You know what a game is – there’s basketball, Chutes and Ladders, Dungeon and Dragons, tennis, Wizard School!

你知道什麼是遊戲－有籃球，瀑布，樓梯，城堡與龍，網球、巫師學校！

But those are examples of games. What I’m asking for is the definition of a game.

但這些都是遊戲的例子。但我在問的是遊戲的定義。

Maybe, if you haven’t been keeping up with Crash Course Games, you’d simply say that,

或許，如果你沒有玩過Crash Course Games，你可能就只會這樣說，

a game is a competition, with winners and losers.

遊戲就是競賽，有贏家跟輸家。

But, what about a game like ring around the rosie?

但，圍繞著羅絲指環的遊戲（譯注：繞圈圈的童謠遊戲）又該怎麼說呢？

Does a game require at least two players?

遊戲一定要有兩個玩家嗎？

No, there is literally a game called solitaire solitaire.

不，我們有所謂的單機遊戲。

Maybe a game is just a thing you do for fun.

或許遊戲只是個可以得到樂子的東西吧！

But what about “who can stay quiet the longest” –

但「誰可以安靜最久」又該怎麼說？－

the game that your parents used to use on long car trips?

你的父母在長程車程中最常使用的遊戲呢？

Or, like, Russian roulette?

或者，像是，俄羅斯輪盤？

Or The Game of Thrones, where you win or you die?

或是君王的遊戲，你會在哪贏？又死在哪？

When it comes to language, there’s a lot to philosophize about.

當他指涉到語言時，就會有很多關於此的哲學討論。

But one question that philosophers of language like to mull is the question of meaning.

但有一個問題，關於語言的哲學家喜歡去著墨的是關於意義的問題。

What do words – like ‘game’ or ‘red’ or ‘banana’ What do they mean?

一個詞－像是「遊戲」或「紅色」或「香蕉」到底是在指什麼？

How do we know what they mean?

我們怎麼知道這些詞是在指什麼呢？

And who gets to decide?

誰決定的？

[Theme Music]

〔音樂〕

Language is one of our most nuanced and powerful tools.

語言是我們最細緻、最有利的工具之一。

It takes all of the stuff that’s swirling around in each of our lonely, isolated brains – all those thoughts – and transfers them into someone else’s brain.

他讓所有的東西可以在我們每一個人獨立的、孤立的大腦邊旋轉－這些想法－把他們變成其他人的腦

Which is really, fabulously cool. It’s like telepathy!

是多麼的真實，不可置信的酷。就像是心電感應一般！

But with the extra step of actually speaking or writing.

但在真實的口說與寫作的步驟外，

But, how do words – a collection of sounds or written symbols – key into the mental concepts that we want to communicate?

但，字詞－一串的聲音或書寫符號－怎麼進入到我們想要溝通的心智觀念中呢？

The naive understanding of what words mean is just that they’re just whatever the dictionary says.

單純對字詞意思的理解，就如同字典上所說的一般。

But we know that’s not totally true.

但我們知道這必不完全是真的。

Think about the difference between words like ‘cat,’ ‘kitty,’ ‘mouser,’ and ‘feline’.

想想在字詞之間的差異，像是「貓」「小貓」「鬼鬼祟祟者」跟「貓科動物」

Early 20th century German philosopher Gottlab Frege helped parse out this difference by drawing a distinction between what he called sense, and reference.

二十世紀初期，德國哲學家Gottlab Frege藉由在感官與表現之間畫出差別，來幫助去分出來之間的不同

The reference of a word is the object or concept that it’s meant to designate.

一個詞所指涉到的是一個物件或是觀念，他的意思是為了稱呼。

The reference of all these words is this.

所以這些字的關聯即為此。

觀念（常識）, on the other hand, is the way in which the words tie us to the object or concept.

，在另一方面而言，其實是一種將我們與物件或者是觀念綁在一起的東西。

So, while the reference of each of these words is the same, they have different senses.

所以，當每個字之間所指涉的對象相同時，他們就有了不同的意思。

A kitty might be a baby cat, or sort of fancy lap cat,

kitty 可能是小貓仔，或是一系列的粗腿貓（凱蒂貓），

while a mouser might be a cat that lives in a barn and kills rodents for a living.

補鼠的動物可能是一支住在榖倉並且咬死一個生命的貓。

So how do words get their meaning?

所以，字詞是怎麼得到他們的意思的呢？

A definition is traditionally understood as whatever meets the conditions for both necessity and sufficiency.

一個傳統認為的定義是，根據所遇到的需求跟充分兩種條件而論。

A necessary condition is what’s needed – like, what must be present – in order for a thing to be a thing.

需求條件是根據所需要的－像是，有什麼東西必須是現在的－使一個東西是某物。

In order for X to be X.

為了讓x成為x。

A necessary condition of being a bachelor, for example, is that you must be unmarried.

作為一個單身漢的必要條件是，例如，你必須未婚。

A sufficient condition is something that’s enough for X to be X,

一個充分條件則是某物，對x成為x是足夠的。

but it’s not required for that thing to meet that definition.

但這並未要求事物卻遇到其定義。

For example, being born in the United States is a sufficient condition for being an American citizen.

舉例，出生在美國是成為美國公民的充分條件，

But it’s not a necessary condition, because people who weren’t born in the US can still become citizens.

但不是必要條件，因為不是在美國出生的也可以成為美國公民。

The long-standing view of definitions was that, if you can figure out both the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be X, then you’ll have your definition.

針對定義的長存觀點為，如果你可以理解需求跟充分兩件條件對某物成為x的影響，則你可以有你自己的定義。

That is, you’ll have found the criteria that exclude all non-X’s, but include all X’s.

那就是，你將可以找到不包括所有非X，但包括所有的X的標準。

If you’re following me.

如果你跟著我。

But 20th century Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein said this rigid concept of definitions doesn’t actually work.

但二十世紀澳英混血的哲學家維根斯坦說，關於定義的刻板印象並不是真的有用。

For example, you just can’t define the word ‘game’ in a way that’s going to make everybody happy.

舉例，你就是無法用一種可以讓大家都開心的方式定義「遊戲」這個詞。

Any definition you give, someone’s going to come up with a counterexample –

你所給的任何定義，總是會有提出反例－

either some game that’s excluded by the definition,

即便是那些被定義所包含的遊戲。

or something that the definition includes that not everyone would agree is a game.

或者是某個並非每個人都會同意定義的即是遊戲。

It took Andre and entire 10 minute episode to define games!

這花了Andre一整集十分鐘的影片去定義遊戲！

But the thing is, Wittgenstein said this doesn’t matter!

但事實是，維根斯坦說這並不重要。

Because, everyone knows what a game is!

因為，大家都知道這是個遊戲！

He pointed out that we learn and know the meaning of words

他指出我們學習以及認識字的含義

by hearing the way other members of our linguistic community use them.

是藉由聽到其他語言學家的社群成員如何使用這些字。

We hear Candyland, rugby, and Cards Against Humanity all referred to as games,

我們聽到英格蘭中部rugby市的Candyland，以及Cards Against Humanity（毀滅人性的卡片）以遊戲的方式提到它。

so eventually our brains piece together what’s common between them,

所以，事實上，我們的大腦將它們之間的共通點拼組在一起，

in a recognition that Wittgenstein called family resemblance.

在一個維根斯坦稱之為家族相似性的認知中。

You know how you can just see the relation between people sometimes?

你知道有時候你就是可以看到人們之間的關聯，是怎麼一回事嗎？

Rather than rigid definitions, Wittgenstein said word meanings are so-called cluster concepts.

比起嚴謹的定義，維根斯坦說一個字詞的含義是所謂的一組觀念。

There’s no one element that everything in the cluster has in common,

在一般情況下，沒有所謂的單一的元素在一個群組中。

but they all share something with some other members of the group.

但它們跟其他群組中的成員分享了一些東西。

It’s sort of like you have your dad’s nose and your mom’s sense of humor,

有點像是你有你爸的鼻子以及你媽的幽默感，

and your sister has your mom’s eyes and your dad’s athleticism.

而你姊有你媽的眼睛以及你爸的競技運動特質。

You and your sister don’t really have much in common, but you do both resemble both parents.

你跟你的姐姐並不是真的有很多的共通點，但是你們的兩個都跟父母很像。

But it’s not like every concept in the cluster is equal.

但並非像是每個觀念在群組中都是一樣的。

The ones that everyone would accept are the paradigm cases – you can picture them in the center of the cluster.

每個人都會接受的例子是－你可以在群組的中心去描繪它們

And as you move to the outer edges you’ll get fringe cases, the ones that some people would include in the group but others would exclude.

而當你移到外圍的時候，你會得到較邊緣、不符合的案例，有些人同意，而有些不這樣認為。

Everyone will agree that football is a game, but there’s going to be some disagreement about things like,

每個人都同意足球是一種遊戲，但對於某些事情則不同意，如

I don’t know, knife fights, or how long you can hold your breath under water.

我不知道，騎士打架，你在水下可以憋氣多久。

And Wittgenstein said that’s fine.

然後，維根斯坦說這沒關係。

Language is a living phenomenon, and like most living things, there’s going to be change and variation.

語言是一個活著的現象，就像大部分的生物一般，他們會有改變與變異。

But who gets to decide what words mean, or if a meaning is legitimate?

但誰來決定一個字的意思呢？或者是一個意義是合法的（適當的）？

Here, Wittgenstein said, “meaning is use.”

這裡，維根斯坦說，「意義即是使用」。

In other words, as long as a linguistic community uses a word in a particular way, it has that meaning.

換句話說，一旦語言學社群以一種特殊的方式使用一個字，它就有它的意義。

Watching the way words develop and change does suggest that Wittgenstein was onto something.

看看字詞的演變以及改變可以證實維根斯坦是凌駕於某些東西之上的。

I mean, ‘mouse’ didn’t used to mean that thing, but now it does.

我指的是，「mouse」以前不是這個意思，但現在它是。

We make words up as we need them.

當我們有所需要的時候，單字就會出現。

And at the same time, words also fall out of use, or take on entirely new meanings.

同時，字詞也會偏離使用，而有一個全新的含義。

Now, this view of language assumes that meaning is tied to a particular linguistic communities.

現在，這個對於語言的觀點假定意義是跟一群特定的語言社群綁在一起的。

And a community might, or might not, span all of the speakers of that language.

而一個社群可能會，或者不會，跨越這個語言的所有講者。

Think about the regional differences in words that might be specific to your town, or school, or group of friends, or family.

想想在用語的地方上差異，可能對你的家鄉、學校、朋友群或者是學校有特殊的意思。

And what about this: Do you and your best friend have code words – words that you use to talk privately, even when you’re in public?

那這個呢：你跟你的朋友之間有密語嗎？通常用來討論隱私的用語，即便是在大庭廣眾之下？

Like, the two of you could be at a club, and one of you would say to the other:

就像是，你們兩個在一個酒吧裡，而你們其中一個會跟另一位說：

“That guy at the bar is a total shoehorn” and the other one would know exactly what you meant?

「那個在酒吧裡的人員全就像個鞋拔一樣」而另一個人很清楚知道你在說些什麼？

In that case, do those words, that have meaning specific to the two of you,

在這種情況，使用這些字，對你們兩個來說有著特殊含義。

really mean what you say they mean, even if no one else agrees with you?

真的代表你想說的話，即使沒有其他人同意你？

And what happens if the two of you forget that meaning?

那如果你們兩個都忘記這個字的意思會發生什麼事呢？

Is the meaning still there?

意義還存在嗎？

Or does it only exist as long as someone uses the word that way?

還是說，只有當有人以這樣的方式使用他們時才存在呢？

Let’s bounce over to the Thought Bubble for a bit of Flash Philosophy.

讓我們倒帶一下，回到關於快閃哲學的一些泡泡想法。

A linguistic community of two – like you and your friend – seems fairly plausible.

一個兩人的語言社群）就像你跟你的朋友－看起還簡直就是個巧合。

But is it possible to have an entirely private language?

但擁有一個完全隱私人的語言可能嗎？

Wittgenstein asked us to imagine that each of us has a box, and inside each box is something.

維根斯坦讓我們去想想一下，我們每個人都有一個盒子，在每個盒子裡面裝有東西。

We all refer to the thing in our box as ‘a beetle,’ but no one can see inside anyone else’s box, ever.

我們都將我們盒子裡的東西事做木搥提及，但沒有人可以看到其他人的盒子裡面，絕不。

We all call our hidden thing a beetle, but we have no idea if the content of our boxes is the same.

我們稱我們被藏起來的東西為木搥，但我們不知道我們盒子中的內容物究竟是不是一樣。

Wittgenstein said there’s no way we can meaningfully use the word ‘beetle’ in this context,

維根斯坦說，沒有一種我們可以在文章中有意義的使用「搥子」的字。

because we have no way of verifying what others mean when they use the word, and they have no way of verifying what we mean.

因為我們沒有辦法去辨認其他人在使用這些字詞指的是什麼，而他們也不能辨認我們所說的。

This is meant to illustrate how it’s impossible to directly communicate our subjective experiences.

這是指說要圖像化來直接描述我們的主觀經驗是如何的不可能。

We all use the word ‘red’ to refer to the color we see when we look at a stop sign,

當我們看到暫停標誌的時候。，我們都會使用「紅色」這個字去做為我們所看到的顏色

but I have no way of knowing if you’re actually seeing the same thing that I’m seeing.

但我沒有辦法可以知道你是否確實看到了跟我所看到的東西是一樣的。

I don’t know if your pain feels like my pain or your love feels like my love.

我不知道你的痛苦是否跟我的痛苦感覺一樣，或是你的愛跟我的愛一樣。

Our minds are like boxes.

我們的大腦就像是盒子一般。

No one else can see what’s inside.

沒有任何一個人可以看到裡面有什麼。

But here’s the thing: it doesn’t matter.

但裡面確實有東西：而這不重要。

Because ‘beetle’ just means, ‘what’s in the box.’

因為「搥子」只是代表在盒子裡的「東西」。

It could literally be a beetle, or it could be a fox! In socks!

可以被視作為一個搥子，或者是一隻狐狸！在襪子裡！

The point is, we don’t know if the color red in my mind is the same as the color red in your mind, because the color red is a beetle in a box.

重點是，我們不知道在我們腦子裡的紅色跟你腦子裡的紅色是否一樣，因為紅色就像是在盒子中的搥子一樣。

It’s a label for what’s in our minds.

只是個在我們腦中的標籤。

So language, Wittgenstein said, can’t refer directly to an internal state,

所以語言，維根斯坦說，無法直接辨認永恆的狀態。

like what it’s like to see the color red, or to experience pain.

就像是看到紅色，或者是經驗疼痛。

Instead, it can only refer to the aspect of it that’s publicly observable by other people.

取而代之的是，只能有一個其他人怎麼看待的大概方向。

So, the word ‘pain’ isn’t the feeling of physical suffering, it’s jumping on one foot and cursing when you stub a toe.

所以，「疼痛」這個字不是一種生理上的感受，而是跳到某人的腳上，好奇並採滅他。

It’s rubbing your temples when you have a headache – the observable behaviors that are associated with it.

當你頭痛時，你按摩你的太陽穴－這是一個可以觀察的行為表現。

Thanks, Thought Bubble! Now I want to propose an experiment.

感謝，Thought Bubble! 現在，我想計畫一個實驗。

If use is meaning, you should be able to give a word meaning by using it, right?

如果使用即意義，你就可以藉由使用去給單詞一個意義，對吧？

At least, if you can convince a linguistic community to go there with you.

至少，如果你可以說服一個語言學社群去跟從你。

So let’s try it.

那就讓我們來試試吧！

If every Crash Course viewer starts referring to bananas as chom choms, can we make it catch on?

如果每個速成觀看者開始把香蕉視作為 chom choms，我們就可以捕捉到了嗎？

Can we create meaning?!

我們可以創造意義？！

We’ll have to stay tuned for the answer to that one, but in the meantime, we can think about what might happen.

我們都必須要對這保持和諧，但在此時，我們可以想想會發生什麼事？

And to do that, we need to make a distinction between two different types of meaning.

並且去做，我們需要在兩個不同類型的意義間製造差別。

When people communicate verbally, there’s speaker meaning, which is what the speaker intends when using a word.

當人們使用話語去交談時，他們是在講述意義，即是講者們在使用時的意圖或傾向。

And then there’s audience meaning, which is what the audience understands.

然後，聽眾的意義，即是觀眾所了解的！

Since the whole point of language is communication, our goal is for speaker meaning and audience meaning to match up.

自從語言的全部重點是在溝通，我們的目標就是讓說者與聽者的內涵是契合的。

But, as anyone who’s ever, like, had a conversation, knows, this doesn’t always work out.

但是，就如果過往的人一般，喜歡有對話，知道，這並不總是有效。

Like, Billy tells Bobby that he likes Sally.

像是，比利告訴包比他喜歡莎麗。

Billy, the speaker, means that he likes Sally as a friend.

比利，說者，指的是他把莎麗當朋友。

Bobby, the audience, takes Billy’s statement to be a profession of, like, you know, like-like.

包比，聽者，把比利的聲明當做是一種告白，表示喜歡。

So Bobby then goes and tells Sally that Billy like-likes her, when in fact Billy actually like-likes Suzy, and pretty soon, you know how it goes. Tears.

所以包比就會跑去跟莎麗說比利喜歡她，但事實上比利喜歡蘇西。很快的，你就知道接下來會發生什麼事。眼淚（悲劇）。

The point is, that even with a simple word that we all think we understand, like ‘like,’

重點是，甚至只是個簡單的字，而我們都以為我們理解，像是「喜歡」

speaker meaning and audience meaning can fail to connect.

說者跟聽者的意義可以完全搭不上線的！

When we get into more complicated or nuanced words, or when we try to invent a new word, like chom chom,

當我們進入到更複雜或者是細微的單字時，或當我們試著發明一個新的字時，像是chom choms。

we’re likely to run into some pretty high-level speaker-meaning/audience-meaning confusion.

我們就像跑進了一些相當高程度的所謂的講者與聽眾間，而混淆了。

But for now, we learned about meaning.

但是現在呢，我們學到了關於意義。

We talked about sense and reference, beetles in boxes, and language games.

我們討論了觀念與關連，盒子裡的披頭四，以及語言遊戲。

And we learned that bananas are called chom choms.

我們學到了香蕉可以稱作chom choms。

Repeat it with me: chom choms.

跟我念一次：chom choms.

Never say bananas again.

永不再說香蕉。

Next time, we’re going to talk about another linguistic concept – conversational implicature.

下次，我們要談關於語言的觀念－對話的蘊含

Crash Course Philosophy is produced in association with PBS Digital Studios.

哲學速成課是與PBS Digital Studios.協作製作的。

You can head over to their channel to check out a playlist of the latest episodes from shows like

你可以往他們的頻道清單去確認最新的節目單元。

PBS Idea Channel, It's Okay to be Smart, and Physics Girl.

PBS Idea頻道。可以讓你變聰明，以及成為物理學女孩。

This episode of Crash Course was filmed in the Doctor Cheryl C. Kinney Crash Course Studio

這集速成課是由Doctor Cheryl C. Kinney Crash Course Studio所錄製

with the help of all of these awesome people

所有這些超棒的人的幫忙

and our equally fantastic graphics team is Thought Cafe.

同樣厲害的還有我們的影像團隊 Thought Cafe