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  • A few years ago the economist Thomas Piketty

  • became a world celebrity with his book Capital

  • In The 21st Century, a book which actually

  • became the best selling economics book

  • of the 21st century, so far.

  • His new book Capital And Ideology

  • is now available in English in the bookshops.

  • Thomas Piketty is here to talk to the FT about the book.

  • Welcome.

  • The previous book really put inequality on the map.

  • Here you talk about ideology, and how

  • it shapes what you call inequality regimes,

  • and how inequality in turn shapes ideology.

  • Give us a glimpse of the argument.

  • Well, the novelty of this book as compared to the previous one

  • is that in the previous one, I was very much centered

  • on the experience of western countries,

  • in particular western Europe and North America

  • during the 20th century.

  • And the way World War One, World War Two

  • contributed to a big reduction of inequality.

  • Here, I take a much broader comparative

  • and international perspective.

  • I look at India, I look at Brazil,

  • I look at South Africa, China, Latin America.

  • And this allows me, I think, to better understand

  • how over time, over a long period of time,

  • you see major transformation of the structure of inequality

  • in various countries.

  • And the main driving force, I think,

  • it's not so much a violent destructions through war,

  • or economic deterministic forces,

  • or technological or control forces.

  • But rather, the changing ideology

  • and the changing political mobilisation about inequality.

  • So you see countries in history, which choose to be very unequal

  • in their organisation of property relations,

  • or think Sweden, which we now view as a very egalitarian

  • country but between 1865 and 1911,

  • you had actually voting rights that belonged first only

  • to the top 20 per cent of the population.

  • But within these top 20 per cent you

  • could have between 1 or 100 voting rights,

  • depending on the level of your property and tax.

  • And in several dozen municipal elections

  • you could actually have one individual

  • who had alone more than 50 per cent of the vote,

  • including the prime minister of the time.

  • And you know if you had told someone in Sweden

  • in 1910 that this was going to become

  • a very egalitarian country, the old political system

  • was organised very differently.

  • And there are many other national trajectories,

  • examples of countries that I describe in the book, you know,

  • just changing the structure of inequality.

  • In India, during the period of colonisation,

  • and how independent India tried to develop

  • the positive discrimination in order

  • to reverse some of these very strong inequalities

  • toward the formerly discriminated

  • lower caste of society.

  • So lots of examples showing that there's nothing

  • natural in the way social and economic inequalities

  • are organised in any given place.

  • It really depends on the imagination of societies,

  • and also the ability of the different sort of narratives

  • on inequality to win the day, through mobilisations,

  • through the political platform.

  • And I think it would be the same in the future.

  • It's kind of an interesting evolution from our previous

  • book, which I think left some readers with a bit of fatalism,

  • in the sense said that there was...

  • some of the measures seem to be there.

  • There are some very strong material forces at work here

  • that makes inequality, you know there's a strong tendency

  • towards widening inequalities.

  • And this perspective on ideas, and in some

  • sense I think more optimistic that if you change

  • enough people's imagination, as you put it,

  • things can change in the material economy very quickly.

  • When you look at the global perspective,

  • do you find that these changes in ideas have global reach?

  • What happens in one place also happens somewhere else?

  • Or are these idiosyncratic to different countries?

  • Well, sometimes you have a very quick diffusion of ideas.

  • So if you think of the rise of progressive taxation of income

  • and wealth around World War One, and in the interwar period,

  • it's very striking to see these very fast diffusion of ideas.

  • So until 1914, no country would dare having a top income tax

  • rate, or top inheritance tax rate above 10 per cent or 20

  • per cent .

  • And then suddenly, in the interwar period,

  • having 60 per cent, 70 per cent, 80

  • per cent on very large income, or very large ones,

  • becomes almost the norm.

  • Following the US, which has been a leader in the development

  • of progressive taxation in the interwar period,

  • up until to Reagan basically.

  • Up until 1980.

  • And then...

  • Introduced an income tax in 1915, something like that?

  • 1913 in the US.

  • So it was actually before the war.

  • It's interesting that in the case of the US

  • it was peaceful social mobilisation that

  • took more than 20 years because they

  • had to change a federal constitution in order

  • to make the possibility of a federal income tax

  • constitutional.

  • In France, you have to wait until World War One.

  • Its really the summer of 1914.

  • So the war helps.

  • Yeah, well this is in the case of France

  • this is very, very sad story.

  • It's only to pay for the war with Germany

  • that finally the political decision is

  • taken to create an income tax.

  • Before that, the French political elite

  • would say okay in France we had the French Revolution.

  • So that's enough.

  • We are already are a country of equals.

  • So we are not like aristocratic Britain, also Italy or Prussia.

  • And that's also an interesting example of how sometimes

  • the elites tend to instrumentalise their own

  • national history in order to preserve...

  • It's a function of ideology, as you describe it.

  • Yeah, sometimes it's to protect your own interests.

  • But I tried to take this set of ideas

  • seriously, because there are always

  • more than just pure hypocrisy.

  • There is some hypocrisy sometimes.

  • But it's usually, they always have

  • some grain of plausibility.

  • People drink their own Kool-Aid.

  • Yeah, it's a...

  • Especially if they are paid for it.

  • We have to take these ideas.

  • We always have to take them seriously

  • if we want to go beyond them, and then

  • move to a different inequality regime.

  • It almost sounds from the book that if it's

  • the ideas that change, and that's what drives it,

  • it actually sticks more.

  • Because you mentioned that Germany didn't have very

  • high tax rate for very long.

  • It was basically on the western occupation.

  • So, I mean, it seems like when the ideas change you actually

  • get more lasting change.

  • That's right.

  • So in the case of Germany there are also

  • ideas that actually change and work

  • quite well, which is the whole idea of co-management.

  • You have workers' rights in the board of companies.

  • And so this was created in the 1950s, where

  • in large corporationS in Germany you

  • have half of the seats in the board of large companies

  • which go to a worker representative elected

  • by workers.

  • Those I'll go to shareholders.

  • So shareholders actually have half of the seats plus one.

  • So they have the decisive vote.

  • But if workers in addition to the 50 per cent of the vote

  • as workers, own 10 per cent of the shares, 20 per cent

  • of the shares of the company.

  • Or even some local government, regional government which

  • sometimes happens in Germany, own 10 or 20

  • per cent of the share, then you can

  • have a change in the controlling majority of the company,

  • in spite of the fact that some private shareholders have

  • 80 per cent of the shares.

  • So you can see that these enormous legal transformation

  • as compared to the one share one vote view of private property,

  • and private co-operation.

  • And this is an example of an innovation that actually

  • did not spread too much.

  • You know, progressive taxation was

  • an example where you have large international diffusion.

  • Here it has sort have remained a specificity

  • of Germany, and Sweden, and Nordic countries.

  • But until the present day, this did not really

  • spread in Britain, in US, actually in France.

  • In my own country you still stick

  • very much to the one share, one vote principle.

  • I think this could change in the future because in the end,

  • these German Nordic system of co-management

  • worked pretty well.

  • It's quite successful.

  • Yeah, in getting workers to be more

  • involved in the long-term investment

  • strategy of the firm.

  • And I think this is something that is now discussed,

  • including in the US by Warren and Sanders,

  • of introducing more workers' rights in the board of US

  • companies.

  • And I think these could be, if this was adopted in the US,

  • in Britain, in France, there could

  • be a well diffusion of these other models

  • of corporate governance going on.

  • And this would be a pretty major change.

  • So more broadly, what is the state of play

  • in terms of ideology today?

  • It does feel like everyone's sort

  • of looking for a new direction.

  • Yes, I think we live at a time of great uncertainty,

  • because the ideology of globalisation

  • and financial deregulation, as it has developed in the 1980s,

  • is now at a time of crisis.

  • So first of all, in the US and the UK, where there was...

  • Reagan sort of made the claims that we will get more growth,

  • more innovation, by relying on a more free market...

  • And the government is the problem, yeah.

  • But 30 years later, in fact US workers

  • have not truly seen the growth.

  • And if anything the growth rate in the US

  • has been divided by two, following the Reagan decade.

  • You know, between 1990 and 2020, the 30-year period,

  • you only have 1.1 per cent in per capita national income

  • in the US, which is twice as less as between 1950 and 1990.

  • So the claim that by reducing top income tax rate,

  • and actually dividing them by two,

  • you will stimulate more innovation and growth.

  • This could have been true.

  • This could have been true.

  • But that's not what we've seen.

  • And I think this is why today, basically

  • you have two possible reactions to that.

  • You have a sort of the Trump, or in a way the Brexit discourse,

  • which is to say, OK, we're going to limit the competition

  • from foreign workers.

  • We have got to limit the flow of people,

  • the flow of immigration.

  • Build a wall with Mexico, and protect yourself

  • from your foreign competition.

  • And in the UK you add a little bit

  • of that with Polish workers and stubs of free circulation

  • of the people.

  • Now there's another way, which I think

  • of trying to regulate the circulation of people,

  • to regulate more of circulation of capital,

  • or at least to try to.

  • If you want to have free capital flow going on,

  • I think you need to have in exchange a more equitable tax

  • system for large corporations, for large wealth holders,

  • income holders.

  • So now, in between you could have business as usual.

  • You don't want to regulate more labour.

  • You don't want to regulate more capital.

  • But I don't think this is really an option.

  • Doesn't seem sustainable.

  • And you, of course, participate.

  • You don't just analyse this, but you participate,

  • and you're in that second camp, arguing for more progressive

  • taxation.

  • You also talk about shared power in corporations.

  • We've already mentioned that.

  • But tell us about your wealth tax proposal.

  • Because in the book it comes it comes out as pretty draconian.

  • You have tax rates going up to 90 per cent in a proposal.

  • Yes, actually this has been done in the past, actually.

  • It is exceptional wealth taxes.

  • For instance, after World War Two in Germany or Japan,

  • in order to reduce very large public debt of the time,

  • there was progressive tax up to 90 per cent

  • and very large wealth portfolios.

  • And these worked pretty well, because it allowed these two

  • countries, Germany and, Japan, to reduce

  • very fast their public debt, and then

  • to invest in public infrastructure, education

  • in the '50s, '60s.

  • And I think this was a large success.

  • Now, it depends, of course, on the level of wealth

  • at which you do that.

  • You know, if you tax 90 per cent someone

  • who owns the entire world, you know,

  • you would still own 10 per cent of the world, which is a lot.

  • So it's all...

  • we have to discuss.

  • So to put concrete numbers, I use

  • in the proposal I make, I use the proceeds

  • of the annual wealth tax, and of the tax entirely to finance

  • a system of inheritance for all, where everybody at age 25

  • would receive 120,000 euros.

  • Now in the system I propose people will now receive

  • zero would receive 120,000.

  • This is about...

  • As a one-off payment at age 25.

  • Age 25.

  • Like a one-off universal basic income.

  • Like inheritance.

  • And so people who used to receive zero

  • will receive 120,000.

  • That's about half of the population

  • would receive close to zero.

  • People today would receive 1 million

  • after the tax everything, they would receive 620,000.

  • So you know, this is not complete equality.

  • And if you want my opinion, I think

  • we could go further than that.

  • But I think what's important is that poor children, or children

  • of the middle class, and the lower middle class

  • also have good ideas to create firms.

  • And you can also buy an apartment.

  • And I think property is also a way

  • to change the power structure in society.

  • And to give more bargaining power to people

  • so that they can better choose which job

  • and which wage to accept.

  • And this is a way to allow more people

  • to participate in the economy in a way where you can make plans.

  • And I think this is really what we need.

  • I think the level of inequality we have today

  • is not only unfair, but it's so not efficient

  • for the working of our economy, where

  • we live in very educated societies,

  • and we need, you know, broad participation

  • by a very large group.

  • And the ideology that we still have

  • today that more concentrated power,

  • and more concentrated ownership is always good.

  • And no matter what the number of zeros for the millionaire,

  • who else, it's always...

  • we should always keep it like that,

  • I think is not convincing.

  • So what do you say to those who say well,

  • we regret that wealth is so concentrated.

  • But your sort of proposal is so confiscatory

  • that it completely removes the incentive for accumulation,

  • and that will be bad for productivity and growth.

  • And in the end, will hurt even those who tried to help?

  • That is the standard counter argument?

  • What's your answer?

  • As I was saying, someone was about to inherit 1 million,

  • will still inherited 620,000.

  • So why is it that some people should inherit 10 times,

  • 100 times more than others?

  • All children have good ideas in life to make project,

  • and I think we have to think harder about this.

  • And the view that because you've made a fortune, say at age 30,

  • you should keep all the decision-making power

  • at age 50, 70, 90, I think corresponds

  • to a sort of monarchical view of the working of modern economy

  • and modern corporations that is really

  • at odds with the reality.

  • Today, we have a lot more billionaires and much wealthier

  • billionaires in the US, and in the world than what

  • we had in the '70s or '80s.

  • But in terms of productivity growth, we actually don't...

  • so we have billionaires everywhere

  • except in growth statistics.

  • So people say we have more innovation because we

  • have more patents, but yes.

  • OK, maybe people put their patents

  • and they put their name everywhere, including on items

  • they did not invent themselves.

  • But if this were real innovation,

  • you should see it in productivity,

  • and in output growth, and the growth of income and wages.

  • And we've not seen that in the past 30 years.

  • So...

  • It's clear that we have seen higher taxes

  • with higher productivity growth in the past.

  • But one final question about this.

  • I mean, in the past you've advocated

  • an international wealth tax.

  • Could this be done by a single country?

  • Because it's somewhat utopian to think that everyone

  • has to do it at once.

  • Is it possible to pursue your sort of programme,

  • very steep wealth taxation, for one country to start with?

  • Well, you have to rethink the way

  • you organise the movement of capital and capital controls.

  • This is what I was saying earlier about control

  • of individual labour flow, or control of capital.

  • You have to do something, I think, about the capital.

  • So take for instance the proposals

  • that have been made in the US by Warren and Sanders

  • to introduce a billionaire tax up

  • to 6 per cent, 8 per cent per year of tax payment.

  • Depending on those cases.

  • What they both add to this is the fact

  • that if you want to go away with your wealth,

  • well first as long as you are a US citizen, even if you

  • go away, you pay the tax.

  • Now, if you really want to go away and give up

  • US citizenship, and bring your wealth to Switzerland,

  • what Warren and Sanders are saying is OK, you can do that.

  • But you will pay an exit tax of 40 per cent.

  • Right?

  • So you leave on 40 per cent of your wealth.

  • Now, the US federal government has a capability

  • to enforce that, which will not be

  • the case of any government in the world.

  • So clearly there is an asymmetry in the state capacities.

  • So that doesn't mean that smaller governments cannot do

  • anything.

  • But clearly they have to think harder about maybe they cannot

  • have a tax that is as progressive as in the US.

  • But what this illustrates is that there are still

  • things you can do without waiting for,

  • you know, the UN adopting a wealth tax.

  • But even in an era of globalisation,

  • national power hasn't actually been exhausted.

  • No, you can do a lot.

  • And if you think of co-management

  • that we referred to before.

  • Germany and Sweden didn't wait for the UN

  • to adopt co-management to apply it.

  • And this has worked pretty well.

  • So the view that nation states cannot do anything anymore,

  • I think he's wrong.

  • Now, sometimes they need to take tough unilateral actions

  • in order to step aside a little bit of the legal framework

  • of free capital flows that we've seen in the past.

  • So when you have an exit tax of 40 per cent

  • you're not exactly in that free capital flow world of before.

  • Or actually, when Obama in 2010 threatened Switzerland

  • that they would lose their banking licence if they don't

  • change legislation about bank secrecy,

  • we are not quite just in free capital flow,

  • you do what you want, kind of setting that that actually

  • was almost constitutionalised in Europe.

  • That's a problem with Europe, is that if France and Germany were

  • telling Luxembourg, we're going to take away your banking

  • licence if you don't transmit information of our taxpayer

  • in Luxembourg, then in fact Luxembourg

  • could sue France and Germany with a court of justice

  • in Luxembourg, saying we're looking into the Maastricht

  • treaty.

  • It never says that we have to give you this information.

  • It says that capital can flow with no counterpart

  • of any kind.

  • So now what do we do?

  • Do we wait for another Obama to solve the problem of Europe,

  • with Switzerland and Luxembourg?

  • Or do we, at some point, accept the idea

  • that OK, we made mistakes in the way we wrote the Maastricht

  • treaty, and the treaties around globalisation

  • in general in the '80s, '90s.

  • But we are not going to wait for Luxembourg to agree to changes.

  • So at some point you need some unilateral departure

  • to propose a new treaty.

  • But if Luxembourg doesn't accept you have to put sanctions.

  • And in the end this is politics.

  • This cannot just be legal treaties,

  • you made a mistake in the past, therefore we're going to stick

  • with it for another 50 years.

  • So that's the difficult part where we are today.

  • But if you don't do this kind of departure from the current

  • organisation of globalisation then you end up with nativist

  • parties who are going to propose another kind of departure,

  • which is basically to be very tough with migrants.

  • Because that's easier than being tough with Google,

  • or with rich people.

  • But in the end, this nativist departure

  • is much more frightening I think for globalisation.

  • And in addition, is not going to solve the problem of rising

  • inequality.

  • It's not going to solve the problem of global warming.

  • So we have to choose between different options.

  • And business as usual I think is not an option.

  • A provocative contribution to the raging battle of ideas.

  • Thomas Piketty, thank you very much for talking to the FT.

  • Thank you.

A few years ago the economist Thomas Piketty

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