The Philosophical Zombie Argument is a  thought experiment in the philosophy of mind,  

哲學殭屍論證是心靈哲學的思想實驗，

particularly in discussions about  consciousness and physicalism.

特別是在意識和物理主義的討論中。

Proposed by philosopher David Chalmers,  the argument presents the concept of a  

該論證由哲學家大衛·查爾默斯提出，提出了「哲學殭屍」的概念

"philosophical zombie," which is an entity  that is indistinguishable from a normal  

，這是一個

human being in every way except that it lacks  conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.

在各方面都與正常人沒有區別的實體，除了缺乏意識經驗、感受性或感知力。

The zombie behaves and appears  exactly like any other human;  

殭屍的行為和外表與任何其他人類完全相同；

it can speak about its emotions, respond to pain,  

它可以談論自己的情緒，對疼痛做出反應，

and behave as if it is conscious, but it does  not actually have any subjective experience.

表現得好像有意識一樣，但它實際上沒有任何主觀體驗。

The core of the zombie argument  is to challenge physicalism,  

殭屍論證的核心是挑戰物理主義，

the doctrine that everything is physical or that  the real world consists only of physical entities.

即一切都是物理的或現實世界僅由物理實體組成的理論。

Chalmers uses this argument to suggest that  

查爾默斯用這個論點表明，

conscious experience cannot be fully  explained by physical processes alone.

意識體驗不能只用物理過程來完全解釋。

If it is conceivable that there could be  a physical duplicate of a person without  

如果可以想像，可能存在一個沒有

consciousness, then consciousness  must involve something non-physical.

意識的人的物理複製品，那麼意識一定涉及某種非物質的東西。

This leads to the conclusion that physicalism  is false, as the existence of such zombies  

這導致了這樣的結論：物理主義是錯誤的，因為這種殭屍的存在

would mean that physical facts do not  exhaustively account for mental facts.

意味著物理事實不能詳盡地解釋心理事實。