in this, in this 250 year sweep,
it's unusual, Y is almost always zero percent.
It's always zero in science.
It's almost always in technology, and
so it's very rare where people made money.
You know, the early,
the late 18th, early 19th century, the first
industrial revolution was textile mills, steam engine,
the sort of automated things.
And you had these relentless improvements,
that people improved efficiency of
textile factories, manufacturing generally.
At a clip of 5 to 7% every year.
Year after year, decade after decade.
You had 60, 70 years of
tremendous improvement from 1780 to 1850.
But even in 1850, most of the wealth in Britain
was still held by the landed aristocracy.
The workers didn't, you know,
the workers didn't make that much,
the capitalists didn't make that much either.
It was all competed away.
There were hundreds of
people running textiles factories.
It was an industry that just,
the structure of the competition prevented people
from making any money.
And so I think there are, in my mind,
there probably are only two broad categories in
the entire history, the last 250 years,
where people have actually come up with new things, and
made money doing so.
One is these sort of vertically integrated
complex monopolies which people did build in
the second industrial revolution at the end of
the 19th and started the 20th century.
And so this was like Ford, it was the vertically
integrated oil companies like Standard Oil.
And what these vertically integrated monopolies
typically required was this very complex coordination.
You've got a lot of pieces to fit together in
just the right way, when you assembled it,
you had a tremendous advantage.
This is actually done surprisingly little today.
And so I think this is sort of a business form that
when people can pull it off is very valuable.
It's typically fairly capital intensive.
We live sort of in a, in a culture where is very hard
to get people to buy into anything that's super
complicated, and it takes very long to build.
But I, you know,
when I sort of think about my colleague Elon Musk
from PayPal success with Tesla and Space X, I think
the key to these companies was the complex vertically
integrated monopoly structure they had.
So if you sort of look at Tesla or Space X you ask,
you know, was there sort of single breakthrough?
They certainly innovated on a lot of dimensions.
I don't think there was
a single tennex breakthrough and battery storage,
or you know, maybe working on some things in rocketry.
But they hadn't,
there was no sort of single massive breakthrough, but
what was really impressive was integrating all these
pieces together, and doing it in a way that was more
vertically integrated than most of their competitors.
So, Tesla,
you also integrated the car distributors, so
they wouldn't steal all the money, as has happened with
the rest of the car industry in the US.
Or SpaceX, you basically pulled in
all the subcontractors where most of the large aerospace
companies have single source subcontractors that are able
to sort of charge monopoly profits, and
make it very hard for
the integrated aerospace companies to make money.
And so vertical integration I think is sort of a very
under explored modality of technological progress,
that people would do well to look at more.
And then I think there is, there is something about
software itself that's very, very powerful.
Software has these incredible economies of
scale, these low marginal costs and there is something
about the world of bits, as opposed to the world of
adams, where you can often get very fast adoption.
And, and the fast adoption is critical to capturing and
taking over markets because even if you
have a small market if the adoption rate is too slow,
there'll be enough time for other people to
enter that market, and compete with you.
Whereas if you have a small to mid size market, and
have a fast adoption rate.
You cannot take over this market.
And so I think this is
one of the reasons Silicon Valley has done so well, and
why software has been this phenomenal industry.
And what I, what I would suggest, what I would want
to leave you with is there are sort of these different
rationalizations people give for why certain things work,
and why certain things don't work.
And I think these rationalizations always
obscure this question of creating X dollars in value,
and capturing Y percent of X.
So the science rationalization we're
always told, is that
the scientists aren't interested in making money.
They're doing it for
charitable reasons, and that you're not
a good scientist if you're motivated by money.
And I'm not even saying people should
always be motivated by money or something like this.
But I think we should be a little more critical of this
as a rationalization.
We should ask, is this a rationalization
to obscure the fact that Y equals zero percent.
And the scientists are operating in this sort of
world where all the innovation is
effectively competed away, and
they can't capture any of it directly.
The software distortion that often happens,
is because people are making such a vast fortunes in
software, we infer that this is the most
valuable thing in the world being done full stop.
And so if people at Twitter make billions of dollars,
it must be that Twitter is worth far more than anything
that Einstein did.
What that sort of rationalization tends to
obscure, is again that X and Y are independent variables.
And there are these businesses where you
capture a lot of X and there others where you don't.
And so, I do think the history of innovation has
been this history where the microeconomics,
the structure of these industries has mattered
a tremendous amount.
And when there is sort of this
story where some people have made vast fortunes, because
they were in industries with the right structure, and
other people made nothing at all, because they were in
these sort of very competitive things.
And we shouldn't just rationalize that away,
I think it's worth understanding this better.
And then finally, let me come back to this
sort of overarching theme for
this talk, this competition is for losers idea.
Which is always a provocative way to
title things, because we always think of
the losers as the people who are not good at competing.
We think of the losers as the people who are slow on
the sports team, on the track team in high school,
or who do a little bit less well on the standardized
tests, and don't get into the right schools.
So we always think of losers as people who can't compete,
and I want us to really rethink,
and revalue this and consider whether it's
possible that competition itself is off.
That we've sort of, it's not just the case and
we don't understand this
monopoly competition dichotomy intellectually.
So that's, sort of,
why you wouldn't understand intellectually,
because people lie about it.
It's distorted.
We have all these history of innovation
rationalizes what's happening in all these very,
very strange ways.
But I think it's more than just an intellectual blind
spot, I think it's also a psychological blind spot
where we find ourselves, you know, very attracted to
competition in one form or another.
We find it reassuring if other people do things.
The word ape, already in the time of Shakespeare,
meant both primate and imitate.
And there is
something about human nature that's deeply mimetic.
Imitative.
Apelike, sheeplike, lemminglike, herdlike.
And it's this very problematic thing that we
need to always think through and try to overcome.
And there is always this question about
competition as a form of validation.
Where we go for
things that lots of other people are going for,
and it's not that there is wisdom in crowds, it's
not when lots of people are trying to do something that,
that's proof of it being valuable.
I think it's when lots of people are trying to do
something that is often proof of insanity.
There are twenty thousand people a year who move to
Los Angeles to become movie stars,
about 20 of them make it.
I think the Olympics are a little bit better,
because you can figure out pretty quickly whether
you're good or not, so there's a little bit less of
a dead weight loss to society.
You know?
>> You the sort of educational experience at
a place, the pre Stanford educational experience.
There's always sort of
a non-competitive characterization, where I
think most of the people in this room had machine guns,
that were competing with people with bows and arrows.
So it wasn't exactly a parallel competition when
you were in junior high school and high school.
There's always a question,
does the tournament make sense as you keep going?
And there is always this question if people go on to
grad school, or
post doctoral educations, does the intensity of
the competition really make sense?
There's the classic Henry Kissinger line
describing his fellow faculty at Harvard.
That the battles were so
ferocious, because the stakes were so small.
Describing sort of academia.
And you start to think on one level this is
a description of insanity.
Why would people fight like crazy when the stakes are so
small?
But it's also,
I think simply a function of the logic of the situation.
When it's really hard to differentiate yourself from
other people.
When the differences are, when
the objective differences really are small.
Then you have to compete ferociously to maintain
a difference of one sort or
another, that's often more imaginary than real.
There's always a sort of a personal version of
this that I tell where I was sort of hyper tracked.
My 8th grade junior high school yearbook,
one of my friends wrote in,
I know you'll get into Stanford in four years
as a Sophomore, sort of when it is going to Stanford four
years later, the end of high school.
Went to Stanford Law School.
You know, ended up at a big law firm in New York,
where from the outside everybody wanted to get in.
On the inside everybody wanted to leave.
>> And it was this very strange dynamic, where after
I sort of realized that this was not the best idea,
and left after seven months and three days.
You know, one of the people down the hall from me told
me, it's really reassuring to see you leave, Peter.
I had no idea that it was possible to
escape from Alcatraz.
Which of course, all you had to do was go out the front
door and not come back.
But so much of people identities got
wrapped in winning these competitions,
that they somehow lost site of what was important.
What was valuable.
And you know, competition does make you better
at whatever it is you're competing on.
Because when you're competing,
you're comparing yourself with the people around you.
You're figuring out,
how do I beat the people next to me?
How do I do somewhat better at whatever it
is they're doing.
And you will get better at that thing.
I'm not questioning that, I'm not denying that.
But, it often comes at this tremendous price that you
stop asking some bigger questions,
about what's truly important and truly valuable.
And so I would say, don't always go through the tiny
little door that everyone's trying to rush through.
Maybe go around the corner, and
go through the vast gate that no one's taking.
Thank you very much.
I guess there's time for,
do you want to take a few questions?
>> Sorry?
>> Oh yes, people want to take,
I'll take a few questions with few minutes time.
Yeah, go ahead.
>> Since, yeah, as you mentioned,
you already mentioned further competition often
look similar because the narrative of
people tell our selves.
Do you have any ways to
easily determine the difference when your
looking at an idea that is better than your own idea?
>> Well I'd say the question I always try to focus on is
what is the actual market?
So not what's the narrative of the market,
because you can always tell a fictional story about
a market that's much bigger or much smaller.
But what is the real objective market?
So, it's always, yeah, you always try to figure it out.
And you realize people have
incentives to powerfully distort these things.
Yeah?
>> Which of the aspects of monopolies that you
mentioned would you say >> Well
they have network effects with the ad network.
They had proprietary technology that gave them
the initial lead, because they had the page
rank algorithm which was sort of, an order of
magnitude better than any other search engine.
You have economies of scale,
because of the need to store all these different sites.
And at this point, you have brand, so
Google has all four.
Maybe the proprietary technology's somewhat
weaker at this point.
But, definitely, it had all four, and
maybe three out of four now.
Yeah.
>> How does this apply to and, second, what's it like.
The seconds what?
>> What's with the i-Phone? >> That's
sort of a set of companies that are doing
different copycat payment systems on mobile phones.
There's Square, there's PayPal.
They just have sort of different shapes.
That's how they differentiate themselves.
One is a triangle, one is a square.
And so you know...
>> Maybe at some point the apes weren't out of shape or
something like that.
But I think, pounds here we started with focus on
the intelligence community which is small sub-market,
you had a proprietary technology that used
a very different approach.
Were it was focused on the human
computer synthesis rather than the substitution,
which I think is the dominant paradigm.
So there's a whole set of things I would say on
the market approach, and on the proprietary technology.
Yes?
>> When you have design thinking methodology in
a start-up thinking, which is used to mitigate risk by
not creating things that people don't want.
But I think young innovators have inspiration create
complex systems that last's through time.
>> Could you repeat the question?
>> Yeah. So the quest is what do I
think about lean start-up's, iterative thinking,
where you get feedback from people,
versus complexity that may not work.
So, I am personally quite skeptical of all the lean
start-up methodology.
I think the really great companies did something that
was, sort of.
Somewhat more of a quantum improvement that
really differentiated them from everybody else.
They typically did not do massive, you know,
customer surveys.
The people who ran these companies sometimes,
not always, suffer from mild forms of Aspberger's, so
they were not actually that influenced,
not that easily deterred by what other people thought or
told them to do.
So I do think we're way too focused on iteration as
a modality, and not enough on trying to have a virtual
esp link with the public and figuring it out ourselves.
I would say that, the risk question
is always a very tricky one because there are, you know?
They're, they're, it's not, it's often.
I think it's often the case that you
don't have enough time to really mitigate risk.
If, if you're gonna take enough time to
figure out what people want.
You often will have missed the boat by then.
and, and then, of course, there's always the risk of,
of doing something that's, that's not that,
significant or meaningful.
So, you know? You could say a track in
law school is a low risk track from one
perspective, it may still be a very high risk track in
the sense that maybe your not, have a high risk of
not doing something meaningful with your life.
So, we have to think about risk in these,
very complicated way.
I think risk is for a very complicated concept.
Yes. I was just checking for
the last advantage, but then doesn't that
imply that there's already competition to begin with
between the chess pieces on the chess board?
>> Yeah, so, there's always this terminology thing,
so I would say that there are categories in
which people sort of are bundled together.
I would say the monopoly businesses were in effect
they really were a big first mover in some sense.
You could say Google was not the first search engine.
There were other search engines before, but
on one dimension,
they were dramatically better than everybody else,
they were the first one with page rank,
with sort of an automated approach.
Facebook was not the first social networking site.
My friend, Reed Hoffman, started one in 1997,
and they called it Social Net.
So they already had the name,
Social networking, in the name of their company,
seven years before Facebook.
Their idea was that it was gonna be this virtual
cyberspace, where I'd be a dog and you'd be a cat.
And we'd have all these different rules about how
we'd interact with each other.
>> In this virtual alternate reality.
Facebook was the first one to get real identity.
So, it was, so I would say,
I hope Facebook will be the last social networking site,
it was the first one in a very important dimension.
People often would not think of it as the first because
they, sort of, lump all these things together.
>> I have one more question.
>> Okay, one question, let's take one here.
>> If you're theoretically someone who,
worked at Golden College and left there after six months,
and is now going to do science at Standford.
How would you recommend rethinking
>> I don't have a great,
I'm not great at the psychotherapy stuff so
I don't quite know how to >> solve this.
There are these very odd studies they've
done on people who go to business school.
There's one they've done at Harvard Business school
where it's sort of the anti-Asperger, personality.
We have people who are super extroverted,
generally have low convictions, few ideas.
And you have sort of a hothouse environment.
You put all these people in for two years.
And at the end of it, they systematically end up,
the largest cohort systematically ends up
doing the wrong thing.
They tried to catch the last wave.
You know in 1989 everyone in Harvard tried to work for
Mike Milken, it was one or
two years before he went to jail for
all the junk bond stuff.
They were never interested in Silicon Valley or
tech, except for '99 and 2000 when they timed the dot
com bubble peaking perfectly.
They did, and then '05 to '07 was housing.
Private equity, stuff like this.
I do think this tendency for
us to see competition as validation is very deep.
I don't think there's any sort of
easy psychological formula to avoid it.
I don't know what sort of therapy to recommend.
>> But my first.
My first starting point,
which is only like maybe ten percent of the way,
is to never under estimate how big a problem it is.
We always think this is
something that afflicts other people.
It's easy for
me to point to people in business schools or people
at Harvard or people on Wall Street, I think it actually
does afflict all of us to a very profound degree.
We always think of advertising as
things that work on other people.
How, who are all these stupid people who fall for
all those ads on tv,
they obviously work to some extent and
they work, to a disturbing extant on all of us.
And it's something we, we all should work to overcome.
Thank you very much.