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  • - [Robin] My name is Robin Albing.

  • I'm the Director of Lifelong Learning

  • in Alumni Relations here at Dartmouth.

  • Matthew J. Slaughter is the Paul Danos Dean

  • of the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth.

  • The Earl Daum 1924 Professor of International Business,

  • and the founding faculty director of the Center

  • for Global Business and Development.

  • He is also currently a Research Associate

  • at the National Bureau of Economic Research,

  • an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the

  • Council on Foreign Relations,

  • a member of the Advisory Committee

  • of the Export/Import Bank of the United States.

  • A member of the Academic Advisory Board

  • of the International Tax Policy Forum,

  • and of Economic Innovation Group,

  • and an Academic Adviser to the McKinsey Global Institute.

  • He told me this morning he doesn't

  • care if we give the long introduction,

  • but I think it's important for all of us

  • to put everything in context, and

  • know from whom we're going to be hearing.

  • From 2005 to 2007, Dean Slaughter

  • served as a member on the Council of Economic Advisers

  • in the Executive Office of the President

  • where he advised the President,

  • the Cabinet and many others on issues

  • including: international trade and investment,

  • currency and energy markets, and

  • the competitiveness of the US economy.

  • Dean Slaughter's area of expertise

  • is the economics and politics of globalization.

  • He has published dozens of articles

  • in peer reviewed journals and books,

  • and has coauthored four books,

  • including: "The Squam Lake Report:

  • "Fixing the Financial System" and

  • "Globalization and the Perception of American Workers."

  • Prior to joining the Tuck faculty in 2002,

  • since 1994 Dean Slaughter had been

  • on the faculty of the Economics Department at Dartmouth.

  • In 2001 he received Dartmouth's

  • John M. Manley Huntington Teaching Award

  • and in 2012 he received Tuck's Class of 2011

  • Teaching Excellence Award.

  • He received his Bachelor's degree

  • summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa

  • from the University of Notre Dame in 1990

  • and his doctorate from MIT in 1994.

  • Please join me in welcoming Dean Matt Slaughter.

  • (clapping)

  • - So, thanks everybody, good morning.

  • That's very kind.

  • Robin thank you for that very kind introduction.

  • And for those of you coming in late,

  • there's some seats down here, and I

  • promise I won't cold call on the front row.

  • So if you wanna sit (laughter)

  • you can come sit down here.

  • There's a few seats down here, so come on in.

  • So, thank you, it's great everybody's back.

  • Welcome back to all the alumni.

  • And you know, go Big Green, beat Yale.

  • So, we don't want to stand in the way of that.

  • I just put together a handful of slides

  • in talking with Robin and her colleagues

  • about what to talk about.

  • Just kinda thinking about where the world economy is,

  • and kind of where the US economy is.

  • So, I've got some slides I put together.

  • I've got five topics that we'll talk about.

  • I wanna talk about economic--

  • I'm an economist, sorry.

  • So, we'll talk about the economy and public policy.

  • And I'm happy for this to be a conversation,

  • so I wrote down conversation.

  • So, if you've got questions, or I'm not being clear,

  • just raise your hand or shout it out,

  • and it'll be lively and we'll have it all figured out

  • by 11. (laughter)

  • I wanna talk about economic growth.

  • So, that's kind of thinking about,

  • you know 'member,

  • John Kennedy gave a couple of lovely economic speeches,

  • talking about the rising tide lifting of all the boats.

  • So, the rising of the tide is economic growth.

  • The lifting of all the boats will be the second topic,

  • which you think about income distribution

  • and think about what's happening

  • and who's earning income in the US

  • from what growth we've got.

  • I want to look at the rest of the world a little bit.

  • I want us to think about how the US government is.

  • A lot of economic issues depend on what policies are set

  • in the state and national governments.

  • So we'll focus on Washington for a minute,

  • in some sense, do we have the fiscal means

  • as a country to meet the aspirations we might have.

  • And then I wanna just, I'll kinda draw all that together

  • by looking at what people think these days.

  • As was kindly said, I've done a lot of

  • research over the years with an old college

  • roommate who's a political scientist.

  • On kind of looking at how people feel

  • and how they think about the economy.

  • How they think about globalization and things like that.

  • So, but like I said, if I'm unclear,

  • or if you have questions, just let me know.

  • And I hadn't thought, Robin, but

  • if people want these slides, not that you do,

  • but if you do, you can have them.

  • I'll email them along.

  • 'Cause I just have some pictures.

  • So, we'll go through each of the topics.

  • First we'll talk about economic growth.

  • And then we'll go through them.

  • But, I just want to stress to people two things.

  • One is I'm an Independent Tigger.

  • So, independent means I'm a lifetime independent.

  • I'm not a Republican or a Democrat.

  • That also means here I'm not working for

  • any campaign right now, so you're not gonna

  • hear some sort of, I will gently say, partisan line.

  • And the other thing that I'll stress is Tigger.

  • So in the Winnie the Pooh stories,

  • if you remember the characters when you.

  • My wife and I have two boys, sons now.

  • When you read those stories as an adult,

  • you realize that there was a lot of intelligence

  • written into the different characters in the 100 Acre Wood.

  • So, I tend to be an optimistic person.

  • But I stress that 'cause frankly

  • though we're not in a world financial crisis,

  • the economy isn't all that great.

  • So, some of the numbers I'm gonna show us

  • actually are a little, mmm

  • let's call them Piglet like, (laughter)

  • or, you know, frankly Eeyore like, okay.

  • (laughter)

  • So, but that's where we are.

  • But as I say to my Tuck students all the time,

  • that's just a huge opportunity.

  • Us, involved in education for the undergraduates

  • here and the professional schools.

  • Like, what addresses these problems is knowledge.

  • Not that you have to know the answers perfectly,

  • but that you're thoughtful about how to approach them.

  • So, some of the numbers aren't Tigger-like.

  • That just reinforces all the great things

  • that happen on campus here at Dartmouth, okay?

  • Good.

  • So let's start with economic growth.

  • The rising tide.

  • Another metaphor that sometimes gets used

  • is the speed limit for countries.

  • If you think about driving a vehicle.

  • So, some countries grow very quickly.

  • Some countries grow slowly.

  • I just want us to think about, for the United States,

  • what seems to be happening with our speed limit.

  • And the way that economists typically look at this

  • is they look at the average rate of growth,

  • of what's called gross domestic product, GDP.

  • That's the total value of goods and services

  • that a country produced.

  • Add up the value of all the educational services,

  • and automobiles and everything else,

  • that gets you GDP.

  • If you can't read these numbers,

  • I tried to make the pictures as big as I could.

  • This is just average annual growth of GDP

  • in the United States for a number of decades.

  • Starting with the 1950s and counting through to the 2000s.

  • The message I want you to see here is these

  • blue bars are getting shorter.

  • The average speed limit rate of growth,

  • how much the tide is rising,

  • if you wanna mix metaphors, and English,

  • your English faculty here can correct you on that.

  • We're not growing as quickly as we used to.

  • So, our speed limit seems to be slowing.

  • There's a bunch of measurement issues

  • here that we won't go into.

  • I'm happy to talk about afterwards.

  • But, even if you discount in some sense,

  • or eliminate the years of the financial crisis,

  • and depending on how many years you put in the 2000s,

  • whether you want it through last year or just through 10.

  • Doesn't matter.

  • The speed limit rate of growth for

  • the United States is slowing.

  • And that's not great.

  • Now the question is why is that happening?

  • There's two main things that determine

  • the speed limit rate of growth for a country.

  • One is what's the growth in the labor force.

  • And the second is what economists call

  • growth in productivity.

  • Kind of how many goods and services,

  • what's the productivity of each one

  • of those workers in the labor force?

  • So, if your mind thinks as an accountant, or mathematically,

  • you can kind of see the total growth in output

  • is a combination of growth in people working in some

  • sense interacted with the productivity of those people.

  • So, why the speed limit is slowing

  • could be either of those things.

  • So, let's look at a picture of each one of those.

  • Part of it is the slowing growth in the labor force.

  • That's this picture.

  • This is growth in the US labor force.

  • The dark blue bars are data, decade by decade.

  • And then the light blue bars are projections

  • of the current US government right now.

  • You saw there was a period where

  • the labor force grew dramatically.

  • And then it's been waning.

  • That dramatic acceleration in the

  • growth of the labor force was the Baby Boom.

  • That was 76 million people being born

  • in the United States between 1946 and 1964.

  • Aging and entering traditional plummet years.

  • Along with that, the socio-economic change

  • of rising female labor force participation.

  • Yeah?

  • - [Voiceover] In the previous slide, what impact

  • if any has there been on the growth rate

  • of frequency and severity of the economic crises?

  • - [Voiceover] Could you repeat the question?

  • - Yeah, I'll repeat all the questions.

  • The question was when I talk about the

  • slow down in GDP growth, how do you

  • take account of business cycles and crises.

  • - [Voiceover] Severity and frequency.

  • - Yeah, and severity and frequency.

  • Great question.

  • The short answer is the slow down in

  • the speed limit for the US is independent

  • of what you think about business cycles.

  • Now, we could talk about business cycles.

  • 'Cause that relates to the Fed

  • and it relates to fiscal policy too.

  • So, I'll come back to crises when I show us

  • the fiscal status of the US in a few minutes, okay.

  • But this, you should think of this as,

  • if you think like economists, a supply side statement.

  • The kind of productive capacity

  • and potential for the US is slowing.

  • And it's a basic sense, like oh, mmm, that

  • doesn't sound like a Tigger thing.

  • Like economic growth generally is good.

  • 'Cause it speaks to the growth in income for people

  • and families, which I'll show us in a minute, okay.

  • So great question.

  • So there's the Baby Boomers entering

  • the labor force and then, I know my hair's gray,

  • but at 46 I'm a Baby Buster, so I'm on the wrong

  • side of this generational divide.

  • There's not as many people like me,

  • who've come cohort by cohort behind.

  • And now what's been happening and started

  • a few years ago, independent of the crisis,

  • is Baby Boomers have aged and are reaching

  • traditional retirement years.

  • They don't have to, but traditionally

  • there's kink points of retirement at

  • 60, 62, 65, based in part on Federal law

  • in the US for Social Security.

  • Though part of the slow down is driven

  • by Baby Boomers being followed by Baby Busters.

  • And by the way, the best guess of the United States

  • government right now is that isn't going to change

  • very much.

  • The big wild card with projections of labor force

  • are projections about immigration.

  • And yet, if you look at the dysfunction in

  • Washington, DC, do we think we have anything

  • coming any time soon on comprehensive immigration reform?

  • That's a little bit of editorializing.

  • The short answer is no. (laughter)

  • I'll come back to that at the end.

  • But when you think about these projections,

  • that's the big wild card.

  • Not to be crass, but productions of the

  • labor force growth are pretty easy to do.

  • They're largely a function of actuarial tables

  • of birth rates and death rates.

  • And then some, calculation and judgement

  • about labor force participation choices.

  • Yes.

  • - [Voiceover] What about the Millennial generation?

  • That's huge too, and it's starting

  • to come into the workforce.

  • - It's not as huge relative to the Baby Boomers

  • is the short answer.

  • It's huge relative to my generation.

  • But it's not huge enough.

  • So, the point is, the message to have is,

  • this slow down in the speed limit,

  • part of it is a slow down in the labor force.

  • But the keyword here is part.

  • The biggest thing that's driving the slow down

  • in the speed limit rate of growth

  • is actually a slow down in productivity growth.

  • So, I'm gonna show us that picture right now.

  • That's this picture.

  • I don't have decades here, 'cause I wanna stress

  • here the technology cycles are a little more important.

  • Okay.

  • So a lot of this has to do with

  • how innovative the country is.

  • So, part of what I want you to see here is,

  • this is growth rates of average

  • annual labor productivity in the US.

  • From the end of World War Two up until

  • the first oil crisis, we had booming

  • productivity growth in the US of almost 3% per year

  • in growth in the non-farm output worker hour.

  • That was great.

  • That was, many of you, I know I'm gray,

  • but I see some people who were in the labor force

  • and living in that time.

  • That was a sense of American economic excellence.

  • As I'll show us in the income side too.

  • But then we had this lost generation

  • of very slow productivity growth,

  • and economists don't know much,

  • so we don't know why the heck that was happening exactly.

  • But then, notice that third bar got taller.

  • What industry was driving that productivity boom?

  • (crowd murmurs)

  • Awesome. IT.

  • So that was a massive acceleration

  • in that productivity growth in

  • IT hardware in particular and some related software.

  • Globalization had a great deal to do with that.

  • The back of your iPhone says designed by Apple

  • in California, assembled in China.

  • That's a great anecdote of how globalization

  • contributes to acceleration in productivity.

  • But notice unfortunately this slump

  • back down in productivity growth.

  • Especially post-financial crisis.

  • The past four years, growth in output

  • per worker hour in the US has been less than 1% a year.

  • It's the worst four year stretch in productivity

  • growth we've had in like 60 years.

  • As long as we've been measuring the data basically.

  • That's really bad.

  • Because historically most of the growth

  • in total output for countries like the United States

  • comes from growth in productivity,

  • not growth in workers.

  • Yes.

  • - [Voiceover] Productivity growth is dependent

  • on the cost of good and services.

  • A lot of technology is now going toward free services.

  • - Yep.

  • - [Voiceover] How do you account for those.

  • - I'm not, so great questions.

  • I'm gonna give you a short answer, on the fact that.

  • The question was, with a lot of the growth

  • in IT, especially late with social and mobile

  • and things, how do we measure that?

  • Especially if stuff is free.

  • It's harder to measure, but it gets measured

  • is my short answer.

  • So, maybe it's gonna be the case

  • that the technology optimists say,

  • you know what, Uber and things like this,

  • we're mismeasuring things so much,

  • and it's a golden age of productivity.

  • I think the jury is, to put it politely,

  • very much still out on that.

  • And importantly, if you thought that was true,

  • and we were undermeasuring productivity growth,

  • you would see it on the income side

  • in surging income growth.

  • And as I'm gonna talk about in a minute,

  • we're just not seeing that.

  • So, maybe that's going to change.

  • But, it hasn't so far.

  • So the first message I want to convey then,

  • on message number one for the US

  • is we've had this dramatic slow down

  • in productivity growth that we don't fully understand why.

  • But that makes all the kind of policy

  • and life choices harder when you

  • have slower economic growth.

  • Slower economic growth is not a panacea for everything.

  • But when it's slower, in some basic sense,

  • society gets more fragile and more factious, okay.

  • And that's just, I don't like this, but this is

  • a feature of the US that we should all be cognizant of.

  • Especially those that are involved in the campaigns

  • running around here in New Hampshire these days.

  • Alright.

  • I see two hands there. I'll take quick questions.

  • Then I'm gonna go on. First.

  • - [Voiceover] Very quickly.

  • Infrastructure, you know we have a--

  • - I'll come back to that in a slide

  • later about infrastructure.

  • But I'll answer it by saying,

  • what drives productivity growth?

  • We know in a broad sense, it's public investments

  • in infrastructure, public investments in early stage

  • research and development, investments in education.

  • It's how open are you to the rest of the world?

  • High skilled immigrants.

  • How open you are to the spur of international competition.

  • Do you have a sound tax policy to support growth

  • and innovative activities in your country?

  • So, there's no law of physics that determines

  • how much each of these drives productivity growth,

  • but the collection of all those things is

  • what determines the productivity growth potential.

  • And I'm previewing a little bit of one of the messages.

  • Which is in Washington, DC we are doing

  • a completely horrible job, I say this as an independent,

  • I fault all the parties, on doing the things we

  • should be doing, and I'll have two slides on this later,

  • to drive productivity growth.

  • And there was a hand in the back.

  • - [Voiceover] Yeah, what's the, have you

  • measured the impact of regulations,

  • especially in the past seven years, on productivity?

  • - Some have. That's harder to measure.

  • Because it's a lot of qualitative judgement.

  • But the regulatory environment

  • I will add to the list on things that

  • support or restrain productivity growth.

  • Okay.

  • So, everybody clear on the first fact?

  • Slow down in the speed limit, because

  • of slow down in productivity growth.

  • Alright.

  • And good former students remember all this, right?

  • (laughter) Of course.

  • The second number is income distribution.

  • So, if the rising tide is productivity growth

  • and economic growth, the lifting of all the boats

  • is a question of the workers, the people

  • that own, that provide the labor services

  • and the capital services, are their incomes going up?

  • I think most of us aspire to live in a society

  • where lots of people's incomes are going up.

  • Not necessarily equally and to the penny,

  • but I think there's a sense of a vibrant society

  • is one where a lot of people feel like

  • over time they're doing better economically.

  • So let's see whether that's been the case.

  • Let's go way back in time, and let's look at the

  • first three quarters of the 20th century of the US.

  • What we're looking at here is data

  • that come from tax returns.

  • So these are, the IRS, for better for worse,

  • the personal income tax was legalized

  • with a Constitutional amendment,

  • and the first year of collecting income tax

  • on people and workers was 1913.

  • So, you can go back in time, as some famous economists

  • have done, and look at tax filers

  • as the unit of observation.

  • So the data here are tax filers, on the individual side.

  • And I'm gonna forestall, all the questions,

  • there's a bunch of measurement issues around that.

  • S-Corps, whose income hits on the personal side,

  • and all sorts of stuff.

  • I'm not gonna take any questions on that.

  • 'Cause qualitatively, the message is the same

  • regardless of what data you look at.

  • And so what I've got here is data points for each year.

  • The black diamond is average income of

  • the bottom 99% of the tax filers.

  • Ranked in terms of the level of adjusted gross income.

  • The white triangles is the 1%.

  • That's the top 1% of tax filers.

  • And hit the left axis here, it

  • corresponds to the black diamonds.

  • The right axis, which I'll show us in the next slide,

  • corresponds to the top 1%.

  • But the message I want you to see here,

  • and you can see on the question earlier,

  • you can see crises here.

  • We can see the Great Depression.

  • So, what happened in the Great Depression?

  • Everybody's incomes fall dramatically.

  • Alright, so that's just striking.

  • And here, if you had mini-crises before then.

  • Here's some after-effects of World War One.

  • But the general message I want you to see is

  • income growth was strong for a lot of people,

  • especially after World War Two.

  • Remember I showed you that high

  • productivity growth period of '47 to '53.

  • On the income side, a lot of boats were rising.

  • You can see this quite dramatically.

  • This is all inflation adjusted.

  • Average incomes went from about 20,000 dollars

  • to over 40,000 dollars, about a doubling

  • of average incomes of the 99 percenters during that time.

  • And again, the scale is different,

  • but there was some modest growth of the top 1% too.

  • But here's, over much of the 20th century, what

  • economic growth we had, that was lifting a lot of boats.

  • Now, let's look at what comes next.

  • So, let's go through to 2012, and what

  • I want you to see is there's some zigs and zags,

  • especially with the productivity boom of the late 90s.

  • But notice, relative to the peak here,

  • the bottom 99% income today is about

  • where it was about the year I was born in 1969.

  • I'm not saying that's good or bad.

  • This is what globalization and technological change

  • and a whole bunch of forces are delivering.

  • But at the very least, this rapid growth of incomes

  • over much of the 20th century has basically

  • stopped for most people in America.

  • Now that you can see the right axis for

  • the top 1% tax filers, the average incomes of people in

  • the top 1% of tax filers about tripled during that period.

  • From about a little over 300,000

  • dollars to over a million dollars.

  • I'm not saying that's good or bad,

  • (crowd murmur)

  • but I think some people, I'm hearing some murmurs,

  • saying, mmm, that's maybe not the greatest thing.

  • I care a lot about a lot of boats rising,

  • but the dynamic in more recent times is

  • a small number of boats are rising, and

  • most boats are flattish at best.

  • This is tax filers.

  • So, it's variation in the number of people

  • in the households that are working,

  • variations in the types of income they got.

  • 'Cause it's not just labor income but capital income.

  • So I wanna show us one more data point,

  • which is what if we unbundle that 99%.

  • The skewness of income growth at the top,

  • what do we see if we break this apart by people?

  • That's what I'm gonna do in the next slide.

  • And this slide is the one that worries me the most.

  • So I put up here, you know (laughter)

  • people say hey your hair's gotten really gray.

  • I'm like, hey, thanks a lot.

  • It's good to see you too. (laughter)

  • But the fact is, the rising tide

  • hasn't been lifting a lot of boats.

  • Now let's look at individual people.

  • These are data that our US government collects,

  • kinda like the data in the decennial census,

  • but it's year by year.

  • We're gonna again, adjust for inflation so it's real.

  • It's the total money income earned by individuals.

  • All in money income, base salary, bonuses,

  • it excludes the about 18% of total labor comp

  • that is health insurance, stocks, stock option

  • grants, stuff like that.

  • Okay.

  • But this is the broadest measure of income

  • our US government collects, where I can

  • march up the skills ladder of people.

  • And there's many ways to measure skills.

  • But the single best measure, if you give me only one

  • is educational attainment, per being in

  • a wonderful institution like Dartmouth.

  • Right, it's not perfect.

  • You know, Bill Gates, dropped out of

  • college at Harvard, he's a college dropout.

  • He's done kind of okay in the labor market, right?

  • (laughter)

  • Mark Zuckerberg, people like that.

  • So let's march through, and the last year of data

  • that's finalized I can do this on is 2013.

  • So, let's start with high school drop outs.

  • 8% of workers in recent years, in 2013.

  • Over that time period of those 13 years,

  • in inflation adjusted terms, the average

  • high school drop out in America, their earnings fell by 5.8%

  • That's a mean.

  • Those of you that remember or are taking statistics,

  • medians look almost identical.

  • But here's a boat that on average hasn't been rising.

  • High school drop outs.

  • Some did better, some did much worse, this is an average.

  • And then you can think, who cares?

  • Whose fault is it?

  • These types of questions arise,

  • especially in a public policy context, right.

  • But just as a matter of data,

  • here's a boat that wasn't rising.

  • So, let's keep going.

  • Here's high school graduates.

  • 27% of workers.

  • An average earnings change of a decline of 6.7%.

  • Now let's pick up people with some college,

  • not a four year degree, maybe a two year degree,

  • but not a bachelors degree or above.

  • That's about 28% of workers.

  • A mean earnings change of a decline of 10.9%.

  • If you're tallying the middle column,

  • we're over 50%, so I've got at least half the labor force.

  • I've got the median voter probably in there.

  • These are all people 25 and above.

  • So when you think about the appeal of

  • people like Bernie Sanders and the

  • like, paradoxically, Donald Trump,

  • you start to think about the political dynamic

  • present in our country.

  • Now, over most of the 20th century,

  • if I kept clicking, if through hard work

  • or good luck, you earned a college degree,

  • over most time periods, your real earnings were rising.

  • But that even hasn't been happening in recent times.

  • Let's look at a four year degree only.

  • No advanced degree, but a four year bachelors

  • degree across all disciplines and all schools.

  • So this is aggregating a lot of things.

  • And Dartmouth students, don't drop out when you see this.

  • But we've got 23.4% of workers.

  • And mean earnings change of a decline of 11.2%.

  • Alright.

  • And I think if a lot of us reflect on friends

  • and family we have, we know examples

  • like this, of young people especially,

  • coming into the labor market of late.

  • Who are kind of struggling.

  • Part of this is the financial crisis.

  • But it's not all.

  • If I showed us these numbers through '07 or '08,

  • qualitatively the last column is identical

  • in terms of pluses and minuses,

  • and all I have so far is minuses.

  • - [Voiceover] Well, we had two crises in that 13 year span.

  • - Yeah. Right.

  • And now we're kind of thinking

  • about what's coming in the future, right.

  • But we'll come to that, 'cause I'm a Tigger.

  • Now, let's keep going.

  • Non-professional masters degrees.

  • So, masters in social work, masters in education,

  • masters in public policy.

  • That's 10% of workers.

  • A mean earnings change of a decline of 7.6%

  • If you're tallying the middle column,

  • I've got 96% of workers in the American labor force,

  • all of whom are in educational cohorts whose

  • earnings have been falling, not rising,

  • for now what's approaching a generation.

  • This isn't to say don't go to college

  • relative to high school, very importantly.

  • This is a statement of changes, not levels.

  • In present value terms, if you can earn a college

  • degree, especially at a wonderful place like Dartmouth,

  • you're still massively better off economically.

  • But, the returns to that in some sense,

  • are not growing like they used to, per this data.

  • Who's left by the way?

  • So, people with PhDs, 1.9% of workers.

  • An average earnings change of an increase of 4.5%.

  • And who else is left? Excellent.

  • The advanced professional degrees.

  • The doctors, the lawyers, the MBAs.

  • 2.1% of workers.

  • A mean earnings change of an increase of 12.3%.

  • So this skewness of income growth we saw

  • in the tax return data shows up in the individual data.

  • What income growth we have had

  • in the United States in recent,

  • what output growth we have had in the US,

  • the tide lifting, on the income side,

  • where that has been accrued is

  • predominantly in a relatively small

  • scale of highly educated, highly talented individuals.

  • And the other things is returns, broadly speaking,

  • not to be Karl Marx, but to capital, to business.

  • Business income, broadly measured,

  • as a share of GDP in the United States is at record highs.

  • Again, that's not a judgment.

  • This is what, this is all pretax.

  • This is what globalization and technological

  • change and a whole bunch of dynamic forces

  • are delivering in terms of how our economy is working.

  • Yes.

  • - [Voiceover] Is this for college professors,

  • in the PhD group?

  • - Yeah, a lot of us are in there.

  • And so clearly - Deans?

  • - Deans as well, yes. (laughter)

  • You know, we need to start measuring deans,

  • and worry about the deans more.

  • Yeah, I'm in there somewhere, right.

  • So, if I switch to households, one more

  • data point as a unit of observation.

  • Every year the US government reports

  • the median household income.

  • It's a big report that comes out in September.

  • It came out about a month ago.

  • And they line up all the households

  • from the poorest, in God love 'em,

  • someplace like Appalachia, to Mr. Gates's household.

  • And they pick the median household

  • and they measure the total money income.

  • What do you think the total money income

  • of the median household was in America last year?

  • (murmurs)

  • Good, I heard somebody was almost on the spot.

  • Sorry this didn't show up well.

  • 53,657 dollars.

  • But what I want to stress, and I can't stress enough,

  • that same level of median income was

  • first reached 25 years ago in 1989.

  • The median household in America today

  • has the same income it had 25 years ago.

  • And a big reason this growth in median income

  • hasn't happened is this slow down in productivity growth.

  • So, if you're a real geek like me,

  • you can go read the economic report

  • of the President earlier this year.

  • Chapter One had a good analysis,

  • and the biggest force that explains

  • this absolute slow down in growth

  • in household income is the slow down of productivity growth.

  • And if you're wondering why Bernie Sanders

  • is beating Hillary Clinton in Iowa and in New Hampshire

  • as we speak here, and paradoxically,

  • some of the biggest supporters in places

  • like Michigan with the auto industry blow out

  • in recent times, is Donald Trump.

  • Voters in America, I'm front-running some of the slides

  • in a minute, they don't feel all that comfortable when

  • they're sitting around the kitchen table

  • saying how we doing economically.

  • And they're looking for candidates that can

  • give voice to an explanation or

  • at least an awareness that this is happening.

  • And if you think it's otherwise,

  • you're completely kidding yourself.

  • There's a question there ma'am.

  • - [Voiceover] Yeah, what is the

  • inflation rate that same period?

  • - So this is all real, this is not nominal.

  • So it's adjusted for inflation.

  • But, over this 13 years, if I remember the data,

  • the consumer price index that I used

  • to deflate this rose by about 30%.

  • Now, within that though, there's high variation.

  • Over this 13 year period, what happened to the

  • the prices we in America see for

  • the price of personal computers?

  • Declined by 88%.

  • What happened to the overall CPI, about

  • 30% during this period, maybe it was a few more.

  • Healthcare services, up by 72%.

  • Not to speak heresy, but you can go look at the data.

  • College tuition and fees. (murmurs)

  • 118% increase.

  • - [Voiceover] Housing?

  • - Owner occupied housing I don't remember.

  • Sorry, I'd have to look it up.

  • - [Voiceover] Up, flat or down?

  • - Up, no up. Yeah.

  • Over this period.

  • It's not just, so careful.

  • The implied rental flow you get off this

  • in living expenses is very different

  • from the purchase price of a home.

  • Okay, so that's the second point.

  • Income, mmm, I'm not sure who you are.

  • But if you think this is Tiggerish,

  • let's have a talk afterwards, okay.

  • (laughter) This is not Tiggerish.

  • What's happening in the rest of the world?

  • Let's switch from data.

  • A picture is worth a thousand words.

  • So here's one thousand words.

  • Where's this in the world?

  • (murmurs) Excellent.

  • So that's the Huang Pu river looking

  • out to an area called Pu Dong.

  • This is the Peace Hotel, if you've ever been there.

  • This is the lovely pedestrian walkway the Bund.

  • Around in the 1900s, turn of the previous century,

  • this was a very, Shanghai was a very

  • vibrant international commerce exchange.

  • You can find cotton exchanges and gold exchanges

  • and old bank houses when you walk along the Bund there.

  • This was 12 years after, no 14 years after Mao died.

  • 12 years after Gai Deng Xiaoping came to power.

  • And even back in 1990, people were like,

  • you know they had some agriforms

  • and they're opening up these special export zones,

  • but like, oh my God, it's China and this is

  • soon after Tiananmen Square.

  • And you could see a lot of just open parks

  • here in this area called Pu Dong.

  • Alright.

  • But China's been growing since the

  • open door policy started in 1978.

  • Yes, it's been slowing down now,

  • we're worried about how slow it is.

  • But from the 35 years of '78 through to 2013,

  • the average rate of growth, its speed limit

  • rate of growth in China was 10% per year.

  • And you just accumulate that math.

  • That's a doubling of GDP every seven years.

  • Does Shanghai look like this today?

  • (murmurs)

  • So, I, one of the things I've had the good

  • fortune to do at Tuck is be the faculty

  • co-director of an exec-ed program

  • where we take people to India and China,

  • after they come to Hanover for a while.

  • And a couple years ago, you could have taken a picture from

  • the 67th floor of the Viridian Hotel that looked like this.

  • (crowd murmurs)

  • Right.

  • So what's happening in the rest of the world

  • is amazing economic growth.

  • In this picture, literally and metaphorically,

  • there's millionaires and billionaires.

  • So that's the financial district now.

  • That's the Communist Party's communications

  • tower, the television station.

  • That's the Bottle Opener.

  • You can stand up here, it's like 110 stories, and it's

  • got glass, you can look down if you like to do that.

  • And now that's not the tallest building.

  • This is dated.

  • They built a building here that's like 147 stories tall.

  • Second tallest building in the world.

  • So that growth, on the one hand,

  • if we can have the smart public policies,

  • is a huge opportunity for workers and

  • companies in America if we can connect to that

  • dynamism and sell goods and services to them.

  • Editorial comment again, the Transpacific Partnership

  • absolute thumbs up, that should be approved

  • is my humble opinion.

  • Because we need to find ways to build jobs in America

  • connected to that kind of opportunity and growth.

  • It's not easy.

  • And you gotta be wise in doing it.

  • But where we could have some rising tide

  • has gotta be driven by where there's

  • growth and opportunity in the world.

  • And yet, if we don't have the wise policies.

  • What also this picture encapsulates

  • is hundreds and hundreds, cumulatively

  • across the world, more than a billion people

  • entering the effective global labor force now,

  • that aspire to have the same kind

  • of hopes and dreams like we all do.

  • And that does put pressure on the labor market

  • opportunities and outcomes for people here as well.

  • So, the global economy has opportunity,

  • but it has challenges as well.

  • Just for what it's worth, the US then as a

  • share of the global economic pie, on all kinds of measures.

  • This is GDP.

  • The US share of the global economy is shrinking.

  • I'm not saying that's a bad thing.

  • But we should all be cognizant of

  • in a policy sense, the ability and

  • or desire of others in the world to follow

  • US economic policy is in some broad sense attenuated.

  • Alright.

  • So the US share of global GDP has fallen,

  • yeah, by about a percentage point a year.

  • That's China and India growing so much

  • more quickly than we are, and some other countries.

  • Now we know from the recent news,

  • a lot of these emerging markets, it's slowing.

  • Or it's in recession in places like Brazil and Russia.

  • But, still, on the aggregate, almost surely,

  • given the slow speed limit rate of growth here,

  • there's much faster growth still

  • coming in the rest of the world.

  • Two more numbers real, or kind of items.

  • The budget, what can our government

  • do to address these global forces?

  • And then how do people feel about all this?

  • Well, what we can do today depends

  • in part on what we've done in the past.

  • So, let's look at the total fiscal

  • potential for the United States.

  • The best way that economists like to measure it

  • is to look at the total debt outstanding

  • as a country as a share of its GDP.

  • That broadly speaking, doesn't get to

  • the micro-regulatory capacity issues

  • that someone asked about earlier.

  • But in some broad sense, what governments

  • do most basically of all, is they

  • raise taxes and they can spend.

  • (murmurs) Exactly.

  • So that's independent of the Fed,

  • which prints money, central banks print money, right?

  • That's fun.

  • We do it, we go to jail, that's counterfeiting.

  • But (laugh)

  • I'm talking about fiscal policy here, right.

  • Fiscal policy is about the public purse.

  • What capacity is there for the sovereign

  • to levy taxes and use that, perhaps to

  • support public investments, or offset

  • income pressures for certain groups.

  • So, here's the historical data.

  • This is two centuries of America's

  • fiscal, kind of, strategy.

  • This is from the US Congressional Budget Office.

  • All the way from 1790 through to 2010 is the data.

  • This is debt outstanding as a share of GDP.

  • Gross debt.

  • This geeky measurement, things we can talk about later.

  • There's a couple thing that you see.

  • One is indebtedness of the US government,

  • like almost every other country around the world,

  • tends to go up during times of existential crisis.

  • Either during war.

  • The Civil War, World War One, World War Two.

  • Or financial crisis.

  • The Great Depression, and then here,

  • here's the world financial crisis of the past few years.

  • Debt outstanding as a share of GDP in the US

  • doubled in about a five year period.

  • Pre-crisis, it was about 35, 36%.

  • Post-crisis we've gotten up to about 72, 73%.

  • What the US has done historically,

  • is when it incurs large indebtedness

  • for the good of the order of the people,

  • over time then we run surpluses

  • and do other things to pay down that indebtedness.

  • So that's been our pattern.

  • And, there's a lot of sovereigns that default historically.

  • Greece, Argentina, we can talk

  • about all those types of countries.

  • But the pattern of in some sense,

  • healthy societies, is they run up debt

  • when they need to, but then they maintain

  • their access to capital markets in good times.

  • What is the current best guess of the US government

  • for what's the fiscal future for America?

  • Are gonna, is that dept to GDP ratio gonna fall?

  • No.

  • Ben Bernanke, when he was chair of the Fed,

  • gave a few speeches talking about us

  • being the calm before the storm.

  • The best guess of anybody in the public

  • and private sector in the US is indebtedness,

  • the calm is this little period here.

  • Actually he was talking before the financial crisis.

  • The calm was here.

  • That Ben was talking about.

  • But now the calm is a few years before

  • the indebtedness of the United States

  • goes up, up, up, up.

  • Are they predicting more financial crisis and turmoil?

  • No.

  • What is going to drive up the indebtedness

  • of the United States on all plausible forecasts?

  • - [Voiceover] Entitlements.

  • - Aging of the population.

  • But more fundamentally, interacting

  • with health care costs increasing.

  • It is the increase in expenditures on

  • Social Security, but especially Medicare and Medicaid.

  • And implied then, accumulated interest

  • payments that have to go up that's driving this figure.

  • I won't spend a lot of time on this.

  • But, when you break it out by spending programs,

  • what you see is the aging of America,

  • but especially aging interacted with

  • health care costs increase that are projected to continue.

  • That is gonna make the fiscal future

  • for the United States not great.

  • So, Social Security spending.

  • Major health care programs.

  • Net interest.

  • The average over the past 40 years

  • was about 4% on Social Security.

  • 2.8% health care programs.

  • Net interest two two.

  • Here's where we are today.

  • As those leading cohorts of Baby Boomers

  • are already starting to reach traditional

  • retirement years exit, they uptake Social Security.

  • And no judgement, but as we all age,

  • the incidents and costs of the health care

  • services we take up tends to go up.

  • So, here comes Social Security,

  • projected to get to 6%, 6.3% of GDP in 2039.

  • Health care going up to 8%.

  • Net interest, this is a wild card too,

  • it depends on interest rates that we're able to command

  • or the world commands to us.

  • And everything else, non-interest spending

  • on everything else, gets squeezed and squeezed

  • and squeezed.

  • And in the shorter term, this is already happening,

  • because of this funky word called sequestration.

  • When the US government almost shut down

  • and we almost defaulted and all this stuff in 2011.

  • The President and Congress agreed

  • that for the next 10 years we would slow

  • the rate of growth in everything outside of

  • Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security.

  • That discretionary non-entitlement spending

  • is already getting squeezed.

  • Most programs are getting cut at 5% per year.

  • And that's been happening for five years running,

  • and nobody has the courage in Washington

  • to raise their hand and say maybe we

  • should do something a little differently.

  • Editorial.

  • - [Voiceover] What's the biggest chunk of that?

  • - What's the biggest chunk of what?

  • - [Voiceover] That spending.

  • - This? Defense.

  • Non-entite, so the federal government last year

  • spent about 3.5 trillion dollars.

  • Non-entitlement spending is only about a third of that.

  • So, non-entitlement spending in the US

  • is only about 1.2 trillion dollars.

  • Of that, defense is a little north of 800 billion dollars.

  • So, when you take out defense.

  • When you hear people intone and say,

  • I'm going to get serious about

  • non-entitlement, non-defense spending,

  • I get 400 billion dollars is a lot of money to you and me.

  • That's only a little north of 10%

  • of the total federal budget.

  • So, anybody that tells you they're gonna get tough,

  • or they're really gonna focus on that,

  • frankly they're being pretty loose and

  • not clear about the facts, I'll say.

  • I'm not saying I want to incite

  • a lot of conversation about the

  • inter-temporal issues that are raised here.

  • This is basically a generational issue.

  • I will frame it to you, I will suggest as,

  • how does society support the young versus the old?

  • And I'm not saying that we shouldn't be a

  • society that makes good on the desire

  • to provide income transfers and

  • health insurance support to people as they age.

  • I wanna do that.

  • But that means, somebody's gotta

  • pay more in taxes if we're gonna support that.

  • If we don't get faster productivity growth,

  • or smart people like Sherry don't figure

  • out how to slow the rate of growth of health care costs,

  • this is what's coming, with probability near one.

  • Forecasts are really noisy, I get that.

  • Especially when you're forecasting

  • out stuff like this like 20 years.

  • But, the data better start changing pretty quickly.

  • Because then, even if it changes,

  • the longer it doesn't change, the math just means

  • the adjustments have to be harder in the future.

  • This is the fiscal future that's coming.

  • Independent of whether we have another financial crisis.

  • Independent of whether, God forbid, we have another war.

  • Independent, God forbid, we have

  • some pandemic health crisis.

  • And yet, you know.

  • The only fiscal conversation the next few weeks.

  • Is the government gonna shut down again

  • on December 12th or whenever it is we

  • run out of money again and hit the debt ceiling?

  • So, I think I've kind of telegraphed this one,

  • and I'll be quick.

  • That's the sense of the citizenry

  • when you ask them about this?

  • Americans' sense of security has waned, to put it politely.

  • Focus groups are one way to do this.

  • Here's a quote from the FT recently.

  • This gentleman named, "People are more negative

  • "about our changes than they have been

  • "since our records began in 1946."

  • Coming from one of the main polling agencies in DC.

  • So when you look at the surveys,

  • you see things like this.

  • "Which best describes your family's financial situation?"

  • Getting ahead, 21%.

  • Have just enough to maintain or falling behind,

  • 78% of Americans feel that way

  • when asked in an NBC/Wall Street Journal

  • poll a little over a year ago.

  • This gentleman, Stan Greenberg,

  • who's a Democratic pollster, in this FT piece

  • on this recently, says, "When we have focus groups,

  • "when ask people to come and they have

  • "free sandwiches and sodas, and we talk to them

  • "about who you gonna vote for and that.

  • "When we start to ask them about the economy,

  • "this has never happened in my career,

  • "but people start breaking down and crying

  • "in these focus group rooms."

  • So, that's I'd gently suggest, not great.

  • In particular, a lot of people voice unease

  • about the global jobs competition.

  • When you ask them what makes you worry,

  • they say the global economy.

  • And the pressure on my incomes.

  • And the pressure on the jobs.

  • I've had a lot of great Tuck students over the years

  • in class, but you want to find some of the

  • most sophisticated people in understanding

  • the global economy, go walk the plant floor

  • of any manufacturing place in the country.

  • And the people whose day to day jobs,

  • do I have a job and what's my W2,

  • who depend on prices of global commodities,

  • import competition from China and India,

  • those people live it everyday.

  • And they're anxious about it.

  • So, FT did a big thing, this is pre-crisis.

  • But they did this lovely survey of

  • about 12 countries, not just the US.

  • And in most advanced countries around the world,

  • people, they don't feel all that great about globalization.

  • A popular backlash against globalization

  • and the leaders of the world's largest companies

  • is sweeping all rich countries.

  • Large majorities of people in the US and Europe

  • want higher taxation for the rich.

  • And even pay caps for corporate executives

  • to counter what they believe are the

  • unjustified rewards and negative effects of globalization.

  • And as my Tuck students know in recent years,

  • we talk a lot about this, people in these countries,

  • between a third and a half said they had no

  • admiration at all for corporate bosses.

  • I don't like that, but it's the reality

  • in which our MBA students and other

  • executives are going into the world.

  • My view on that is high quality educational

  • institutions like Dartmouth, this is a huge

  • opportunity to create the principled, values-driven

  • leaders that people in the world are yearning for.

  • But, for better or for worse, they don't feel

  • that they're seeing a lot of that.

  • So, do our people feel empowered in this country?

  • Not really.

  • Ask people what are called thermometer questions.

  • Ask them how they feel.

  • "Do you think that America is in a state

  • "of decline, or do you feel that is not the case?"

  • Last time the Journal and NBC asked this

  • was a little over a year ago.

  • Two-thirds, 65 to 31%, say America is in a state of decline.

  • A similar thermometer question is,

  • Is America on the right track or the wrong track?

  • Last time this was asked by the Journal and NBC,

  • 65% said off on the wrong track.

  • Only 28% said the right direction.

  • And if you really wanna get a sense of how people feel,

  • don't ask them about themselves,

  • ask them about whom?

  • (crowd murmurs)

  • Not their neighbors, who?

  • - [Crowd] Children. I mean they like

  • their neighbors, but, you know.

  • Their children.

  • "Do you feel confident or not confident that life

  • for our children's generation will be better

  • than it has been for us?"

  • They've asked this question a long time,

  • so you can go back, and on one of the questions earlier.

  • There is some business cyclicality to these answers.

  • So, I went back and looked, coming out of

  • the previous two recessions, before the financial crisis.

  • Even when the US was coming out of a recession,

  • a plurality or a majority of people said

  • I think the future's better for our kids.

  • October of 1990, 50% confident versus 45% not confident.

  • December of '01, 49% confident versus 42% confident.

  • But today, oh my God, it's just sobering.

  • The last time they asked this was again,

  • a little over a year ago, only 21%

  • of American today say they feel confident

  • that the children's generation is gonna

  • be better than it has been for us.

  • 76% say they're not confident.

  • So,

  • if, and again, paradoxically, they're on totally different

  • sides of the policy aisle and political spectrum.

  • This is the commonality between Donald Trump

  • and Bernie Sanders in my mind.

  • They are speaking to this anxiety.

  • They offer wildly different prescriptions

  • for what they would do.

  • But at least those people in Michigan

  • and places like that, feel that someone

  • is acknowledging the anxiety which they are feeling.

  • Much, not all, much of which is driven by economic anxiety.

  • I'll gently suggest, that's the proper way

  • to think about what's coming in our country

  • with all the elections and things happening.

  • Yes.

  • - [Voiceover] Quickly, do you have a sense of how

  • these statistics measure up against other

  • economic powerhouses in the world?

  • - Yeah, good question.

  • So, these have been all good questions.

  • If you're really interested, the Pew Research Center,

  • does a set of lovely analyses like these.

  • Sorry, it's not on my computer.

  • They did a survey like this about a year ago.

  • And they did, they asked a question very similar to this one

  • in 10 advanced countries,

  • and in like 36

  • emerging markets and developing countries.

  • In the 10 advanced countries

  • the cross tabs on this question

  • was like 65%

  • 30%.

  • So two-thirds of people in advanced countries

  • say I don't think the future's gonna be better for our kids.

  • And that's because, just,

  • these global force, a lot of this is technological change

  • and globalization and these issues

  • hitting the US are qualitatively very similar

  • to the ones that are facing Germany,

  • Japan, France, the UK.

  • And in the faster speed limit,

  • faster productivity growth emerging markets,

  • it's flipped around.

  • A slight or larger majority in these

  • emerging markets say, oh I think the

  • future is gonna be better for our kids.

  • So, if you want this global perspective,

  • that just is what it is.

  • The billions of people in the world

  • that now see literally, at zero cost

  • thanks to the internet, what the future

  • could be for them, I don't fault them.

  • They see, I could come to Dartmouth.

  • I could get a job at Google.

  • That is such an amazing opportunity for them.

  • Many in advanced countries see the same thing.

  • And yet, I'll suggest, again in closing,

  • because we don't quite have the policies

  • to make this work, they don't feel like

  • it's working for them, is how I would say it.

  • And I'll maybe just say two more things and then.

  • Yeah, okay, quick question and then

  • - [Voiceover] Going back to your

  • statement about confidence and corporate leadership.

  • How do you think about things like

  • the large corporations funding

  • climate denial science, I'll put it in quotes,

  • or Volkswagon's recent cheating

  • - Yeah - [Voiceover] situation.

  • - So, look the firms I do a lot of things with.

  • And when I teach, and in my dean's hat,

  • I'm like do you wanna be a part of this group?

  • Then go work for Volkswagon, I mean you know.

  • (chuckles)

  • Or do you wanna be one of the few visionary leaders

  • that can articulate points of view to the world

  • that says I and my organization are different.

  • We're going to be part of the solution,

  • not part of the problem.

  • We're going to create good jobs

  • connected to the global economy.

  • We're going to take care of the

  • stakeholders in our organization.

  • That's what we aspire to do at Tuck.

  • We're not perfect, but we do a pretty good job at it.

  • And all of us more generally at Dartmouth,

  • all of this is such an opportunity for educators

  • to give voice to the students that

  • want to make this world better.

  • Now, do I worry about global warming and climate change?

  • Absolutely, I'm a Tigger, so this is

  • an optimistic presentation. (laughter)

  • You know that, there's a bunch of other things.

  • On the fiscal stuff, if you live in the US,

  • my God, this is federal.

  • Look at Connecticut, look at Illinois.

  • Look at so many states that have unfunded pension

  • liabilities because people don't wanna take

  • responsibility and pay the taxes that they need

  • to create the society that's gonna work.

  • In the teeth of the financial crisis,

  • this picture was taken.

  • This is on September 29, 2008.

  • What happened on the floor of the House

  • on September 29, 2008?

  • They voted down a bill.

  • What was the bill?

  • Rhymes with harp.

  • (crowd murmurs)

  • Excellent, TARP.

  • So this is when crisis Lehman dies,

  • AIG almost dies, Hank Paulson

  • and Ben Bernanke go up to Congress.

  • Hank's a Dartmouth graduate.

  • I worked for them in the US government.

  • And get together all the Senate and House

  • leaders on both sides of the aisle.

  • Hank says, God love 'em, "It's really bad.

  • "Here's Ben." (laughter)

  • And turns it over to Ben.

  • And then Ben drains the blood out of

  • everybody's face explaining that the,

  • it's not just terminal and capital markets at banks,

  • but the the General Electrics and all those firms,

  • Jeff FIMA Oughton and people were

  • reaching out the government and saying

  • we can't roll over our commercial paper.

  • This is like, this is not just banks.

  • If this panic doesn't stop, all of economic

  • activity basically on the planet

  • is going to grind to a halt.

  • We will not be able to pay our vendors.

  • We will not be able to meet payroll.

  • And people realized we were literally

  • on the cusp of a Great Depression.

  • Very, very quickly.

  • History will show, rightly, hopefully,

  • Ben Bernanke, more than any other

  • human being on the planet, prevented a Great Depression.

  • I'm biased, I worked for him.

  • But then, what happened in the US,

  • was we said, well what do we do?

  • And Ben said, we'll do things at the Fed,

  • but we have to have a massive fiscal support for this.

  • They called it the TARP, the Troubled Asset Relief Program.

  • 700 billion dollar allocation.

  • And all the people went out, all this

  • is in the public domain, right.

  • So, everybody went out, arm in arm,

  • US crisis, we'll pull it together.

  • Well, they dropped the bill on the House side,

  • and then, you know, got voted out of committee.

  • And then sure enough, the bickering starts again.

  • You know, I'm gonna vote for

  • this, but it's Republicans fault.

  • I'm gonna for this, but this's Democrats fault.

  • I'm gonna vote for this, but it's,

  • you know, whoever's fault.

  • And then, sure enough, in real time,

  • I did a little TV at the Dartmouth studio that day,

  • and I went back and a colleague came

  • and knocked on my door and said,

  • Hey, by the way, are you aware that,

  • are you watching the vote?

  • And it was on CNBC and CSPAN and all that.

  • And in real time, everybody around the world

  • began to realize, oh my God, the House of Representatives

  • is gonna vote down this 700 billion dollar allocation.

  • What happened to US stock prices

  • and pretty much every asset price on the planet?

  • In about 90 minutes, a trillion dollars

  • in market cap was wiped out in US equities.

  • And at the end of the day, the DOW closed down 777 points,

  • the single largest point decline ever in American history.

  • On the DOW.

  • Hopefully that will stay that way.

  • And that night, this isn't a partisan

  • this is not a partisan, you know.

  • That's Nancy Pelosi, that's James Clyburn,

  • that's Steny Hoyer, House Democratic leadership.

  • The Republicans were really gloomy that night too.

  • And then about a day or two later,

  • the FT ran a piece with this picture

  • saying will historians look back and say

  • this was the decline of the American economic empire,

  • sunset of the American economic empire.

  • Because the leaders couldn't kinda pull it together

  • on the question about leadership.

  • And so, you know, I read the piece,

  • you know I do these things.

  • I'm like, God, that's a striking picture.

  • Standing on the step of the Lincoln Memorial,

  • looking down the Mall, there's the Washington

  • Monument, the White House is over here.

  • Up the gentle upslope to the Capitol Hill, to Congress.

  • And I looked at that, and those who spent time

  • in Washington, DC, what did I notice about the direction?

  • What direction are you facing?

  • Actually, you're facing east not west.

  • It's sunrise, not sunset. (chuckles)

  • So, I knew the guys at the FT that wrote the piece,

  • so I sent them a little email saying,

  • hey, by the way, from a citizen of the country

  • that beat you in the Revolutionary War

  • (laughter) you know,

  • be a little careful before you say it's sunset

  • on my home country's empire, no disrespect.

  • (laughter)

  • But, how have we been doing in the seven years since?

  • Ahh, you know.

  • On the question about public investments.

  • We're just grinding down the share of

  • government spending as a share of GDP

  • that's allocated to public investment.

  • It's unfortunately been happening for a while,

  • but it's really happening now.

  • That's the funding of the NSF, and the road and bridges,

  • and NASA, and the National Institute for Health.

  • So we're not building out the productive capacity

  • to make the future better as a society.

  • And we're doing things that are literally

  • just shooting ourselves in the foot.

  • One of the ways we can build up

  • productivity growth, and jobs and potential.

  • Economists know very few things.

  • One of the things is you let high skilled immigrants

  • into your country, they bring all sorts of

  • productivity and job creating benefits.

  • I can give you a gazillion academic

  • studies that show this if you'd like.

  • That raise the incomes not just for native-born

  • skilled workers, but native-born less skilled workers also.

  • This slide is a snapshot from the US government

  • that describes the H1B visa program.

  • That's the main visa program our US government

  • uses to allocate each fiscal year

  • for how many new, at least bachelors degree

  • people come in with a job match.

  • How many new H1B visas did the

  • US government create every year?

  • (crowd murmurs) Good. Close.

  • 85,000. 65,000 for bachelors.

  • And there's a 20 thousand tranche

  • for master's degree or above.

  • The window for the new H1B visa

  • applications for the next fiscal year opens every April one.

  • How many applications were received between

  • April one and April five of this year?

  • (crowd murmurs) Good.

  • 233,000. At which point, they slammed shut

  • the visa window and like in earlier years,

  • they don't even read them and say, you know,

  • you're a Nobel Laureate, you get in.

  • Matt, you're a nice guy, you don't get in.

  • They hold a lottery is what they do.

  • And full disclosure, I work with a lot of firms on this.

  • It is mind-blowing the amount of time and energy

  • that our most innovative companies that are

  • trying to create new ideas and jobs and all that stuff.

  • They can't hire the people here.

  • Well, if you don't let the people in,

  • don't fault the companies when they export the jobs.

  • When Microsoft several years ago raised their hand and said

  • we can't get people in because of this binding visa cap.

  • We're opening a software facility across the border

  • from Seattle, in Vancouver, Canada.

  • And don't blame us.

  • This is kind of, you know we live

  • with the consequences of the choices that we make.

  • And there's no prospect.

  • The earliest this might change, frankly,

  • at this point, is fiscal '19, I think is the best guess.

  • We're gonna live through at least three more years of this.

  • Given the ridiculousness of Washington, DC.

  • So, you know, I write things about this.

  • And there's an op-ed I wrote a little while ago.

  • We lose a new job every 43 seconds

  • is a good ballpark number, in the US economy.

  • Because of the job creation potential lost by this.

  • And if you think it'll get better in Washington,

  • my last picture, and again, this is meant to be optimistic.

  • There's the hope for the future.

  • (laughter)

  • But here's a measure by some political scientists

  • on the degree of policy overlap in the House and Senate.

  • From the post-bellum period of 1879

  • through to the current Congress in 2014.

  • It's a measure of votes taken,

  • and in our American political parlance,

  • identifying how much overlap is there

  • between the most conservative Democrats,

  • and the most liberal Republicans.

  • And we had generations where there

  • was pretty substantial overlap.

  • In both the Senate and the House.

  • And today, in neither chamber is there

  • any measurable policy overlap between

  • the Republicans and Democrats.

  • And those of us,

  • some of the folks who I know who have

  • lived and worked in DC, it's a whole

  • subtle dynamic that's taken hold there, alright.

  • And now even the Republicans in the House

  • can't even figure out who's gonna lead them,

  • let alone reach across the aisle and talk to people.

  • Talk about things.

  • So, there we are.

  • I appreciate it, and go Big Green.

  • (clapping) But I just want to stress,

  • thank you.

  • And I'm happy to take a couple questions,

  • but then we gotta clear out for the next thing.

  • All this, in the context of us on campus here,

  • I can't stress enough, this is nothing but a massive

  • opportunity for all of us involved in higher ed.

  • Because what we need is more knowledgeable,

  • more motivated people to go out from formal

  • and informal education to be forces of change

  • to make this kind of stuff better.

  • So, I'm happy to take maybe one or two more questions.

  • But I appreciate everybody's time and attention.

  • And there's a hand there.

  • - [Voiceover] In productivity, what effect do

  • does high executive compensation and

  • corporate stock buy-backs have on that?

  • - High executive compensation on productivity?

  • Short answer, really don't know.

  • I don't know of any studies that

  • have been done on that.

  • In a geek academic sense.

  • In a broader sense, I'll ask the open question

  • about in firms...

  • I'll say this.

  • The SEC in the US just passed a rule

  • that will apply to all US-based

  • publicly traded companies where they're

  • gonna have to report the ratio

  • of the pay of the CEO to the median worker.

  • Okay.

  • Now, I see a lot of people nodding their heads.

  • This is where a little bit of education helps.

  • So, I write up ads, but I do this little Monday

  • morning missive called the Slaughter and Rees Report.

  • And a few weeks ago I wrote one for Matt and me.

  • His name is Matt too, saying, that rule,

  • as well intentioned as it might be,

  • will actually make it harder for those

  • CEOs to create jobs in America.

  • And the short answer is, because most of these companies

  • that this rule hits are global companies.

  • They hire people all over the world to take advantage of

  • China, which supports their job creation here.

  • - [Voiceover] Yeah.

  • - But when you hire people in China,

  • on average they earn a lot less than here in America.

  • And yeah, that drags down the median

  • compensation as measured in this rule.

  • So, like I said there, this is one where

  • you gotta put some time and energy

  • into being wise about what we do with public policy.

  • That rule is going to have the reverse effect

  • for all the people that applauded and said

  • that's gonna be great as a restraint on CEO

  • pay and help the basic workers.

  • It's gonna hurt the basic workers.

  • So, this, it's an example where you gotta be careful.

  • - [Voiceover] Corporate stock buy-backs?

  • - We can talk after.

  • Again, there's not a lot of, what we know about

  • productivity growth is limited.

  • I'll just be honest.

  • Yes.

  • - [Voiceover] What are you doing at Tuck

  • to improve the leadership development

  • capability of your students there?

  • - Yeah, that's like commercial,

  • we're doing a lot, we gotta do even more.

  • So, I used to teach a class where we would have

  • mock Congressional parliamentary hearings.

  • One of the former students here,

  • Byron's here.

  • Students would have to cross-examine each other.

  • I can't remember, what did you testify on?

  • - [Byron] Actually executive

  • compensation and global warming.

  • - So he had the answer on that one.

  • And then the students totally go at each other,

  • in the Tuck way of support and trust.

  • And really force each other to develop articulate opinions,

  • so when they go out into the world,

  • they've got answers to these kinds of questions.

  • It'll make it more likely that they become

  • the leaders that we aspire them to do.

  • More generally, we do a lot at Tuck.

  • But you know what, I mean, we're great,

  • but, you know.

  • Everyone should come to Tuck,

  • but you know, we're only one school. So.

  • Yeah.

  • - [Voiceover] In the broadest sense,

  • technology was supposed to be the

  • great hope of increasing productivity.

  • We're in the technology age and it

  • seems to have done the reverse.

  • And is that?

  • - Well, careful.

  • The one thing I'll say is, when you've got the ri--

  • When you've got the right policies it works well.

  • The one period where we had

  • good income growth in the US.

  • How do I do slideshow? There we go.

  • Ah, that didn't work.

  • Ah, here.

  • You can see this little blip up

  • in the late 90s into the early 2000s.

  • That was when you had the IT productivity boom.

  • But part of what was happening was that was,

  • I'll use just one anecdote.

  • That was the period of time where we

  • expanded the H1B visa window from 65,000 to 195,000.

  • Because of the demand from the IT companies.

  • And we did a bunch of other things that were

  • pretty prudent at that time, that--

  • Again, you never know this ex ante,

  • it's hard to predict, but that allowed growth to be fast.

  • And you had strong growth in the income distribution,

  • even for high school drop outs.

  • So, but the spirit of what you say is right.

  • Which is technology growth in and of itself,

  • there's no law of physics that says

  • innovations magically accrue to

  • lots of workers and raise lots of boats.

  • But we know in general, probabilistically

  • what we could do to make that more likely.

  • And that's, if you gave me the policy magic wand,

  • we'd be doing a lot more things like that, okay.

  • But good question.

  • Yeah.

  • - [Voiceover] When I see people glued

  • to their smartphones, I wonder if

  • technology's not the enemy of productivity.

  • - Well, yeah, so the, good question on that.

  • I mean part of what we know is just not to be

  • the task master but, if it's consumption of free

  • leisure activity, happening during the work hours.

  • I mean you know, (laughter)

  • I get it, we all check sports scores and things.

  • But, how technology interacts with work,

  • and compensation thereof is very subtle and very fluid.

  • And we just, we don't know a huge amount about that still.

  • Maybe one more hand here, the gentleman in red.

  • And then just, I wanna be prudent of time,

  • so I'll stop there and not drop anything else.

  • (laughter)

  • - [Voiceover] You cited political polarization.

  • - Yep.

  • - [Voiceover] Is that not skewed substantially

  • by the fact that the political parties

  • were not ideologically separated.

  • You had the Dixiecrat effect in the South

  • that put all the conservatives and all the

  • liberals in the same party so it's hard to read.

  • In your slide up there.

  • - Yeah, no, so what, I don't fully know what explains this.

  • I will gently point out, some people say,

  • oh the problem is gerrymandering.

  • But notice that's not true in the Senate.

  • The Senate partisanship is just like it is in the House.

  • So, it's not a function of just gerrymandering

  • of districts in the House.

  • You know, books and dissertations yet to be written

  • on what explains this and the consequences.

  • I just know from my limited purview,

  • you know I do a lot of Congressional testimony

  • in recent years, and I work with a lot of

  • members and their staffs on both sides of the aisle.

  • I just, the, what I see is, it's like a lot of

  • things we teach at Tuck and elsewhere.

  • You wanna make change, it requires

  • leaders that actually roll up their sleeves

  • and spend time with people.

  • That's happening less and less in Washington,

  • on both sides of the aisle.

  • But then collectively across.

  • Most members fly out Thursday at, you know.

  • Congress most, both chambers have votes just three days.

  • Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, typically.

  • It's 'cause the members are flying out on Thursday

  • and a lot of them are going to fund raise.

  • And then they'll go home to their districts,

  • or fund raise, and do that through Monday,

  • and they fly back Monday evening.

  • - [Voiceover] It's the rise of the political class.

  • - And it just erodes, it erodes the ability

  • of individuals there to have the physical time

  • to get to know members in their own caucus better,

  • let alone to reach across the aisle better.

  • I will, again, you hand me the magic policy wand,

  • there's a lot of things I'd do.

  • I've become a much bigger fan of term limits, and

  • you start to think about caps on spending for these things.

  • You know, Senate races now, in most states,

  • it's tens and tens of millions of

  • dollars that you have to raise.

  • So, unless you have that wealth personally,

  • or through your family, you have to spend

  • a non-trivial amount of your time fund raising.

  • And it, I'm just, I don't mean to be heretical,

  • but the other things is.

  • Like most, I tell you what, we don't teach at Tuck

  • assign key leadership positions based on seniority.

  • Now, it might be correlated with good outcomes,

  • right, per gray hair.

  • But (laughter)

  • You know, the way that the Congressional committees work?

  • I'm not anywhere near wise enough

  • to understand what's happening with this.

  • But just the outcome of the separation

  • of a sense of there being a civic space

  • where our elected members have the time

  • and the ability to talk with each other

  • to try to work some of these things out.

  • I don't know what mechanisms will change this.

  • I will gently suggest, this is not great

  • to address a lot of the interesting

  • topics we've talked about here.

  • And I want to be sensitive to the next group.

  • So, I appreciate the time of everybody.

  • (clapping) And thanks for coming.

  • And we gotta go.

  • (loud clapping)

- [Robin] My name is Robin Albing.

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2016年大選臨近,美國經濟前景如何? (As the 2016 Elections Approach, What is America’s Economic Outlook?)

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