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You probably think you know a lot of things.

你也許覺得自己知道很多東西

But do you know what it means to know something?

但是你了解「知道」的意義嗎？

We’ve spent quite a bit of time discussing beliefs and knowledge, but we haven’t really

我們花了不少時間討論信念和知識，但是我們還沒

been specific about what we mean when we talk about those things.

特別去談在討論這些東西時所代表的意思

Thankfully, philosophers love a good definition. They have very specific and lucid ideas in

幸好哲學家很愛清晰的定義，他們在使用「知道」、「相信」、

mind when they use terms like know or believe or proposition or justification.

「主張」、「釐清」時都很清楚這些詞在表達上的不同

And, about ten minutes from now, you too will know what you’re really saying when you use those words.

而你，從現在算起的10分鐘內，也將會了解自己在使用這些詞時到底想表達什麼

But, just because these terms have been defined, doesn’t mean that philosophers aren’t still arguing over them.

但是，哲學家們並沒有因為這些詞被定義了而停止為它們辯論

Because you know, that’s how philosophers do.

因為你知道的，哲學家就是如此

Their definitions might seem kind of obvious at first, but the more you think about them,

他們的定義第一眼看起來也許很理所當然，但當你越是去思考

the more nuanced they turn out to be.

就會發現他們之間細微的差異

Like, is having knowledge of something the same thing as being correct?

例如，擁有關於某物的知識等於你是對的嗎？

Or, if you believe something to be true, and it is true, does it matter if your belief in it is justified?

或者，如果你相信某個事物是真的，而他確實是真的，那麼你的看法被釐清時有關係嗎？

And can you be right about something without really trying?

而你可以不多加嘗試就對某事看法正確嗎？

Answers to these questions and more await you, as well as

以上疑問的解答以及更多內容都在等著你

cats!

還有貓咪！

[Theme Music]

主題曲

So you’ve heard this already: Philosophers love a good argument.

你剛剛就聽聞了：哲學家喜歡一場好的辯論

But you’ve figured out by now that philosophers argue in a different way than, like, kindergarten

但是你現在應該了解，哲學家爭執時不像幼稚園的孩子、

kids, or Internet trolls, or other people who confuse “arguing” with sniping back

網路酸民、或是把「爭論」跟來回互嗆互酸

and forth or just thinking up witty comebacks.

搞混的人

Nope. Philosophers have all kinds of rhetorical devices at their disposal that they can use

不，哲學家的資料庫裡有各種修辭用來闡釋他們的想法

to advance an idea, or call into question the ideas of their interlocutors.

或是對他們的辯論者的想法提出質疑

So in order to hold your own in a philosophical debate, you’re gonna have to know the difference

為了在哲學辯論中站得住腳，你必須了解兩個不同

between two things that sound like exactly the same thing: an assertion, and a proposition.

但是聽起來完全一樣的東西：聲明和主張

And you’ll need to be able to tell whether someone actually knows what they’re talking

你也必須能夠分辨一個人是真的了解自己在說什麼

about, or if they just believe what they’re saying might be true.

或是只是相信自己所說的也許是對的

For example: The sentence I’m saying right now is an assertion. An assertion is a linguistic

例如：我現在說的句子是一個聲明，是一個言語上的動作

act – either spoken or written – that has a truth value. And despite what it might

不管是口說或是筆寫，它有真假值，而先不管他聽起來如何

sound like, truth value isn’t a measure of how right something is. It’s just the

真假值並不是衡量一件事有多正確

state of being either true, or false, or indeterminate. All declarative sentences have truth values.

而是一種真、假、或是不確定的狀態，所有宣告句都有真假值

Declarations that assert something about the past or present are either true or false.

聲明過去或現在事情的宣告不是真的就是假的

And assertions about the future are indeterminate, at least when they’re expressed, because

而關於未來的聲明是不確定的，至少在他們表達時是如此

no one knows if they’re right or not yet.

因為還沒有人知道這是對的還是錯的

For example, I’m gonna assert that “This cat will pee on my desk before the end of the show.”

例如，我要聲明「這隻貓會在這個節目結束前尿在我的桌子上」

That assertion has a truth value, but it’s indeterminate, because the show’s not over yet.

這個聲明有真假值，但是是不確定的，因為這個節目還沒結束

We’re just gonna have to wait and see.

我們只能等著看

Now, all of this contrasts with other kinds of linguistic acts, like questions, which don’t assert anything.

以上這些相較於其他語言行為，如提問便並不聲明任何事物

“This is a cat” is an assertion, as opposed to “Is that a cat?,” which is a linguistic

「這是一隻貓」是個聲明，而相反的「這是一隻貓嗎？」則是一個語言上的行為

act, but not an assertion.

但不是一個聲明

But the substance of what you assert has a name, too.

而你所聲明的東西也有個名字

The content of your assertion is your proposition. It’s the underlying meaning of what you’re saying.

你所聲明的內容就是你的主張，是你所言之物內含的意義

So even though an assertion itself can change, depending on say, what language it’s spoken

所以即使聲明本身可能因為所使用的語言而有所不同

in, its meaning doesn’t change just because its outer packaging does.

它所代表的意義並不因此而改變

Like, “This is a cat” and “Este es un gato,” both assert the same proposition.

例如，「這是一隻貓（英文）」和「這是一隻貓（西班牙文）」，兩者都在聲明相同的主張

And a proposition is true if it asserts a claim that corresponds to reality.

而主張則因為聲明與事實相符而真實

The proposition when I assert “This is a cat,” is true if the object of the “this”

如果我聲明的「這」事實上就是貓，那麼「這是一隻貓」的主張就是真的

is in fact a cat, and false if it is anything other than a cat. Like, “This is a cat.”

相反的，如果「這」是指其他東西，那麼主張就是假的，例如，「這是一隻貓」

It’s worth pointing out that attitude counts, too, when you’re asserting something.

值得一提的是，態度在你聲明的時候也是關鍵因素

A speaker’s mental state toward the proposition they’re making is their propositional attitude.

發言者對於他們所做的主張的心理狀態就是命題態度

If I say, like, “This is a cat,” but I actually believe it to be a rat and I’m

像是當我說「這是一隻貓」，但是我其實認為這是隻老鼠而故意要搞混你

trying to fool you, then philosophers would say that I have a propositional attitude of disbelief.

哲學家會說我這是懷疑的命題態度

Whereas, if I think I’m speaking truthfully, I have a propositional attitude of belief.

相反的，如果我誠心地在講話，我就有相信的命題態度

And of course, you’re not going to get very far as a philosopher unless you understand

當然，除非你了解「相信」本身的精髓定義，否則你無法

the classic definition of belief itself. Based on the lingo you’ve learned so far today,

像哲學家那般深入，單就你今天所學的這些來解釋的話

belief is just when you take a propositional attitude of truth.

「相信」就是當你持真實的命題態度

I believe that this is a cat, if I think it’s true – that is, if my attitude is that the

我相信這裡有一隻貓，而我也認為這是真的，也就是說我認為

assertion corresponds to reality. And even if I’m wrong -- even if there were an aardvark

這個聲明與事實相符，就算我是錯的、就算我的桌上是一隻土豬

on my desk, or if there weren’t a cat on my desk at all, which there isn’t anymore

或甚至我桌上根本沒有任何貓，就像現在這樣

-- if I really thought there was a cat on my desk, that would just be my belief.

如果我真的認為桌子上有一隻貓，那也就是我的信念

My propositional attitude, in other words, is what determines if I have a belief.

我的命題態度，換而言之，依據我的信念而決定

What all this means is that I, like everyone else, can have false beliefs. Simply thinking

這代表著我（如同其他人一般）可能會有錯誤的看法，簡單來說

something doesn’t make it correspond to reality, which is what’s needed for truth.

就是某件事並沒有和事實相符，而這乃是「真實」的必要條件

But of course, the fun of arguing is showing off what you know to other people, or at least

但是當然，爭論最好玩的地方就是向他人展現你知道什麼

producing really clever evidence to support your case.

或至少生出能夠支持你的論點的絕妙證據

So, this raises the question of what it means to actually know something, in the philosophical sense.

以哲學的觀點來說，這就提升了真的「知道」某事物的意義了

The traditional definition of knowledge is that it’s a justified true belief.

傳統對「知」的定義是「經過釐清的對的信念」

Note that there are three separate components here.

注意到這是由三個分別的元素所組成的

So, I have knowledge that this is a cat if: I first believe i’s a cat

如果我有關於這是一隻貓的認知：首先我相信這是一隻貓

And also that it is in fact a cat – that is, my belief corresponds to reality and is

而這也確實是一隻貓，也就是說，我所相信的和現實相符

therefore true. And finally, I can be said to have knowledge about this cat if my belief

因此這是真的，而最後，如果我的信念被釐清了，就可以說我有這個「認知」

is justified – meaning, I have some sort of legitimate evidence to support my belief.

意思是，我以一些確實的證據來支持我的信念

Now, we’ve already defined truth and belief. Justification is simply evidence, or other

我們已經定義了「真實」和「信念」，「釐清」單純只是對你的信念的證據或是其他支持

support, for your belief. If you remember back to episode 2, you’ll recall that premises

如果你還記得我們第二集談的，我們說「假定」可以釐清結論

offer justification for conclusions. And justification can come in a variety of forms. Most often,

而「釐清」可以有很多種不同的形式

it comes about through testimony – just taking someone’s word for it. Not all testimony

最常見的就是證詞：直接使用他人的說詞

is strong, or trustworthy, of course. But if it comes from someone who’s an expert

當然，並非所有證詞都很合理或可信，但是如果是由

on the topic in question, you might consider the testimony to be reliable.

該問題領域的專家所說，你也許就會認為他的證詞是可靠的

And the fact is, most of what you know about the world, you learned through testimony.

事實上，你對這個世界大部分的認知都是來自「證詞」

You took your teachers’ word for it when they were teaching you stuff, and the same

你相信老師所教你的東西

goes for every book you’ve ever read and every news report you’ve ever seen. They’re

對於你讀過的所有書本內容和新聞報導也是如此

all just forms of testimony, which you accepted as justification for your knowledge, and your beliefs.

他們都只是各種形式的證詞，而你都將他們接收成為你的知識和信念的釐清

But justification can come in other forms, too. Another common type is first person observation

但是「釐清」也有其他形式，另一種常見的是「第一人稱觀察」：

– information you acquire through your senses.

由你的感官所獲得的資訊

If I believe that a cat is a cat, because I already have robust and well-informed beliefs

如果我相信這是一隻貓，那是因為我原本對貓咪就有健全且充分瞭解的信念

about cats, then, having had extensive experience with them in the past, I’m identifying the

接著，藉由過去對貓咪廣泛的經驗，我透過

cat as a cat through my direct contact with it

直接與它接觸來認定這是一隻貓

It looks, feels, acts like a cat. Ergo: cat!

它看起來、摸起來、行為都像貓，因此：是貓咪！

But! Philosophy wouldn’t be any fun if the key to knowledge were that easy, right?

但是！如果「認知」的關鍵如此簡單，哲學就不會這麼有趣了，對吧？

Until American philosopher Edmund Gettier came along in the 1960s, philosophers were

在1960年代、美國哲學家埃德蒙·葛梯爾出現前

in pretty widespread agreement about the definition of knowledge -- that it’s justified true belief.

哲學家普遍同意對於「認知」的定義：就是經過釐清的對的信念

Because, you can believe any old thing, but in order to know something, it just makes

因為你可以相信任何事物，但是若要「知道」它

sense that you must also have evidence for your belief, and it must be true. In other

可想而知，就要有證據支持你的信念，而且證據必須是對的

words, you can have a false belief, but you can’t have false knowledge. And if something

也就是說，你可能有錯的信念，但是你不可能有錯誤認知

you thought you knew turns out not to be true, then the fact is, you never actually knew it, you just believed it.

而如果你以為你知道的事物事實上是錯的，那麼你其實從來沒有「知道」過，你只是「相信」而已

And likewise, you might happen to hold a true belief, but if you don’t have any justification for it, if you

同樣的，有時候你也許剛好有對的信念，但是你無法釐清它

just accidentally happened to be right, which happens sometimes – that doesn’t count as knowledge, either.

那麼你也只是剛好正確，而這也不算「知道」

Enter Edmund Gettier. Gettier wrote a short but fabulously influential paper that turned

開始談埃德蒙·葛梯爾，他寫了一篇簡短但是影響力十足的論文

the standard understanding of knowledge upside down.

大大地改變了對於「認知」的標準理解

He did this by proposing what came to be known as Gettier cases – situations in which one

他提出了著名的葛梯爾案例：一個人可以有經過釐清的對的信念

can have justified true belief, but not knowledge.

但是並非「認知」的狀況

Which brings us to this week’s Flash Philosophy! Let’s go to the Thought Bubble.

讓我們來看這週的速食哲學！來看看思考泡泡

Here’s one of Gettier’s original cases. Smith and Jones have both applied for the same job.

這是葛梯爾其中一個原始案例，Smith和Jones同時應徵同個工做

The president of the company told Smith that Jones will get the job. This counts as evidence;

公司的老闆告訴Smith，Jones會得到這份工作。這算是證據

the president of the company would seem to be a reliable source of this information.

公司的老闆看起來是這個資訊的可靠來源

Meanwhile, Smith counts the coins in Jones’ pocket and sees that there are

同一時間，Smith數了Jones口袋裡的零錢，發現裡面有10個銅板

ten coins in there. Smith then forms a belief, based on his first person observational evidence

Smith這時依據自己對於銅板的第一人稱觀察

of the coins, as well as the testimony of the company president.

再加上公司老闆的證詞而有了一個信念

He comes to believe that: The person who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket.

他因此相信：得到這份工作的人口袋裡有10個銅板

But, it turns out, the testimony of the president was false, and it’s Smith, not Jones, who gets the job.

但是事實上，公司老闆的證詞是錯的，其實是Smith得到工作，而非Jones

AND, it just so happens, unbeknownst to Smith, that he also has 10 coins in his own pocket.

而且就這麼剛好，Smith不知道他自己的口袋裡也有10個銅板

So, Smith has a belief – that the person who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket.

因此Smith就有了個信念：得到工作的人口袋裡會有10個銅板

And that is justified – because he counted Jones’ coins, and the president told him

而且這是被釐清的：因為他數了Jones的零錢，而且老闆告訴他

Jones was getting the job. And his belief also turns out to be true – the person who

Jones會得到這份工作，而他的信念也是對的：

got the job did have 10 coins in his pocket.

得到工作的人口袋裡會有10個銅板

However, neither pieces of justification actually pointed Smith to the right answer. The president’s

但是沒有任何一個「釐清」給了Smith正確的答案

testimony was wrong, and the 10 coins that he saw were in Jones’ pocket, not his own.

老闆的說詞是錯的，而那10個銅板是在Jones口袋裡發現的，而非自己的口袋

So it seems Smith simply lucked into being right.

所以看來Smith只是剛好是對的

Gettier argued that we now have a case of justified true belief that is not knowledge.

葛梯爾說這就是一個經過釐清的對的信念但不是認知的案例

As he pointed out, you don’t KNOW something if you simply stumbled into the right answer.

他指出，如果你只是剛好得到對的答案，就不算「知道」某件事物

Thanks Thought Bubble, the philosophical world was turned upside down by this idea, and philosophers

感謝思考泡泡，哲學世界因為這個想法而有了巨大的改變

– loving a good counterexample – began generating their own Gettier cases.

而喜歡完美反例的哲學家便開始提出他們自己的葛梯爾案例

American philosopher Roderick Chisholm proposed this one:

美國哲學家羅德里克·奇澤姆提出了這個：

Looking across a field, you see an object that looks like a sheep, and you form the

往一片平原看去，你看見了一個像綿羊的物體，因此你有了

belief that “there is a sheep in the field.”

「平原上有一隻綿羊」的信念

It turns out that the object you see is actually a dog.

結果你看到的物體其實是一隻狗

Yet, there is also a sheep, obscured from your vision by a hill.

但其實那裡真的有一隻綿羊，只是山坡遮蔽了你的視線

So, you have a justified true belief, but the justification for your belief -- the object

因此你得到了一個釐清過的真的信念，但是你的信念的「釐清」（那個你看到的物體）

that you saw – is not a sheep. You just lucked into being right.

其實不是一隻綿羊，你只是剛好猜對了

Once you understand how it works, it’s pretty easy to generate Gettier cases of your own.

一旦你了解這是如何運作的，很容易就可以提出你自己的葛梯爾案例

And many philosophers today think that Gettier successfully destroyed the “justified true belief” definition of knowledge.

如今許多哲學家認為葛梯爾成功推翻了對「認知」的定義，「經過釐清的真的信念」

But even though the 1960s might seem long ago to you, remember: philosophers are in

即使1960年代對你來說也許是很久以前，但是記得：

the business of having millennia-long debates about stuff. So it shouldn’t surprise you

哲學家的工作就是進行關於事物、為期千年的辯論

that the philosophical debate about this is still a-raging.

所以這個哲學辯論如今仍未停歇應該不意外

But if knowledge is not justified true belief, then…whaaat is it?

但是如果「知」並不是經過釐清的真的信念，那麼...是什麼？

Next time, we will look at one possible answer.

下次，我們要來看看一個可能的答案

In the meantime, you learned about some of the key concepts we use when discussing belief

同時，你學到一些我們在討論信念和認知時

and knowledge. You learned what defines an assertion and a proposition, and that belief

會用到的關鍵概念，你學到聲明和主張的定義

is a kind of propositional attitude. We also learned about forms of justification and the

以及「信念」是一種命題態度，我們也學到各種形式的釐清

traditional definition of knowledge, which Edmund Gettier just totally messed with, using his Gettier cases.

以及認知的傳統定義，就是埃德蒙·葛梯爾用他的葛梯爾案例推翻的那個

And the cat did not pee on my desk! Because the cat was unable to spend any time at all

而且這隻貓沒有在我的桌上尿尿！因為這隻貓根本沒辦法在桌上待太久

on my desk. So it turns out the assertion that I made was false.

所以我之前做的聲明是錯的

But it is a true assertion that this episode was brought to you by Squarespace. Squarespace

但是關於這集是由Squarespace提供的聲明是真的

helps to create websites, blogs or online stores for you and your ideas. Websites look

Squarespace協助為你和你的想法架設網站、部落格、或是線上商店

professionally designed regardless of skill level, no coding required. Try Squarespace

網站不需要高技巧就看起來像專業設計的，不需要寫程式

at squarespace {dot com} {forward slash} crash course for a special offer.

去squarespace.com/crashcourse試試看有優惠的Squarespace吧

Crash Course Philosophy is produced in association with PBS Digital Studios. You can head over

哲學速成班由PBS數位工作室協助製作

to their channel to check out amazing shows like Game/Show, The Chatterbox, and Physics Girl

你可以到他們的頻道看看超棒的節目像是Game/Show、The Chatterbox和Physics Girl

This episode of Crash Course was filmed in the Doctor Cheryl C. Kinney Crash Course Studio

這集的哲學速成班由Doctor Cheryl C. Kinney速成班工作室

with the help of these awesome people and our equally fantastic graphics team is Thought Cafe.

以及這些超棒的人拍攝的，而我們的高品質、優質動畫團隊是Thought Cafe