字幕列表 影片播放 列印英文字幕 [MUSIC PLAYING] SPEAKER: Joel Greenblatt, our guest for today, is the co-founder, managing principal, and co-CIO of Gotham Asset Management. We could not be more thrilled and more grateful than to have him accept our invitation and be here. Thank you so much, Joel-- over to you. [APPLAUSE] JOEL GREENBLATT: Thanks so much. Thanks for coming out today. I really appreciate it very much. I've never been here before, so I'm looking forward to my tour right after, so thank you. So even Warren Buffett says the vast majority of people should index, and I agree with him. So are there any questions, or do I have any time? [LAUGHTER] Then again-- well, I have time, so then again, Warren Buffett doesn't index and neither do I. So I thought I'd tell you why, and then maybe you'll have some more information to decide for yourself what makes sense for you. And in a sense, it shouldn't be that hard. Actually, I had a friend who's an orthopedic surgeon and is in charge of a group of orthopedic surgeons. And he asked me to speak to them at a dinner, about the stock market. And I said, OK, these are smart, educated guys. They can understand this stuff. And I spoke for about 35 minutes, explaining how the stock market worked and everything else. And then I started getting questions along the lines of, oil went down $2 yesterday-- What should I do? Or a market was up 2% yesterday-- what do I do about that? So my interpretation of those questions was I had just crashed and burned. So last year, I was lucky enough to be asked to teach a ninth-grade class, a bunch of kids, mostly from Harlem. And I had just sort of crashed and burned with the orthopedic surgeons, and I didn't want to do that with the kids. And so I started to try to think of, what could I do to explain the stock market a little bit better? And so I walked into class the first day, and I handed out a bunch of three-by-five cards. And I brought in this jar of jellybeans right here, and I asked-- the students passed around the jar of jellybeans. I asked them to count the rows, do whatever they wanted to do, and write down their best guess for how many jellybeans were in the jar. I collected the three-by-five cards, then I went around the room, one by one, to each one of the kids in the room. And I said, listen, you can keep your guess or you can change your guess. That's up to you. And I went, one by one, around the room and asked people how many, and wrote down the various guesses. So it turned out, the average of the guesses for the three-by-five cards was 1,771 jellybeans. There are 1,776 jellybeans in the jar, so that was pretty good. The guess when I went around the room, that was 850 jellybeans. And I explained to them that the stock market's actually second-guessed, because everyone knows what they just read in the paper or what the guy next to them said, what they saw in the news, and are influenced by everything around them. And that was the second guess, and that's the stock market. The cold, calculating guess, when they were counting rows and trying to figure out what was going on, that actually was the better guess-- that's not the stock market. But that's where I see our opportunity. Once a year in my class at Columbia, at least for the last five, six years, somebody raises their hand and asks a question that goes something like this-- hey, Joel, congratulations. You've been doing this for 35 years, and you've had a nice record. But now there are more computers, there's more data, there's more ability to crunch numbers. And isn't the party over for us? Isn't it just more hedge funds? It's just a lot more competition. Isn't the party over for us? So my students are generally second-year MBAs-- I'd say average age, 27 or so. So I just answer it this way. I tell them, let's go back to when you learned how to read. Let's take a look at the most followed market in the world. That would be the United States. Let's take a look at the most followed stocks within the most followed market in the world. Those would be the S&P 500 stocks. Let's take a look at what's happened since you learned how to read. So I tell them, from 1997-- when they were 9 or 10-- to 2000, the S&P 500 doubled. From 2000 to 2002, it halved. From 2002 to 2007, it doubled. From 2007 to 2009, it halved. And from 2009 to today, it's roughly tripled, which is my way of telling them that people are still crazy. That was just the last 17 years. And I'm way understating the case, because the S&P 500 is an average of 500 stocks. If you lift up the covers and look underneath what's going on, there's huge dispersion of those 500 stocks between those, at any particular time, that are in favor and those that are out of favor. And so there's a wild ride going on underneath the covers. If you look under the covers, there's a wild ride of those 500 stocks at any particular time. And that doubling and halving, doubling and halving with the average of 500 stocks is really smoothing the ride. So there should be an opportunity. And if you understand what stocks are-- and I guarantee my students, first day of class-- I make a guarantee every year. And they walk in, and I guarantee them this-- if they do good valuation work of a company, I guarantee them the market will agree with them. I just never tell them when. It could be a couple weeks. It could be two or three years. But if they do good valuation work, the market will agree with them. Stocks are not pieces of paper that bounce up and down, and you put complicated ratios on, like Sharpe ratios or Sortino ratios. Stocks are ownership shares of businesses that you are valuing and, if so inclined, tried to buy at a discount. So if you believe what Ben Graham said, that this horizontal line is fair value, and this wavy line around that horizontal line are stock prices, and you have a disciplined process to buy, perhaps, more than your fair share when they're below the line, and, if so inclined, sell or short more than your fair share when they're above the line, the market is throwing us pitches all of the time. The reason people don't outperform the market-- there are behavioral problem. There are agency problems. But it's not because we're not getting those opportunities. I will show you briefly-- let me tell you how we value stocks. It's not very tough, and I think most of you will understand it. And I think the best example that seems to resonate with most people is thinking about buying a house. And to keep the numbers simple, let's say that someone is asking $1 million for the house. They want to sell, and your job is to figure out whether that's a good deal or not. So there's certain questions you would ask. One of the first questions I'd ask is, well, how much rent could I get for that thing, OK? So in other words, if I rented out that million-dollar house, how much rent would I collect?