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  • It's hugely disappointing for investors  or more so devastating for investors.

    這對投資者來說是巨大的失望,或者說對投資者來說更是毀滅性的打擊。

  • It was definitely a surprise and a shock.

    這絕對是一個驚喜和震驚。

  • It signals a terrible thing about the industry.

    這預示著該行業的一個可怕的事情。

  • The collapse of FTX shook crypto to its core. The once $32 billion exchange,

    FTX的倒閉震動了加密貨幣的核心。這個曾經價值320億美元的交易所。

  • established in 2019, filed for bankruptcy in November 2022.

    成立於2019年,在2022年11月申請了破產。

  • I'm in contact at the moment with about 60 different investors who

    我目前正在與大約60個不同的投資者聯繫,他們

  • have come to me seeking legal advice.

    來找我尋求法律意見。

  • Louise Abbott is a partner at U.K. law firm Keystone Law. She specializes

    路易斯-艾伯特是英國Keystone法律事務所的合夥人。她的專長是

  • in recovering crypto assets on behalf of victims of fraud.

    在代表欺詐受害者追回加密貨幣資產方面。

  • It covers people that have invested £2,000 right through to a lady who

    它涵蓋了投資2,000英鎊的人,直到一位投資了2,000英鎊的女士。

  • invested £5 million. It's a very broad range of people who have invested.

    投資500萬英鎊。這是一個非常廣泛的投資人群。

  • FTX had the semblance of a blue-chip crypto company,

    FTX有一個藍籌加密公司的影子。

  • rivaling exchanges like Binance and Coinbase. It even brought on board

    媲美Binance和Coinbase等交易所。它甚至還引入了

  • some of the wealthiest names in Silicon Valley and Wall Street as investors.

    硅谷和華爾街的一些最富有的名字作為投資者。

  • Ultimately though, reality hit home for FTX and its millions of users,

    但最終,對於FTX及其數百萬用戶來說,現實是殘酷的。

  • who saw billions of dollars vanish overnight.

    看到數十億美元一夜之間消失的人。

  • So, what went wrong with FTX, and does it spell trouble for crypto's other trading platforms?

    那麼,FTX出了什麼問題,它是否意味著加密貨幣的其他交易平臺的麻煩?

  • Like a typical stock exchange, FTX was a venue connecting buyers and sellers of an asset

    就像一個典型的證券交易所一樣,FTX是一個連接資產的買方和賣方的場所 --

  • in this case, digital currencies like bitcoin, plus a type of financial contract known as derivatives.

    在這種情況下,像比特幣這樣的數字貨幣,加上一種被稱為衍生品的金融合同。

  • However, as we've come to learn, FTX did a little more than that. Reports suggest the

    然而,正如我們所瞭解到的,FTX所做的事情遠不止這些。報告顯示

  • company dipped into client accounts to make risky trades through its sister firm Alameda Research.

    該公司通過其姐妹公司Alameda Research浸入客戶賬戶進行高風險交易。

  • Some customers wired their funds directly to Alameda to transfer it to their

    一些客戶直接將資金匯給阿拉米達公司,以便將其轉移到他們的

  • FTX trading account, sparking concerns over a potential muddling of funds by FTX and Alameda.

    FTX的交易賬戶,引發了對FTX和Alameda可能混用資金的擔憂。

  • FTX also had its own token called FTT. It acted a lot like a loyalty scheme,

    FTX也有自己的代幣,叫做FTT。它的作用很像一個忠誠度計劃。

  • granting traders perks such as discounts off their trading fees. Alameda held a lot of FTT,

    給予交易員優惠,如交易費的折扣。阿拉米達持有大量的FTT。

  • according to one report, and even used the token as collateral for loans from other crypto

    據一份報告稱,他們甚至用代幣作為抵押,向其他加密貨幣提供貸款。

  • companies. This sparked fears over FTX's financial health. A tweet on Nov 6 from the CEO of rival

    公司。這引發了人們對FTX財務健康的擔憂。11月6日,競爭對手的首席執行官在推特上寫道

  • firm Binance, that it was selling most of its FTT holdings, sent the token's value spiraling.

    公司Binance表示,它正在出售其持有的大部分FTT,使該代幣的價值直線上升。

  • That in turn caused customers to flee FTX in large numbers. In a surprise twist,

    這反過來又導致客戶大量逃離FTX。在一個意外的轉折中。

  • Binance offered to acquire FTX on November 9, only to back out a day later

    Binance於11月9日提出收購FTX,但一天後又退出了

  • after getting a look inside the company's books. On November 11,

    在瞭解了該公司的賬目後。在11月11日。

  • FTX filed for bankruptcy protection, and its chief Sam Bankman-Fried stepped down.

    FTX申請了破產保護,其負責人Sam Bankman-Fried下臺。

  • Bankman-Fried was arrested on December 13 by the Bahamas authorities after the

    班克曼-弗裡德於12月13日被巴哈馬當局逮捕。

  • U.S. government filed criminal charges to hold him to account.

    美國政府提出刑事指控以追究其責任。

  • For Oleg Fomenko, co-founder of fitness-focused crypto network

    對於專注於健身的加密貨幣網絡的聯合創始人Oleg Fomenko來說

  • Sweat Economy, FTX's insolvency meant the likely loss of over

    汗水經濟,FTX的破產意味著可能會損失超過1000萬美元的資金。

  • $400,000 worth of cryptocurrencies including USDC, tether and his company's own token, sweat.

    價值40萬美元的加密貨幣,包括USDC、tether和他公司自己的代幣,sweat。

  • Of course, the panic for our liquidity, and how we were affected. We knew that it would

    當然,對於我們的流動性的恐慌,以及我們是如何受到影響的。我們知道,這將

  • be just sort of in low hundreds of 1,000s. It's an amount that makes me swear probably

    只是排序在低的幾百個1000個。這是一個讓我發誓的數額,可能是

  • every day, but it's not an amount that is going to make our project suffer.

    每天,但這不是一個會使我們的項目受到影響的數額。

  • Sweat Economy held these funds on FTX through two of its market makers. Market makers act

    Sweat Economy通過其兩個做市商在FTX上持有這些資金。做市商的行為

  • as the middlemen in trades between buyers and sellers. So, if someone wants to buy or sell a

    作為買家和賣家之間交易的中間人。是以,如果有人想購買或出售一個

  • token for instance, they aren't left waiting for the person on the other side of the trade.

    比如說,他們不會被留在交易的另一邊等待對方的到來。

  • This $400,000 that we had on FTX was liquidity that we had with two

    我們在FTX上擁有的這40萬美元是我們在兩個國家擁有的流動資金。

  • market makers at the time when they cut their withdrawals. We tried to withdraw,  

    做市商削減提款時的情況。我們試圖退出。

  • but there was a sort of long, long, long queue, and then they completely cut them.

    但有一種長長的、長長的、長長的隊列,然後他們完全切斷了它們。

  • 2022 exposed a deep interconnectedness in the crypto ecosystem not seen in previous

    2022年暴露了加密貨幣生態系統的深度互聯,這在以前是沒有的。

  • market cycles. Companies engaged in risky lending practices, taking customer funds, and investing

    市場週期。從事高風險借貸行為的公司,佔用客戶資金,並投資於

  • them elsewhere in search of sky-high yields. They posted illiquid, volatile tokens as collateral.

    他們在其他地方尋找高額收益。他們把流動性差、波動大的代幣作為抵押品。

  • The result? Several high-profile collapses and a resulting contagion impacting a vast

    其結果是什麼?幾次高調的倒閉,以及由此產生的影響巨大的傳染病。

  • set of companies with exposure to those failed firms. FTX is the most notable case so far.

    對這些失敗公司有風險的一組公司。到目前為止,FTX是最引人注目的案例。

  • FTX is a falldown from Terra Luna. And there has been contagion from that moment

    FTX是Terra Luna的一個縮影。而從那一刻起,就有了傳染病。

  • onwards. There might be actually exposures that are in more traditional finance.

    向上。實際上可能會有更多傳統金融的風險。

  • Marieke Flament is CEO of the Near Foundation, which is behind a blockchain network called Near.

    Marieke Flament是Near基金會的首席執行官,該基金會是一個名為Near的區塊鏈網絡的背後。

  • Her company was among the firms caught up in the fallout from FTX.

    她的公司是被捲入FTX影響的公司之一。

  • The impact for Near and Near foundation is actually extremely limited.

    對 "近 "和 "遠 "的影響實際上是極其有限的。

  • The amount of money that we raised, which is $500 million between January and April of this year,

    我們籌集的資金數額,在今年1月至4月期間為5億美元。

  • all of that is actually in fiat and held in bank accounts.

    所有這些實際上都是法幣,並在銀行賬戶中持有。

  • Still, she was shocked when she found out about FTX's troubles.

    不過,當她發現FTX的麻煩時,她還是感到很震驚。

  • As an industry, we already had a first shock with Terra Luna, which is, oh my god, you know,

    作為一個行業,我們已經有了Terra Luna的第一次衝擊,這就是,哦,我的上帝,你知道。

  • this is systemic. It felt quite contained. But it was still a first

    這是系統性的。它感覺相當有內涵。但這仍然是一個第一次

  • warning in the industry. And therefore, what are the repercussions of that?

    在行業中的警告。是以,這有什麼反響?

  • Bosses of other exchanges have since sought to reassure investors that

    此後,其他交易所的老闆們都試圖向投資者保證

  • their platforms aren't at risk of facing the same problems as FTX.

    他們的平臺沒有面臨與FTX相同問題的風險。

  • We are very concerned about anyone using the token they create for leverage,

    我們非常關注任何人利用他們創建的代幣進行槓桿交易。

  • as a collateral. At Binance we don't do that.

    作為抵押品。在Binance,我們不這樣做。

  • How should customers think about CRON and your business? This is your own currency.

    客戶應該如何看待CRON和你的業務?這是你自己的貨幣。

  • We've never utilized it in a way that FTX did. We never used this as collateral 

    我們從來沒有像FTX那樣利用過它。我們從未將此作為抵押品

  • for any loans or anything. We run a very simple business.

    為任何貸款或任何東西。我們經營的是非常簡單的生意。

  • Captains of the industry are really  not there to move the industry forward,  

    該行業的船長真的不是為了推動該行業的發展。

  • they're there to nefariously enrich themselves.

    他們在那裡是為了非法致富。

  • After FTX's insolvency, investors were left wondering which domino will fall next.

    在FTX破產後,投資者不禁要問,下一張多米諾骨牌會倒下。

  • One example was crypto lender BlockFi,

    其中一個例子是加密貨幣貸款人BlockFi。

  • which entered bankruptcy after revealing exposure to Bankman-Fried's empire.

    該公司在暴露了班克曼-弗裡德的帝國後進入破產。

  • Now, attention is turning to other trading and  lending firms, including Gemini and Genesis.

    現在,人們的注意力正轉向其他交易和貸款公司,包括Gemini和Genesis。

  • I don't think all the dominoes have fallen  out from the contagion of what's been

    我不認為所有的多米諾骨牌都已經從被傳染的東西中倒下了。

  • happening. The impact that this will have is that a lot of projects actually are not

    發生。這將產生的影響是,很多項目實際上沒有

  • going to have the funds, and therefore the resources for them to continue.

    將會有資金,是以有資源讓他們繼續下去。

  • To counter the risk of contagion, investors began moving their assets away from exchanges.

    為了應對傳染的風險,投資者開始將他們的資產從交易所轉移出去。

  • The number of bitcoins on exchanges fell from its peak of 3.1 million

    交易所的比特幣數量從高峰期的310萬枚下降

  • in 2020 to around 2.2 million at the end of 2022.

    2020年增至2022年底的約220萬。

  • The amount of ether on exchanges sank from 34 million to 18 million in the same period.

    同期,交易所的乙醚數量從3400萬下沉到1800萬。

  • Some investors are seeking safety incoldhardware wallets rather than

    一些投資者正在尋求 "冷 "硬件錢包的安全,而非

  • centralized exchanges. This one, from Paris-based company Ledger,

    集中式交易所。這個,來自巴黎的公司Ledger。

  • is designed to make that process more intuitive than it is currently.

    是為了使這一過程比目前更直觀。

  • There is a saying, which is: 'not your keys,

    有一句話,就是:"不是你的鑰匙。

  • not your coins.' And the magic of crypto, is that you can hold it in your hand.

    而不是你的錢幣。而加密貨幣的神奇之處在於,你可以把它拿在手裡。

  • For seven years, our company has had the same premise, which is security and self-custody of

    七年來,我們公司一直有一個相同的前提,那就是安全和自我保管的問題。

  • crypto assets. A year ago, when I was telling people that they shouldn't keep their crypto

    加密貨幣資產。一年前,當我告訴人們,他們不應該保留他們的加密貨幣時

  • with centralized exchanges, they would treat me as if I was trying to convert them to veganism.

    在集中交流的情況下,他們會把我當作試圖讓他們皈依素食主義。

  • Nothing's too big to fail. And that's actually the point of crypto, right?

    沒有什麼是大到不能失敗的。而這實際上就是加密貨幣的意義所在,對嗎?

  • If not self-custody, why crypto?

    如果不是自我監護,為什麼要用加密貨幣?

  • For their part, exchanges are taking steps to increase transparency throughproof of reserves,”

    就其本身而言,交易所正在採取措施,通過 "儲備證明 "提高透明度。

  • mechanisms that show they have enough assets available to backstop customer withdrawals.

    顯示他們有足夠的資產來支持客戶提款的機制。

  • This involves taking a cryptographic snapshot of the coins and tokens held by a crypto exchange.

    這涉及對加密貨幣交易所持有的硬幣和代幣進行加密快照。

  • But proof of reserves only offers a snapshot of an exchange's assets at a single point

    但儲備證明只提供了一個交易所在某一時刻的資產快照。

  • in time. Critics say this provides an incomplete picture of these businesses' financial health.

    在時間上。批評者說,這提供了這些企業財務健康的不完整情況。

  • There's also a lot of talk around being audited, and then it comes as like,

    圍繞著被審計的問題也有很多議論,然後就像這樣了。

  • what's the right timeframe and timing to actually do these things?

    實際做這些事情的正確時間框架和時機是什麼?

  • On most crypto exchanges - even Coinbase, the only publicly traded crypto exchange - customers

    在大多數加密貨幣交易所--甚至是唯一公開交易的加密貨幣交易所Coinbase--客戶

  • are treated asunsecured creditors,” a categorization that puts them in the same

    他們被視為 "無擔保債權人",這一分類將他們置於相同的地位。

  • bucket as business suppliers and contractors. If an exchange fails, customers aren't entitled to

    桶作為企業的供應商和承包商。如果交換失敗,客戶無權要求

  • any government-guaranteed compensation, unlike with regulated brokers or banks.

    任何政府擔保的補償,與受監管的經紀人或銀行不同。

  • But that could be about to change. Governments in the U.S.,

    但這種情況可能即將改變。美國的政府。

  • European Union and the U.K. are introducing frameworks to clean up these markets.

    歐盟和英國正在引入框架來清理這些市場。

  • The demise of FTX - and other cryptoplatforms - has added urgency to those efforts.

    FTX--以及其他加密平臺的消亡,為這些努力增添了緊迫性。

  • I think we are already seeing a lack of confidence. People need

    我認為我們已經看到了信心的缺乏。人們需要

  • to see that there's steps being taken to regulate it. If we are

    要看到正在採取步驟來規範它。如果我們是

  • able to offer some regulation, we will build confidence.

    能夠提供一些監管,我們將建立信心。

  • So, is it curtains for crypto exchanges? Most experts believe they'll continue

    那麼,加密貨幣交易所是不是要謝幕了?大多數專家認為他們會繼續

  • to play a rolebut their survival will be determined by how seriously

    發揮作用--但他們的生存將由以下方面決定

  • they take risk management, governance and regulation.

    他們採取風險管理、治理和監管。

  • I think crypto is here to stay. Crypto is still going to be popular eventually.

    我認為加密貨幣會一直存在。加密貨幣最終還是會流行起來的。

  • It is part of our future. And it can be a good thing.

    它是我們未來的一部分。而且它可以是一件好事。

  • Long term, it's good for the industry, because  it exposes bad actors, fraud, and, you know,  

    長期來看,這對行業有好處,因為它暴露了不良行為者、欺詐和,你知道。

  • this kind of fake value proposition of get rich quick with centralised value propositions.

    這種以集中的價值主張快速致富的虛假價值主張。

  • 2023 may be the year that crypto winter ends - however,

    2023年可能是加密貨幣冬天結束的一年--然而。

  • there's no crystal ball to tell when the ice will finally thaw.

    沒有水晶球可以告訴我們冰層何時會最終解凍。

  • I feel that we probably have six to nine months before things will start kind of going on the up.

    我覺得我們可能有六到九個月的時間,事情才會開始往上走。

  • We believe that every business needs to be ready for this market to continue up to 24 months.

    我們相信,每個企業都需要為這個市場持續24個月做好準備。

It's hugely disappointing for investors  or more so devastating for investors.

這對投資者來說是巨大的失望,或者說對投資者來說更是毀滅性的打擊。

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