This viewpoint suggests that mental states are accounted to solely by their functional role, by their causal relations to sensory input, behavioral output, and other mental states.

這種觀點認為，心理狀態只能通過其功能作用，通過其與感覺輸入、行為輸出和其他心理狀態的因果關係來解釋。

Thus, any being that functionally behaves like a human must have conscious experiences identical to a human's.

是以，任何在功能上表現得像人類的生物都必須擁有與人類相同的意識體驗。

Essentially, this viewpoint posits that what makes something a mental state is causal relations to sensory input, behavioral output, and other mental states.

從根本上說，這種觀點認為，使事物成為心理狀態的是與感覺輸入、行為輸出和其他心理狀態之間的因果關係。

Therefore, any entity capable of fulfilling these roles should possess the same mental experiences, regardless of the specific material composition of the brain or body.

是以，無論大腦或身體的具體物質構成如何，任何能夠扮演這些角色的實體都應該擁有相同的精神體驗。

A classic example illustrates this concept involves pain.

疼痛就是詮釋這一概念的典型例子。

According to functionalism, what matters about the experience of pain is not that it's caused by a particular type of neural activity, e.g.

根據功能主義的觀點，疼痛體驗的關鍵不在於它是由某種特定類型的神經活動引起的，例如

C-fiber stimulation in humans, but rather that it serves specific functions like producing avoidance behavior, triggering emotional responses, and motivating decisions to protect the body.

C纖維對人體的刺激，而是具有特定的功能，如產生迴避行為、引發情緒反應，以及促使人們做出保護身體的決定。

Thus, if an alien species or any artificial intelligence system could functionally replicate these patterns of responses and interactions, Functionalism asserts that they too would experience pain, even if their neural architecture is vastly different.

是以，如果外星物種或任何人工智能系統能夠在功能上覆制這些反應和互動模式，功能主義就斷言它們也會體驗到疼痛，即使它們的神經結構大相徑庭。

This framework challenged the idea of P-zombie because it insists that any being that behaves indistinguishably from a conscious human would necessarily have the same conscious experiences.

這一框架對 "P-殭屍 "的觀點提出了質疑，因為它堅持認為，任何行為與有意識的人類無異的生物都必然具有相同的意識體驗。

According to functionalism, consciousness isn't a mythical property separate from physical processes, but is a result of the functional role that this process fulfills.

根據功能主義的觀點，意識並不是一種獨立於物理過程之外的神祕屬性，而是這一過程所發揮的功能作用的結果。

Critics of the P-zombie argument, like Daniel Dennett, leveraged functionalism to argue that P-zombies are conceptually incoherent.

P-zombie論點的批評者，如丹尼爾-丹尼特（Daniel Dennett），利用功能主義來論證P-zombies在概念上是不連貫的。

If a hypothetical being behaves and reacts to the world in the same way a conscious person does, then by functionalist account, it is necessarily conscious.

如果一個假想的存在以有意識的人的方式對世界做出行為和反應，那麼按照功能主義的觀點，它必然是有意識的。

Dennett's famous intentional stance further supports this, suggesting if treating something as a conscious agent reliably predicts its behavior, then it should be considered a conscious agent.

丹尼特著名的意向立場進一步支持了這一點，他認為，如果把某物當作有意識的代理能夠可靠地預測其行為，那麼它就應該被視為有意識的代理。

Moreover, functionalism provides a theoretical basis for understanding artificial intelligence and the consciousness of non-human entities.

此外，功能主義還為理解人工智能和非人類實體的意識提供了理論基礎。

For instance, if a computer program could replicate all the functional aspects of human cognition, many functionalists would argue that the program could be considered conscious.

例如，如果計算機程序可以複製人類認知的所有功能方面，許多功能主義者就會認為，該程序可以被視為有意識的。

Functionalism presents a compelling challenge to P-zombie thought experiment by denying that there could be an entity in every way like a conscious human but lack consciousness itself.

功能主義對 P-zombie 思想實驗提出了令人信服的挑戰，它否認可能存在一個在各方面都與有意識的人類相似，但本身卻缺乏意識的實體。

Instead, it emphasizes that mental states are fully defined by the patterns of interactions and behaviors associated with them.

相反，它強調心理狀態完全由與之相關的互動和行為模式來定義。