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  • Hello everyone, welcome back again with us in another episode of Military TV. Today we


  • are going to talk about "Vietnam strengthens its defenses on the Spratly Islands to send

    我們 要談“越南加強在南沙群島的防禦將 消息

  • a message to the People's Republic of China”. But before we discuss it further, let's

    發送 到人民共和國的中國”。但是,在我們進一步的討論,讓我們

  • start with a question, Why are the Spratly Islands important?

    有一個問題,為什麼在南沙群島重要? 南沙群島

  • The spratly islands are important for economic and strategic reasons. The Spratly area holds

    啟動 島嶼是重要的經濟和戰略原因。南沙地區擁有

  • potentially significant, but largely unexplored, reserves of oil and natural gas, it is a productive

    潛在的重要但大部分未開發的石油和天然氣儲量,它是 世界漁業

  • area for world fishing, it is one of the busiest areas of commercial shipping traffic, and

    的生產 區,它是商業航運最繁忙的地區之一,以及

  • surrounding countries would get an extended continental shelf if their claims were recognized.


  • In addition to economic incentives, the Spratlys sit astride major maritime trade routes to

    除了經濟激勵外,南沙群島橫跨通往 東北亞的

  • Northeast Asia, giving them added significance as positions from which to monitor maritime

    主要海上貿易路線 ,這使它們作為監視 南海 海上

  • activity in the South China Sea and to potentially base and project military force from. In 2014,

    活動和2014 年, 中國因其在 南沙群島的 疏浚活動而引起了越來越多的國際關注。

  • China drew increased international attention due to its dredging activities within the


  • Spratlys, amidst speculation it is planning to further develop its military presence in

    該地區的 軍事存在 。通過改善其在 南沙群島的

  • the area. By improving its defense facilities on the

    防禦設施並在 附近進行海軍演習,越南正在向

  • Spratly Islands and conducting a naval exercise nearby, Vietnam is sending a signal to the

    中華人民共和國 發出一個信號, 即兩國之間就其

  • People's Republic of China that armed engagement between the two over their conflicting claims

    對這些島嶼 的衝突主張 進行 武裝接觸 將付出代價。

  • to the islands would come at a cost. The PRC has long been fortifying artificial islands

    在北京 下令其軍事工程師通過填海將 人工島嶼 抬高到海平面以上

  • within the Spratly chain that were designated asmaritime featuresbefore Beijing

    之前 ,中國長期以來一直 在南沙群島鏈中

  • ordered its military engineers to raise them above sea level through reclamation.

    加固人工島嶼 ,這些 人工島嶼 被指定為“海洋特徵”

  • As reported by VnExpress online newspaper, Vietnam's Navy conducted combat-readiness

    。 據報導由VnExpress在線報紙,越南海軍進行了

  • drills with its 1,500-ton Quang Trung frigate in Spratly waters in early April 2021. Ka-28

    在南沙群島海域的1500噸級杜光護衛艦 戰備 演練在四月初2021卡-28

  • anti-submarine helicopters also participated in the exercise with the Quang Trung, which


  • is equipped with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles.


  • Hanoi's enhanced fortifications in the South China Sea island chain in recent months include


  • coastal defense installations, concrete pads and bunkers, administrative buildings and


  • a large tower apparently for communications or signals intelligence, the Center for Strategic


  • and International Studies' Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) reported, over

    與國際研究中心的亞洲海事透明度倡議 (AMTI) ) 報導,在

  • the last two years, “West Reef and Sin Cowe Island have seen the most drastic changes


  • of all of Vietnam's outposts in the disputed Spratly Islands group, noting that most of


  • the 70 acres of dry land at West Reef is reclaimed land, with a further 26 acres at Sin Cowe

    西礁 70 英畝的 大部分 旱地已被開墾土地,在 Sin Cowe 島

  • Island being similarly reclaimed. The changes include the building ofseveral coastal

    還有 26 英畝的土地也 被類似地開墾。這些變化包括 過去兩年

  • defense installations, administrative buildings, concrete pads and bunkers, and a large tower

    在西礁 建造“幾個海防 設施、行政大樓、混凝土墊和掩體,以及一個

  • structure presumably for communications of signals intelligenceat West Reef over

    可能用於信號情報通信的 大型塔式 結構”

  • the past two years. Similar additions have appeared on other Vietnam-controlled parts

    。在 南沙群島的 其他越南控制的部分

  • of the Spratlys, such as Sand Cay, Central Reef and Spratly Island.

    ,如沙礁、中央珊瑚礁和南沙島, 也出現了類似的增加 。

  • Vietnam's national legislature declared in 2012 that it has sufficient evidence and

    越南國家立法機構於 2012 年宣布 ,根據《聯合國 海洋法公約》

  • a legal basis to assert sovereignty over the Spratlys, in accordance with the United Nations

    ,它有足夠的證據和 法律依據主張對南沙群島的主權

  • Convention on the Law of the Sea. In 2016, an international tribunal in The Hague, Netherlands,

    。 2016 年,荷蘭海牙的一個國際法庭 裁定, 在與菲律賓的爭端中,

  • ruled as unlawful the PRC's claims to an exclusive economic zone around its artificial

    中國對圍繞其人工 特徵 的專屬經濟區的主張是非法的

  • features in a dispute with the Philippines, which also claims some of the Spratlys. Vietnam's

    ,菲律賓也對一些南沙群島提出了主張。 AMTI 的負責人

  • presence on the Spratlys predates that of the PRC by many years, AMTI's director,

    Greg Poling 告訴《論壇》, 越南 在南沙群島

  • Greg Poling, told FORUM, and it has built fortifications on natural islands and reclaimed

    的 存在比中國早很多年 ,而且它在自然島嶼上建造了防禦工事,並 從這些

  • land extending from them. PRC fortifications, while larger, sit on entirely reclaimed land

    島嶼上開墾了 土地。中華人民共和國的防禦工事雖然更大,但坐落在完全開墾的土地上

  • which constitute artificial features. Poling said that Vietnam is focused mainly


  • on making its islands more resilient, survivable and ensuring that it can give China a bloody


  • nose if it comes to that. Keeping its installations supplied is key, therefore deeper harbors

    流鼻血。保持其設施供應是關鍵,因此 為更大的船隻增加了

  • and channels for larger vessels have been added, along with helipads on all the islands

    更深的港口 和航道,以及所有島嶼上的直升機停機坪,

  • so they can be resupplied by air to prevent the Chinese from starving them out in a conflict.


  • Vietnam also has built four aircraft hangars on Spratly Island and extended its runway

    越南還在南沙島上建造了四個飛機庫,並 為更大的飛機

  • for larger aircraft. So, Hanoi's naval drills and fortifications

    延長了跑道 。因此,河內的海軍演習和防禦工事

  • signal to Beijing that Vietnam is ready to defend its claims. The danger is we really


  • don't know how it is being received. Beijing has been remarkably tone-deaf to the signals

    不知道它是如何被接收的。北京一直 對其東南亞鄰國發出

  • being sent by its Southeast Asian neighbors and, as a result, what you have seen is time

    的信號充耳不聞, 因此,你所看到的是 中國 一次

  • and again China is undertaking a degree of coerciveness and aggression in the South China

    又一次地在 南海 採取一定程度的脅迫和侵略,

  • Sea that undermines its broader strategy of influence in the region.


  • Notwithstanding the vastly different strategic context Vietnam finds itself situated in today,


  • there is no room for complacency. Vietnam should expect to fight China again if push


  • ever comes to shove. Entertaining this prospect is not far-fetched, if one takes it seriously

    。如果人們認真對待 北京在 2017 年 8 月威脅要在有爭議的水域攻擊越南軍隊,除非

  • Beijing's threat in August 2017 to attack Vietnamese forces in disputed waters unless

    河內要求西班牙能源公司 Repsol 停止其在

  • Hanoi were to demand that the Spanish energy firm Repsol stand down from its work in an

    海上碳氫化合物區塊的 工作,

  • offshore hydrocarbon block claimed also by China. Hanoi did capitulate eventually, and

    否則 這一前景並不牽強 。中國。河內最終投降了,

  • Repsol stood down. But clearly, Vietnam does not wish to appear weak in front of China.


  • Credibility is at stake, with both domestic and external repercussions for the ruling

    信譽岌岌可危, 河內 的統治 精英在

  • elite in Hanoi. And by now, after seeing the way ASEAN intramural dynamics play out over

    國內外都會受到影響 。到目前為止,在看到 多年來 東盟內部動態

  • many years on the South China Sea disputes, Hanoi would have reached the dire conclusion


  • that the bloc, if there is ever going to be an outright shooting war with China, would


  • not offer a united stance except perhaps to issue an obligatory statement calling upon


  • all sides to cease fighting and negotiate a settlement. Some of the individual ASEAN


  • member states may even overtly take Beijing's side, or just stay neutral. At best Vietnam


  • could rely on ASEAN as a bedrock for post-conflict economic recovery, even though such a prospect

    只能依靠東盟作為衝突後經濟復甦的基石,儘管 考慮到該集團與中國的經濟相互依存

  • is still far from certain considering the bloc's economic interdependence with China

    以及後者可能進行的經濟報復, 這種前景

  • and possible economic retaliation by the latter. It is most likely that Vietnam would receive

    仍遠未確定 。 在與中國就南海 爆發點 發生戰爭時

  • support from multiple major powers in times of a war with China over the South China Sea

    ,越南最有可能得到 多個大國的支持

  • flashpoint, but not direct military intervention, especially if Beijing elects to keep the clashes


  • localized and well contained to avoid provoking an overwhelming international response. As

    局部化並妥善控制以避免引發壓倒性 的衝突 國際反應。因此

  • such, Hanoi could expect those friendly extra regional powers to cheer for it, or at best


  • offer diplomatic condemnation against Beijing, and possibly some form of material and technical

    對北京進行外交譴責,並可能 為其戰鬥努力提供

  • aid for its fighting efforts. But not more than that.

    某種形式的物質和技術 援助。但不止於此。

  • If that fateful day eventually comes, will the United States flex its muscles with a


  • carrier strike group somewhere close to Chinese shores or near the scene of battle, and will

    靠近中國海岸或戰鬥現場的某個地方 與 航母打擊群一起展示實力,

  • that make any difference to the outcome? Perhaps, but nobody can be sure.


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Hello everyone, welcome back again with us in another episode of Military TV. Today we



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B2 中高級 中文 美國腔 越南 中國 島嶼 北京 主張 防禦

越南中国在南沙群岛(Vietnam VS China in Spratly Islands)

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    joey joey 發佈於 2021 年 08 月 12 日