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  • The question today is not:

    譯者: Vicky Chen 審譯者: Ann Lee

  • Why did we invade Afghanistan?

    今天的問題不是:

  • The question is:

    我們為什麼侵略阿富汗?

  • why are we still in Afghanistan

    而是

  • one decade later?

    我們為什麼還待在那裡?

  • Why are we spending

    十年之後?

  • $135 billion?

    我們為什麼要花

  • Why have we got 130,000 troops on the ground?

    135億美元

  • Why were more people killed

    我們為什麼要有13萬軍隊部屬在戰爭現場

  • last month

    為什麼有更多人死去

  • than in any preceding month

    上個月

  • of this conflict?

    比之前任何一個月都多

  • How has this happened?

    因為這個戰爭?

  • The last 20 years

    為什麼會這樣?

  • has been the age of intervention,

    最後20年

  • and Afghanistan is simply one act

    是干預的年代

  • in a five-act tragedy.

    而阿富汗只是其中一個行動

  • We came out of the end of the Cold War

    在一個接連5個行動的悲劇

  • in despair.

    我們絕望地從冷戰末期

  • We faced Rwanda;

    走出

  • we faced Bosnia,

    我們面對過盧安達(種族)大屠殺

  • and then we rediscovered our confidence.

    我們面對波士尼亞(瑟布雷尼卡)屠殺事件

  • In the third act, we went into Bosnia and Kosovo

    然後我們重拾信心

  • and we seemed to succeed.

    在第三個行動中,我們進入波士尼亞和科索沃

  • In the fourth act, with our hubris,

    最終我們似乎成功了

  • our overconfidence developing,

    在第四個行動中,我們以驕傲的心態,

  • we invaded Iraq and Afghanistan,

    變得越來越過度自信

  • and in the fifth act,

    我們侵略了伊拉克和阿富汗

  • we plunged into a humiliating mess.

    在第五個行動中

  • So the question is: What are we doing?

    我們慘陷令人不堪的泥诏

  • Why are we still stuck in Afghanistan?

    所以,我們在幹嘛?

  • And the answer, of course,

    為什麼我們還陷在阿富汗?

  • that we keep being given

    當然這個答案

  • is as follows:

    提供我們的一直是

  • we're told that we went into Afghanistan

    如下

  • because of 9/11,

    我們被告知去阿富汗

  • and that we remain there

    是因為911恐怖攻擊

  • because the Taliban poses an existential threat

    而我們之所以還待在這裡

  • to global security.

    是因為塔利班的存在

  • In the words of President Obama,

    對全球安全帶來了威脅

  • "If the Taliban take over again,

    歐巴馬總統多次談到

  • they will invite back Al-Qaeda,

    如果塔利班捲土重來

  • who will try to kill as many of our people

    他們將會迎回蓋達組織

  • as they possibly can."

    這組織將盡他們所能

  • The story that we're told

    試著殺死我們的人民

  • is that there was a "light footprint" initially --

    我們被告知的說法

  • in other words, that we ended up in a situation

    是我們最初只是輕輕地踏上那土地

  • where we didn't have enough troops,

    換句話說,我們的結局反而造成了

  • we didn't have enough resources,

    我們並沒有足夠的軍力

  • that Afghans were frustrated --

    我們沒有足夠的資源

  • they felt there wasn't enough progress

    使阿富汗人民很沮喪

  • and economic development and security,

    他們感覺不到足夠的進展

  • and therefore the Taliban came back --

    經濟發展和安全

  • that we responded in 2005 and 2006

    因此塔利班才會回來

  • with troop deployments,

    2005年和2006年之間

  • but we still didn't put enough troops on the ground.

    我們部屬了軍隊

  • And that it wasn't until 2009,

    但數量依然不足夠

  • when President Obama signed off on a surge,

    一直到2009年

  • that we finally had,

    當歐巴馬總統在波濤洶湧的情勢下批准後

  • in the words of Secretary Clinton,

    我們才終於有了

  • "the strategy, the leadership and the resources."

    套句美國國務卿希拉克林頓的話

  • So, as the president now reassures us,

    策略,領導精神和資源

  • we are on track to achieve our goals.

    所以,當總統又再次向我們保證

  • All of this is wrong.

    我們正走在實現目標的正軌上時

  • Every one of those statements is wrong.

    這些都是錯的

  • Afghanistan does not

    那些陳素也都是錯的

  • pose an existential threat

    阿富汗並不是

  • to global security.

    對全球安全來說

  • It is extremely unlikely

    並不是個威脅

  • the Taliban would ever be able to take over the country --

    根本不可能

  • extremely unlikely they'd be able to seize Kabul.

    塔利班能夠再次接管這個國家

  • They simply don't have a conventional military option.

    他們更不可能能夠佔領喀布爾

  • And even if they were able to do so, even if I'm wrong,

    她們就是沒有一個傳統的軍隊選擇

  • it's extremely unlikely

    即使她們能夠這樣做,即使我錯了

  • the Taliban would invite back Al-Qaeda.

    依然不太可能

  • From the Taliban's point of view,

    塔利班會迎回蓋達組織

  • that was their number one mistake last time.

    從塔利班的角度來看,

  • If they hadn't invited back Al-Qaeda,

    上次是他們犯過最大的錯誤

  • they would still be in power today.

    如果他們沒有贏回蓋達組織

  • And even if I'm wrong about those two things,

    他們今天就應該還會掌權

  • even if they were able to take back the country,

    即使我對這兩件事的看法都錯了

  • even if they were to invite back Al-Qaeda,

    即使她們可以奪回國家

  • it's extremely unlikely

    即使他們會迎回蓋達組織

  • that Al-Qaeda would significantly enhance

    還是非常不可能

  • its ability to harm the United States

    蓋達組織會顯著地強大

  • or harm Europe.

    傷害美國的能力

  • Because this isn't the 1990s anymore.

    或傷害英國

  • If the Al-Qaeda base

    因為現在已經不是1990年代了

  • was to be established near Ghazni,

    如果蓋達組織基地

  • we would hit them very hard,

    會蓋在加茲尼附近

  • and it would be very, very difficult

    我們會猛烈攻擊他們

  • for the Taliban to protect them.

    那將會非常困難

  • Furthermore, it's simply not true

    要保護他們的話

  • that what went wrong in Afghanistan

    那完全不是事實

  • is the light footprint.

    在阿富汗造成的錯誤

  • In my experience, in fact,

    只是輕微的影響

  • the light footprint was extremely helpful.

    事實上,就我經驗談

  • And these troops that we brought in --

    這個輕微影響其實很有幫助

  • it's a great picture of David Beckham

    而那些我們帶進去的軍隊

  • there on the sub-machine gun --

    這是一張貝克漢的照片

  • made the situation worse, not better.

    拿著衝鋒槍

  • When I walked across Afghanistan

    這使情況更糟,沒有更好

  • in the winter of 2001-2002,

    當我行走阿富汗時

  • what I saw was scenes like this.

    在2001和2002年間的冬天

  • A girl, if you're lucky,

    我看到的是像這樣的場景

  • in the corner of a dark room --

    如果你夠幸運,一個女孩

  • lucky to be able to look at the Koran.

    在昏暗房間的角落裡

  • But in those early days

    幸運地能夠看著可蘭經

  • when we're told we didn't have enough troops and enough resources,

    但是在早些日子那時

  • we made a lot of progress in Afghanistan.

    我們被告知沒有足夠的軍隊和資源

  • Within a few months,

    我們其實在阿富汗有很大的進展

  • there were two and a half million more girls in school.

    在幾個月內

  • In Sangin where I was sick in 2002,

    學校裡有超過250萬的女孩們就讀

  • the nearest health clinic

    2002年時我在Sangin病倒了

  • was within three days walk.

    最近的衛生診所

  • Today, there are 14 health clinics

    還要走三天的路

  • in that area alone.

    今天,有14個衛生珍所

  • There was amazing improvements.

    單單在那個區域

  • We went from almost no Afghans

    那時其實有驚人的改善

  • having mobile telephones during the Taliban

    我們從幾乎沒有阿富汗人

  • to a situation where, almost overnight,

    在塔利班時期擁有電話

  • three million Afghans had mobile telephones.

    進展到一個現象,幾乎一夜之間

  • And we had progress in the free media.

    三百萬阿富汗人擁有手機

  • We had progress in elections --

    我們在媒體自由上也有進展

  • all of this with the so-called light footprint.

    我們在選舉上也有進展

  • But when we began to bring more money,

    這些都是所謂的輕輕踏過

  • when we began to invest more resources,

    但是當我們開始帶來更多金錢

  • things got worse, not better. How?

    開始投資更多資源時

  • Well first see, if you put 125 billion dollars a year

    事情沒變好卻更糟。 怎麼這樣?

  • into a country like Afghanistan

    嗯 首先 如果你一年投入125億元

  • where the entire revenue of the Afghan state

    在像阿富汗這樣的國家上

  • is one billion dollars a year,

    整個國家財政收入

  • you drown everything.

    一年才一億元

  • It's not simply corruption and waste

    那就是像石沉大海

  • that you create;

    你造成的不只是

  • you essentially replace the priorities of the Afghan government,

    貪汙和浪費

  • the elected Afghan government,

    你根本上替換了阿富汗政府的執政重點

  • with the micromanaging tendencies

    那個被選出來的政府

  • of foreigners on short tours

    而傾向由短期旅居的外國人

  • with their own priorities.

    隨著他們的喜好

  • And the same is true for the troops.

    管東管西

  • When I walked across Afghanistan,

    對軍隊來說也是這樣

  • I stayed with people like this.

    當我行走阿富汗時

  • This is Commandant Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj.

    我借住在這樣的人家裡

  • Commandant Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj was a great host.

    這位是指揮官 Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj

  • He was very generous,

    他是一位很讚的東家

  • like many of the Afghans I stayed with.

    非常大方

  • But he was also considerably more conservative,

    就像我借住過的很多阿富汗人一樣

  • considerably more anti-foreign,

    但他相對來說也比較保守

  • considerably more Islamist

    比較仇外

  • than we'd like to acknowledge.

    比較伊斯蘭基本教義派

  • This man, for example, Mullah Mustafa,

    比起我們認為的

  • tried to shoot me.

    譬如說 這個人Mullah Mustafa

  • And the reason I'm looking a little bit perplexed in this photograph

    想要射殺我

  • is I was somewhat frightened,

    我之所以在照片裡看來有點迷茫

  • and I was too afraid on this occasion

    是因為我有點被嚇到

  • to ask him, having run for an hour through the desert

    而且我在這樣的場合下太害怕

  • and taken refuge in this house,

    問他 在我在沙漠中跑了一小時後

  • why he had turned up and wanted to have his photograph taken with me.

    終於在這屋裡可以避難後

  • But 18 months later, I asked him

    為什麼他突然要和我合照

  • why he had tried to shoot me.

    但18個月後,我問他

  • And Mullah Mustafa -- he's the man with the pen and paper --

    為什麼他要射殺我

  • explained that the man sitting immediately to the left as you look at the photograph,

    Mullah Mustafa 拿著筆和紙的那個人

  • Nadir Shah

    解釋坐在照片左邊的那個人

  • had bet him that he couldn't hit me.

    Nadir Shah

  • Now this is not to say

    和他打賭他不敢打我

  • Afghanistan is a place full of people like Mullah Mustafa.

    我的意思不是說

  • It's not; it's a wonderful place

    在阿富汗都是像Nadir Shah這樣的人

  • full of incredible energy and intelligence.

    不是 它是一個好地方

  • But it is a place

    充滿著難以置信的能量和智慧

  • where the putting-in of the troops

    但是這個地方

  • has increased the violence rather than decreased it.

    部屬軍隊

  • 2005, Anthony Fitzherbert,

    只會增加暴力而不是減少

  • an agricultural engineer,

    2005年時 Anthony Fitzherbert

  • could travel through Helmand,

    一個農業工程師

  • could stay in Nad Ali, Sangin and Ghoresh,

    可以旅經爾曼德

  • which are now the names of villages where fighting is taking place.

    可以待在奈德阿里Sangin 和Ghoresh

  • Today, he could never do that.

    但現在那些村莊戰爭正在進行

  • So the idea that we deployed the troops

    現在他再也不能這樣做了

  • to respond to the Taliban insurgency

    所以我們想部屬軍隊

  • is mistaken.

    來回應塔利班的暴亂

  • Rather than preceding the insurgency,

    是錯的

  • the Taliban followed the troop deployment,

    不但沒有早於暴亂發生之前

  • and as far as I'm concerned,

    塔利班還接著軍隊部屬後而來

  • the troop deployment caused their return.

    就我所知

  • Now is this a new idea?

    軍對部屬導致他們重返

  • No, there have been any number of people

    難道這是個新的想法嗎?

  • saying this over the last seven years.

    不,在過去七年裡

  • I ran a center at Harvard

    很多人一直提出這個想法

  • from 2008 to 2010,

    我在哈佛主持一個中心

  • and there were people like Michael Semple there

    從2008到2010年間

  • who speak Afghan languages fluently,

    那裡有像Michael Semple

  • who've traveled to almost every district in the country.

    會一口流利阿富汗語的人

  • Andrew Wilder, for example,

    幾乎去過整個國家的每一區

  • born on the Pakistan-Iranian border,

    比如說Andrew Wilder

  • served his whole life

    他出生在巴基斯坦和伊朗的邊界

  • in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

    把他的一生都奉獻

  • Paul Fishstein who began working there in 1978 --

    於巴基斯坦和阿富汗

  • worked for Save the Children,

    像從1978年就在那裡工作的Paul Fishstein

  • ran the Afghan research and evaluation unit.

    是為了拯救孩童

  • These are people

    他主持阿富汗研究和評估單位

  • who were able to say consistently

    這些人

  • that the increase in development aid

    可以肯定一貫地說

  • was making Afghanistan less secure, not more secure --

    發展援助的增加

  • that the counter-insurgency strategy

    讓阿富汗更不安全而不是更安全

  • was not working and would not work.

    而且反暴動策略

  • And yet, nobody listened to them.

    不但過去無效也不可能有效

  • Instead,

    但是卻沒人聽得進去

  • there was a litany of astonishing optimism.

    反之

  • Beginning in 2004,

    卻有一連串驚人的樂觀主義出現

  • every general came in saying,

    從膽2004開始

  • "I've inherited a dismal situation,

    每個將軍都說

  • but finally I have the right resources and the correct strategy,

    我承接著了一個慘淡的局勢

  • which will deliver,"

    但終於有了對的資源和正確的策略

  • in General Barno's word in 2004,

    將帶來

  • the "decisive year."

    套一句Barno將軍在2004年的話

  • Well guess what? It didn't.

    決定性的一 年

  • But it wasn't sufficient to prevent General Abuzaid saying

    你猜怎麼著? 那並沒有發生。

  • that he had the strategy and the resources

    但這並足夠阻止General Abuzaid說

  • to deliver, in 2005,

    他有策略和資源

  • the "decisive year."

    在2005年帶來

  • Or General David Richards to come in 2006

    決定性的一年

  • and say he had the strategy and the resources

    或在2006年 阻止General David Richards

  • to deliver the "crunch year."

    說他有策略和資源

  • Or in 2007,

    帶來緊縮的一年

  • the Norwegian deputy foreign minister, Espen Eide,

    或是2007時

  • to say that that would deliver the "decisive year."

    挪威外交部長代表Espen Eide

  • Or in 2008, Major General Champoux

    說的即將帶來決定性的一年

  • to come in and say he would deliver the "decisive year."

    或是2008年時 少將 Champoux

  • Or in 2009, my great friend,

    說他會帶來決定性的一年

  • General Stanley McChrystal,

    或2009年 我的好朋友

  • who said that he was "knee-deep in the decisive year."

    Stanley McChrystal將軍

  • Or in 2010,

    他身處決定性的一年裡

  • the U.K. foreign secretary, David Miliband,

    或2010年

  • who said that at last we would deliver the "decisive year."

    英國外交部長David Miliband

  • And you'll be delighted to hear in 2011, today,

    說我們終於將帶來決定性的一年

  • that Guido Westerwelle, the German foreign minister,

    你會很開心聽到2011年的今天

  • assures us that we are in the "decisive year."

    德國的外交部長 Guido Westerwelle

  • (Applause)

    向我們保證今年是決定性的一年

  • How do we allow

    (掌聲)

  • any of this to happen?

    我們怎能容許

  • Well the answer, of course, is,

    這些發生

  • if you spend 125 billion or 130 billion

    答案當然是

  • dollars a year in a country,

    如果你每年花125億或130億美元

  • you co-opt almost everybody.

    在一個國家上

  • Even the aid agencies,

    你幾乎吸收了每個人

  • who begin to receive an enormous amount of money

    甚至援助機構

  • from the U.S. and the European governments

    他們開始收到一大筆錢

  • to build schools and clinics,

    來自美國和英國政府

  • are somewhat disinclined

    用來蓋學校和診所

  • to challenge the idea

    他們不太願意

  • that Afghanistan is an existential threat

    挑戰這個阿富汗是

  • to global security.

    是對全球安全的一個存在威脅

  • They're worried, in other words,

    的想法

  • that if anybody believes that it wasn't such a threat --

    換句話說 他們擔心

  • Oxfam, Save the Children

    如果有人相信其實阿富汗不具有如此威脅性

  • wouldn't get the money

    樂施會,拯救孩童

  • to build their hospitals and schools.

    就不能得到錢

  • It's also very difficult to confront a general

    來建造醫院和學校

  • with medals on his chest.

    要對抗一個胸上有獎牌的上將

  • It's very difficult for a politician,

    也是非常難的

  • because you're afraid that many lives have been lost in vain.

    對一個政治人物來說非常困難

  • You feel deep, deep guilt.

    因為你害怕太多生命已經徒勞犧牲

  • You exaggerate your fears,

    你感到愧疚萬分

  • and you're terrified about the humiliation

    你誇大了恐懼

  • of defeat.

    而且你被失敗的羞辱嚇死了

  • What is the solution to this?

    嚇死了

  • Well the solution to this

    這個解決方法是什麼呢?

  • is we need to find a way

    解決方法就是

  • that people like Michael Semple, or those other people,

    我們需要找到一個方法

  • who are telling the truth, who know the country,

    讓像Michael Semple的人或其它那些人

  • who've spent 30 years on the ground --

    那些說真話,了解這個國家

  • and most importantly of all,

    那些花了30年在現場

  • the missing component of this --

    最重要的是

  • Afghans themselves,

    這件事情少了的部分

  • who understand what is going on.

    阿富汗人他們自己

  • We need to somehow get their message

    他們才了解正在發生什麼

  • to the policymakers.

    我們必須想辦法讓他們的訊息

  • And this is very difficult to do

    傳給立法者知道

  • because of our structures.

    因為我們的結構

  • The first thing we need to change

    這很難辦到

  • is the structures of our government.

    首要改變的是

  • Very, very sadly,

    我們政府的結構

  • our foreign services, the United Nations,

    令人很難過的是

  • the military in these countries

    我們的外國服務,聯合國

  • have very little idea of what's going on.

    這些國家的軍隊

  • The average British soldier is on a tour of only six months;

    不甚了解發生了甚麼事

  • Italian soldiers, on tours of four months;

    英國軍人平均巡迴阿富汗六個月

  • the American military, on tours of 12 months.

    義大利軍人四個月

  • Diplomats are locked in embassy compounds.

    美國軍人12個月

  • When they go out, they travel in these curious armored vehicles

    外交官被關在大使館圍牆裡

  • with these somewhat threatening security teams

    就算他們出去,也是躲在奇怪的裝甲車裡

  • who ready 24 hours in advance

    帶著這些有些嚇人的安防隊伍

  • who say you can only stay on the ground for an hour.

    每天24小時前就準備好

  • In the British embassy in Afghanistan

    說你只能現場待一小時

  • in 2008,

    阿富汗的英國大使館裡

  • an embassy of 350 people,

    2008年時

  • there were only three people who could speak Dari,

    在350個人的大使管理

  • the main language of Afghanistan, at a decent level.

    只有3個人可以說像樣程度的Dari語

  • And there was not a single Pashto speaker.

    阿富汗的主要語言

  • In the Afghan section in London

    沒有一個說Pashto語的人

  • responsible for governing Afghan policy on the ground,

    在倫敦的阿富汗區

  • I was told last year

    負責治理阿富汗現場的政策

  • that there was not a single staff member

    去年我被告知

  • of the foreign office in that section

    在那一個外交辦公室的組別裡

  • who had ever served

    沒有任何一個組員

  • on a posting in Afghanistan.

    曾經用阿富汗語

  • So we need to change that institutional culture.

    張貼過任何消息

  • And I could make the same points about the United States

    所以我們必須改變那個體制文化

  • and the United Nations.

    對美國和聯合國來說

  • Secondly, we need to aim off of the optimism of the generals.

    我講得也是有道理的

  • We need to make sure that we're a little bit suspicious,

    第二,我們必須把目標從那些上將的樂觀主義上轉移

  • that we understand that optimism

    我們必須確定我們有些多疑

  • is in the DNA of the military,

    我們知道樂觀

  • that we don't respond to it

    是軍人基因中與生俱來的

  • with quite as much alacrity.

    我們不能太敏捷

  • And thirdly, we need to have some humility.

    地回應它

  • We need to begin from the position

    第三,我們必須謙虛一點

  • that our knowledge, our power,

    我們必須從了解到

  • our legitimacy

    我們的知識,力量

  • is limited.

    和合法性

  • This doesn't mean

    是有限的定位出發

  • that intervention around the world is a disaster.

    這並不是指

  • It isn't.

    干預國際事務是個災難

  • Bosnia and Kosovo

    不是

  • were signal successes,

    波士尼亞和科索沃

  • great successes.

    是成功的信號

  • Today when you go to Bosnia

    偉大的成功

  • it is almost impossible to believe

    如果你現在去波士尼亞

  • that what we saw in the early 1990s happened.

    你幾乎不會相信

  • It's almost impossible to believe the progress we've made

    我們在1990年代看到

  • since 1994.

    以及自從1994年來我們促進的發展

  • Refugee return,

    發生過

  • which the United Nations High Commission for Refugees

    難民回來了

  • thought would be extremely unlikely,

    這是聯合國難民屬

  • has largely happened.

    覺得極不可能發生的

  • A million properties have been returned.

    竟然大大的發生了

  • Borders between the Bosniak territory

    一百萬個檔案資料已經被送回

  • and the Bosnian-Serb territory have calmed down.

    在波士尼亞領土附近的邊界

  • The national army has shrunk.

    以及波士尼亞和賽爾維亞邊界的情勢已經安定下來

  • The crime rates in Bosnia today

    播士尼亞國軍已經縮減

  • are lower than they are in Sweden.

    現在波士尼亞的犯罪率

  • This has been done

    比瑞典還低

  • by an incredible, principled effort

    這全靠

  • by the international community,

    驚人 有紀律的努力

  • and, of course, above all,

    以及國際社會

  • by Bosnians themselves.

    當然最重要的是

  • But you need to look at context.

    波士尼亞人們自己才能辦到

  • And this is what we've lost in Afghanistan and Iraq.

    但是必須要知道事情前後脈絡

  • You need to understand that in those places

    這是我們在阿富汗和伊拉克所喪失的

  • what really mattered

    你必須知道在那些地方

  • was, firstly, the role of Tudman and Milosevic

    真正重要的

  • in coming to the agreement,

    首先是圖季曼和米洛舍維奇的角色

  • and then the fact those men went,

    能夠達成協議

  • that the regional situation improved,

    以及那些人真的去了

  • that the European Union could offer Bosnia

    區域的情勢改善了

  • something extraordinary:

    歐盟也提供波士尼亞

  • the chance to be part

    很棒的東西

  • of a new thing, a new club,

    那個可以成為

  • a chance to join something bigger.

    一個新東西,一個新社團

  • And finally, we need to understand that in Bosnia and Kosovo,

    可以加入一個更大的團體的機會

  • a lot of the secret of what we did,

    最後,我們必須了解在波士尼亞和科索沃

  • a lot of the secret of our success,

    我們所做得絕大秘密

  • was our humility --

    我們成功的絕大秘密

  • was the tentative nature of our engagement.

    都功歸於我們的謙虛

  • We criticized people a lot in Bosnia

    和我們試驗性的參與天性

  • for being quite slow to take on war criminals.

    我們在波士尼亞批評了很多人

  • We criticized them

    太慢與戰爭罪人對抗

  • for being quite slow to return refugees.

    批評他們

  • But that slowness, that caution,

    太慢送回難民

  • the fact that President Clinton initially said

    但是那個慢速度,那個慎重

  • that American troops would only be deployed for a year,

    柯林頓總統最初說的事實

  • turned out to be a strength,

    美國軍隊只會部屬一年

  • and it helped us to put our priorities right.

    結果變成我們的強處

  • One of the saddest things

    幫助我們放對重點

  • about our involvement in Afghanistan

    在我們涉入阿富汗事件中

  • is that we've got our priorities out of sync.

    最可悲的事情

  • We're not matching our resources to our priorities.

    就是我們的重點沒做到同步

  • Because if what we're interested in is terrorism,

    我們並沒有把資源運用在我們的重點上

  • Pakistan is far more important than Afghanistan.

    因為如果我們關心恐怖主義

  • If what we're interested in is regional stability,

    巴基斯坦比阿富汗重要得多了

  • Egypt is far more important.

    如果我們關心的是區域性的穩定

  • If what we're worried about is poverty and development,

    埃及重要得多了

  • sub-Saharan Africa is far more important.

    如果我們擔心的是貧窮和發展

  • This doesn't mean that Afghanistan doesn't matter,

    次撒哈拉非洲地區重要得多了

  • but that it's one of 40 countries in the world

    這並不是說阿富汗不重要

  • with which we need to engage.

    但只是世界上40個國家中

  • So if I can finish with a metaphor for intervention,

    我們需要參與其中的其中之一

  • what we need to think of

    所以如果用一個比喻來說干預這件事

  • is something like mountain rescue.

    我們需要想到的是

  • Why mountain rescue?

    像山區救援這樣的事情

  • Because when people talk about intervention,

    為什麼呢

  • they imagine that some scientific theory --

    因為當人們談到干預

  • the Rand Corporation goes around

    他們認為某些蘭德公司

  • counting 43 previous insurgencies

    做的科學理論

  • producing mathematical formula

    把之前43起叛亂

  • saying you need one trained counter-insurgent

    算出一個公式

  • for every 20 members of the population.

    告訴你你需要一個訓練好的反叛亂行動

  • This is the wrong way of looking at it.

    給人口中每20個人一個

  • You need to look at it in the way that you look at mountain rescue.

    這是錯誤的看法

  • When you're doing mountain rescue,

    你需要像看山區救援那樣看待它

  • you don't take a doctorate in mountain rescue,

    當你進行山區救援時

  • you look for somebody who knows the terrain.

    你不需要博士學位才行

  • It's about context.

    你要找一個瞭解地勢的人

  • You understand that you can prepare,

    這和背景有關

  • but the amount of preparation you can do

    你知道可以準備

  • is limited --

    但你能做的準備

  • you can take some water, you can have a map,

    有限

  • you can have a pack.

    你可以帶些水,帶個地圖

  • But what really matters

    你可以準備一個包包

  • is two kinds of problems --

    但真的重要的是

  • problems that occur on the mountain

    兩種問題

  • which you couldn't anticipate,

    山裡會發生的問題

  • such as, for example, ice on a slope,

    而你預料不到

  • but which you can get around,

    例如像是坡上的冰

  • and problems which you couldn't anticipate

    但你還可以逃開

  • and which you can't get around,

    以及預料不到

  • like a sudden blizzard or an avalanche

    又逃不開的問題

  • or a change in the weather.

    像突然的暴風雪和雪崩

  • And the key to this

    或是天氣驟變

  • is a guide who has been on that mountain,

    對此的解決之道

  • in every temperature,

    就是一個曾經在山上

  • at every period --

    待過各種氣候

  • a guide who, above all,

    任何時間的嚮導

  • knows when to turn back,

    最重要的是, 一個

  • who doesn't press on relentlessly

    知道什麼時候該回頭

  • when conditions turn against them.

    當情勢轉劣時不會堅持前進

  • What we look for

    的嚮導

  • in firemen, in climbers, in policemen,

    我們從

  • and what we should look for in intervention,

    消防員,登山員和警察

  • is intelligent risk takers --

    以及應該從干預中找的

  • not people who plunge blind off a cliff,

    是聰明的冒險者

  • not people who jump into a burning room,

    不是盲目跳下懸崖的人

  • but who weigh their risks,

    不是跳進火坑的人

  • weigh their responsibilities.

    而是會衡量風險

  • Because the worst thing we have done in Afghanistan

    衡量她們的責任

  • is this idea

    因為我們在阿富汗做過最糟的事

  • that failure is not an option.

    就是抱著

  • It makes failure invisible,

    沒有失敗的選擇的想法

  • inconceivable and inevitable.

    這使失敗隱形了

  • And if we can resist

    無法想像且無可避免

  • this crazy slogan,

    如果我們能抵抗

  • we shall discover --

    這個瘋狂口號

  • in Egypt, in Syria, in Libya,

    我們會發現

  • and anywhere else we go in the world --

    在埃及 敘利亞 利比亞

  • that if we can often do much less than we pretend,

    以及世界上任何其他國家

  • we can do much more than we fear.

    如果我們能卸去偽裝

  • Thank you very much.

    我們就能無畏地做得更多

  • (Applause)

    非常感謝你們

  • Thank you. Thank you very much.

    (掌聲)

  • Thank you. Thank you very much.

    謝謝。謝謝你們。

  • Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

    謝謝,謝謝你們。

  • (Applause)

    謝謝你們謝謝你們謝謝你們

  • Thank you.

    (掌聲)

  • Thank you. Thank you.

    謝謝你們

  • Thank you.

    謝謝你們謝謝你們

  • (Applause)

    謝謝你們

  • Bruno Giussani: Rory, you mentioned Libya at the end.

    (掌聲)

  • Just briefly, what's your take on the current events there

    Bruno Giussani: Rory你最後提到利比亞

  • and the intervention?

    簡短說一下,你對現今在那裏發生的事情的想法

  • Rory Stewart: Okay, I think Libya poses the classic problem.

    還有那邊的干預

  • The problem in Libya

    好 我認為利比亞構成一個經典的問題

  • is that we are always pushing for the black or white.

    利比亞的問題

  • We imagine there are only two choices:

    是我們總是在推動黑人或白人

  • either full engagement and troop deployment

    我們以為只有兩個選擇

  • or total isolation.

    不是全心投入部屬軍隊

  • And we are always being tempted up to our neck.

    就是完全與之隔離

  • We put our toes in and we go up to our neck.

    我們總是對誘惑動心萬分

  • What we should have done in Libya

    我們踏進泥诏然後滿身泥濘出來

  • is we should have stuck to the U.N. resolution.

    我們在利比亞應該做的是

  • We should have limited ourselves very, very strictly

    我們應該謹守聯合國的決議

  • to the protection of the civilian population in Benghazi.

    我們應該嚴格限制自己

  • We could have done that.

    只要保護班加西的平民

  • We set up a no-fly zone within 48 hours

    我們應該早就做得到

  • because Gaddafi had no planes

    我們設立一個48小時內無飛機的區域

  • within 48 hours.

    因為格達費48小時內

  • Instead of which, we've allowed ourselves to be tempted

    沒有飛機

  • towards regime change.

    反之,我們允許自己被誘惑

  • In doing so, we've destroyed our credibility with the Security Council,

    想改變政權

  • which means it's very difficult

    因為這樣,我們已經摧毀安全理事會對我們的信任

  • to get a resolution on Syria,

    這使得

  • and we're setting ourselves up again for failure.

    對敘利亞的決議非常困難

  • Once more, humility,

    而且我們又再次邁向自己設好的失敗

  • limits, honesty,

    我再重申一次 謙虛

  • realistic expectations

    限制 誠實

  • and we could have achieved something to be proud of.

    實際的期望

  • BG: Rory, thank you very much.

    那我們就能做到值得驕傲的事情

  • RS: Thank you. (BG: Thank you.)

    Rory非常謝謝你

The question today is not:

譯者: Vicky Chen 審譯者: Ann Lee

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